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A CKNO WLEDG EMENTS 
"To the gods I owe good grandparents, good parents, a good sister, and teachers, 
kinsmen, and friends good almost without exception; and that I never fell out with any of 
them, in spite of a temperament that could very well have precipitated something of the 
sort, had not circumstances providentially never combined to put me to the proof" (Marcus 
Aurelius 1964:1.17). In the course of writing this book, I discovered that others must at 
times have had the same ideas, though they expressed them with more clarity and 
consistency than I could ever hope to do. The discovery was far from disappointing. It felt 
like wandering through the countless treasure chambers of mankind's collective memory. 
Somewhere on one of these trips I stumbled on the lines quoted above, once more finding 
phrases superior to anything I could write: they are short, precise, and sincere. All I can 
add to them is that my feelings of thankfulness for the patience shown and support given 
by my family, friends and teachers are perhaps too passionate for words. 
Many others have helped me in one way or another to write this book. Their 
comments on drafts and chapters often obliged me to make revisions in the whole text. I 
find it impossible to determine the precise limits of their influence; all of them influenced 
all of it, I think. To those whom I may forget to mention I apologize in advance. My 
thanks are due, first of all, to Ad van Deernen, Rob Gilsing, Bob Goodin, Steven 
Hartkamp, Cor van Monlfort. Paul Nieuwenburg, Ewoul Ossewold, Larry Temkin, as well 
as to the participants in "de Kleine Kring", in the green politics workshop at the 1991 
ECPR Joint Sessions in Essex, in the political theory workshop of the 1992 conference of 
the Dutch Political Science Association (especially Bob Lieshout) and in the Polybios 
workshop on political theory at the University of Leiden in January 1994. I owe special 
thanks to Mark Bovens, without whose repeated warnings against focusing on particulars 
and technicalities this book would never even have been "an outline of a theory" but at 
best "an outline of a detail". For the ideas all these people shared with me, for the efforts 
they made to read my miserable first drafts and hopefully belter later versions, and for the 
friendship and pleasure they gave me I owe them at least these words. For the same and 
other reasons, I owe the same and lois more to Marin Terpstra and Andy Dobson. (In this 
context, I should also mention that I am grateful to NWO, who was kind enough to 
finance a most fruitful trip to Andy Dobson in 1994.) Of course, each and every one of 
my critics occasionally tried to show me the errors of my way, but I tend to be mulish at 
limes. The responsibility for misinterpretations, mistakes and other misdemeanours in this 
text must therefore be mine and mine alone. 
Thirdly, I am indebted to my colleagues at the department of political science in 
general, and to Carmelita Parisius in particular, for creating the atmosphere in which I -
we all - could work. It has always been an honour, often an immense pleasure, and never 
a curse, to work and break bread with them. 
Ultimately, the Dutch tax-payers were responsible for keeping me off the streets, 
alive, and at work. A few months before my grandmother died, I told her I had been 
offered a job at this university. She asked me what exactly I was going to do, and to keep 
it simple, I answered "I'm going to write a book". Her answer: "Yes, but what are you 
going to doT Like many others, she could not understand why writing a book would be 
paid. I am not sure even I do, but I am thankful to the tax-payers for their tolerance.1 
The idea of aknowlcdglng a debt to the lax-payers Is not mine, but Dart Drlessen's. In his dissertation 
Van Utopie naar Anarchie (1990. in), he thanked them for spending their tax money on him I doubl if the tax-
payer voluntarily supported me (or him), but it lies well wimin their power to prevent a government from 
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Finally, there are three people to whom I owe more than "just" all kinds of 
friendship and support. One of them is the man who supervised my research, taught me 
how to teach, often corrected my Englisch, and introduced me to the secret world of 
university politics: Grahame Lock. Apart from being a merry, funny and caring person, I 
found that he was the best supervisor I could have wished for. He never lost track of what 
I was doing, never missed an opportunity to point out where I lost track myself, and was 
always able to enrich my ideas even (hough he did not agree with all of them. He 
typically leaves people all the intellectual freedom desirable, a practice which allowed me 
and, I think, at least induced others, to complete a thesis on time. "This clearly shows that 
we learn better in a free spirit of curiosity than under fear and compulsion" (St Augustine, 
1986: 35). Working with and for Grahame has been a wonderful and positive experience. 
A good friend is one with whom you can drink, think, and wink. Martin van Hees 
and I drank a lot together, not to mention the other small pleasures of life we shared, like 
tobacco, music, good talks, and half a year of intensive correspondence while he worked 
in the United States. We also used one another to discuss and test unfinished, imperfect 
and wild theories which we did not dare unveil to others. I doubt if he realizes how much 
I enjoyed those debates, how much I benefitted from them, or how fascinated I am by the 
sheer beauty of his work. Finally, we wink. After some time, we understood one another 
well enough to occasionally replace language by body language. In so far as the content of 
this book is concerned, I probably owe more to him than to anyone else. I have tried and 
still try to repay him in the same manner, but I cannot do so to the same degree. I owe 
him even more for things other than ideas - and I wish I knew how to thank him for 
those. 
For nearly three years, Masja Nas and I shared a room and a computer. To make a 
long story short, we also shared telephone calls, visitors, computer games, books, interests, 
thoughts, trips, teaching, grief, anger, pleasure, quarrels, germs, illness, gossip, dirty jokes, 
cigarettes, diners, recipes, talks till dawn, a lot of alcohol, hangovers, the histories of our 
lives, and innumerable other small and great things. It would be an insult to merely thank 
her as a colleague for all her support and advice, or for the many opportunities she offered 
me to help her, small and inadequate as my contributions to her work must needs be. 
However much these last things meant to me, she has been much more than a colleague. 
She has made a difference. 
In this best of all possible worlds, I have been remarkably fortunate. I wish to 
dedicate this book to some of the people who contributed most to that fortune: two whom 
I love, my parents Ria Polman and Co Wissenburg; one whom I love and miss, my sister 
Astrid Wissenburg in Glasgow; and two whom I love and shall dearly miss, Martin van 
Hees and Masja Nas. 
Nijmegen, June 1994 
throwing money at projects like mine - a power they did not exercise. 
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PART I: THE LIBERAL IDEA OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
"There is no agreement on the divisions of justice." 
Samuel Putendoli (1991: 31) 

CHAPTER 1: THE MEANING OF "SOCIAL JUSTICE" 
Section 1 : An introduction to book, chapter and verse 
One reason why we lives in states and societies is that there is no escape. We are 
bom into them, we do not choose them or create them. Rather, they design us and our 
desires, needs, habits and customs; our own contribution as private persons to their make-
up is negligible. We are in chains from the very first moment of our existence - even 
though by nature we may be free. "L'homme est né libre et partout il est dans les fers"? 
Only through collective action can we change state and society. A second reason is the 
one Hobbes gave: to escape a state of universal warfare. We are not angels and we do not 
expect our fellow humans to be angels; we need chains to protect ourselves. But, as recent 
events in Somalia and former Yugoslavia underlined, the bare fact of the existence of a 
state is not enough to warrant its preservation. It requires our active support, to give this 
support we in turn need good reasons, and one of these many good reasons can be justice. 
If there is any legitimacy to the state, or in the words of Augustine of Hippo, if there is 
any relevant difference between the state and a band of robbers - it must be justice. 
This book deals with distributive social justice, more specifically with the recent 
debate in political philosophy and political theory about the two questions central to this 
problem: how should we distribute the benefits and burdens, the joys and bores, of 
society?, and why should we accept these distribution rules7 Both are traditional questions 
in political philosophy, but, assuming that political philosophy is not, they are also very 
practical. A society cannot function without some support of its members, or at the very 
least without the absence of resistance on their side. The perception of distributive 
injustice in the societies of which we are members and citizens frequently leads to such 
resistance. Tax evasion, for instance, is not always inspired by pure egoism. Sometimes, as 
in the United Kingdom in Poll Tax times or in the Italy of the Mani Pulite ("clean hands") 
campaign, a refusal to pay is legitimized as a form of resistance against a government that 
misuses its legitimate share of the social product, that unfairly redistributes it, or that 
burdens the tax-payers in an unfair way. On occasion, the legitimacy of taxing itself is 
denied by objectors who feel that the money is theirs and no one else's to spend. Tax 
evasion is still a relatively innocent example; there is not a day that the papers do not 
relate of violent struggles about the proper distribution of power, freedom, opportunity, 
welfare, or plain food in societies near and far. 
Before anything else is said, the reader should have some idea of what is meant by 
a distribution problem. Imagine eight persons trying to divide one pie of which they all 
want a quarter. There are four types of solution to this problem. Three of these are what I 
call supply-side solutions: one could simply exclude at least four persons, one could 
change the preferences of at least four persons, or one could bake a second pie. Supply-
side solutions are not necessarily illegitimate or immoral but they do not solve the 
distribution question. They only displace it. Following a supply-side strategy creates other 
distributive questions: who and how many should be excluded, and why?; Whose 
preferences should be changed, in which direction, and why?; Why should all eight get a 
quarter of a pie - do they equally deserve it? The pure distribution problem, then, is that 
of distributing benefits or burdens without changing the parameters: one pie and eight 
"Man Is born free; and everywhere he is In chains": Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Coniracl (1973: 
165). 
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people claiming a quarter of it. Within these limits, the theorist of distributive justice tries 
to find morally acceptable rules for the division of the social pie. 
This book is, furthermore, concerned mainly with the quest for an impartial theory 
of distributive justice. This means that we do not just want distribution rules to be applied 
impartially - we also want the rules themselves to be impartial: whether some situation 
should be seen as beneficial or undesirable should be determined impartially, the way in 
which it is to be treated should be determined impartially, and the rules for these two 
judgements should be chosen under conditions of impartiality. 
Though this is a book about political theory, written by a political theorist, it is not 
just interesting to the initiated, the theorists of social justice, only. It may be as interesting 
as the whole debate on justice itself is to political philosophers on the one hand, to 
economists, jurists, political scientists, sociologists, and social psychologists on the other. 
Philosophers, in particular continental philosophers, sometimes complain about a lack of 
philosophical rigour in the debate. I think this is a misunderstanding, but even if it was 
not, such a deficiency should be seen as an invitation to join in rather than as an excuse 
for expressing disapproval. I hope to come some way towards opening the debate to these 
less interested philosophers by exposing the philosophical foundations of the debate where 
this is expedient, and by linking its political themes to traditional and new philosophical 
questions. Empirical social scientists often voice a diametrically opposed complaint: the 
debate would be too theoretical, too abstract, and unrealistic. I can do little about this -
just two things. In the first place, I can and do claim that the debate, like any other debate, 
empirical or not, should be judged on its own terms, terms which I hope to elucidate. The 
justice debate in political theory should not be understood first and foremost as a 
contribution to progress in empirical sciences. It is a debate about the just society, 
interpreting the world from its own point of view. Secondly, though I cannot elude the 
trait that gives political theory a bad name to some (i.e., its being theoretical), by invoking 
more of the far from transparent conditions of the so-called real world, I at least want to 
raise its relevance for the reflection on the moral foundations of modern states and 
societies, whether they are liberal democratic or not. Which, by the way, makes this book 
worth while for anyone who is Interested in the well-being of his or her3 society. 
The debate to which I referred above focuses on the idea and content of a liberal 
theory of social justice, a theory to which the notion of impartiality regarding the 
individual's conception of a good life is central. It has found its classical expression in 
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), the book that set the agenda for the ensuing 
debate and for my own contribution to it. In this first part I shall give a rational recon-
struction of the debate, i.e., a description of the ethical and ontological premises from 
which it starts out, the themes around which it centres, and the specific definition of social 
justice participants in it apply. In the second and third parts of the book I shall enter the 
debate by developing a new theory of justice, based on an (also new) interpretation of 
impartiality. 
I do not follow any strict policy of political (in)correctness as regards the sex of in this book. Rather 
than fully neglecting the existence of women (as in "the average citizen ... he ...") or that of men ("the citizen ... 
she ..."), I have allowed chance to rule the sexes in (his book: at times I refer to "he", at others to "she", to both, 
or to neither. 
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Part I is divided into two chapters, conveniently numbered 1 and 2. Defining the 
subject area of this book, the first chapter must unfortunately be rather taxonomical. In 
fact, a critic of an earlier draft insinuated that it was "boringly taxonomie", and he was 
probably right - at the time. The chapter discusses the liberal conception of social justice 
as distinct from other approaches to morality in general and to justice in particular, while 
focusing mainly on what the term "social justice" means to liberal theorists of justice. I 
shall start by asking whether there is any use in talking about meanings at all (section 2) 
and answer this positively. In section 3, I try to draw some borders between justice and 
related concepts like the right, the good, and the rational, and between justice and other 
criteria for a moral evaluation of states. Section 4 introduces the most important classical 
types of justice: distributive, general, and commutative justice, and others. Theorists of 
liberal social justice implicitly, and some outsiders like Ewald (Ewald 1984: 550-552) 
explicitly, suppose that social justice is a matter of distributive justice. Contrary to this 
popular view, we shall see in section 5 that other views also exist: a Thomistic approach, 
according to which social justice is in fact general justice, and a Utopian Marxist approach, 
in which distributive and general justice are equally important. Section 6 is etymological 
rather than taxonomical. It addresses the connections between the debate on the liberal 
theory of justice on the one hand, and its social and scientific surroundings on the other. I 
end in section 7 with an apology of the liberal interpretation of justice. 
The chapter results in a tentative characterization of liberal social justice. On the 
surface, it looks as if theorists of liberal social justice have little in common. Politically, 
they are liberals, social liberals, social democrats, socialists, anarchists, libertarians, or 
even apparently uninterested in politics. Themalically, they deal with the nature of the self, 
incentives and taxation, abortion, deontology and consequenlialism, natural and animal 
rights, and so forth. Taxonomically, the only thing they seem to agree about is a vague 
description of their field of study: justice in society. Yet on a deeper level they turn out to 
have something more in common. Their main point of discussion is distributive justice, 
i.e., the question how society should divide its goods and bads among its members, rather 
than commutative and general justice. They also share a series of for the greater part 
typically liberal ethical axioms, which centre around the idea of impartiality. And finally, 
they are concerned with the abstract concept of justice, ideal justice, rather than with 
practical applications - even if practical dilemmas are invoked in arguments. 
Chapter 2 examines the notions that give the liberal theory of justice its specifically 
liberal character: impartiality and the ethical axioms associated with impartiality, notably 
liberty, equality, fraternity, neutrality, rationality, fairness, and suum cuique tribuere 
(giving each his due). The aim of that chapter is to establish the existence of a kind of 
family resemblance between, or even of a paradigmatica! structure below, this collection 
of so diverse theories of justice that have been developed in the last twenty-odd years. 
This structure will, in tum, serve as a guideline in the development of my own theory in 
Parts II and III. 
As for these latter parts, I shall refrain from giving a detailed description of their 
contents here, and instead restrict myself to a superficial sketch of the argument. 
The questions central to those parts are the ones central to the whole debate on 
social justice: how should goods and freedoms be distributed over a society?, and why 
should we accept the distribution rules? For very simple and quite frustrating logistical 
reasons (lime, space, and money), I have not been able to deal separately with the issue 
that immediately follows the formulation and defence of principles of justice: what should 
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people do, or refrain from doing, to protect and support (their principles of) justice? 
Nevertheless I tried to rise to the occasion where the occasion arose, in particular when 
discussing communitarian justice at the beginning of Part II and at the end of Part III. 
A few lines ago, I referred to the paradigmatica! structure of the debate. Part of 
this structure is the presupposition that rules or principles of justice can only be accepted 
as morally valid if they are both impartial and chosen under conditions of impartiality. 
Consequently, we can formulate two provisional research questions: (1) how is an 
impartial choice of principles of justice possible?, and (2) what should these principles be? 
I shall answer these questions in the same order, the first in Part II and the second in Part 
III, for the simple reason that one cannot justify principles without knowing what 
justification requires. 
Part II discusses justification procedures and in particular the possibility of defining 
and defending an Archimedean point (in John Rawls's terminology, or archpoint in mine), 
a universally valid procedure for designing and sustaining equally universal principles of 
justice. For reasons explained there, I shall opt for the contract theory model as being 
most consistent with the idea of impartiality. In the contract model I use, principles of 
justice are justified by the consent of disinterested individuals who are well-informed in 
general, but who need not be too well-informed about their own lives. To those acquainted 
with Rawls's theory, this must sound familiar. Despite superficial similarities however, 
there are important differences both in the shape of this archpoint and the assumptions 
behind it. The archpoint must be seen as a reaction to the shortcomings that (mostly) 
others detected in comparable constructions. I designed it, in particular, to meet the two 
most important lines of critique brought in against Rawls's and other modern liberal 
theories of justice. 
On the one hand, liberal theorists of justice, in particular Rawls, have been accused 
of not being impartial (universalistic) enough. Their theories would be based on too 
"substantial" assumptions about what matters to and about an individual, by presuming the 
universality of values that are typical of modem Western societies if not of the still 
smaller group of genuine liberals living in those societies. On the other hand, they have 
been criticized by communitarian theorists for being far too universalistic (impartial). In 
the first place, liberals would build their theories on an inadequate representation of the 
individual. By separating the self from its social context and moral convictions for the 
purpose of creating an impartial individual, they disregard the social construction of the 
self, as well as the strong identification of the self with its convictions. One cannot strip 
oneself of one's heritage (even if we could be conscious of all our judgements and 
prejudices) - not without losing everything that defines individuality. Consequently, liberal 
theories cannot convince "real" individuals as these will not (want to) recognize them-
selves in such morally neutered creatures. Secondly and more basically, the demand that 
individuals be impartial will result in moral impotence. No goals or aims of individuals 
and no ideals of society can ever be justified, nor any moral community sustained, if the 
highest moral principle, impartiality, demands that all other principles be considered 
culturally specific, and hence coincidental and unjustifiable. For the sake of completeness, 
I should point out that this last objection is also supported by some liberals (e.g. William 
Galston and Joseph Raz), who understand it as a lack of room for perfectionism. 
The answer I propose to these charges (in sofar as justified) is, firstly, to admit that 
there are indeed limits to the evaluative potential of justice as impartiality, but that this 
need not conflict with a communitarian view of justice. Basically, impartial principles of 
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justice put limits to the validity of communitarian views on morality. If we value 
impartiality (and I argue that we do, or at least ought to), then we must accept that there 
are certain things people should do or should not do, regardless of their personal convic-
tions and regardless of whatever consensus on morality may exist in their communities. 
On the other hand, anything goes within these limits. Beyond the emphasis it puts on 
respect for basic human values and human dignity, the notion of impartiality has little 
evaluative potential. It thus leaves room for any kind of consensus, compromise, discourse, 
and conflict about principles that are typical for their specific time, place, and culture. 
Secondly, I shall submit a more impartial alternative to the existing accounts of 
moral relevancy and the human good which, as said above, have been criticized for 
containing too many contingent factors and thus for being too typical of liberals living in 
liberal societies to be called really impartial. The key notion in this alternative is that a 
liberal theory of justice should be impartial towards certain basic reasons for behaviour 
rather than towards any list of social goods or moral ends, the last being destined to be 
socially or culturally determined. These basic reasons, HIS-reasons (short for "Here I 
Stand, I can do no other"), bear a certain resemblance to virtues. They do not prescribe the 
goals or ends of human action, and are therefore independent from the contingent factors 
distinguishing particular societies. Instead, they merely indicate how one would want to 
act, what the quality of one's actions should be, regardless of circumstances. I call a 
person's set of HIS-reasons, for want of a better and less theological term, a plan of a 
"full" life. 
Having constructed an impartial archpoint, I shall turn to the description of a 
mclric of social justice consistent with this view of impartiality in Part III. The term 
metric is somewhat broader than "principles": a metric of social justice is a system of 
rules, measures, and variables, certified as just for a society, which together determine 
what should be distributed, by whom, to whom, in which proportions and on what 
grounds. What most distinguishes my metric from others are its definition of the subject of 
justice, society, and its radical distinction between two sorts of distributable goods, basic 
needs and further wants. 
Current theories of distributive justice usually start from a simple model of society: 
one slate, one shared language and history, one equally healthy and sane population, no 
intermediate levels of government, and no international trade, contact, or responsibilities. 
The only complicating factors are those within a population: differences in age, sex, 
colour, religion, or whatever. Once a distribution scheme has been designed for this 
relatively simple society, further complicating factors are added, preferably one at a time: 
children, embryos, disabled citizens, Nazis, Nietzscheans and other intolerant fundamental-
ists, future generations, animals, the Third World, and so forth. This is a very satisfactory 
method for designing consistent principles fitting an imaginary world, but that is not the 
world we live in. If, following Rawls, the theory of justice should give us criteria for 
evaluating the basic structure of society, the institutions distributing our fundamental rights 
and freedoms and determining the basis of our expectations concerning our future, we 
should at least give up the ideas that each person's basic structure is made up of only one 
political authority, the centralized nation-state, and that all citizens of the same state 
necessarily share the same basic structure. The necessary changes in this hypothesis being 
made, social justice can be brought back to its true proportion, that of a tentative general-
ization of the individual's "basic structures". 
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A second ivssue widely discussed in justice theory is that of the equalisandum. 
According to its formal definition, (distributive) justice requires that equals be treated 
equally and unequals in proportion to their inequality. Allocating shares in proportion to 
the relevant differences between individuals however requires an impartial yardstick by 
which to measure the value of shares, the so-called equalisandum. If the basic criterium of 
impartiality is to be respect for HIS-reasons and for the plan of a "full life" defined by 
them, measures like utility, desert, pure equality, or primary social goods will not qualify. 
Respect for HIS-reasons, I argue, can only be expressed adequately if basic needs, i.e., 
rights to the opportunities and external resources needed to practice one's HIS-reasons, are 
equally distributed - an equalisandum which I call equality of options. However, there is 
more to be distributed than conditional rights to basic needs and inalienable rights to the 
individual's internal resources needed for a full life. This remaining category of further 
wants cannot be measured in terms of options, as they are at most accessory to a full life. 
Their relevancy to the full life lies in their being the subject of social conflict and possibly 
the cause of the disruption of society, which by itself is inimical to a full life. 
Accordingly, and using "envy" as a pars pro toto label for all the sources of conflict, I 
shall claim that envy-containment is the best defensible impartial equalisandum for further 
wants. Such a formal criterium obviously leaves room enough for the culturally, historical-
ly and socially specific conventions that communitarians so zealously defend. 
Justice is a mean between too much and too little. If principles of justice are too 
precise, loo rigid, and too all-embracing, they risk being impractical or unconvincing. If 
they are too pragmatic and too sensitive to the whim of the people, they turn out to be too 
liberal even for liberalism, allowing the most horrid forms of exploitation and oppression. 
A mean between these two should have as much of the advantages of both as possible and 
as little of their disadvantages. The series of principles developed in Part III will, I expect, 
score high enough on the fist and low enough on the second scale: they are both rigid in 
demanding the satisfaction of the most fundamental human rights, and lenient in allowing 
societies to freely determine their own shape within the borders set out by impartiality. 
Section 2: Why talk about meanings? 
Social justice is a rather new term. One will not find references to it in the 
classical philosophical and political texts. After years of debate, there is still no real 
convention on its meaning. It seems then that energy spent on establishing an uncontrover-
sial interpretation of this term "social justice", or on related and equally contested terms, 
will be spent in vain. Even if a consensus existed, one could simply define terms at will 
and get on with the real job of criticizing old or deriving new principles. Unfortunately, 
such an axiomatic approach is ill fit for a contribution to an ongoing debate - as ill fit as 
any authoritarian claim to a unique meaning is. 
There are ultimately two options in a debate about the "truth" of the meanings 
given to politically controversial words: either one lakes a radically conventionalist stance, 
or one argues for realism. In the first case, words do not have any relation to objects in 
the real world of Platonic forms, let alone to the world of ashes and dust, except in sofar 
as they have been given a meaning, consciously or unconsciously, by one individual or by 
(parts of) a consenting language community. In all these cases, the meaning of a word 
depends solely on some form of convention. In a second case, words do have a true 
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meaning independent of any possible convention. This second option is a typically 
aggressive one: it is a very useful instrument to silence the discussion on a subject, or to 
steer it towards or frame it in specific political discourses - provided others accept such 
moves. An example of this line of thought will be discussed in Section 5, when I 
introduce Leo Shields's orthodox Thornislic interpretation of social justice. 
As I think that this second option results in a wordplay, I shall choose the first, 
i.e., conventionalism. What I call realism would imply that words could be used falsely, 
meaning that the idea ("meaning") is not adequate to the "facts". But the existence of 
"untrue" interpretations of a term is a fact as well - and not just a counterfaclual fantasy. 
Whatever we call il, a rose is a rose. Realism therefore is of no direct interest to under-
standing the actual meanings attached to words, even if it were the one and only true 
theory of meaning. 
A conventionalist attitude however can also have undesirable consequences - and 
this is where we meet the disadvantages of an axiomatic approach. Conventionalism may 
well induce equanimity and even a kind of solipsism. One may start to feel indifferent 
about "correct" meanings, or ultimately decide that everyone is Adam, i.e., that we can all 
name things according to the impulse of the moment. What you may call social justice for 
the next five minutes could be a telephone to me and animal magnetism to others. But 
obviously, any kind of disregard for both existing conventions and for the absence of 
conventions will obstruct the communication between reader and writer, as well as 
between the author and other contributors to the debate. In the first place, in order to 
contribute to a debate it must be clear what it is about: the vocabularies of others have to 
be described. Secondly, as a matter of convenience, a new contributor must somehow 
relate his own vocabulary to existing terminologies. One cannot comment on other 
opinions without somehow clarifying the terms one uses and without slicking to those 
definitions, especially if conventions are absent, and one can best comment by using terms 
according to their conventional meanings - if these exist. Thus, even a conventionalist has 
good reasons to elucidate the meanings of the words he uses, beginning with social justice 
itself - that is, if he is interested in communication at all. A moderately conventionalislic 
strategy of following custom where possible and inventing new meanings where necessary 
may not assure that we will be talking about the "things" terms like social justice really 
refer to, but it will at least allow us to talk about the same things. 
Section 3: Social justice and other virtues 
The natural thing to do, confronted with a vague or ambiguous concept like social 
justice, is ask what it means - or more precisely, to ask if there are any conventions on its 
meaning. Aristotle opened the fifth Book of his Nicomachean Ethics with the dullest of 
propositions, announcing his programme for a conceptual analysis: "With regard to justice 
and injustice we must consider (1) what kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what 
sort of mean justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate." 
(Aristotle 1980, 1959: 1129*1) These are some of the questions on which I shall touch 
here, albeit in relation to the liberal idea of social justice only. 
Let me start with the clearest distinction, the one between moral justice, the 
normative or evaluative concept, and legal justice, which is more or less synonymous with 
positive law. Ideally, legal justice would be fully compatible with moral justice. In 
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practice, laws are of course designed and applied with reference to moral justice as well as 
other criteria, which means that discrepancies between the two can and do arise. As from 
now, I shall use the term justice to refer to moral justice exclusively. 
The concept of (moral) justice is often used in connection with ideas like the good, 
the right, and morality. The connotations of these three terms differ from language to 
language, yet in most European languages there seems to be a certain convention on their 
hierarchy: what is good (German: das Gute, Dutch: het goede, French: le bien) is a 
broader concept than, and embraces, what is moral {die Moralität, de moraliteit, la 
moralité). The domain of justice (die Gerechtigkeit, de rechtvaardigheid, la justice) is in 
its tum more limited than that of morality. A fourth English term, right (as in "the right 
thing to do"), has no exact equivalents in German, Dutch, or French. The German noun 
Recht (Dutch: recht) refers to legal rather than moral justice, whereas the adjectives (in 
both languages variants of recht) also refer to "straight" or correct behaviour, correct 
reasoning, honesty, and rationality. The best French translation would be juste. In English 
it is used as an equivalent of rationality, justice or, most often, morality (cf. Frankena 
1962). 
A further complication is apparently inherent to philosophical texts: every author 
has his own taxonomy. Richard Brandt, in his A Theory of the Good and the Right 
(1979), tries to make sense of the idea of the good by tentatively interpreting it as 
rationality (Brandt 1979: 10). He uses this same concept to understand morality or the 
morally right (Brandt 1979: 163-4). Roughly, he understands goodness as that which is 
intrinsically desirable in general, whereas morality refers to the goodness of actions or 
social interaction in particular. For Brandt, justice is a more or less superfluous concept: it 
is merely an aspect of morality, namely that of a morally right distribution of good and 
evil (Brandt 1979: 306-7).4 John Rawls on the other hand defines the good as an individu-
al's conception of what is worthwhile, the right as principles of conduct consistent with 
justice, and justice as the acknowledgment by a society of certain principles that warrant 
the equality and liberty of citizens and the efficiency of society itself. Justice, in his view, 
has priority over the right, and the right has priority over the good (see e.g. Rawls 1971: 
30-32, 395-7). 
A thorough analysis of the philosophical uses of these three terms, good, right, and 
just, will probably support my thesis that at least some terminological consensus between 
Rawls, Brandt, and related theorists is possible. The terms can, I think, be described 
without denying the differences between individual definitions. For reasons of clarity then, 
I (provisionally) define the good or goodness as that which is valuable for an individual; 
the morally right or morality as that which is valuable in similar cases for any individual 
as a member of a society; and the just or justice as what is morally right in exchanges (of 
all kinds of goods and, in Orwell's words, ungoods) between, and distributions over, 
individuals in societies. "Society" must be read in a weak sense: it can include states and 
clans as well as any other kind of Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft. "Valuable" can have two 
meanings: that of subjective, perceived, value, as well as that of objective, actual, value, 
depending on the author and on his or her understanding of what objectivity and subjectiv-
ity in ethics are. Both of these terms will require further explanation once they are to be 
Brandt slam with the interpretation of "is unjust" as "Is prima facie morally wrong because It would 
produce an unequal distribution of good and evil" (cf. Brandt 1979: 307). to subsequently question the need for 
an equal distribution (Urandt 1979: 310 ff.). Ile does not thereby reject the concept of justice itself. 
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used as substantive parts of a new theory of justice, but the need to do so will not arise 
until we reach Parts II and II. 
Apart from the question of distinguishing justice from goodness and morality, there 
is another distinction to be made: one between justice and rationality. Although the two 
terms have different meanings in ordinary life and language (under circumstances it may 
be both rational and unjust to steal), in philosophy they are sometimes hard to separate. 
One of the sources of confusion is (radical) determinism, and in particular its basic 
assumption of the impossibility of more than one future, course of action, or "content" of 
the human will. In such theories the rational thing to do is the only thing one can possibly 
do, and consequently justice is either necessarily identical to rationality, or it is an empty 
phrase, referring to the impossible (fictional) world in which choices are possible. 
Fortunately for us, the theorists of distributive social justice are not radical determi-
nists. Yet some of them do identify justice and rationality, be it for other reasons -
Richard Brandt for instance. In his view, principles of justice are part of the social moral 
code that would be chosen by perfectly rational people (Brandt 1979: 308), people who 
have tested and if necessary revised their desires and wants on a rational basis. In this 
context, rationality consists of two demands: firstly, that one considers all relevant options 
and possible outcomes of action as well as possible future desires, and secondly and most 
of all, that one goes through a process of what Brandt calls cognitive psychotherapy. In 
this process of value-free reflection, desires are confronted with all relevant available 
information, to be adapted or "de-conditioned" (in sofar as they are not innate and 
unchangeable) if they turn out to be indefensible (cf. Brandt 1979: 113 ff.). In short, a 
rational person has no desires that contradict known empirical facts. Rather than eliminat-
ing the differences between justice and rationality, Brandt thereby unintentionally 
illuminates them. The idea of justice is not value-free. Whereas justice is based on desires 
or principles we should (positively) have and cherish, (Brandtian) rationality is only 
concerned (negatively) with determining which desires we should not have, provided that 
we ought to reject counterfactual desires. Yet even that is an open question: the desire for 
some kind of heaven on earth is clearly unrealistic, given that much is still beyond the 
powers of genetical engineers - but that does not disqualify it as, at least, a valuable 
guideline for action. 
A theorist who is more successful in identifying justice and rationality - even in 
reducing the first to the last - is the rational choice theorist David Gauthier in his Morals 
by Agreement (1986). The greater part of his success is, however, a result of his decision 
to fully neglect the theme Brandt concentrates on: the origins and merits of individual 
preferences. "What is good is good ultimately because it is preferred, and it is good from 
the standpoint of those and only those who prefer it" (Gauthier 1986: 59). Having 
excluded the possibility of moral judgements about values, preferences and autonomy,5 he 
then seeks to show that justice and morality, understood as impartial constraints on 
rationality a.k.a. the pursuit of one's greatest interest or benefit (Gauthier 1986: 7), are 
fully compatible. In his view, both idealized impartial actors and actual participants in the 
bargaining process called "society" will find it in their best interest to acknowledge the 
minimal natural rights to one's body and endowments and in the fruits of one's labour. 
The only remaining other-regarding "judgements" allowed by Gauthier are second-order preferences. I.e., 
preferences about other people's preferences - which is not much of a basis for a debate on values and 
responsibility for value-formation 
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These limits are nearly all there is to justice; within them, each individual is free to 
bargain his or her way to the maximization of his or her expected preference-satisfaction. I 
shall discuss some of Gauthier's suggestions later on (in Part II). For the moment, I only 
want to point out that there is some intuitive difference between justice on the one hand 
and rationality on the other. Whether rationality be understood as the maximization of 
benefit, as consistency with known facts, as the capacity to think logically, or in any of 
the other ways we may encounter later on - it will always be associated with necessity, 
given certain aims (such as maximum personal benefit). In contrast to this, justice, 
morality, and ethics are concerned with accounting for the choice for those same aims. 
Within the broad concept of justice we can try to make further distinctions to 
isolate the more restricted concept of social justice. One possible distinction concerns the 
location of justice. The first of five alternatives was preferred by Aristotle, who described 
justice primarily as a virtue of the individual, a disposition of the acting subject (Aristotle 
1980, 1959: 1129*7). The virtuous act in Aristotelian theories of justice - some of them are 
modern theories of social justice - is one in which the actor has the intention to be just. 
Robert Nozick, a libertarian theorist of social justice, borrowed some of his ideas 
from Aristotle, notably that of a just distribution as the result of just exchanges between 
individuals, as well as Aristotle's second interpretation of the term justice. Nozick 
considers justice to be principally a trait of social interaction rather than one of intentions. 
In fact, intentions do not come into play at all. Justice, in Nozick's eyes, is acting in 
accordance with the principles of original acquisition and transfer (Nozick 1974: 151), the 
first (Lockean) principle demanding that anyone who grabs a part of nature should see to 
it that "enough and as good" is left for others, and the second reducing exchanges to those 
freely agreed to. Entitlements to holdings and the distribution resulting from transfers are 
just if and only if the holdings themselves are the product of a history of just acquisition 
and transfer. 
Thirdly, John Rawls considers justice to be first of all a properly of the structure 
of social interaction: "the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society" 
(Rawls 1971: 7). No matter how, for instance, the distribution of political freedom in a 
developed society came about, or with which intentions, it is the resulting structure of 
society, in this case the distribution of political rights and power, that is to be qualified as 
just or unjust. The past is not interesting to Rawls; what matters is that a society should 
provide a predictable and fair basic structure, defining the legitimate expectations on 
which citizens can build their plans for the future. 
Fourthly, there are theorists who are mainly interested in end-states, and not (or not 
by definition) in just acts, just intentions, or a just basic structure. The obvious example 
are radical egalitarians, who equate justice with an equal distribution. In his heavily 
criticized interpretation of Plato, Karl Popper presents the Plato of the Politela as another 
proponent of end-statism, as Plato would not be interested in justice between individuals, 
but only in the just (Utopian) state with its just relations between classes. For Plato, just is 
"... a synonym for 'that which is in the interest of the best stale'" (Popper 1966: 87). 
Fifthly and finally, justice can be ascribed to states of affairs as such, a possibility 
to which Aristolle never explicitly refers, and which Nozick finds of secondary importance 
(see above). Nevertheless, other theorists of justice are, as Nozick observed, interested in 
social stales, which ihey judge by "a natural dimension" like merit, usefulness to society, 
or need. Nozick calls such criteria "patterned principles" (Nozick 1974: 156). 
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As may be obvious now, it is futile to try to delineate liberal social justice by the 
location to which theorists apply the concept. They simply disagree. 
A second dimension of justice, cross-cutting that of location, is that of the field to 
which the concept is applied. In the once popular philosophical genre of the theodicy, 
justice was an aspect of God's distribution of properties over creation. In fact, every kind 
of relationship can be translated into and judged in terms of justice: the family, commer-
cial relations, participation in politics, labour relations, and so forth. Theories of liberal 
social justice, in particular, obviously focus on justice in society, but this does not help us 
much. More often than not, society is treated as a primitive term, where some explanation 
would have been welcome. In theories like Rawls's and Nozick's, for instance, the subject 
of debate is economics and politics rather than sex, religion, love, friendship, education, 
free time, or death - things which, to others, are undeniably part of social life. Leaving the 
exact meaning of "society" in the dark, it is often unclear whether liberal principles of 
justice apply to all aspects of society, or only to some, and if so to which. 
By way of a third dimension, Herbert Kitschelt has suggested a distinction between 
(at least) two types of theories of justice: those immediately based on and justified by 
"substantial or formal norms, values, or principles", and those based on and justified 
through procedures, regardless of the outcome of those procedures. (Both types can be 
divided in still more precise sub-categories). An example of the first approach would be 
utilitarianism, which derives its conception of justice from the principle of utility (or, in 
more modem versions, from welfare). Examples of the second approach are John Rawls 
and Jürgen Habermas, who both want to ground their theories of the just society on an 
agreement reached in "a counterfactually conceived ideal speech-situation" (Kitschelt 
1980: 392-3). 
Kilschelt's suggestion is interesting but of little use. For one thing, it offers no help 
in discerning the particularities of modern liberal theories of social justice, as these are by 
no means exclusively of the second type. Dozens of utilitarians, welfarists, and resourcists 
(Hare, Hart, Smart, Sen), egalitarians (G.A. Cohen, R. Dworkin), and perfectionists (Raz) 
are generally acknowledged as participants in the debate - even if they are not all political 
liberals. Secondly, and more seriously, Kilschclt's dichotomy is the product of an 
erroneous interpretation of Oscar Wilde's claim that "only fools do not judge by appear-
ances". Whether or not some theorist's principles of justice are in fact justified with a 
direct reference to some substantial norm, or whether such norms are to be "found" in a 
roundabout way through some procedure, is irrelevant. What counts is whether either 
course is theoretically possible, and, as we shall see in Part II, often both are. Rawls, for 
instance, not only invokes the procedural instrument of the original position, but also 
appeals to his readers's considered judgements as well as to some quite "substantial or 
formal norms" to legitimize the assumptions behind the original position. And on the other 
side of the imaginary cleft, utilitarians for example have occasionally switched from a 
direct appeal to utility to a procedural justification of their system by introducing an 
"impartial observer, a god-like extra-terrestrial evaluating the moral stale of the world. 
Apparently then, if we try to characterize the recent debate on liberal social justice 
as one, united but distinct, approach to justice, we have, at this moment, little more than 
an annoyingly vague notion of a common subject: the idea of justice in society. 
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There is one further essential distinction to be made: that between justice and other 
criteria to value a society. When we speak of a justified policy, for example, we mean to 
say more, and sometimes even something else, than that a policy is just. It may be just or 
unjust to raise social benefits, it may at times be quite unwise, but it always shows 
benevolence. A law may or may not be just, but it can be the result of highly valued 
democratic processes. Giving foreigners the right to vote may or may not be implied by a 
theory of justice, but it does express respect for their equal worth as humans and for their 
contribution to their present society, not to mention that it could support liberty, equality, 
and fraternity. War may be unjust in itself, but justified as unavoidable if a society wants 
to defend itself and survive. Finally, a choice between two or more equally just policies is 
not impossible; it can be justified in terms of efficiency, aesthetics, tradition, or whatnot. 
For many, justice is a virtue among others - a crucial, but not the most important, 
virtue: "Love and mercy, of course, go beyond justice" (Passmore 1979: 27), or "...the 
virtue of a state is its security" (Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus. 1951: 290). Feminist 
philosophers influenced by Carol Gilligan have argued for an ethics of care to supplement 
if not overrule the "cold jealous virtue", as David Hume described justice (see e.g. Baier 
1987: 42). According to Aristotle, on the other hand, justice is the principal virtue of a 
polis (Aristotle 1980, 1959: 1129b26 ff.). Without justice, neither the stale nor, 
consequently, the individual are safe (Aristotle 1981: 1253*29), let alone that anyone can 
be assured of happiness, freedom, or virtue. 
Now clearly there is little sense in asking why theorists of social justice chose 
justice as their object - they would not be theorists of justice if they had not. What is 
more interesting is to ask why liberal theorists think justice is so important, even of 
supreme importance: "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems 
of thought" (Rawls 1971: 3). Few of Rawls's colleagues have contradicted this statement -
in fact, none that I know of - but being human, it seems likely that they would at the same 
time reject the principle of fiat justitia, pereat mundi. There is a contradiction in this: if 
one rejects the last principle, if justice has a price, it cannot be the highest virtue of a 
society; there must be something even more valuable. 
Intuitively speaking, it is not surprising that justice is so important for liberals. 
Attaching as much importance to personal liberty as they do, liberals are bound to prefer a 
state that optimally protects this freedom. Certainly a state apparatus exploiting war, 
pestilence, hunger and death to maintain itself will not do this, and neither will the 
absence of a slate in the war of all against all, or the presence of a stale enforcing some 
ideal way of life. So what could be more convenient than a state devoting itself first and 
foremost to that procedural virtue of impartially balancing conflicting freedoms and, as the 
Justinian definition of justice says, giving each his due? 
Yet explaining the importance of justice as a public virtue in terms of an ultimate 
individual value like freedom still leaves some questions unanswered: why would one 
expect (even) a liberal to sacrifice justice, at the apparent risk of loosing individual 
freedom,, for the survival of society? What is so valuable about society that liberals 
investigate social justice rather than justice as such? I have tried to answer these questions 
and solve the paradox implied by them, implicitly, in Parts II and III, by giving a new 
account of the moral relevancy of being a free and rational human being and by imple­
menting it in a metric of justice. For the moment, however, I must let all this rest and 
instead draw attention to a far less ambitious hypothesis. In sofar as the liberal theory of 
justice is concerned, we may conclude that justice is not good or important for its own 
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sake, as a virtue might be for an Aristotelian, but good rather because of what it means to 
society, and because of what society, in turn, means to liberals. 
Section 4: Historical categories of justice 
Social justice may be a new term, it is not a new theme. Our history is filled with 
examples of calls for, and experiments with, what we now call social justice. The 
youngest-but-one trial and error of communism in Germany, the Anabaptist rule over the 
city of Münster (1534-1535), could well be understood as one of these experiments. The 
medieval guilds, in sofar as they were cooperatives aimed at mutual support, promoted 
social justice within professional groups. Julius Caesar's decision to allot citizenship to the 
inhabitants of Gallia Cisalpina and other Roman colonies offers another example. And of 
course the history of political philosophy is filled to the rim with further proposals for and 
theories about "justice in society". 
There is, however, little known about the history of the term social justice itself. It 
is one of those terms that popped up in European political debates in the first part of the 
19th century, along with other social-isms like social science, social feeling, social 
responsibility, and social politics.* Until the 1900s it was mainly a political slogan of the 
leftists of those days, the radical liberals and socialists. In their critique of contemporary 
economic and social conditions, social justice referred lo a desirable alternative to the 
alleged reduction of justice to legal justice. Justice, so they claimed, began and ended with 
the legitimation of labour contracts and the laissez-faire protection of market procedures, 
thereby supporting or even causing the preconditions for unjust phenomena like poverty 
and exploitation. The rise of socialism in the 19th century is but one (though probably the 
best known) manifestation of this call for social justice. Enlightened ("social") liberals like 
John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green, or progressive Christians and Jews were no less 
advocates of social justice - though some of them perhaps more out of fear for the 
attraction of socialism than because of a desire to be virtuous. 
At the start of this century social justice found its way into the social sciences and 
social philosophy. From then on it has led a double life in the political and academic 
worlds. It would take us too far to discuss all that happened since: the actions taken under 
the banner of social justice, the political theories that grew, blossomed, and withered 
away, the scientific and philosophical approaches towards (as it is often called with a little 
scientific distance, "the problem of') social justice, and so forth. There is, nevertheless, 
one important development to be noticed: the evolution in political philosophy7 of three 
separate "paradigms" of social justice. This evolution happened relatively independent of 
any changes in political practice and ideology. The liberal approach is by no means 
restricted to whatever the fashion of a particular country prefers to call liberals; the 
Shields (1941: 26) says that "(t)he first appearance of the phrase social justice known to this writer was 
In A. Tapparelli's Saggio Teoretico di dritto naturale, published in 1845". Dui Shields did not explicitly look for a 
primal source; nevertheless, he may well have discovered its first appearance in Thomistic literature (Tapparelli 
being a Jesuit), the history of which he did Investigate rather thoroughly. 
On some Interpretations, political philosophy entails neither political theories of the reflective kind (like 
Locke, Rousseau, Rawls), nor those of the practical kind (e.g. the theories verbalised by political parties). In my 
terminology however reflective political theory Is a form of political philosophy. 
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Thomistic approach is nol restricted to strict Catholics; and the best example of a Utopian 
approach towards social justice is one of Karl Marx's slips of the tongue. Political 
convictions play an important role in these schools of thought Yet the borders between 
them are not defined by ideology but by different conceptions of justice. 
The basic distinction between these modem approaches concerns the question what 
social justice "really" means in terms of the categories Aristotle developed to conceive of 
justice in all its forms. His terminology and, to a lesser extent, his conceptions of justice 
still function as the skeleton of almost all theories of justice, up to and including modern 
theories of social justice. There is one amendment to the peripatetic model, based on an 
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, that we need next to Aristotle's categories to account 
for the differences between the three views mentioned. 
In the fifth book of his Ethica Nicomachea. Aristotle distinguished seven categories 
of justice, beginning with justice "in general". A just person in this general sense is one 
who furthers, maintains, and protects the good of the polis (ideally expressed in its laws) 
in the interevSl of the polis - in other words: the common good. The six other categories of 
justice are called "special" kinds: distributive justice, commercial justice, corrective 
justice, political justice, household justice, and finally equity. 
Distributive justice concerns the distribution of whatever can be lawfully distrib-
uted among the members of a polis, following the rule of proportional equality: each 
person's share should be proportional to his or her worth as established by the (local) law. 
The first of the two categories of justice between individuals', commercial justice 
or justice in exchange, is voluntary and demands equality of the value of the possessions 
involved in an exchange, before and after the exchange. Value is measured by need and 
expressed in a currency: if a car salesman bought a car for £1000, the maximum he 
wanted to pay for it, and he can now sell it to someone who offers him £5000 (whether or 
not she knew what the salesman paid for it), then, if the salesman honestly likes the car so 
much that he would not sell it for a penny less, the car is really worth £5000. Should the 
client buy the car, then, in Aristotle's terminology, the salesman is not making an immoral 
profit but only receiving the legitimate price. 
Corrective justice is often involuntary. It applies the same rules as justice in 
exchange, but now to rectify unjust exchanges like theft, rape, and murder. Equity 
performs a comparable task with regard to the law. It rectifies the injustice that is 
potentially or actually caused by the generality of positive law, when applied to those 
particular cases where the abstract rule would produce the opposite of the intended effect, 
i.e., injustice. 
Political and household justice finally are domains for the exercise of justice rather 
than genuine forms of justice: they concern the proper duties and rewards of officials and 
those of independent' members of the household. 
Thomas Aquinas copied and systematized Aristotle's categories of justice. Thomas 
distinguished four main categories of justice: two between separate members of a polity, 
and two between non-separate members. For separate persons, Aristotle's categories of 
Aristotle calls both commercial and corrective justice "remedial justice", as they involve remedíais for 
giving and taking (Aristotle 1980. 1959: Ш1к25). Other translations use "rcctificatory justice". 
9 
Children and slaves are not independent; the head of the household is their guardian and owner. The 
position of women is unclear (Aristotle, 1959: I134b16). 
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commercial and corrective justice were taken over and united under the heading of 
commutative justice. 
The two forms of justice between non-separate persons are essentially political. As 
members of the same polity or family (cf. Aquinas 1975: 90/91, 2-2q61), humans are 
inseparable because they share the same interest in the common good of their union. 
Distributive justice is of a top-bottom form: it "apportions common goods and duties 
among citizens in accordance with their deservingness in terms of ability or accomplish-
ment in behalf of the common good" (Shields 1941: 11; cf. Aquinas 1975: 88/89, 2-2q61). 
Legal or general justice (not to be confused with the modern concept of legal justice alias 
positive law) has the reverse direction: it "aims to conduct the dealings of private persons 
to the good of the community" (Aquinas 1975: 90/91, 2-2q61), in other words, its function 
is to instruct us how to live virtuously and further the virtuous lives of others.10 Tho-
mas's general justice is obviously the same as Aristotle's justice "in general", with the 
slight amendment that it can now be understood both in Aristotle's sense of the word, i.e., 
as the purest expression of justice overruling the special forms of justice, and as a special 
form of justice itself, i.e., as the mirror-image of distributive justice (cf. Aquinas 1975: 
90/91, 2-2q61). 
It is especially important to keep the distinctions between distributive, general, and 
commercial justice in mind. The distinction between distributive and general justice is 
important, as we shall see in the next section, to distinguish the liberal from the Thomistic 
and Utopian approaches to social justice. The distinction between distributive and commu-
tative (or rather commercial) justice is important in another respect: it serves to distinguish 
shades and colours within the liberal approach. One can look at any transfer of goods or 
rights from a distributive and a commercial point of view. The worker's wage can be 
judged, commercially, as a just or unjust reward for his or her services; it can also, 
dislribulively, be judged as a just or unjust share in the product of cooperation, the more a 
liberal theorist believes that personal talents or qualities are undeserved, the less likely he 
or she is to take the point of view of commercial justice, and let the distribution of rights 
and goods be a result of market forces. An example of the commercialislic extreme is 
Robert Nozick, who fiercely believes that a person owns his or her self end everything 
that comes with it: talents, advantages, production. In his view of a just society, there is 
hardly any place for (re)distribulion. One of Nozick's opponents is Gerald Cohen, who 
cannot accept the consequences of self-ownership and argues for a (re)distribution of 
nearly anything that can actually be distributed. 
Section 5: Three interpretations of social justice 
There are, as already claimed, three wide-spread views of social justice, which 
evolved along the lines drawn by Aristotle and Aquinas. Apart from their adherence to the 
Aristotelian vocabulary, these three approaches share three important traits. First of all, 
they politicize social justice: it is not a purely, or even chiefly, private affair, but one of 
the polity or state. Secondly, the views themselves are in one respect also apolitical. They 
are not expressions of three separate and mutually exclusive ideologies, nor are the 
To avoid confusion, I shall reserve the expression legal justice for positive law, and general justice for 
Thomas's (moral) category of "legal or general" justice. 
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theorists of social justice neatly distributed over the three approaches according to their 
political points of view. In the third place, the Utopian, the orthodox Thomistic and the 
liberal interpretations of justice all follow Justinian's definition of justice ("the precepts of 
law") as: honeste vivere, non alienimi Uedere, suum cuique tribuere - to live honourably, 
not to injure another, to render each his due." They all define social justice specifically 
as suum cuique, to each his due. Nonetheless, the three views fundamentally differ in their 
interpretation of the political character of social justice. They all deal with general and 
distributive justice in the Aristotelian-Thomistic senses of those terms. Yet the orthodox 
Thomists emphasize general justice and more or less disregard distributive justice qua 
form, the liberals put the emphasis the other way around, and the Utopians stress both in 
one breath. 
The orthodox Thomistic approach 
Orthodox Thomists identify social justice with general justice. An excellent 
example of this approach is Leo Shields's 1941 dissertation on the history and meaning of 
the term social justice. Shields argues for two theses: firstly, that there is one and only one 
meaning in which we must understand the term social justice, namely that of general 
justice; and secondly, that this identification of general and social justice is already present 
in official Catholic political theory. The second claim may well be correct. 
Up to 1891, "social justice" was merely a means of expressing outrage with the 
existing social and economical system. Catholics used it as much as did others, whenever 
and wherever they thought fit - though they did in fact often already refer to it as a 
question of general justice. This need not surprise us, if we recall the domain of justice as 
Aristotle saw it on the one hand, and the foundation of the Catholic religion (indeed most 
religions) on the other. Aristotle conceived of justice as a virtue - a possible aspect of the 
individual's disposition - and one to be executed by that individual. Aquinas, and after 
him the Catholic church, could easily absorb this view, as Catholicism is all about 
personal salvation, to be ensured by the cultivation of a virtuous character rather than by 
virtuous behaviour; Catholics never were behaviouralisLs. (On the cenlrality of (personal) 
virtue in Thomistic ethics see also Bourke 1986: 64 ff.) 
In 1891 pope Leo XIII published his famous encyclical Rerum Novarum, which 
dealt with the Church's vision on the social question. Popes are, to Catholic philosophers, 
maybe not always infallible but surely always authoritative. Accordingly, Leo's interpreta­
tion of justice in society gained a status of respectability if not dominance within the 
philosophy of his church. Pius XI, in his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, added to 
the influence of Leo's view by putting, so to speak, exclamation marks behind the text of 
Rerum Novarum - as did other popes after him (cf. Davies and Walsh 1991: xii ff. and 
Hickel 1984: xxiii). 
Leo XIII stressed the responsibility of citizens for the well-being (the Good) of 
their society and fellow-citizens, a thought we can immediately identify as consistent with 
the Thomistic theory of general justice. Leo's approach to the social question was that it 
should not only be answered by the state but also, and even primarily, by the citizens. 
Social justice could not be enforced by the state, at least not without endangering private 
property (which is a natural right of every human being), and it should certainly not be 
enforced by means of a revolution. The lack of social justice and the danger this posed to 
и From Justinian's Institutions, quoted in Freund (1962: 94). 
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societies whatever their momentary form originated in a lack of personal social virtues: 
greed and cold-heartedness on the side of the capitalists (Leo XIII 1991: 43, 58) anti-
harmonious socialist aggression on the side of the workers (Leo XIII 1991: 16, 58). The 
task of the state was to protect both property and workers (the last by ensuring at least a 
minimal level of existence (Leo XIII 1991: 35)), but it should not impinge on the market. 
The necessary redistribution (Leo XIII 1991: 47) was not one of the state's tasks, as it 
must guarantee the rights of property, not the contradictory correct use of property. 
Redistribution should rather be one of the harmonizing effects of the actions of the 
members of society (employers and employees), if they were to realize their duties of 
supporting the common good, the virtuous lives of themselves and their fellow beings, and 
the mere maintenance of their social and political union (Leo XIII 1991: 49 ff.). 
Consequently, Leo was opposed to both laissez-faire and trade-unionism, which he held to 
be subversive - especially the last, based as it was on an ideology that did not recognize 
the social whole as an organism. The only acceptable alternative in his eyes was found in 
the well-known theory of corporatism. 
From 1891 on, the orthodox Thomistic theme of general justice became part of the 
body of thought of most Thomistic and Catholic thinkers. Less orthodox Thomists, who 
had difficulties in adhering to the priority of the common good of society over the 
personal good, a doctrine that was omnipresent in encyclicals on social justice, eventually 
also found their place among theorists of general justice. In this context, the name of 
Jacques Maritain should be mentioned, whose highly influential La Personne et le Bien 
Commun (1947) interpreted the common good, understood as "communion in well-living", 
as both instrumental to and resulting from the personal good of spiritual and moral self-
development (Maritain 1947: 27,45). That general justice is still the dominant interpreta-
tion of .social justice among Thomists may be concluded from Paul Weilhman's recent 
article on international distributive justice. A large part of this text, in which Weithman 
tries to harmonize Thomism and the Rawlsian principles of justice, is devoted to a defence 
of his unorthodox focus on distributive rather than general justice (Weithman 1992: 181-
186). Protestant social theorists were somewhat slower in adapting to their limes and 
taking up the issue of social justice (Hickcl 1984: xxiii) - but once they did, they followed 
the Thomistic fashion of identifying social with general justice. 
There were good historical and sociological reasons for the popularity of general 
justice in religious circles. For one thing, there was a class-struggle going on. quickly 
developing into something that looked like civil wars. It was not just a quarrel about the 
proper distribution of the cake - it endangered the whole bakery. The destruction of the 
ultimate source of security for humans, their social bond, was apparently not far off (cf. 
Leo XIII 1991: I, 3). Secondly, the all-important concept of the citizen's responsibility 
could function as a weapon for those who were thought to be responsible for the moral 
education of their sheep: the clergy. Up to then, they had little to offer to their people but 
"give Caesar what is Caesar's". Now they had a religious incentive as well as a humanitar-
ian reason to engage in the activities of parlies and unions: that of reaching the sheep that 
had so unfortunately wandered away from the herd (cf. Leo XIII 1991: 14, 26, 54). But 
the best reason for the spread of the general justice interpretation among both Catholics 
and Protestants was probably internal: ils consistency with the ideas of personal salvation 
and personal virtue. 
The Dutch protestant philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd may illustrate this point. 
Dooyeweerd and the politician Abraham Kuyper were the most important representatives 
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of the theory of "sphere-sovereignty", at the height of its popularity in the Netherlands 
during the first part of the 20th century. More corporatislic versions of this doctrine were 
popular among Protestants elsewhere on (at least) the Continent (cf. Hickel 1984: xxiii). 
According to Dooyeweerd, societies are made up of relatively autonomous spheres like the 
family, the church, the market, and the state. Each sphere has its specific tasks, and 
participants in them carry a certain responsibility for the functioning of that sphere -
responsibilities which are to be respected for various ethical and functional reasons. Hence 
one sphere (e.g. the market) should not infringe upon, let alone dominate, another (e.g. the 
family); if it did, the ultimate consequence could be a disintegration of society. 
In a society of sovereign spheres, justice must clearly be a personal virtue. The 
well-functioning of spheres and the well-being of society depend on the activities of 
individuals, who are not only members of, but also integrated in and formed by, spheres. 
Social justice apparently cannot be state-enforced, at least not without violating the 
sovereignty of the spheres. It is therefore a responsibility of the - all - spheres, or rather of 
those participating in them. 
So far, so good. Dooyeweerd did indeed limit the task of the slate to the formula-
tion and protection of formal laws, and he did exclude redistribulive tasks. As far as 
justice in society is concerned, he understood it as general justice. And yet, on the one 
occasion when he used the term social justice, he used it as a synonym of distributive 
justice in the Aristotelian sense: the slate exists to serve the public interest, by 
proportionally distributing charges and benefits (Dooyeweerd 1957: 444). Activities to 
perform this function, Dooyeweerd claimed, should be guided by the idea of public social 
justice, and require the harmonisation of all the interests in a society, respecting the 
sovereignty of the spheres (Dooyeweerd 1957: 446). In other words: social justice would 
be a task of the stale rather than one of citizens. 
It thus appears that there are two conceptions of social justice to be found in 
Dooyeweerd's work. His interest lies in general justice, the orthodox Thomislic conception 
of social justice, but his definition of social justice equals it with of distributive justice. 
Social justice in the last sense is, however, of little interest to him - which can probably 
be explained by his commitment to the defense of the inviolability of religious autonomy. 
This takes us back to Leo Shield's first claim that there is one and only one 
meaning in which the phrase social justice is to be understood. For the sake of communi-
cation he is right: consensus about a single meaning of a term is no bad idea at all. From 
the point of view of a holist he may also have made a good argument by stressing the 
importance of general justice. It is, to understate the point, not unreasonable to suspect 
that the justice of a society depends at least partly on the support and attachment of 
individuals to justice and to just institutions. But that same holist would also argue that a 
society of just citizens is not a just society unless its institutions and the actual distribution 
of benefits and burdens are also just. If there is any "realistic" reason to restrict the use of 
the term social justice to one and only one meaning, it would be such an analytical 
argument in favour of a holistic interpretation of social justice. 
The Utopian approach 
The Utopian approach to social justice satisfies the holist's demands. It relates legal 
to distributive justice and vice versa, asserting that they are necessary conditions for one 
another. The most prominent representatives of this approach are - not surprisingly -
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Utopian novelists, as well as some anarchists like Kropotkin. As both schools are famous 
for their lack of analytical rigour, I chose another example: Karl Marx. 
Marx's views on justice are generally interpreted in two ways: either he is 
supposed to have dismissed talk about justice as "twaddle" (McBride 1975: 205), 
ideological rhetoric, or he is presented as a champion of social justice, defending the 
maxim (from his CritiQue of the Gotha programme) "from each according to his capacity, 
to each according to his needs". The first interpretation, obviously, does not allow other 
than "contextual" (Nielsen 1986: 107) maxims of justice, i.e., prescriptions based on the 
rationality of actions in the light of the liberation of the exploited (see e.g. Brown (1992) 
and Hübner (1992)). 
An unorthodox reader of Marx, William McBride, has argued that neither of these 
views is totally correct. Marx did indeed distrust the rhetorical use of terms like justice 
and he was sceptical about the idea of eternal justice (McBride 1975: 209), but he implied 
more than once that justice was a valuable ethical idea in itself (cf. McBride 1975: 208), 
and he often used concepts commonly associated with the idea of social justice, such as 
freedom, equality, and rationality (McBride 1975: 211 ff.). On the other hand, his famous 
axiom "from each (etc.)" may well have been a slip of the tongue, as Marx is known to 
have disliked and rejected talks about blueprints for communism (even) more than he 
disliked rhetoric. 
If we accept McBride's theory that Marx's Gotha maxim was a terminological 
inconsistency, a step too far, we can still believe that it was not necessarily a conceptual 
inconsistency. Supposing that Marx wanted to avoid terms like justice, social justice, and 
justice in society, he still held views about "the unnamed", views that can account for his 
once-only adherence to a maxim of social justice. 
For Marx then, social justice would have meant both legal and distributive justice. 
They could not be separated. Justice was a matter of how the goods of society were 
produced as much as of how they were distributed. Both depended on the actual division 
of economic power in society and not on the social conscience of individuals, which is but 
an expression and product of a society's productive relations. Hence, social justice is 
ultimately not a question of abstract rationality but one of concrete power. Zuerst kommt 
das Freßen und dann die Moral. 
Marx considered ordinary proposals for distributive social justice to be some sort 
of revisionism, of which he strongly disapproved. Changes that would not go beyond the 
so-called superstructure of society, that would not alter the basic inequality and injustice 
of the economic basis of society, were merely cosmetic operations (Hook 1975: 75). It did 
not matter to Marx that those superficial improvements might indeed be made operative. 
As a political sociologist Marx might be interested, for the success of those necessarily 
temporary measures depended upon the degree of adequacy between them and the basic 
(economic) structure of society. As a socialist however, he would point out that the 
injustice in society was of a fundamental nature. Accommodating and comforting as such 
socially "just" mechanisms of (e.g.) redistribution could be - they would not change the 
injustice that made them necessary in the first place (Lock 1989: 1). 
Marx also disapproved of the type of solutions proposed by Utopian socialists or 
guild socialists. Pope Leo XIII certainly was not a Utopian socialist, but by (Marx') 
definition an exponent of "clerical socialism", the twin brother of "feudal socialism", and 
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thus a form of "reactionary socialism"12. Yet Leo's alternative and Utopian socialism met 
with the same objections Marx discussed in the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 
1967: 114-117): both theories are based on an unrealistic trust in the powers of rational 
argument. Harmony is no solution to the problems of capitalism, talks at round tables 
cannot produce fair answers, rationalism cannot beat brute economic force. What all 
reconciliating theories of social justice have in common, according to Marx, is that they 
disregard or bluntly deny the opposition of class interests. A self-conscious revolutionary 
proletarian class in a developed stage of the class struggle will never accept the results of 
round-table talks, if such talks were possible at all. Social justice is simply not a question 
of reasoning towards a common truth, as there и no such truth where diverging classes 
and opposite interests exist (cf. Fisk 1975: 59 ff.). Consequently, there is no common 
virtue to direct behaviour, no common grounds to support general social justice - neither 
in the Utopian, nor in the clerical forms. 
Now what about changes that do go beyond cosmetics, what about social justice 
after the revolution? Obviously, the whole point of Marxism is to do away with the 
economic conditions that created juxtaposed ideologies and so prevented agreements on all 
basic social questions. Obviously, too, the revolution is not only defended by an appeal to 
the impersonal laws of the evolution of society, but also by a moral demand for social 
justice, justice for those deprived of it, the proletariat. (Compare in this context Stephen 
Lukes's explanation of Marx's ethical ideas as inspired by the notion of emancipation 
(Lukes 1985: 27 ff.).) 
Under communism, when capitalism and the intermediate phase of socialism would 
be history, both the legal and the distributive parts of social justice can be satisfied: from 
each according to his capacity, to each according to his need. In a genuine community, 
mutual aid is a necessary precondition for both production and distribution, whereas in 
civil society both depend on extortion. In this classless society it would be in each one's, 
thus everyone's, interest to give society all one has and to let society give all one needs -
not (only) because it is a "subjectively" reasonable interest but also because it is "objec­
tively" just. 
However, to give everyone what he or she needs there must be plenty (Lock 1989: 
2) - either in fact or in the eye of the beholder. Marx may have had a Utopian vision of a 
society in which this was the case, but that is not our concern now. In the absence of 
abundance, supposedly under socialism, Marx would still have to invoke distributive 
principles. He formulated one (again) in his Critique of the Gotha programme, where he 
proposed "equal rewards for equal labour", thus maintaining the analytical distinction 
between the value (Wert) and worth (Würde) of labour. The result would be inequality: not 
everyone would get equally near to what he or she needs; some (specialists) would get 
more, some (especially the unskilled) less. To convince the working ex-class of the 
necessity of still giving all they had while getting less in return, Marx might have tried to 
offer a defence of at least this kind of inequality. 
But he did no such thing. Marx's defence is not based on the consideration that 
justice must be done even under imperfect conditions ("abundance" apparently being 
perfect, and an essential precondition of justice), but on considerations of power. Under 
socialism, the remnants of the former bourgeois class still exists - that is: there are still 
Marx's terminology in The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1967: 106-107), not mine. The 
original German version sneaks of papist (pflßisches) socialism (Marx and Engels 1965: 16-17). 
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people wilh a class-conscience. Among these are the specialists, whose contribution to 
society is still needed, and who may not accept the Marxian form of, as Michael Walzer 
would call it, simple equality. To gel them to work they need incentives. Therefore Marx, 
trusting that the working ex-class will understand the need to compromise for a generation 
or two until bourgeois-conscience has been exterminated, proposed an unequal satisfaction 
of needs (Lock 1989: 3-5). 
The Marxian problem of the mutual exclusion of scarcity and justice may or may 
not be characteristic of the Utopian approach to social justice. It probably is: utopia 
demands harmony, harmony demands satisfaction, and satisfaction is hardly compatible 
wilh perceived avoidable scarcity. For our purposes however, it is more interesting to note 
that Utopians cannot appreciate the question of the justice of distributive processes in 
itself, that is, independent of the question of general justice and without asking what 
causes what: do people create institutions, or is it the other way around? Utopians can 
only think of justice in the ideal world of abundance, and therefore fail to be able to 
distinguish between "more" and "less" unjust stales, or between just institutions, just states 
and just persons. 
The liberal approach 
The last of the three approaches to social justice understands it as distributive 
justice. Being, at the moment, the dominant research programme, it is itself dominated by 
liberal idea(l)s (which we shall discuss shortly). Unsurprisingly, representatives of the 
liberal programme arc themselves often heirs of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution: libertarians and near-anarchists, egalitarian liberals, liberal and democratic 
socialists, and sometimes even Marxists. 
Other, non-liberal, approaches to distributive justice are of course imaginable: 
Protestant views like Dooycwcerd's for instance might have generated such an approach 
but in fact did not, as he and his fellow believers were ultimately interested in other things 
than social justice. Nevertheless, theories of sphere-sovereignty and the like are still - or 
again - popular. Several critics of the mainstream in liberal social justice theory have 
opposed their notion of a community to that of the individualized and individualizing state 
and market, stressing the social rather than the political and economic basis of social 
justice. In a sense, they have brought the subject of general justice back into the debate 
about social justice. This school, consisting of Anglo-Saxon political philosophers like 
Alasdair Maclntyre, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, Michael Jackson, William Galston, 
and Charles Taylor, are most often referred to as communitarians. They may well be 
described as a school apart, but I shall argue in the following chapter that they are not all 
equally opposed to the liberal paradigm, despite their equally critical attitude. Some of 
them are still primarily interested in distributive justice; the community and its ethical 
peculiarities define the point of view from which they examine the problem of distribu­
tion. They also share at least some of the basic ethical axioms and procedural ideals 
characteristic of the mainstream approach. 
If these communitarians can be seen as the right wing of the liberal paradigm, 
there is also a left wing, made up of political philosophers influenced by Marx (the so-
called analytical Marxists), like Sidney Hook, Gerald Cohen, Jon Elster and Kai Nielsen. 
It is interesting to note a recent development on this side of the liberal approach: a 
renewed interest in the concept of a community, giving rise to a recognizably 
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communitarian type of critique. The left wing critics are, however, often as much 
followers of the liberal approach, for the same reasons as some communitarians are. 
Liberalism (in the stricter sense of the political ideology) is not noted for its 
concern with eternal justice - on the contrary, its disattachment with regard to "substan-
tive" moral theories has often been associated with relativism, indifference, and the pursuit 
of private pleasure at the expense of social justice. Yet numerous liberals have tried to 
reconcile liberalism and social justice. "Liberalism with a human face" was partly 
responsible for the first intrusions on the night watchman-state and hence for the birth of 
the welfare state. For instance, in the Netherlands (with which I am best acquainted) it 
was a social liberal, minister van Houten, who introduced a law against child labour 
(1874). Other reforms stayed out until 1901, when the first law on social security was 
accepted, again under liberal auspices. 
In liberal political philosophy, social justice has always been a subject of dis-
cussion (though not always in as positive sense), with some high-tides. A first wave 
consisted of the radical liberals of the 1840s who joined the "socialist" call for social 
justice. 
During the second part of that century, social justice was an important philosophi-
cal issue in Britain, thanks to the two most influential liberal philosophers of that time, 
John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green. Both started with the same ideas: autonomy and 
self-realization. Mill as a writer and political representative of his utilitarian circle (Mill 
1969: 75, 128-130, 165 ff.), Green as a more academic supporter of the first steps towards 
social justice, defending an idealistic (Hegelian) conception of positive freedom (Wempe 
1986: 151-2). In this connection Henry Sidgwick, who deeply influenced the Anglo-Saxon 
analytical tradition in philosophy, should also be mentioned. In his Methods of Ethics he 
explicitly identifies distributive justice with justice itself: "We may observe that the notion 
of justice always involves allotment of something considered as advantageous or disadvan-
tageous" (Sidgwick 1962: 268). 
The third stream of publications started around 1900, in reaction to the then 
observed "crisis of liberalism" relative to the success of socialism and social Christianity. 
During and after World War II Karl Popper, a highly critical admirer of the welfare stale, 
and Friedrich (von) Hayek, a hard-boiled liberal, produced and induced a less influential, 
but still noteworthy, fourth wave. Especially Hayek constantly stressed the opposition 
between social justice (on a micro-level) under a liberal constitution, and the impossibility 
of social justice in planned societies. Social justice was a constant theme in his work. In 
his The Road to Serfdom (1944) the term social justice (as a synonym of distributive 
justice) is present in almost every chapter, and one of his last books was totally devoted to 
"the mirage of social justice" (Hayek 1976). For Popper and especially for Hayek, 
however, social justice was not an end in itself. To them, any distribution resulting from 
just procedures - primarily market procedures - was just. In this sense they were prede-
cessors of Robert Nozick. 
The fifth stream, which has now risen to a flood, began around 1970 when 
liberalism was, again, in a crisis. It is dominated by such books as John Rawls's A Theory 
of Justice (1971), Robert Nozick's Anarchy. State, and Utopia (1974), Bruce Ackerman's 
Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980), and Michael Walzcr's (communitarian) Spheres 
of Justice (1983). Other well-known authors include Brian Barry, Richard Brandt, Ronald 
Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon, Amartya Sen, and Bernard Williams. Most of 
these writers are to be found in the editorial boards - and indexes - of two high-rated 
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magazines: Philosophy and Public Affairs and Ethics. It is this fifth wave that will concern 
us here. Despite minor and less minor differences, these writers share at least three 
fundamental characteristics that distinguish them from the orthodox Thomislic and Utopian 
theorists of social justice. These three, very general, traits can be briefly described as the 
subject matter, distribution, its primary condition, impartiality, and a common source of 
methodological inspiration, analytical philosophy.™ 
Liberal social justice weighs and balances, as its name already announces, liberties 
and their effects. It conforms to the Justinian principle of giving each person what is due, 
but, as Brian Barry noted, the principles determining "what is due" (the worth of a person) 
are not defined prior to or outside of the theory of justice. Rather than being derived from 
natural law and applied to problems of justice, they are developed within the framework of 
particular conceptions of justice (Barry 1989: 149; cf. Nozick 1974: 159-160). Neverthe-
less, the liberal research programme is primarily, and almost exclusively, concerned with 
giving dues, i.e., with distributive justice. Inductive as the proof of this thesis must be, I 
shall restrict myself to illustrating it with three examples: the theories of Ackerman, 
Walzer, and Rawls. 
Ackerman's point of departure is a counterfactual case: suppose that we find 
ourselves on a spaceship and find a beautiful planet to colonize. There is no way back, as 
we are almost out of fuel. The ship circles the planet and we discover that it contains only 
one resource: manna, available in limited quantities but easily mouldable into anything we 
could ever want - food, chairs, clothes, fuel, whatever. While we are still up in space we 
have to decide how to distribute the manna among ourselves, and between us and future 
generations (Ackerman 1980: 31). 
Walzer tries to defend the autonomy of what he calls distributive "spheres" of 
social action (Walzer 1983: 3-6). The terminology is not the only similarity between his 
and Dooyeweerd's conception of society. Things like honour, salvation, sex, defence or 
consumer goods have separate principles of distribution. We do not (says Walzer) 
distribute sex according to market principles, or education on the basis of deserved 
honour. Nor does every society follow the same principles in any sphere. The only 
legitimate source of these distributive principles are the social actors within a community. 
An intrusion of economical principles in the political sphere, or of Irish principles of 
salvation in the Dutch scenery, cannot be justified (and may even destroy the social bond 
in at least that sphere) - at least not if (a) the social actors in the intruded spheres do not 
univocally accept them, and if (b) the new principles have not "grown" through social 
action and become part of the social conscience but were instead commanded from 
"outside" or "above". 
John Rawls's case is a little harder. Of course, his aim is to formulate principles 
that "provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and ... 
define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation" 
(Rawls 1971: 4). And of course this is exactly what he does: both his general and special 
conceptions of justice are clearly distributive in demanding an equal distribution of social 
goods unless, given appropriate circumstances, an unequal distribution will be to the 
benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls 1971: 302-3). Yet Rawls himself describes his 
For a recent and more detailed overview of schools and issues In Ine liberal social justice debate, see 
Cullen (1992). 
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theory as one of social rather than distributive justice. Social justice is more limited than 
distributive justice, in sofar as his distributive principles have a limited domain. "There is 
no reason to suppose ahead of lime that the principles satisfactory for the basic structure 
(of society, MW) hold for all cases. These principles may not work for the rules and 
practices of private associations or for those of less comprehensive social groups" (Rawls 
1971: 8). Social justice is also more extensive than distribution sec: the principles 
governing the basic structure must not only be just in theory, they must also be stable and 
an acknowledged part of a "public sense of justice" (Rawls 1971: 5). Distributive 
principles are an essential part of a conception of a just society, but they are not the whole 
story of social justice. 
Despite these subtleties, Rawls does not understand social justice in "contrast" to 
distributive justice, contrary to what H.A. Bcdau once claimed (Bedau 1982: 85-86). The 
two are different but not separate or separable. Social justice still is a form of distributive 
justice, it is simply limited to a certain domain on the one hand, and limited by certain 
criteria of justifiability on the other. 
The most vital principle of liberal social justice is impartiality towards theories of 
the good life. Impartiality or neutrality (I shall distinguish these often promiscuously used 
terms in the next chapter) demands that principles of justice are unbiased, that procedures 
for the justification of principles of justice are unbiased, and finally that this justification 
itself be based on non-problematical ethical principles. 
For many writers, the commandment of impartiality necessarily implies equality -
in principle, either because that would be the direct rational consequence of impartiality, 
or because of the insufficiency of (impartial) reasons pointing in a direction other than 
equality. To put this principle into practice, theorists of egalitarian justice invoke the 
notion of an equalisandum ("that which is to be equalized"): the abstract social good we 
all value, on the basis of which comparisons between individual shares in the distributed 
stock can be made. For some, the equalisandum is welfare: concrete social goods may or 
may not be distributed according to need or want, what counts is that the result is an equal 
level of welfare for each and all. For others the equalisandum is opportunity: we should 
all have the same chance to make of our lives whatever we want to do with it. Still others 
propose resources: we should all have equal means of realizing our ideal life. Genuine 
egalitarians will obviously want to distribute the equalisandum equally, but there are few 
genuine egalitarians. Most theorists of justice acknowledge "relevant differences" between 
people, resulting in an unequal distribution of the equalisandum - i.e., in differences 
between, for example, the welfare of a criminal and that of a law-abiding citizen. For this 
reason, I shall use the term equalisandum merely in the more technical sense of the 
(impartial) basis for comparisons between shares. It still has the substantial meaning of 
"that which is to be equalized", but it is only to be equalized in principle, depending on 
good reasons in favour of or against equality. 
To illustrate the difference between equalisandum and egalitarianism, let us 
consider Rawls's and Nozick's equalisanda. The position of Rawls is ambiguous. Rawls's 
list of primary social goods (his equalisandum)14 and the "proportional" equality of 
In his special conception of justice, Rawls distributes (political) liberties and (economic) Inequalities 
according to different rules. One might argue that he thus distinguishes two equalisanda, one scaling the value of 
immaterial and the other that of material goods. 
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distribution he proposes can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand he seems to be 
an egalitarian: social goods should be distributed equally unless inequality is to the benefit 
of the worst-off. On the other hand his principles do not in practice result in or aim at an 
equal distribution of these means to fulfil privale plans of life, but rather aim at the 
maximization of these resources, at least of those of the worst-off. Robert Nozick's case is 
more straightforward. His version of the equalisandum prescribes the equal inviolability of 
natural rights. What we do with these rights however, whether we sell them or use them to 
run naked through the streets or to go on a diet oifiigu and saké, is all our private and no 
one else's business. Nozick is a rabid opponent of enforced patterns of equality. 
Finally, the method of our theorists is deeply influenced by Anglo-Saxon philos-
ophy. This shows especially in their attachment to analytical consistency between beliefs, 
principles, and the real world. Particularly in the days before Rawls, the ordinary way of 
approaching ethical questions was semantical. Philosophers hoped to clarify our moral 
conceptions by searching for the "true", or at least conventionally accepted, meaning and 
uses of a term. It is essentially an Aristotelian method: Aristotle also asked questions like 
"what do we mean when we say a man is just?", subsequently describing common usages 
and conceptions of terms like justice, clarifying inconsistencies, to finally turn them into 
prescriptions. The shortcomings of this approach are equally traditional: it is conservative. 
At best it allows us to see how, and maybe why, a society or a language community 
conceives of a term the way it does. It does however not provide any justifications unless 
we believe in the highly controversial Wiltgensteinian hypotheses that we should remain 
silent on issues that we cannot talk about, and that ethics is one of those issues. In 
Rawls's work as well as in that of others after him, the remnants of this approach still 
survive, though the accent has shifted from meanings to reasoned or reasonable beliefs, 
often illustrated by moral intuitions. Rawls, for instance, tries to justify his principles by 
comparing them with "our considered judgements", a method that should eventually 
produce a so-called "reflective equilibrium" between these judgements and the conclusions 
idealized actors would reach in a fictitious contract situation. Ronald Dworkin claims to 
agree with Rawls's method (Dworkin 1978: 26 ff.). Ackcrman wants us to imagine 
ourselves aboard a spaceship, trying to argue for what we "really" believe is just in that 
counlcrfactual world. Walzcr's spheres are built on (and presumably justified by) our 
"shared understandings" as evolved in social intercourse. 
This "logical" approach can be contrasted with the traditions of continental 
philosophy. Of course I do not want to imply that continental philosophy is illogical, a-
logical or anti-logical - it is rather a matter of the accents being put differently by 
different traditions. Continental philosophy, rejecting the Wittgcnsteinian premises, is more 
devoted to questions of a natural than of a semantical nature, if one will forgive the 
expression. It tries to interpret the world rather than the words, and wants to develop new 
categories and concepts or revise old ones, regardless of existing conventions. Continental 
philosophy begins where convention and innovation clash. The question whether Fou-
cault's "dispositives of power", Habermas's ideal speech-situation, or Nietzsche's will for 
power conform to a consensus is considered far less urgent than the issue of whether and 
in what sense such conceptions are true, good, or beautiful. 
To the theorists of liberal social justice on the other hand, analytical consistency, 
consistency of meanings rather than understandings, is the main tool. A principle of justice 
that has been derived from, but is logically or semantically contradictory to, some prior 
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principle (e.g. rationality, liberty) does not count as "inconclusively proved" but as 
"rejected" - ideally. (We are, of course, still talking about two ideal types of philosophical 
approaches.) There are two extremes in the way their method is presented. On one side 
stands the idiom of rational choice, presenting and testing formulas at least as complex as: 
[(Vy: W,(y) < W/y)) & (Vy: xRy)] ->χ,Ζχ, 
In English this means "If person i's welfare level is lower than that of j , whereas they 
have the same income, whatever the income exactly be, and if everyone's income is worse 
than it could be in the "optimal solution to the pure distribution problem", then, optimally, 
i should get at least as much income as j" (the example is taken from Sen 1978: 287). 
Continental philosophers will hardly ever use this "slang", as I suspect some of them will 
call it. The other extreme mode of expression is employed by people like Ackerman, using 
science fiction-examples, Nozick, inventing an arm-breaking machine to demonstrate the 
inaptitude of recompensation, and Derek Parfit, approaching the problem of personality 
with mind-lransfer machines, teleportation, etcetera (Parfit 1984). They all use (rhetorically 
successful) fiction to cover as well as demonstrate essentially logical points. And again, 
one will seldom find continental philosophers venturing into the counterfactual or into the 
realm of moral intuition. 
Section 6: The roots of the debate. 
Up to the 1960s, the phrase social justice was seldom used in political philosophy. 
Politicians used it as what is now called a "hurrah" word,15 (he odd political theorist 
wrote an article on it, and a few social scientists studied perceptions of (social) justice and 
injustice. During the 1960s the attention of Anglo-Saxon analytical political philosophers 
slowly shifted from linguistics to more profane political issues. One of the first authors to 
break away from linguistics was John Rawls. Between 1958 and 1970, he published 
several articles on "justice as fairness", but he remained little known outside the philo­
sophical community. In 1971 he published a book based on these articles, A Theory of 
Justice. Political philosophy has not been the same since. After the first reviews an 
immense flood of reactions followed: articles, special issues of philosophical and social 
scientific magazines, books, alternative theories of justice evoking the same effects, though 
not to the same extent, and so on and so forth. Numerous theorists, both in America and 
Europe (after the translation of Rawls's book, even in a philosophically isolated country 
like France), contributed to the debate. It is estimated that, in the period between 1971 and 
1990, over 3,000 books and articles appeared, dedicated to Rawls's theory alone. The total 
of publications on social justice since 1971 must lie well over 15,000. In a nutshell, that is 
the tale of the rise of the debate on liberal social justice. 
So far, we have described the liberal social justice approach as one particular (but 
very broad) approach within moral theory: it seems to be informed by typically liberal 
ideals, in particular by impartiality, though that claim has not yet been sustained; it deals 
A "hurrah" word has a positive rhetoric appeal - as a word - but no definite content. A phrase like social 
justice could as easily be used by communists and fascists as by liberals and social democrats. Unfortunately, the 
term "hurrah" word has now Itself become a "hurrah" word for philosophers. 
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wilh justice rather than with the good or the right; it focuses more on distributive justice 
than on general or commutative justice; and society is its domain. What is more, we have 
identified it as a highly popular approach that generated a quite fertile debate. At this 
point the question may rise how the sudden and explosive growth of a, one particular, 
theme in political philosophy could occur - and why it survived more than twenty years of 
sometimes tiresome and technical debate. 
Earlier I pointed at two possible reasons: the Roaring Sixties and the allegedly 
unsatisfying and intellectually suffocating yoke of linguistic philosophy. However, these 
can only, and at best, explain why political theorists started to be interested in more 
substantial ethical and political questions, not why they picked social justice in particular, 
nor why they kept being interested or why anyone outside the philosophical community 
was interested at all. The same objections must be raised against some cultural factors 
explaining interest in justice. Psychological or psycho-somatic disgust over perceived 
injustice, or the desire to live an ethical life, for instance, can only explain the question, 
not the direction in which the answer was sought. There is more that disgusts us about our 
fellow humans than injustice, and there is more to the good life than being just. 
In the following pages I shall discuss three possible reasons for the rise and 
perseverance of liberal social justice theorizing: its mutually beneficial connections with 
the theories behind the welfare stale which, at the end of the nineteenth century, intro-
duced a new conception of responsibility; the continuities between the social justice debate 
on the one hand and traditional political theory and modern political science on the other; 
and finally the influences from and on the social sciences in general. Though necessarily 
incomplete, these three factors must suffice as a description of the good soil in which 
Rawls's seed apparently fell. 
Responsibility, society and the welfare state 
There would not be such a vivid debate on social justice if it was only an academic 
problem. Social justice is also a practical issue, broadly discussed in society. But why 
would people be interested in it? Why be just - and why be socially just? 
In an Interesting article written In 1984, the philosophers Robert Goodln and John 
Dryzek ventured into the empirical realm. Goodin and Dryzek set out to explore "the 
sources of support for the most broadly-based institution presently available for promoting 
social justice, the welfare state" (Dryzek and Goodin 1984: 1) over the post-1945 period, 
with special reference to Great Britain. They suppose that the welfare state can indeed be 
seen as a practice of social justice, that motivational sources are as relevant in explaining 
the rise of the welfare state as are structural and institutional factors, and that sources after 
1945 could also have been sources before 1945 explaining earlier developments. The 
explanation they offer will, as it turns out, force us to dig a bit deeper. Questions of social 
justice, as we now understand them, would not have arisen had not, during the 19lh 
century, a new and quite revolutionary view of society and responsibility emerged. 
Goodin and Dryzek consider three categories of possible motivational sources for 
the rise of the welfare state in Britain after 1945, all of them tentative answers to the 
ancient question "why be moral?" One is altruism, or, in a more profane version, fellow-
feeling in times of war (Dryzek and Goodin 1984: 2, 23). They discard this as an 
insufficient explanation, as it seems to presuppose its conclusion, i.e., that people are 
altruistic. Furthermore, altruism is not a very plausible theory: if altruistic feelings 
extended to everyone in society, rights, for example, should be superfluous. 
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Dryzek's and Goodin's other two solutions are based on the presumption that 
justice implies impartiality (a common assumption among liberal theorists of social 
justice). One explanation is that there are reasons why no one can pursue his egoistic 
interests in massive societies like ours, so that it becomes possible to act impartially on 
moral preferences or according to a sense of justice without any extra costs (Dryzek and 
Goodin 1984: 5). Again, this is a solution that requires its conclusion to be ils premise. It 
only explains the support of those for whom the premise is valid: people must already 
have internalized values supporting social justice and/or the welfare state. 
There is, however, a second option for an explanation in terms of (rational) egoism, 
which Goodin and Dryzek prefer: impartiality induced by fundamental uncertainty. Most 
theories of social justice are built on this premise - John Rawls's original position, the 
Kantian idea of universalizability of principles, and the utilitarian Ideal Observer being 
some of the more familiar examples. The point Goodin and Dryzek however try to make, 
supported by empirical evidence, is that such conditions can and do obtain in the real 
world as well - that is, they did in Britain during and after World War II, and in other 
countries in the same period. The risks of being bombed or injured were equal for all, and 
these as well as other uncertainties gave the impetus to share risks, even or especially in 
the case of self-protecting egoists. The explosive growth of distributive mechanisms during 
the war could thus be interpreted as one of "... just insurance schemes, wherein everyone 
pools his own risks with the ex ante undistinguishablc risks of everyone else" (Dryzek and 
Goodin 1984: 7). 
Unfortunately, the thesis that pervasive uncertainty, impartiality and risk-pooling 
insurance schemes together (partly) account for the motivational basis of the welfare 
state - and therewith for the emergence of social justice as a practical question - cannot be 
totally adequate. The idea of risk-pooling points to deeper problems: why should we share 
insurance on the level of national societies - and why should we pay for the consequences 
of risks taken by others? After all, redistributive mechanisms are not only concerned with 
compensating bombed families. Quite to the contrary: health insurance, housing subsidies, 
unemployment benefits and so forth, all have little to do with such "acts of God", nor with 
risks we all run to the same extent - and yet people feel that it is just to support some 
kind of welfare state. And obviously social justice is not limited, neither in theory nor as a 
practical problem, to nation stales. So why then do we feel that it is just to share so many 
kinds of risks with whomever we share a kind of society with? 
The French philosopher François Ewald's answer seems to reflect the common 
view in philosophy: a change of mentality which either induced or accompanied the 
development of the welfare slate, l'État Providence, must have taken place. Scientists have 
already pointed to various structural and institutional factors in the "context of develop-
ment" of the welfare state, such as secularization, the emergence of national instead of 
local economies, and the increasing power of both capital and labour. In the "context of 
justification", Goodin and Dryzek and others have pointed to (a) altruistic motives, to (b) 
opportunities for egoists lo express their suppressed sense of justice, and to (c) self-
protection in the face of uncertainly, as with Dryzek and Goodin, or because of a changing 
balance of power in society (as in some Marxist perspectives, where the welfare slate is 
one of the weapons of capitalism in the class struggle). To all this Ewald adds the 
"context of interpretation": the development of a new episteme, an epistemological 
mechanism "producing" truth. According to his Foucaullian vocabulary, a new 
conceptualization of responsibility in the context of society supported, reinforced, and 
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modified the influence of factors and contexts like those discussed so far. Its rise would 
further explain the evolution of laissez-faire liberalism's at best morally required charity 
(bienfaisance) into political and legal insurance schemes, and, in particular, the public 
support for sharing ever more social risks (Ewald 1986: 77 ff., 122 ff.). 
Ewald illustrates his theory with the development of the French "historic school" of 
jurists who, around 1900, advocated the inclusion of social justice in the Napoleonic-
liberal system of civil law. Crucial in their proposals was a shift from liability for errors to 
liability as risk-pooling. Ewald quotes Saleilles, one of their spokesmen: "Modern life is 
more than ever a matter of risks" (Ewald 1986: 353). Society became more intricate, risky 
and opaque, individuals were forced to play an increasing number of social roles, and they 
increasingly depended on the work, cooperation and support of others. To the degree that 
these developments occurred, everyday moral and legal categories like fault, personal 
responsibility and punishment became less applicable (Ewald 1986: 362, 372, cf. 15 ff.). 
According to the historic school, the law should be concerned with the more fruitful 
question of who was to bear the costs of all these risks and specifically with who caused 
the risks rather than the accidents. 
Hence liability was no longer understood in terms of a natural characteristic, the 
individual's responsibility as a free person. It was now to be derived from a conventional 
definition of responsibility: society determined who was liable and who would have to pay 
the costs (Ewald 1986: 354). It was only a small conceptual step from here to solidarity 
(fraternity) and risk-pooling (Ewald 1986: 358 ff., cf. 336); and reasoning from compensa­
tion to redistribution was even simpler: if one cannot be individually responsible for one's 
burdens in this risky society to which all contribute, how can one be responsible for one's 
benefits, how can we call our earnings really ours! (cf. Ewald 1986: 368) Finally, as 
Saleilles's colleague Bourgeois argued, if there is no objective measure for responsibility, 
the only way to justify such a system of redistribution must be an insurance contract, a 
social contract, to which we would agree if we were free and equal and had no particular 
position in existing societies - a fictitious contract (Ewald 1986: 369-370). To those 
familiar with modern theories of social justice, all this must look like в déjà-vû. 
The central point in this new episteme is the shift from a natural, causal, individ-
ual-based conception of responsibility, characteristic of classic liberalism, lo a fictitious, 
political, society-based conception. The responsibility for risks and accidents in social and 
economic life had become so widely and uncontrollably dispersed that it transformed into 
collective responsibility. Compared to other conceptions of responsibility, this shift is a 
landslide. Determinists like the Stoics could not understand responsibility other than as 
limited to what is truly within the individual's power: motives, dispositions, emotions 
(Epictetus 1966: I). Spinoza was of the same mind, though in his view human (intellectual 
and physical) power could extend to parts of the outer world (Wissenburg 1991a: 11 ff.). 
Neither these determinists, nor the voluntaristic classical liberals would ever have 
considered the idea of linking responsibility to uncertainly, or of radically shifting the 
costs of manmade risks from the individual to society. In their view, uncertainty originated 
in God or nature, not in man, and responsibility necessarily rested in free individuals 
acting on their best knowledge. 
Even if there are other virtues to society, modern political philosophy nearly 
always perceives of it as a form of cooperation for mutual advantage - Locke, Hobbes, 
Pufendorf, and Spinoza did, the jurists of the historic school did, and theorists of social 
justice are no exception. The conception of responsibility as pooling of uncertainty 
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immensely increases the advantages to be gained from living together - as well as the 
risks. If we may believe Ewald, this conception is not only popular among philosophers 
but also characterizes the ideologies of the welfare state. There, it allows propositions like 
"X could have happened to all of us" (let X be unemployment, or a handicap, or poverty), 
"you have not deserved X, you are not responsible for being X', and "X, or the disadvan­
tage caused by X, is a risk of living in modem society" to make sense and raise support 
for welfare stale institutions. It would thus bridge the gap between our feelings of guilt or 
shame about not suffering X or about being glad not to suffer X, and a feeling of being 
responsible and hence morally obliged to share risks. 
To explain support for the welfare slate it seems that we need such a hypothesis: 
support seems rational only to the degree that people somehow believe that social and 
economic risks are social products creating a collective responsibility. It would take us too 
far into political science, history and sociology to investigate if collective responsibility is 
in fact the dominant or unique episteme at the basis of public support for the evolution 
and maintenance of the welfare state.1* What counts is that the same "mind-frame" 
characterizes mainstream liberal theories of social justice, which might help to explain the 
popularity of the philosophical debate: philosophers and the public at large for once speak 
the same language. Whether it is an appropriate language, i.e., whether the notion of 
collective responsibility is adequate or true or rational, is another question (one that shall 
be addressed in Part III). 
The problem of distribution and cooperation 
Apart from an ideological17 foundation, the debate on social justice also has roots 
in - evidently - political theory in general. In this respect modern political theory has been 
deeply influenced from two sides: traditional political philosophy and modem political 
science. In the first place, political philosophers since Socrates have interpreted justice as 
the main problem and central task of the slate (cf. Ewald 1986: 558). The debate on social 
justice is no exception to this rule; it is firmly rooted in the tradition. Secondly, it has 
received a new impulse from modem American political science, which has always 
defined politics in terms of the (legitimate) distribution of benefits and burdens over a 
society. Take the most simple, and, through Easton's adaption, most influential definition 
of politics, Laswell's, which characterizes politics as the process of deciding "who gets 
what, when and how". The social justice perspective can then be described as asking the 
"why should?"-qucstion about politics: 
Y,\who, what, when, how]. 
In the greater part of - at least Anglo-Saxon - political theory this question has 
been conceptualized as one of choice and distribution. Disregarding nuances, we can 
distinguish two, historically separate but by no means mutually exclusive, relevant 
The thesis may be true not only for France bul also for Britain around 1900, when the same Ewaldlan 
themes and conceptions appeared in political debates on social security; cf. Michael Frceden's The New 
Liberalism Π 978). 
If one may call the ontologica! axiom of collective responsibility, together with its imperative impact, 
ideological. 
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perspectives: rational choice and social justice." In the first perspective, which includes 
theories like individual and social choice (cf. Elster 1987: 73), public choice, collective 
action, and games theory, the point of view is amoral or "beyond morality". Preferences 
and interests are taken as a given, and the problem is to find out which policy choice 
(rationally) best satisfies the often opposed preferences, which strategy is best for 
generating a rational choice, or which side-constraints must be put on preferences and 
procedures to reach one. In the second tradition, the accent is shifted from rationality to 
morality, to the theories behind preferences. The choice is to be one for a distribution that 
may or may not optimally satisfy the individuals's preferences and other demands of 
rational choice, but that should at least be perceived as based on just principles - and it is 
on the justification of those principles that justice theorists concentrate. 
Ideally, the rational choice will by definition be the socially just choice. Theories 
of social justice however depart from the supposition that this is not necessarily the case -
for various possible reasons. For instance: 
(1) perhaps individuals have certain preferences that cannot be "rationalized"; or 
(2) maybe there are no preferences that can be justified; or, arguments also used 
against utilitarianism, 
(3) maybe preferences and current desires are not the whole truth about what is 
desirable in itself (Sen and Williams 1982: 6); and 
(4) an ordinal measurement of preferences may be impossible because things like 
religion and aesthetics, or desires and ideals, cannot be put on one scale (cf. Sen 
and Williams 1982: 8-9). 
All four arguments would discredit if not disqualify the rational choice approach. Another 
possible reason is the assumption 
(5) that there is an ethical universe outside that of rationality, generating prescrip-
tions which are at least as important as, or more important than, the rational 
satisfaction of preferences (e.g. autonomy, liberty, equality, fraternity). 
Finally, it may be - and I think - that 
(6) the choice to "rationalize" morality, to translate distribution problems in terms 
of rational choice, is itself a moral choice, a step that cannot be taken without first 
determining the degree to which preferences and moral principles should be taken 
seriously. 
In the last two cases there is no a priori good reason why preferences rather than 
principles should, or why principles should not, be satisfied as best as possible. 
Over the years, the social justice perspective has developed numerous connections 
with its surroundings in political philosophy and political science. Merely as an illustration 
Other taxonomies are of course equally possible. See e.g. Harsanyi (1982: 43), who distinguishes 
between three main perspectives: Individual rational choice, rational choice In a social setting (which he calls 
game theory), and ethics, alias social justice. 
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of how well the debate fits in its environment, I shall sketch five general "levels" of the 
debate. 
Firstly, there is a level of what I call general theory and basic adaptions. After 
Rawls, theorists like Nozick (1974), Brandt (1979), Ackerman (1980), Walzer (1983), and 
recently Barry, in his three-volume A Treatise on Social Justice (of which so far only the 
first part has been published), developed complete theories of (social) justice, often 
inspired by famous predecessors. Others, like Dworkin, Scanlon, Wolff, and various 
contributors to collections like Reading Rawls (Daniels 1975) and Reading Nozick (Jeffrey 
1981), have constructed alternatives to earlier proposed principles of justice, or solutions 
to perceived weak spots in the basic arguments for those general theories. Still others have 
made attempts to integrate general theories of social justice into the framework of existing 
political theories, or investigated the relation between for example Rawls and Kant (a 
theme that is especially popular in Germany), Nozick and Locke, and communitarianism 
and Rousseau. 
Secondly, there is a level at which the debate goes into more detail. It is then less 
concerned with interpreting or generating theories of social justice, and more with 
clarifying the concepts or methods used, such as individuality and self, equality, liberty, 
rights, intuition, consent, obedience, duty, and virtue. Much of what Amartya Sen" has 
written on social justice falls into this category (e.g. on Rawls: Sen 1975), as do Derek 
Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) and Larry Temkin's Inequality (1993). 
As a special case of the debate on these two levels, I should mention the dialogue 
between social justice and rational choice that is conducted in texts like Barry (1989), 
Brandt (1979), Elster (1987), Harsanyi (1982), and Sen (1975). As a rational actor is not 
necessarily a just actor (and vice versa), there is good reason to ask how rational theories 
of justice are, or how just rational policies can be. 
Fourthly, there is the level of application of already existing theories of social 
justice, especially Rawls's. The aim of such work is to adapt theories for practical use 
rather than to find - as is done at the second level - philosophical shortcomings. Perhaps 
the most popular field in which this is done today is that of "green politics" (cf. Wissen­
burg 1993). 
The last level of the debate to be mentioned here is a special case of the former: in 
texts on social justice, data from the empirical social sciences are often used to support 
philosophical arguments, whereas themes discussed in the philosophical debate are in their 
turn taken up by social scientists. I shall discuss this exchange between philosophical and 
scientific ideas in more detail below, as a third possible reason for the popularity of 
theories of liberal social justice. 
In general, the debate has not only expanded far beyond the "general" core, it has 
also become fragmented: few philosophers are interested in building new ecumenical 
theories - the trend is rather down to (second-level) conceptual analysis, or away to other 
hot issues in moral philosophy such as ecologism - and fewer scientists are interested in 
the hairs theorists of justice currently (need to) split. Brian Barry, making up the records 
of the debate at a Dutch conference in 1991, observed the same tendencies, and corn-
Sen has made another helpful distinction between two modi operanda of critics. I.e., between case-
Implication critique, examining contradictory Implications of theories of justice, and prior-principle critique, which 
is focused on (he misfits between the more basic and the more practical principles a particular theorist (theory) 
espouses (Sen 1980: 197). Sen's division cross-cuts mine between general and detailed levels of analysis. 
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merited with some regret that the time for grand theories was over and that the debate on 
social justice sec was nearly dead (Barry 1991a). 
Social justice and social science 
The relation between the philosophy of social justice and the social sciences20 is 
less one of real communication than of a combination of one-sided relations. In the words 
of Klaus Scherer, there is a "fragmentation of scholarship and research across the various 
disciplines concerned with it" (i.e., with social justice) (Scherer 1992: ix). Attempts to 
"dress up" the findings of social science in a theoretical suit, or to test whether people 
behave in real life as they are supposed to do in theories of social justice (e.g. under a veil 
of ignorance) are, impressive and interesting as they may be to one side, often peripheral 
to the other. Both parlies profit from one another, even to their mutual advantage, but not 
in a cooperative venture. 
Liberal theorists of social justice borrow ideas, concepts, and facts from social 
science, and sometimes even use them as key concepts. In this sense they "exchange" 
information with the social sciences. Rawls, for instance, look one of his central axioms 
from economy: the maximin principle, according to which rational individuals will choose 
that distribution principle which will make them, if they were to be worst-off, least worst-
off in comparison to all other principles. Nozick's theory of justice is heavily influenced 
by classical economics. He extended the "invisible hand"-explanalion to cover the 
development of states, and applied the idea of a free market to preferences regarding the 
people with whom one wants to share a community (Nozick 1974: 8 ff. respectively 299 
ff.). The first half of Brandt's book (1979) contains a detailed discussion of psychological 
theories about subjective values, desires, and behaviour, all to help construct the basic unit 
of his theory, the rational individual. In Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1983), examples 
taken from history and anthropology contribute substantially to his arguments. A few years 
ago, a renowned British philosopher described American political theory as "what's up at 
the Supreme Court". Although this may be an unfair generalization, the verdict seems to 
be correct in at least one case. In all of Dworkin's work, the decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Constitution of the U.S. and the debates in American law schools are 
constant points of reference. Finally, there is not one theorist who does not use concepts 
from political science - especially those of liberal democracy and the welfare state. 
Nevertheless, Rawls, Nozick, Brandt, Walzer, Dworkin and many others all 
(legitimately) use modern scientific concepts and data selectively and egoislically, that is, 
on their own terms. They do not take sides in scientific debates, nor do they write with the 
intention of directly contributing to scientific theory-development or of illuminating 
concepts used in the social sciences. They participate first and foremost in their own, 
philosophical debate on the issue of what could or should be the case (regarding justice), 
rather than in one about what is the case - which would be the scientific question. The 
hypothetical character of this philosophical discussion, combined with the ever provisional 
status of scientific knowledge, together explain why theorists of distributive justice prefer 
to use empirical knowledge as illustrations rather than as proofs of political theories. They 
I use the term social science in a very broad sense, comprising all the scientific disciplines wholly or 
partially devoted to the study of man In society. I.e., history, law, sociology, psychology, economy, political 
science, etc. 
36 J U S T I C E F R O M A D I S T A N C E 
accept rational choice theorems, indicating the borders of what is logically and "thus" 
empirically possible, with much less hesitance. 
A second contribution of the social sciences to the theory of liberal social justice is 
much less substantial. In consequentialislic theories of justice, like Hare's (e.g. 1982), or 
Brandt's (1979), as well as in more deontological ones (for instance Rawls'), justice or 
acting justly is directly related to having and using adequate knowledge. One has to know 
as much as is reasonably possible about the real world and real humans to be able to act 
justly (or as justly as possible) and to know what the proper (as proper as possible) 
principles of justice are. Conform the contingent nature of scientific knowledge this 
remains a formal requirement: the content of such knowledge is hardly ever described in 
detail. 
Hence the social sciences contribute to the development of theories of justice, but 
they do so in the peculiar role of philosophy's messenger boy bringing in messages from 
the real world, an intermediary between theoria and praxis of justice. 
On the other side of the divide between social science and philosophy, social 
justice is a well-established research field, especially in sociology, social psychology (in 
both these disciplines known as social justice research) and, focused on closely related 
subjects like the welfare stale and liberal democracy, in political science. Yet here 
philosophy is the maid-servant. References to theorists of social justice are rare, relative to 
the number of fellow-scientists quoted, and they are often limited to one or two of the best 
known authors in the field (currently Rawls, Nozick, and Barry). Of course this can be 
explained, again, by the nature of the debate: qualitate qua, scientists are interested in 
what real people think or do about justice, not in what philosophers determine that justice 
should be. Consequently, political science lakes justice motives often as primitive terms, 
as results of sociological or social psychological processes, to be explained in the 
appropriale disciplines. In social justice research in turn, the opcrationalizalion of the 
concept of justice is pram-oriented (Wegener 1990: 67) in two ways: it is directed to the 
measurement of attitudes and behaviour, and guided by earlier (successful) operalionaliza-
lions. Only at this last point do philosophers sometimes contribute to science by offering 
distinctions between justice-related concepts like fairness and equality, or procedural and 
substantial justice. But their contribution is (from the scientific point of view, legitimately) 
limited by the demands that it must be possible to operationalize such distinctions, and 
that those operationalizaüons should somehow yield statistically significant results. 
What can go wrong with philosophizing is obvious and well-known: it may lose its 
relevance to the real world. This is not to say that "the real world" always, or ever, has the 
privilege of determining the relevance of intellectual interests - all I want to say is that 
philosophy can (also) err, especially when it wants to be practical. The danger is clear and 
present in the debate on liberal social justice. It would be nice to have it confirmed that 
social justice requires an international social contract between peoples from developed and 
underdeveloped nations, an international community, a radical redistribution of wealth, 
political power and resources, and a new relationship with nature - but, contingent as they 
may be, it is unlikely that social science can prove that the necessary conditions for 
"ultimate" justice will shortly obtain. We need not go further into that risk here; it shall be 
dealt with on various occasions elsewhere in this book. 
What can go wrong with "scicnticizing", doing scientific research without feedback 
to philosophy, is less obvious but equally disturbing. A recent example, an article by Wil 
Aris and Pcler van Wijck in a Dutch scientific magazine, may illustrale ihis point. Arts 
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and Van Wijck distinguish two traditions in macro-sociological thought regarding the 
choice of principles of social justice in developed societies, one predicting consent on such 
principles (the Durkheimian theory of the industrial society), the other predicting dissent 
(the Marxist theory of the class society; Arts and van Wijck 1991: 65). In view of the 
inconclusive and contradictory evidence for or against both theories, they propose an 
individualistic approach, directed at identifying the factors that cause dissent or consent 
among concrete individuals in their specific social settings when asked to evaluate the 
relative weight given, again in their specific group, to principles of justice.21 Some of the 
factors they mention are homogeneity of a group's social and cultural background, and 
uniformity of the perceived structure of goals (Arts and van Wijck 1991: 76 ff.). 
Now if we recall the distinctions made in section 3 between different "locations" of 
justice, it is clear that Arts and van Wijck suddenly, and probably without noticing, 
changed their perspective. Whereas the Durkheimian and Marxist traditions investigate 
perceptions of principles for distribution over a society (cf. Arts and van Wijck 1991: 67-
71), Arts and van Wijck are interested in the principles actually invoked in processes of 
distribution at a micro-level in a society. More precisely, the followers of tradition locate 
justice at the level of states of affairs, but Arts and van Wijck "relocate" it in social 
interaction - and perceptions of (in)justice need not be the same on both locations. Hence 
they discuss a second conception of social justice rather than illuminate the first. 
Science, including social science, fares well without philosophy - most of the time; 
and philosophy fares well without science - most of the time. To proclaim the necessity 
for (more) interdisciplinary efforts by scientists and philosophers is a platitude, even a 
debatable one. Not only do both parties fare well, but one can also seriously doubt 
whether it is the mission of philosophy to enlighten science, or that of science to bring 
philosophers back to earth.22 A less ambitious conclusion seems to be more in place here: 
there are moments when, on the whole, a little more communication between the two may 
not be harmful. 
Section 7: Anolocv 
There is no evident reason why the liberal paradigm should have a monopoly on 
the term social justice. However, in the remainder of this book I shall identify social 
justice with the liberal interpretation of distributive justice. In principle, such a limited 
approach needs no defence: in the first place one has to limit oneself; secondly, the liberal 
approach is flourishing and as such at least as interesting as competing models; and 
thirdly, I have deeper personal reasons for preferring a liberal over any other approach to 
political issues. Yet I think there is more to be said in favour of the liberal programme, 
even at this moment when we know little more about it than that it is popular, that it aims 
at satisfying impartiality and other undefined liberal principles, and that it discusses 
Ans and van Wijck follow an important tradition in social justice research by distinguishing three 
principles of justice (as ΙΓ there were no others): to each according to his contribution, to each according to his 
needs, and equality for all (Arts and van Wijck 1991: 75). 
22 
One can even Interpret the later Wittgenstein as an agnostic on this point (cf. Lock 1991: 42). For a 
systematic examination of interdisciplinary research on social justice, leading lo a conclusion similar to (he one I 
draw here, see Dell and Schokkacrt (1992). 
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distributive justice in the context of a complex society where risks and responsibilities are 
shared. The (five) arguments I shall offer are not conclusive and perhaps not even sound; 
in the end they may turn out to be no more than bad imitations of Thomas Aquinas's 
style. Still, they serve two good purposes: that of questioning the conditioned reflex of 
adherence to some point of view without knowing why, and that of offering the reader 
other and hopefully better reasons than my own prejudices to read on. 
The first argument is based on the concept of probability and begins with the 
observation that the premises, the basic ethical principles, of the liberal approach are more 
or less consciously shared by millions of people all over the world. 
We all know what the democratic fallacy is: for a moment disregarding the 
differences between ethical and empirical (aspects of) phenomena, it is not true that 
something Ρ is more true if more people believe in it. If truth were determined by belief, 
the Congress of the State of Indiana which (allegedly) decided by an 1897 law that янЗ 
thereby made it true that π equalled 3. Or, in another imaginable world, Santa Claus 
would exist more in the years following a baby boom than in the preceding years. 
But, on the other hand, it is true that the more people believe P, and the more 
reasoru they have to believe P, the chance that there are good reasons among these 
reasons rises and, consequently, so does the chance that they are right in believing P. 
Still, the chance that something Ρ is true is not identical with the existence of P. 
But then again, truth need not be a value in a binary system. Fuzzy logic and other 
alternatives to first order predicate logic allow us to take a less radical position. Think of 
the truth of propositions as adequacy in describing slates of affairs. We can say of two 
propositions, both true, that one is more true (or less false) than the other. "At the moment 
I first wrote down this argument, I was in my late twenties" is true, but less true than "At 
the moment...I was 28". Alternatively, "I am German" is false, but not as false as "I do 
not have German ancestors". 
Furthermore, if we know for certain that something X is not true we could, with 
due care, call propositions less false the more they deny X. For instance: if X is "God is an 
elephant" then Spinoza's metaphysics are less false than the theory that God is, in fact, 
two elephants. 
Therefore, supposing there is an X, such that we can estimate the truth of proposi­
tions relative to X (thereby defining "good reasons" to believe other propositions), then it 
is true that, the higher the belief and the belter the reasons, the less false (or, alternatively, 
the more true) a proposition is. 
Bui we do not have Xs in the field of ethics. However appalling dr. Mengele's 
practices for example may have been, we cannot argue and prove empirically that they are 
ethically wrong. 
On the other hand, it may be that it is exactly the difference between ethical and 
empirical phenomena which makes the democratic fallacy true. All we need is the 
supposition that existence depends on belief, and in this case, that the existence of an 
ethical Ρ depends upon the existence of agreement on P. If we accept this premise (or 
others generating the same conclusion) and thereby do justice to the particular nature of 
values as "something" in between facts and private tastes - then we should also admit that 
there is a considerable amount of truth in the (premises of the) liberal paradigm. 
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The second argument is based on the idea of uncertainty in ethical matters, 
independent of the number of people who are (un)cerlain. 
Suppose for a moment that there is a Platonic or Aristotelian Form of social 
justice, existing independent of any possible method we might use to discover it. Yet 
proselytes of different persuasions wander around this world hitting one another on every 
part of body and mind with their Bibles, Korans, Thoras, Bhagavad Ghitas, and other 
printed editions of what they believe to be the true source of morality. Among them we 
also find a liberal, whose holy book is a dummy. How would each of these persons 
convince us of the truth or desirability of their approaches to justice? 
It is clear that the Utopian programme could not, for two reasons. Firstly, its theory 
of justice can probably only be used to justify principles in a world of abundance, where 
abundance means either a production satisfying our needs, or needs attuned to the possible 
production. It presupposes a world where distribution is no longer an existential problem, 
a problem of survival. In all other possible worlds, theories of justice (Utopian or not) 
would be biased, being, to use the marxist phraseology, the ideological product of classes 
under conditions of economic struggle. Under such circumstances any "impartial" theory 
of justice would be either incomprehensible to the parties involved, or unacceptable to 
some. Secondly, under perfect conditions of abundance the Utopian programme can only 
defend one principle of justice. We would call it a happy coincidence if this were the 
Platonic Form, but we cannot be sure of that. The same objection can be raised against the 
orthodox Thomistic programme: neither Thomism nor utopianism can accept, let alone 
defend, a Form that does not fit in with the ethical standpoint of either party. 
These paradigms then presuppose what the liberal programme tries not to: 
essentialistic or substantive ethics, that is, a material conception of the ultimate or 
common good. Quite apart from the question how the liberal programme would defend the 
platonic Form, it is clear that it is at least open to more possible moral theories than the 
other two programmes. 
However, the force of this argument depends on our own convictions, or absence 
of definite convictions. If we were good Thomists or Marxists, we would not doubt that 
either of our favourite programmes would discover the true Form and, better still, would 
defend It In the best possible, in fact the only valid, way. In this we follow that most 
astute doctor, Brian Barry: "A dogmatist, for the purposes of this discussion, is not simply 
someone who adheres lo a dogma, but someone who adheres to it dogmatically" (Barry 
1990: 13). 
On the other hand, let us suppose that there is no such thing as a Form of social 
justice. Now we must imagine a land without law, where lawyers, judges, and other 
guardians of justice argue with all their rhetorical skills for the merits of Hammurabi, 
Justinian, the Code Napoléon, the Sharia, or Common Law. 
At least the Thomistic paradigm would be in a worse position. In the absence of a 
final ethical truth, it would defend a belief that is by definition overdone and false. 
Utopianism would meet with the same problem in a stale of plenty. 
Be that as it may, under circumstances other than perfect anarchism, communism, 
or whatever the Utopian theorist prefers, the liberal and the Utopian programmes would 
both be able to make possibly valid claims about social justice: utopianism because it is 
amoral or super-moral in the absence of a perfect society, and liberalism because we 
suppose it to be impartial in moral affairs. 
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A third argument centres around the idea of viability, and is again based on the 
large basts of liberalism in society - in the broad interpretation of that tradition. 
What, so we may ask, is the use of a conception of justice if it cannot be imple-
mented? The advantage of the liberal programme is that its basic intuitions conform to 
those of most of the inhabitants of what is so unfortunately called the civilized world, or 
what so unfortunately is the civilized world. From an optimist's point of view, it seems 
reasonable to assume that such a basic consensus will make it easier to discuss theories of 
justice and their possible applications, as it reduces the range and number of debatable 
questions. 
Unfortunately, one may doubt whether the optimist's view is in fact always correct: 
in the last decade, some European voters for instance had little trouble with voting for 
racist parties, though they used to vote for the parties of civilization. Apparently, basic 
values are not as important in real life as they are in political philosophy, or the consensus 
on them is not as stable as one would want it to be. 
Still, let us for a moment grant that a basic consensus makes it easier to influence 
or formulate policies. I do not want to argue that a theory of social justice must be useful, 
that it must conform to the general opinion. Quite to the contrary. But it may, to some 
undetermined degree, be ethically good for two reasons. Firstly, from a deontological point 
of view it is the intention, the Gesinnung, which really counts. If a theory of justice 
influences politicians and policies, then the justice motive in political behaviour will be 
stronger - which, according to the deontologist, must be a good thing in itself. Secondly, 
from a (particular) consequcntialistic point of view, the less we talk about justice and the 
more we do about it, the better. If our policy in fact has a positive effect in terms of 
justice there is reason to be glad, and if it docs not, then at least we will have learned 
something about what justice is not. 
In the fourth place, considering the heterogeneity of moral and political convic-
tions, we can claim that the basic ideas behind the liberal approach make it morally 
superior. For this we must appeal to a classical argument for liberalism, its respect for the 
opinions of others. Including Utopians and Thomlsts, as well as vegetarians, Buddhists, 
Jews, vitalists, nudists and monarchists. Theorists of liberal social justice have proposed 
numerous principles and methods to warrant each person's freedom of seeking almost 
every kind of salvation imaginable. Nozick's utopia, with its nearly unlimited freedom of 
association, probably offers the most extended freedom possible in a liberal perspective. 
The liberal minimum solution to the problem of living apart together will presumably not 
differ much from Ronald Dworkin's theory of the right to equal respect Such a society 
does not guarantee much freedom above, but at least reaches beyond, the bare toleration of 
differing opinions. 
Nonetheless, dogmatists are supposed to adhere dogmatically to a dogma. It would 
seem that such an attitude is incompatible with tolerance, let alone respect for deviant 
opinions. 
To this we may answer that tolerance is passive, intolerance active. To practice 
intolerance is to risk sin, in the theological sense; inconsistency, in the logical sense; and 
depravity, in the ethical sense. Waging war on heretics involves tyranny, killing, looting, 
raping, torture, and other acts that will be immoral after the victory, inconsistent with 
morality during the battle, and sinful everywhere and everywhen. Only a religion of 
Thugs, demanding outright evil of its adherents, could be insensitive to such arguments -
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but one may doubt if such religions are sensitive to any rational argument at all. Hence we 
must admit that it is still an open question whether the dogmatist cannot be convinced of 
the virtue of adhering to - at least - the principle of tolerance.2' 
Yet critics of the liberal approach like Michael Sandel (cf. Sandel 1982: 173 ff.) 
have rightly commented that it is biased towards individuals and towards individualistic 
values. For instance, Rawls distributes primary goods to fulfil individual plans of life, but 
fraternity or a vegetarian society cannot be among these goods. Or, on a welfare view of 
social justice, individual preference satisfaction is the measure of all things. Yet if 
individuals, even a unanimous society of them, considered some social value to be of 
overall importance, that is, if they all desire a society in accordance with Sir Thomas 
More's proposals or with those of William Morris, liberalism could not support their 
views. Even in Nozick's utopia the sub-society of More-isLs or Morrisists (or Marxists or 
Thomisls) would be subjected to an external and possibly incompatible basic constitution 
(the minimal slate), and for the rest be nothing but a circumstantially determined, merely 
"preferred", thick layer of cosmetics. 
Still, what the liberal programme offers is more than the other two can give. There 
is no room for pluralism in those views. Liberalism may not support other social ideals, 
but it also does not by definition ban them. 
At best, liberalism, or indeed any other view than the true belief, is tolerated. But 
such toleration cannot be defended (without becoming somewhat liberal oneself) by other 
than opportunistic considerations: the necessity for a modus vivendi between Christians 
and those lost for the truth, or, as in Marx's socialist principle of distribution, a compro-
mise between communism and capitalism. Even if a dogmatist should be tolerant, as 
argued above, his tolerance is not part of his dogma, but an accidental consequence of the 
incongruity of dogma and reality. This is about the minimum level of freedom that the 
liberal approach, in a Dworkinian society of equal respect, is willing to offer - whereas 
liberals take considerably more trouble to justify the legitimacy of holding on to other 
views. 
At worst, other views are branded "false, heretical and blasphemous", and their 
adherents treated accordingly. 
Finally, returning to the question of the "true" meaning of the term social justice, 
we can ask which paradigm is best suited to "give each his due", or to determine what 
"due" is. On this point little can be said in favour of the liberal approach in specific, but 
still enough to support the claim that it can shed a different and valuable light on the 
theory of social justice. 
Admittedly, the object of the liberal research programme differs only gradually 
from that of the Utopian and that of the orthodox Thomislic approaches. It is, as indicated 
above, primarily concerned with questions of distributive justice. Yet it addresses general 
justice as well: the sustenance of the social bond and the connected problem of obligation 
arc side constraints on the liberal programme. It is precisely this cluster of problems which 
liberal theorists catch when they ask for "our considered judgements" or "our shared 
The argument Is derived from Erasmus's celemín cerneo: Intolerance leads to war and other sins; It Is 
therefore Inconsistent with the Christian faith. Surprisingly, Brian Barry has not listed this once very popular 
argument for tolerance in his essay on the defence of liberal institutions (Barry 1990). 
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understandings". Though the liberal programme may primarily be interested in distributive 
justice, it does not fully ignore general justice. 
Nevertheless the liberal approach positively distinguishes itself in another respect, 
that of the special perspective it offers on social justice - whether general or distributive. 
The Thomistic approach is rather unconcerned about questions of scarcity as such; in the 
end, all that matters is being virtuous and deserving salvation. Nor is it prepared to deal 
with dissenting opinions on the essence or meaning of virtues. The Utopian programme has 
similar problems with regard to dissenting opinions about the ultimate good. Furthermore, 
it is a programme for perfection, for a society in which the problem of distribution can 
never be one of individual or collective survival. 
Hence, the advantages of the liberal approach are twofold: in contrast to its 
competitors, it takes moral pluralism seriously, not as a temporary or contingent phenom­
enon but as a basic fact of life; and it examines the issue of distributive justice in less than 
perfect circumstances. The ultimate virtue of the theory liberal social justice is that it is 
humanistic, in the original sense of the word: it places the needs of concrete human 
beings, hie et nunc, at the centre of attention. 
CHAPTER 2: IMPARTIALITY AND OTHER LIBERAL IDEALS 
Section 8: The core value of impartiality 
In Chapter 1 we encountered three perspectives on "social justice" and opted for a 
liberal understanding of the term. Central to liberal theories of social justice, I claimed, is 
the notion of neutrality or impartiality. (For a similar claim see e.g. Kley 1989: 400 ff.) In 
this chapter I shall focus mainly on this core value: what exactly docs it mean (and what 
not), and what are the implications of adhering to it for the justification of principles of 
justice? 
First, let me clarify some of the implications of my claim about the cenlrality of 
impartiality. To use the image of paradigms or research-programmes once more, theorists 
in such thought frames share a hard core of basic conceptions and methods, either as tacit 
knowledge or as explicit axioms. Impartiality is part of this hard core. The more we step 
away from this hard core, the more individual theories will differ from one another. The 
structure of paradigm-consistent theories can perhaps best be described in comparison to 
another familiar conception of structures: family resemblances. Theories (a, b, c, etc.) with 
a paradigmatica! structure will look like these: a(C, F„ F2, F3), b(C, F2, F3, F4), c{C, F„ 
F3, F4), etc., in which С stands for a shared hard core of propositions, and F,.„ for the 
aspects or propositions in which the theories differ. Theories with a family resemblance do 
not necessarily share C: a(C, F,, F2, F3), d(F,, F2, F3, F4), e(F,, F„ F4, F5), etc. Note the 
term "necessarily": paradigm-consistent theories form part of the paradigm if and only if 
the presence of the hard core in them is not coincidental. 
Though it is, strictly speaking, overkill, I shall make the stronger claim, that is: 
liberal theories of social justice have a paradigmatical rather than a family structure. Such 
a strong claim is probably both the simplest and the most convincing refutation of the 
counter-hypothesis that no superstructure for sets of theories of distributive justice exists, 
i.e., that they have essentially nothing in common and that hence no such thing as a liberal 
approach to theories of justice exists. However, I should warn the reader that my claim 
cannot be fully sustained, at least not at this moment. From a political theoretical 
perspective, the existence of a hard core С is not a coincidence: ils elements are typical of 
liberalism. From a sociological, psychological, or biographical perspective, we can perhaps 
further explain why the adherence of these theorists to liberalism is not a coincidence. Yet 
from a philosophical point of view, adherence to the hard core is only non-coincidental if 
there are good reasons for believing in core propositions, and as it turns out, the theorists 
discussed here fail to fully account for their beliefs. These good reasons do exist, but we 
shall have to formulate them ourselves, and will do so in Part II. 
I shall concentrate in particular on four of the best-known general theories of social 
justice, those of Ackerman, Nozick, Rawls and Walzer, and more or less neglect other 
general theories and other forms of theory, such as topic-oriented theories (Dworkin, 
Scanlon, Nagel) and consistency analysis (Sen, Temkin), assuming that these fit in with 
the general picture. Nevertheless from time to time especially Ronald Dworkin will be 
included in my group portrait as a pars pro toto. 
In the next section (Section 9) I shall begin by explaining what impartiality cannot 
be: complete. Ethical judgements, including those on justice, are impossible in a total 
absence of prior normative ideas. Theories of social justice would not be capable of 
deciding between alternative moral principles (or of defending any) if they were really, 
completely, impartial - and theorists in the field are aware of this fact. Further sections 
deal with the questions thus raised: What then does impartiality mean? (sections 10 and 
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11); With which conceptions of justice is it compatible and which ones are excluded? 
(section 12); And how does the justification of theories by an appeal to impartiality work? 
(sections 13 and 14). 
Section 9: The impossibility of complete impartiality 
The case against complete impartiality is simple: complete impartiality is by 
definition incompatible with moral judgements, even with a judgement to postpone 
judgement. Moral judgements presuppose that there is something on which to judge and 
something with which to judge - in other words, that there are sides to be chosen. 
Complete impartiality however supposes the absence of every standard, every notion of 
morality, every reason to choose sides or abstain from choosing sides. And never the 
twain shall meet. 
A first and obvious consequence of the impossibility of complete impartiality is 
that any judgement on justice will have to be biased somehow. A second and more 
interesting consequence is that these biases, the principles or procedures used in judging, 
cannot be completely impartial themselves - for similar reasons. Thirdly, the subclass of 
principles or procedures that are expected to warrant impartiality will themselves need a 
further justification that cannot be more than impartial in a sense. I shall illustrate these 
claims first with the case of John Rawls's original position, the most famous (supposedly) 
impartial procedure for (lie justification of principles of justice, and subsequently add other 
types of justice theory. 
"The device of the original position (...) cannot plausibly be taken as the starting 
point for political philosophy. It requires a deeper theory beneath it, a theory that 
explains why the original position has the features that it does and why the fact 
that people would choose particular principles in that position, if they would, 
certifies those principles as principles of justice." (Dworkin, 1981: 345) 
Ronald Dworkin's comment on Rawls's original position comes down to this: 
justifying procedures need justification themselves. In Dworkin's view, Rawls's original 
position is constructed as a method to guarantee not just fairness but, first and foremost, 
equality in a special sense. Dworkin's favourite and foundational moral idea, the right to 
equality of respect, would also be the cornerstone of Rawls's theory of justice (Dworkin, 
1978: 180), as it justifies the concept of fairness which in tum justifies the original 
position. 
Apart from the question whether this is a correct interpretation of Rawls, Dworkin 
is certainly right in claiming that the original position did not fall out of the blue, neither 
historically nor theoretically. The history of the original position as described in Rawls's 
magnum opus was one of trial and error: Rawls designed and revised his state of nature24 
The original position is a kind of slate of nature in (he coniractarian sense: it places human beings (more 
or less reduced to the features essential to a theory of justice) in a state where there are either no principles of 
justice, or where those principles are open to debate, revision and replacement. The original position however Is 
not a state of nature in the classical sense of leading to a contract by which a polity or a sovereign is Instated: cf. 
Rawls (1958: 176) and Gough (1957: 3). 
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according to his needs. The veil of ignorance, for instance, was developed in at least three 
steps. 
In 1958 Rawls invoked the notion of "fair procedures" (Rawls 1958: 179-181) to 
justify principles of justice in the eyes of real people - real at least in the way that they 
were not yet placed behind a veil of ignorance, though they were free and equal (Rawls 
1958: 179). The principles they would choose "express justice as a complex of three ideas: 
liberty, equality, and reward for services contributing to the common good" (Rawls 1958: 
166). Fairness as a criterium for procedures was justified as a basic moral notion, required 
to ensure that the contracting parties would recognize one another as persons with similar 
capacities and interests (Rawls 1958: 182). Many features of this first original position 
survived the process of thinking and rethinking; the real people however did not. In 1967 
Rawls covered them with a veil of ignorance: they no longer knew their position in 
society, nor which natural talents and abilities (if any) they had (Rawls 1967: 60). 
According to Kyoung-Kuk Min, who thoroughly investigated the history of the 
original position, this change in the design of the original position had the advantages of 
reducing the high bargaining-costs of the 1958 original position and of eliminating the 
element of personal "character" which would otherwise influence and probably even 
determine the outcome of the bargaining process (Min 1984: 17). As the contractors in the 
first "veil-less" original position had full knowledge of their personal and respective 
position in society, their capacities etcetera, they would have been able to lake full 
advantage of that knowledge, for instance by threatening with non-cooperation unless their 
piece of the cake was enlarged. From the point of view of justice as fairness, this will 
produce sub-optimal outcomes - hence bargaining-"cosLs". 
Now, the interesting question is why Rawls himself made this adaption. The "veil 
of ignorance prevents anyone from being advantaged or disadvantaged by the contin-
gencies of social class and fortune; and hence the bargaining problems which arise in 
everyday life from the possession of this knowledge do not affect the choice of prin-
ciples." (Rawls 1967: 60) At first sight Rawls's motivation is purely technical: the veil 
will "just" make it easier to reach an agreement. Yet in a hypothetical situation such as the 
original position time Is probably Irrelevant. There Is no need to hurry, only a need to 
reach an agreement. One of the bargaining problems in the first version of the original 
position might have been exactly the impossibility of reaching the desired agreement - for 
instance because of the very real possibility that some of the parties involved would stand 
to loose if Rawls's principles were adopted, principles they would thus veto (Wolff 1977: 
52). 
In A Theory of Justice (1971) finally, Rawls's defense of the veil of ignorance is 
more than technical: he now explicitly calls social and natural (dis)advantages morally 
arbitrary and unfair. "Thus it seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one 
should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the 
choice of principles" (Rawls 1971: 18; cf. Rawls 1993: 23 ff.). For one thing, the justice 
of the original position depends on the parties being "fairly situated and treated equally as 
moral persons" (Rawls 1971: 141). In a veil-free original position, their equality would 
only have been formal. The agreement then reached (if at all) would be based on 
exploiting one's bargaining advantages (talents, social position, etc.). It would have been a 
technically rational but not an evidently moral solution: "...to each according to his threat 
advantage is not a principle of justice" (Rawls 1971: 141). 
46 JUSTICE FROM A DISTANCE 
In the second place, the idea of a veil of ignorance is implicit in Kantian ethics. On 
Rawls's interpretation of Kant, a moral principle requires first of all the autonomous 
agreement of free and equal rational beings. Autonomy (as opposed to heteronomy) is 
characterized by the absence of the individual's social and natural contingencies25 from 
the decision-making process (Rawls 1971: 252). The veil of ignorance turns people into 
such autonomous persons or, to use another Kantian term, into noumenal26 selves. 
Let me summarize what facts we have gathered so far. Rawls's original position 
was designed and redesigned to justify specific principles of justice, or at least principles 
that express specific moral ideas which Rawls developed over time. The rationale of the 
original position - and of its revisions - is another, basic, moral notion: fairness. We can 
now draw two conclusions regarding the context of justification of Rawls's theory: (1) the 
shape of the original position is (at least partly) determined by logically prior moral ideas: 
it should incorporate them (fairness) and, indirectly, reflect them (liberty, equality, etc.); 
and (2) Rawls was aware of this logical priority, as his attempts to perfect the original 
position witness. 
Rawls's case is not unique. There are good reasons to believe (1) that all contract 
theories of social justice require a moral theory logically preceding and thus legitimizing 
the shape of the state of nature and its decision procedures; (2) that the same goes for all 
deductive theories of social justice, i.e., theories deriving principles from abstract prior 
principles; (3) that the same also goes for inductive theories, i.e., theories abstracting 
principles from real-world social practice27; and (4) that, tertium non datur, theories of 
social justice can impossibly be completely impartial. 
Contract theories of social justice (next to Rawls's for instance Ackerman's Social 
Justice in the Liberal State) necessarily involve people, proposals, knowledge, rules, goals 
and an end. It is easy to see why contract situations (or states of nature) involve people, 
proposals, and an end (the contract): without these elements there would be no contract 
theory. Furthermore, it is a trivial fact that the three other factors determine the outcome 
of the bargaining process; they are, so to speak, the independent variables. The rules of the 
game determine which proposals are admissible and how they will be discussed and 
judged. The clement of knowledge determines at least two other aspects of the contract: 
the subjective motivation of the members (are they aware of their characters, their natural 
endowments, their social status - or, if they are noumenal selves, what is this "self'?), and 
the objective world for which the contract is designed (is it a particular country at a 
particular point in time, or an abstract type of society, or maybe the Idea of society in 
itself?). Finally, the goals of the "legislative" meeting in the state of nature are the criteria 
which the proposals are to meet. They can be either negative (to put an end to certain 
Following Kant, Rawls only excludes what may be called the story of the causally determined 
personality: "I believe this because I am a good christian, or born with the genes of an agressive being, or 
brought up to be a shopkeeper, or because I hate my father and love my mother", etc. General knowledge of 
social and economic laws is not excluded by Rawls. Though such laws may be contingent In a logical sense, they 
do not In themselves heteronomously "determine" the individual's will. Or so It Is assumed. 
The term "noumenal" Is perhaps misplaced in this connection. Kant's noumenal world, the world of 
essences, of "das Ding an sich" Including "der Mensch an sich", is unintelligible, whereas Rawls seems to think 
that the true essence of persons (not personality or one's private essence) can be conventionally established or 
recognized. 
27 The two approaches, dcduclivism and inductivism, can of course both be applied in one theory. 
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shortcomings of the state of nature) or positive (to realize or approach social and ethical 
ideals), but in either case Ihey can be specified. 
All three, rules, goals and knowledge, are indispensable to the legislative moment 
of the state of nature. Without knowledge there would neither be a need for changing or 
creating principles of justice, nor even a possibility to do so: the members would be mute 
and brain-dead. Without goals, any grounds for meeting, let alone for agreeing or 
disagreeing, would be absent. And without rules, every possible aspect of every imagin-
able proposal would have the same priority and relevance: all debates would take place 
simultaneously. The result would be a dutch concert or silence. 
Thus, a state of nature is not an objective fact: it is devised by an author to meet 
his needs. His - or her - ethical theories are, as already claimed, logically prior to the 
construction of an original position or slate of nature. 
What goes for contract theories goes for all deductive theories of social justice: 
there often is and should always be a (tacit or explicit) justification for the procedures that 
justify principles. Deductivists may start to defend their theories with a reference to "our 
considered judgements", "our moral intuitions", or "our shared understandings", but they 
never build their theories (solely) on these - perhaps - accidental convictions. Instead, they 
presuppose what may be called prior principles, down to the moral "idées claires et 
distinctes", the most basic moral propositions. Why, but because of these fundamental 
moral ideas, should we prefer their theories of justice? 
Robert Nozick is the most famous proponent of non-contraclarian deductive theory. 
His conception of justice as entitlement is partly justified by a reductio ad absurdum of 
other theories such as patterned principles ("to each according to a certain quality"; cf. his 
famous Wilt Chamberlain example (Nozick 1974: 161)). Yet Nozick also uses an ethical 
premise: the fundamental and foundational notion of natural rights. The word "entitlement" 
would be meaningless if he had not first introduced this basic notion of individual rights, 
rights prior to and inviolable by any convention. 
Inductive theories of social justice, like Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1983) and 
other communitarian theories, are apparently founded exclusively on the convictions of 
actual persons as perceptible in speech or practices: intuitions, shared understandings, 
considered judgements, gut feelings. Yet even these theories contain logically prior moral 
theses that cannot be reduced to social practices alone: one to ascertain the justice of 
certain social practices, and one to convince us (the readers) of the monopoly social 
practices in general are supposed to have on justice. Without those premises inductive 
theories would be purely descriptive; one cannot criticize one practice simply by represent-
ing another. Walzer for instance selected his exemplary spheres in exemplary societies to 
illustrate (not to prove) his demand for so-called complex equality in distributive justice 
(Walzer 1983: 20). To convince us of the legitimacy of "evolutionary" justice, justice as a 
result of social interaction, he uses two arguments. One is historical: there has never been 
a common medium of exchange, an equalisandum accepted by all in all spheres of 
interaction, nor will there ever be one. Real people will always decide for themselves how 
to distribute goods, without much respect for the ingenious ideas of philosophers (Walzer 
1983: 4). The other argument sounds more promising (from a philosophical point of view): 
"Even if we choose pluralism, as I shall do, that choice requires a coherent defense" 
(Walzer 1983: 5). Unfortunately Walzer did not give such a defense: he limited himself to 
a vague and general critique of the universal, abstract and artificial principles of justice the 
philosophical tradition has produced. 
48 JUSTICE FROM A DISTANCE 
Theories οΓ justice use different methods to justify different principles: contracts, 
invisible hands, ideal observers, shared understanding, whatever. These methods share one 
characteristic: they are ethically biased and, therefore, require further justification. 
Whatever the impartiality of liberal theories of justice may be, it is not unconditional, 
complete impartiality. Nor could it be: if we want to prefer one principle to another, or 
want to defend it, or abstain from preferring, we need reasons to do so - including ethical 
reasons, at least if we want to convince ourselves of the justice of principles, and not 
merely of their empirical (inevitability. Notice, by the way, that so far no particular type 
of moral defence has been required or promoted. The problem of defending moral choices 
is relevant to both deductive and inductive theories, as well as to outright moral relativists. 
Even the relativist's claim that deeper justifications are impossible or superfluous must 
itself be sustained. 
Section 10: Role and meaning of impartiality 
In the last section I affirmed and generalized the first part of Dworkin's hypothesis: 
not only Rawls', but all theories of social justices require "a deeper theory beneath" their 
method(s) of justification. But how can impartiality be the cornerstone of such mechan­
isms, if complete impartiality is impossible? What exactly is the role of impartiality in 
those theories? There are two answers to these questions. The first one is trivial: justifica­
tion procedures should be neutral or non-biased to assure that they measure (or justify) 
what they are supposed to measure. In this sense, original positions and the like must be 
technically "fair", logically consistent with their aim. If they should measure justice, they 
should measure justice and not the temperature. 
The second answer is in line with the last part of Dworkin's hypothesis. There are 
reasons why particular principles are preferred to others and why they are preferred as just 
principles. Instead of being neutral in all possible respects (complete impartiality), the 
justification procedure should be justified by neutral reasons or ideals, and it should be 
scrupulously neutral with regard to the plans nf life that are allowed or promoted by the 
principles it justifies. This is what I define as the material role of impartiality in this 
context. The notion of impartiality is used here to restrict the discussion and arguments to 
"proper" matters of social justice. The kinds of questions that are thereby excluded will be 
discussed in section 12. In this and the following section, I shall only be concerned with 
the two "proper" matters left: the formulation of self-evident ethical principles and their 
translation into impartial decision procedures for the choice of principles of justice. 
Now before I go on explaining these admittedly rather dark phrases about the role 
of impartiality, I want to bring a bit of terminological clarity in the use (meaning) of 
"impartiality" and "neutrality". As said before, in political theory both terms are often used 
as synonyms, though neutrality is the most popular of the two. Up to now, neither one has 
been defined; I more or less trusted on a tacit common understanding as "giving equal 
weight to ideas about the good life". Unfortunately, neutrality appears to be a house with 
many chambers, in which it is not easy to find one's way - as liberal critics of the 
desirability and possibility of neutrality in politics have discovered. 
William Galslon, for instance, has described four interpretations of neutrality 
(Galston 1991: 100 ff.): 
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(1) Neutrality of opportunity demands that each person should have an equal 
opportunity to live his or her life according to his or her idea of a good life. 
(2) Neutrality of outcome demands an equal degree of realization of the same. 
(3) Neutrality of aim demands that no conception of the good life is promoted 
more than others. 
(4) Neutrality of procedure demands that (all) state procedures are justified without 
depending on some theory of the good. 
Joseph Raz (1986: 111-115) distinguished no less (and perhaps more; I deliberately ignore 
a few subtleties) than nine variants of political neutrality, thus bringing out the utter 
confusion surrounding its meaning: 
(5) Neutrality between individuals, regarding their ideals of the good life. 
(6) Neutrality between ideals of the good life. 
(7) Neutrality concerning the chances of implementing one's ideal of the good. 
(8) Neutrality as in (7) as well as with regard to the chance that a person will 
adopt one conception of the good rather than another. 
(9) Neutrality between conceptions of the good in politics in general. 
(10) The same, but now in the constitution only. 
(11) Nozickean neutrality as forbidding any political action undertaken or 
legitimized as promoting an ideal theory of the good or as enabling individuals to 
pursue an ideal of the good. 
(12) Narrow neutrality as forbidding any political action that influences (a) the 
likelihood of a person endorsing one conception of the good or another, or (b) his 
chances of realizing his conception of the good, unless (c) other actions are taken 
which cancel out such effects. 
(13) Comprehensive neutrality as prescribing as the most important goal of 
governing the assignment to all persons of an equal ability to pursue in their lives 
and promote in their societies any ideal of the good of their choosing. 
Finally, social choice theory has its own - universally accepted - understanding of 
neutrality as the equal treatment of alternatives: 
(14) A social choice rule satisfies the condition of neutrality if, whenever everyone 
reverses their preferences between any two alternatives χ and y, the result (the 
social preference between χ and y) is also reversed (Kelly 1988: 9; cf. Sen 1970: 
72). 
Obviously, this list does not offer an exhaustive account of neutrality, nor of political 
neutrality, nor even of the understanding of political neutrality as actually found in liberal 
theories of justice. Obviously, too, the understandings listed here either already overlap 
one another to some degree (e.g. 1, 7, and 11, 8 and 12, 4, 9 and 10, 5 and 11, 2 and 14), 
or they can be combined to form still other versions of neutrality. What we need is a bit 
of order. To that purpose, I define neutrality as a scheme containing four variables: 
Neutrality consists in the [subject's] giving equal [relevance] to the [scope] of the 
[object]. 
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The meanings given to neutrality in liberal justice theories can, I think, all be reformulated 
so as to fit in this scheme somehow. Again without pretending completeness, but merely 
as a representative selection of the family of conceptions covered by this scheme: 
(1) The [subject] of neutrality can be the state, either in all its actions or as basic 
institutions, individuals, collectives, the universe of rational beings, principles, or 
justification procedures. 
(2) The equal [relevance] given by the [subject] can take either of two forms: the 
[subjectj can refrain from judging on, or it can actively endorse, [scope] and 
[subject]. 
(3) The [scope] of neutrality can range from giving equal weight to the promotion 
of the [object] (cf. Galston's neutrality of aim), to giving equal opportunities of 
pursuing it, to giving equal opportunities of realizing it, to giving equal weight to 
the actual realization of it, down to the equal weight given to developing or 
adopting it. 
(4) Finally, the [objectl can be the universe of possible individual plans of life in a 
society, or a sub-class of this universe: all actually existing plans, all actual or 
possible rational plans (cf. Rawls), the actual or possible conceptions of the good 
underlying plans of life (cf. Raz and Galston), or actual or possible plans of a full 
life.28 
Were this list exhaustive, we would end up wit 7x2x5x8 = 560 complete concep-
tions of neutrality and 589 conceptions in which one or more variables are left undefined. 
Each of these could be part of a theory of justice; the number of theoretically possible 
combinations is as impressive (2 ,MM) as it is meaningless. 
Having defined neutrality as a scheme, I now define impartiality in terms of the 
permutations it allows: 
Impartiality is each element of the set of all conceptions of neutrality and all 
combinations of conceptions of neutrality. 
To the comfort of reader and author alike, there is no need to go through the whole 
"set of impartialities". We can restrict ourselves to one version of impartiality, the one that 
is characteristic of and central to liberal theories of justice. It is made up of the already 
mentioned technical neutrality and, for want of better words, objective and subjective 
neutrality: 
Technical neutrality: the decision procedure should actively endorse the promotion 
(i.e., detection and selection) of neutral principles of justice. 
Objective neutrality: rational human beings should all equally endorse the prin-
ciples or reasons behind the justification procedure, by virtue of their already being 
endorsed in their plans of life. 
28 
The lasl sub-class Is broadly defined as conceptions of how one would want lo live one's life, regardless 
of all life's contingencies (talents, disabilities, economic, social, political and sexual fortune or misfortune, etc.). It 
Is my own invention (as far as I know), and will be discussed at some length in Pan III. 
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Subjective neutrality: the justification procedure and the reasons behind it should 
give equal relevance to individual plans of life or constituent parts thereof. 
Notice that in the definition of objective neutrality the scope remains undefined, whereas 
in that of subjective neutrality relevance, scope, and - in fact - object are all undefined. 
Taken out of the straight-jacket of the definition scheme, and seen in the light of 
their actual role in liberal theories of justice, we can describe these three notions of 
neutrality in a more informal way. Technical neutrality means, as above, that the justifica­
tion procedure should measure what it is supposed to measure, i.e., justice. Objective and 
subjective neutrality demand that the reasons behind justification procedures are (objec­
tively, rationally) uncontestable, and that both reasons and procedures are - within limits -
not biased, either directly or indirectly, in favour of or against individual plans of life or 
vital parts thereof. 
As this is still a rather complex description I will discuss it in parts. To emphasize 
the typically liberal import of the different aspects of subjective neutrality, I shall also 
refer to a classical enemy of liberal neutrality, the German Nazi philosopher of law Carl 
Schmitt. Schmitt distinguished four conceptions of liberal (or, as he called it, negative) 
neutrality, and four diametrically opposed positive conceptions. Negative neutrality, in his 
view, depoliticizes political questions, whereas positive neutrality would lead to a clear 
understanding and definite solution of political problems. Needless to say that Schmitt's 
idea of impartiality leaves little room for the values propagated by liberalism - liberty, 
equality, tolerance, rationality, etc. 
Objective neutrality. Somehow all liberal theories of justice contain references to 
intuitive, a priori or shared understandings of basic moral notions. We caught glimpses of 
such assumptions above in the theories of Walzer, Rawls, and Nozick. Dworkin's case is 
also clear: he professes to his credo, equality of respect as moral persons for moral 
persons, in almost every text he ever wrote about social justice (e.g. Dworkin 1978, 1981, 
1985a, 1985b). Ackerman presents prior principles (that is, principles prior to his theory) 
which sound extremely uncontestable: rationality, proclaiming the moral priority of 
legitimacy over power; consistency, doing the same for logic and (for instance) intuition; 
and neutrality, postulating the rationality of the equal worth29 given to "conceptions of 
the good" (Ackerman 1983: 4, 7, 11). Of course, these three are purely assumptions and 
are as such in principle contestable. In the next section I shall further specify the basic 
moral notions shared by liberals. For the moment I am only interested in their abstract 
role. 
A theory of justice, as I understand it, necessarily needs prior principles: there must 
be some point of reference from which to evaluate alternative applied or applicable 
principles of distribution in societies. Without such a basic understanding of the good or 
the moral, there would be no reason to believe that the principles chosen in an original 
Let us clear this point right away: Ackerman does not directly say that men or conceptions of the good 
are of equal value. He only forbids the use of "better than" arguments (Ackerman 1983: 11). But if A is not 
better than В, В is not better than A, A is worse than or as good as B, and В is worse than or as good as A -
then A and В are (persons or conceptions) of equal worth. Ackerman's principle of neutrality seems to have some 
disturbing drawbacks - for instance, it forces one to judge Mein Kampf to be at least as good a book as The Lord 
of the Rings, and vice versa (cf. Barber 1983: 340). 
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position or by an impartial observer are certified as principles of justice - to quote 
Dworkin again. Whether such principles can be uncontestable is an open question; that 
they should be is, on the other hand, generally accepted. As William Galston puts it, 
"justified belief, then, is opinion that has survived the most rigorous process of dialectical 
testing in contestation with the available contrary views" (Galston 1991: 33). As Anglo-
Saxon philosophers, liberal theorists of justice have been deeply influenced by the critique 
of intuitionism of early analytical philosophers like - notably - Henry Sidgwick. In his 
Methods of Ethics (1874), Sidgwick rejected intuitionism in favour of ideological methods 
of ethics (in particular utilitarianism), yet claimed that there is a necessarily intuitive idea 
of the final aim in each method of ethics, and that there are some very general intuitive 
truths in ethics as such. Sidgwick also formulated some criteria for these first principles: 
they must be clear and precise (the Cartesian clear and distinct, cf. Broad 1930: 216), 
continually self-evident, mutually consistent, and supported by a clear consensus of 
opinion (Sidgwick 1962: 338 ff.). In short: Sidgwick was of the opinion that the 
incontestability of basic intuitions as well as intuition itself are inseparable parts of all 
ethical theories, including theories of distributive justice. 
Subjective neutrality. Liberal theorists of justice assume that there is a qualitative 
difference between the private and public spheres, or, as Dworkin expressed it, between 
preferences about one's own life, internal preferences, and preferences about the (lives 
and) preferences of others, external preferences (Dworkin, 1985a: 196). We may agree on 
certain basic values (the objectively neutral ones) but these only give us very general 
rules. If we know that we should treat one another with equal respect, there may still be 
innumerable ways in which we can do so. Worse: the neutral values are only rules of 
conduct for relations with others. They do not tell us how we should treat ourselves. In 
this last field, liberals accept neither general rules nor authoritative sources of rules. In the 
words of the Prussian king and philosopher Friedrich II: "jeder Mensch muß auf seiner 
Façon selig werden". Authorities like the slate must be as neutral as possible towards 
individual conceptions of the (individual's) good life - either because they do not have the 
right to interfere (cf. Nozick, in whose theory only the individual can have natural rights), 
or because there are no reasons to assume that authorities are by definition more fit than 
any individual to determine what is good for that particular individual. 
Again, this is a contestable assumption from a philosophical point of view. Why, 
for instance, would there be reason to assume that an individual knows anything at all 
about his (objective) private good? Probably the best we can say is that there are empirical 
reasons (Raisons d'État, practical experience) provoking rather than justifying the 
exclusion of the question of private ethical truth from the debate on social justice - the 
same reasons that supported liberalism in general: the history of religious, political, racial 
and sexual oppression. 
Individual autonomy, freedom of choice and of life, are - for whatever reasons - of 
overall importance for liberal theorists of justice. Nevertheless few of them - not even 
David Gauthier - accept the autonomy of individual preferences for the full 100%. Some 
preferences are seen as less true than others, as more perverse, less rational, less informed, 
less authentic, or less autonomous. Perfectionists like Joseph Raz disapprove of self-
destructive life-styles. They would not want a stale to encourage a life of sex, drugs, and 
loo loud rock 'n roll, a life leading (in reverse order) to a deaf, dumb, and blind dead end. 
Some utilitarians would rather base their calculations of total utility on "true" preferences 
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than on the preferences fallible individuals perceive to be more beneficial. Other more 
lenient liberals, Rawls for one, at least demand that there is some rationale behind a 
person's desires, i.e., that desires are ordered in rational life-plans. 
Insensitive to the doubts liberals sometimes feel about private preferences, Carl 
Schmitt referred to this aspect of neutrality as "non-intervention, disinterestedness, laisser 
passer, passive tolerance" (Schmitt 1987: 97) - or relativism of the state, as it limits slate 
activities lo a minimum. The Schmittian positive antithesis of subjective neutrality is 
"objectivity and Sachlichkeit on the basis of a generally accepted norm" (Schmitt 1987: 
100). Liberalism, on the other hand, is definitely in dubio about the relevance of such a 
common (and substantive) good. 
Individual plans οΓ life or vital parts thereof. There is something about individuals that 
is sacrosanct, something that makes them morally relevant in ways a rock or a plant is not, 
if we may believe theorists of social justice. They ascribe it to individuals (rather than to 
mammals, life, the universe or everything), and they agree that it has something to do with 
the human capacity to have a private conception of the good. They disagree on the details. 
For some, the what-really-matters-about-persons is an ordered and rational plan of life, for 
others the underlying conception of the good or the good life, the authenticity or self-
determination of convictions, or the ultimate reasons behind plans of life. If we look for a 
common denominator in all this, the phrase "individual plans of life or vital parts thereof' 
will do as well as any other, provided that we do not demand the "vital parts" to be 
necessarily ordered in a plan. 
In Schmill's vocabulary the sancticity of persons and their idea of the good life 
leads to a second form of negative neutrality in politics: the conception of the stale as a 
neutral and predictable instrument (Schmitt 1987: 98), opposed to the positive neutrality of 
"not egoistically interested expertise" (Schmitt 1987: 100). In the first of these two senses, 
the stale is a bureaucracy, a machine at the service of individual autonomy, whereas in the 
second sense there is nothing holy about ihe individual or his expectations: what matters is 
the interest of the collective. 
No Indirect or direct bias. A rule is biased if, without good reasons, it favours something 
above something else. In theories of social justice this would mean that a principle favours 
or disfavours ("for or against") certain conceptions of the good life - which is, for lack of 
reasons or rights, by definition unjust. But principles can be biased in at least two ways: 
they can openly favour the life-plans of artists over those of philosophers, or they can be 
unbiased in this direct procedural sense and still produce biased results. If a stale valued 
the life-plans of Nazis as much as those of Jews, negroes, homosexuals, free-masons, 
socialists, invalids and women, the result would probably be rather nasty for all life-plans 
except those of Nazis. There are, in other words, limits to the equal relevance given to 
plans of life. 
Neglecting for a moment the exact way in which biases are to be prevented, 
Schmilt's third version of negative neutrality can also be applied to ihe liberal theory of 
social justice, as it intends to give each conviction "an equal chance in building the 
nation's will" (Schmitt 1987: 98). The opposite positive form of neutrality, Unity and 
Totality (Schmitt 1987: 101), which embraces all parties and relalivizes all conflicts, is 
definitely not appropriate: the liberal view of social justice is less compatible with the 
totalitarian Third Reich than with the democratic Weimar Republic. 
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Within limits. Ronald Dworkin distinguished between internal and external, rather than 
between private and public, preferences. Obviously, allowing personal freedom to include 
the freedom of promoting external preferences may lead lo a contradiction: if we do not 
have the same preferences, my freedom will be your oppression. 
Dworkin is not alone in signalling this typically liberal dilemma. Robert Nozick 
acknowledged its existence in stressing the minimal night-watchman slate as ал absolute 
side-constraint on the relation between Utopian communities (Nozick 1974: 333). His 
minimal stale guarantees both the freedom of individuals to live in accordance with their 
internal and external preferences within communities, and the freedom from interference 
by other communities. Clearly, Nozick's solution is only partly satisfactory; external 
preferences have the nasty habit of extending beyond community borders. 
Bruce Ackerman deals with the dilemma when he introduces a Nazi among the 
participants in his social contract (Ackerman 1980: 97), but he only succeeds in defeating 
the Nazi by denying the rationality of his opinions and by - tacitly - threatening with the 
ultimate argument, violence. 
John Rawls's first principle limits the execution of person X's life-plans in denying 
the justice of restricting the liberties of others for the sake of person X. In general, his 
original position limits the equal weight given to plans of life by supposing that its 
members are "mutually disinterested ... they are conceived as not taking an interest in one 
another's interests" (Rawls 1971: 13). He thus not only excludes envy as a motivational 
force from his theory, as was his intention (cf. Rawls 1971: 143), but also a priori 
excludes external preferences from the realm of justice, which can hardly be called a 
solution for the dilemma. 
Finally, Michael Walzer has his own peculiar way of looking at the limits of equal 
relevance: his just society is one in which "no social good serves or can serve as a means 
of domination", it is "an egalitarianism that is consistent with liberty", based on "our 
shared understandings of social goods" (Walzer 1983: xi ν). His main premise is that these, 
our "own" (read American?), understandings are the product of harmonious relations 
between consenting adults - a precondition that, like Rawls', a priori excludes the 
possibility of (at least) an unwanted bias. 
Schmitt called this kind of negative neutrality "parity": all relevant groups and 
opinions have a right to equally participate in society and receive an equal share in the 
advantages of society (Schmitt 1987: 99). His positive antithesis is the neutrality of the 
outsider, the Gefreiter, one might say, who makes "the decision if necessary" (1987: 100), 
not unlike the outside expert companies often hire to make (or legitimize) the more 
unpopular decisions about jobs and wages. Schmilt's idea of "the decision" is, to be quite 
clear, diametrically opposed to that of compromise. 
We can summarize our findings as follows: in liberal theories of social justice, the 
idea of impartiality encompasses three distinct conceptions of neutrality. In a technical 
role, the justification procedure must lead to the choice of objectively and subjectively 
neutral principles of justice; it must be a correct operalionalization. In a material sense, the 
procedure and reasons behind it must be both objectively and subjectively morally neutral: 
the deeper reasons must be rationally uncontestable, and the procedure must give equal 
weight to (vital parts of) individual plans of life. 
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Section 11: Objective ideals in liberal social justice 
In the last section I postulated the existence of a list of objectively neutral prior 
principles characteristic of the liberal conception of impartiality. The time has now almost 
come to specify this list and establish their key importance in the general theories of 
Ackerman, Nozick, Rawls, and Walzer. Before I do so, I want to discuss a crucial aspect 
of the principles on this list: their "incontestability". 
Objectively neutral prior principles. 
According to Sidgwick, self-evident moral axioms have to meet four conditions. 
First of all, the terms of the proposition must be clear and precise (Sidgwick 1962: 338) -
but neither Sidgwick nor Descartes have clearly and precisely specified what the terms 
clear and precise mean. Still, it is evident that there is no sense in talking about self-
evident axioms if they are incomprehensible. Avoiding the problem of the reference of 
moral propositions themselves (can they be objective in any way if they refer to subjective 
cognition or stales of mind?), we could demand of an axiom that it must be possible to 
define its terms in new terms that are (1) as far as possible not part of the original 
proposition, and (2) part of our ordinary vocabulary.30 
Sidgwick's second condition is continued self-evidence on reflection, so as to 
avoid, for one, the extreme of "mere impressions or impulses, which on careful observa-
tion do not present themselves as claiming to be dictates of Reason" (Sidgwick 1962: 339) 
and, for another, that of mere opinion, in the non-problematical truth of which we start to 
believe simply because we hear an opinion so often. Intuitions thus cannot be presented as 
unquestionable beliefs (dogmata); they must be tested in such a way that we are maximal-
ly templed to reject them. 
Thirdly, self-evident axioms must be mutually consistent, as "it is obvious that any 
collision between two intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other, or both" 
(Sidgwick 1962: 341). One must not confuse this third with the first condition. Proposi-
tions like "man is good" and "man is evil" arc unclear and imprecise rather than incompat-
ible. It would suffice to specify them a bit: "man is good by day" and "man is evil at 
night". However, "man is good, everywhere and always" is quite clear and precise, as 
clear and precise as "man is evil, everywhere and always" - and nevertheless the two 
collide. Mutual consistency is a falsificationistic criterium: it does not prove the truth of 
either of two axioms. 
The problem (or rather, another problem) with this condition is that it can be inter-
preted in two ways. It may presuppose that intuitions qua propositions cannot be at the 
same time true and contradictory. This sounds reasonable, and it is a hypothesis accepted 
by most philosophers, including Sidgwick. Kant even based his Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
on the possibility of such antinomies, i.e., propositions that can be rationally proved but 
nevertheless contradict one another. Yet it is not necessarily true that Kant's answer to 
contradictions between propositions about the physical world can also be applied to ethics. 
It is doubted, at least on a large scale, that there is an ethical universe with an ethical 
truth, fit to judge intuitions by, in the same way as there is, to some degree, a natural 
An old-fashioned Marxist or a post-modernist could rightly accuse us of Identifying ideology with (ruth, 
by basing self-evidence on the vocabulary of real, socially situated, people. But we cannot always get what we 
want: in semantics, truth seems destined to depend on convention. 
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universe with an empirical truth. Still, there may be an alternative in between the Scylla of 
ethical relativism and the Charybdis of ethical absolutism. 
The second interpretation is the one I prefer, as it avoids (not: solves) the problems 
of the first: intuitions cannot at the same time be applicable and contradictory. This 
interpretation does not yet require that a moral axiom be applicable (that ought implies 
can) but it does require that axioms should not be contradictory if they are meant to be 
applied somewhere and somehow. 
Sidgwick's fourth and last condition is universal or general consent: an axiom can 
only be self-evident if it is intcrsubjectively self-evident. The experiment of self-evidence 
must be repeated on other subjects. It stands to reason that an axiom is not «//-evident if 
one must force oneself to accept it, instead of being forced by the axiom \\self to accept it. 
General consent is thus an extra guarantee for the integrity of an intuition, a necessary but 
by no means sufficient warrant against subjectivity. 
The following story can illustrate the importance of testing intuitions, especially for 
general consent. In his Justice and the Human Good, William Galston argues for the basic 
importance of three human goods: life, development, and happiness. He also invites us to 
rank these goods by imagining that: 
"You are a healthy, talented young adult forced into a booth with three 
buttons on a panel. The first will bring you instant death; the second, 
lifelong imbecility; the third, wretchedness that increases with the duration 
of your life and the development of your powers. If you fail to push any 
button within a specified interval, a computer will select and execute one of 
the alternatives, at random" (Galston 1980: 94). 
Galston expected that we would select the third button, and that we would be almost 
indifferent between life and development - "almost" meaning a slight bias in favour of life. 
For a moment I doubted whether I was normal, or even human, because I would have 
chosen death rather than a life not worth living, at least not to me. So for almost a year I 
pestered friends, colleagues, family and students with Galston's booth, but found no clear 
pattern. Some chose death, others a life of possibly happy imbecility, still others would 
give up happiness - and a small group would let the computer decide. Clearly not every 
appeal to intuition can be taken for granted. 
If we accept Sidgwick's four conditions, we must also accept a paradoxical 
conclusion: self-evident moral axioms cannot be all that self-evident if they are to be 
accepted as axioms. They can be self-evident in the sense that we have tried everything to 
falsify them, or our belief in them or the grounds for our belief - and yet failed to refute 
them. They cannot be self-evident in the sense that they are somehow revealed to us and 
need not be questioned." This will lead us to another interesting conclusion at the end of 
this section, namely that the prior principles in liberal theories of social justice are self-
evident in the latter rather than in the earlier sense. 
I therefore do not think (hat there Is a contradiction between my analysis of Rawls's theory as using 
prior principles, and Rawls's statement about his original position being built without an appeal to "selfevidence 
In the traditional sense of general conceptions or particular convictions" (Rawls, 1970: 21). Rawls's "considered 
Judgements in reflective equilibrium" may even be a classic example of a method to test selfevidence In accor-
dance with Sidgwick's conditions (cf. Rawls, 1970: 51). 
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Prior principles. 
There are seven candidates for the function of prior principles of social justice: first 
of all liberty, equality and fraternity (the ancient liberal ideals in, it should be stressed, 
very broad or abstract interpretations), furthermore subjective neutrality, rationality and 
fairness, and finally justice itself. They will pass the lest (1) if they perform the role of a 
moral axiom respected or supported by my representative selection from the community of 
liberal theorists - thus in a way satisfying Sidgwick's fourth condition - and (2) if they are 
part of the normative foundation or justification of principles of justice, irrespective of the 
method of justification. I assume that there are no other moral axioms to be found, nor 
ones as clear and precise. After testing these alleged prior principles I will return once 
more to the question of self-evidence: to what extent can we trust these axioms? 
Liberty is the short term for each person's being capable of developing and executing 
plans of life or vital parts thereof. By a plan of life I mean nothing more than an individu-
al's preference about whether and how he or she would like to use whatever he or she can 
use to whatever aims he or she chooses. Admittedly, this is a very broad description, but I 
cannot create more precision where there is so little consensus. The definition, and 
especially the word "capable", immediately draws our attention to the problem of colliding 
liberties, a problem which in actual life seems to be the one and only cause of questions 
about justice. 
In his original theory of justice, Rawls wanted the people in the original position to 
decide on the basis of the one, rational plan of life individuals are supposed to have. A 
few years ago however he introduced the possibility of changing plans of life, and decided 
that this bit of realism would not harm his arguments in favour of the two principles 
(Rawls 1987: 234 ff). The problem is rather whether liberty can only be expressed in 
rational plans of life, that is, the optimal plan for the use of primary goods by which an 
individual's desires are, at least in principle, best satisfied (cf. Rawls 1971: 93). Unfortu-
nately, Rawls expresses no opinion on this point. The only answer available is, in my 
opinion, one by implication. Rawls needs rationality in his plans of life to support a 
rational solution of the distribution problem, but questions of justice do not necessarily 
arise out of the collision of rational plans (cf. Rawls 1971: 4, 127). Problems arise 
because we are free, though they can only be solved if we are also reasonable. 
Other authors are even more easily fitted into this picture. Dworkin sometimes 
takes over Rawls's vocabulary, and at other times takes a more lenient view when he talks 
about liberalism in general - on which occasions his interpretation of liberty is "ambitions 
people have" and "each person's theory of what his life should be like" (Dworkin 1985a: 
192-193). Ackerman, whose theory of justice focuses on the distribution of manna (that is: 
resources; Ackerman 1980: 3), assumes that conflict over scarce resources is the cause of 
the idea and problem of justice (Ackerman 1980: 5). "Resources" is a concept that implies 
utilization to "actualize" a conception of the good - that is, to attain certain ends in life 
according to a plan, however indefinite and provisional (Ackerman 1980: 43 ff). Walzer's 
point of departure is the problem of domination exerted by means of social goods (Walzer 
1983: xiii). Attempts to dominate are a logical consequence of human liberty, the capacity 
to have and execute plans of life: "Men and women lake on concrete identities because of 
the way ihey conceive and create, and then possess and employ social goods" (Walzer 
1983: 8). Finally, Nozick's natural rights would be empty if there was no reason to invoke 
them - that is, if plans of life could not collide or if their existence were irrelevant to the 
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legitimacy of natural rights theories. But they do collide and they are relevant, they are 
even the grounds for the indefeasibility of the individual's rights (Nozick 1974: 49). 
Equality is short for: each person is of equal intrinsical worth. This axiom allows two 
interpretations, a negative and a positive one. For some authors (Ackerman, Nozick, 
Walzer) equality means that there is no authoritative source of knowledge for determining 
a person's worth qua person (though there may be one for the person as member of the 
polity, society or sphere). For others, like Rawls and Dworkin, liberty implies and justifies 
equality. For all, distributive principles must be established without reference lo a person's 
worth. 
The importance of this axiom in the theories of Ackerman and Dworkin has 
already been indicated in the previous section. For a good understanding of Dworkin's 
conception of a moral person, I should add that one is or is not a moral person; there do 
not seem to be degrees of moral capacity or relevancy. 
Nozick's slate of nature is based on equality: humans are ends, not means, for 
which reason there can be no "moral balancing act", no calculation of the external or 
internal worth of persons (Nozick 1974: 32-33). Moral theory must treat persons as if they 
were of equal worth: the rights of one man are just as important as those of another. 
Walzcr's theory is possibly even more depersonalized. In his view, the worth of 
persons is established in and by their social context, according to the shared understand-
ings that rule particular spheres of interaction. However, as far as persons an sich are 
concerned, Walzer takes some distance from this relativistic determination of human worth 
in favour of a general principle of "complex equality", according to which everyone is 
equally worthy of a chance to find his or her "place" in the social spheres. 
Rawls, lo make the list complete, justifies the equal entitlement of human beings to 
justice in terms of "the capacity for moral personality" (Rawls 1971: 505) - that is, liberty 
and a sense of justice. As moral persons, we are of equal worth in the eyes of Justitia and 
of the people in the original position. 
It should be stressed that equality as a moral person does not imply equality in 
distribution. The principle establishes a sort of a priori right to be heard or considered in 
distribution processes; It does not fix the amount that should be allotted. The Inference 
that intrinsically equal persons should get an equal share can only be made if one 
presupposes that intrinsic worth is the sole ground for claims. Nor does equal worth imply 
equality of the unit of distribution (the equalisandum), which would allow relatively easy 
comparisons between claims to or shares in the social product. 
By fraternity I mean the willingness of persons to maintain and reproduce their social 
bond. As a motive for staying together, willingness is here opposed to reluctance (cf. 
Barry 1989: 360). The distinction refers to a basic difference between moral and other 
theories: principles of justice should at least partly be based on ethical consent rather than 
on mere acceptance of the inevitable. In this context, it is interesting to note how Rawls 
understands the difference principle as an expression of fraternity in a strictly traditional 
sense (Rawls 1971: 105). 
There is no need to dwell on this axiom in any detail, as none of our writers takes 
the position that one just has to learn to live with certain principles of justice. They all try 
to generate appreciation and adhesion. For one category of the inconvincible, pure egoists, 
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a writer like Brian Barry however does resort to an argument from necessity: egoists will 
just have to learn to live with their neighbour's sense of justice (Barry 1989: 359-366). 
Neutrality, or more precisely subjective neutrality, was described above as the unbiased-
ness of procedures and prior principles with regard to individual plans of life. We have 
already seen that there is a degree of consensus on this condition. Subjective neutrality 
must be explicitly distinguished from the aforementioned principles of liberty and equality. 
Unlike equality, which demands equal respects for moral persons, subjective neutrality 
demands equal respect for individual plans of life, and whereas liberty allows interference 
with these plans, subjective neutrality forbids this. Neutrality is thus a kind of side-
constraint on the side-constraints of liberty and equality as well as on the other prior 
principles. 
Rarìonality, perhaps the most used, abused and complex concept32 in philosophy, here 
means the duty to at least attempt to give good reasons for ideas, behaviour, and (institu-
tionalized) codes of behaviour. The authors disagree on what exactly counts as a good 
reason, but their answers indicate that it must be something between conviction and truth, 
with the exclusion of both extremes. Merely convincing arguments can be rhetorical, and 
the mere truth (if it exists in ethics) might be incomprehensible. 
Walzer's idea of rationality approaches the extreme of conviction. Justice is created 
in action, as is the meaning of each social good - but even in action there are reasons, and 
a good reason would accord with Walzer's principle of distribution: "No social good χ 
should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y, merely because 
they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x" (Walzer 1983: 20). Walzer 
supposes that there are (deeper) good and non-rhetorical reasons for his readers to accept 
this principle. 
For Ackerman, rationality is the first principle of a legitimate discussion of 
distributive justice (Ackerman 1980: 4). His second and third principles, consistency and 
neutrality, define the criteria that good reasons are to meet The crux of his argument is 
that good reasons, convincing though they may be, are never final: the quest for the 
legitimacy of distributions is eternal, ever open to new arguments, ever searching for a 
definitive judgement. 
Robert Nozick defined his project as an example of political philosophy with "an 
explanatory purpose" (Nozick 1974: 4). In his eyes, the imaginary invisible-hand model 
and the choice model he uses contain good reasons for accepting his theory of justice. A 
fiction, like the state of nature developing in a morally permissible way into a morally 
acceptable social order, has a strong explanative potential, despite its fictivity. Nozick 
defends his view with, among others, an argument borrowed from epistemology (Nozick 
1974: 7) - as good a reason as one can wish for. Borrowing Hempel's notion of a potential 
explanation, he argues that an explanation which is neither law-defective nor fact-defective 
(i.e., one that does not contain false law-like statements or false statements of facts) can 
illuminate our understanding of the moral quality of societies - even if the explanation is 
Complex in the sense Temkin has in mind: there are different (and incompatible) definitions of the 
concept (cf. Temían, 1986). My definition of rationality, the rational choice definition of "choosing the best 
alternative", the stoic interpretation of living in accordance with nature, etc.. are all, albeit to varying degrees, 
incompatible. 
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process-defective, i.e., if it describes another process towards slate-formation than the one 
that actually occurred. 
As for Rawls we can be short. The demand for rationality is omnipresent in his 
original position, in his model for formulating considered judgements, in the notion of a 
reflective equilibrium, and in the defence he offers for all these conditions of rational 
deliberation. 
Like rationality, fairness is a procedural rather than a substantive ideal. It simply demands 
that like cases are treated alike. In John Rawls's theory, fairness as applied to rules has a 
more precise meaning. The equal treatment of cases is only half of the idea of Rawlsian 
fairness, though it also is, to use his metaphor, the most important rule of the game. 
Voluntary acceptance of a rule (which, I think, is already included in my principle of 
fraternity) is just as necessary a condition for fairness as consistency in treatment (cf. 
Rawls 1971: 13,112). Ackerman has made fairness - in my broad interpretation of the 
word - the second principle of neutral discourse (Ackerman 1980: 7). Nozick analyzes 
cases in terms of the natural rights involved - and as these rights are absolute and 
inviolable, the consistent (equal) treatment of cases is guaranteed from the first page of his 
book on. Finally, Walzer's pluralism of spheres, values and goods still allows for a 
general principle (see above under Rationality), one that contains a negative definition of 
fairness: like cases should not be treated differently. However, apart from being negative, 
the principle is also highly formal. Walzer's world is one of constantly changing patterns 
of cooperation and definitions of reality - in short, a perpetual cultural revolution. One 
may doubt if his radical pluralism is still compatible with the existence over time of "like" 
cases. But that is a question for another occasion; for now, what counts is Walzer's formal 
adherence to the principle of fairness. 
Justice, the idea of giving each person his due {suum cuique tribuere) has already been 
introduced in Chapter 1. For reasons which will become obvious later, I shall refer to both 
"treating like cases alike" and "giving each his due" as definitions of justice. 
There is one virtue conspicuously absent from this list: equity, a concept widely 
associated with justice, and introduced by Aristotle in Book V of the Ethica Nicomachea 
(Aristotle 1980, 1959: 1137*31) to denote rectification in those exceptional cases where 
principles of justice are insufficient to do justice. The reason for this omission is simple: 
the liberal theory of social justice is first of all concerned with justice as it should be in 
the best of all possible worlds, with "ideal theory" and "the ideal technology of justice" 
(Ackerman 1980: 21), with "pure procedural justice" (Rawls 1971: 86), with unpolluted 
entitlements (Nozick 1974: 151), or even with what "individuals like us" would choose 
(Walzer 1983: 5). Ideally, equity is superfluous. We will discuss the status of ideal 
theories of justice in sections 13 and 14. 
As I remarked earlier, these seven prior principles of social justice are not self-
evident in the Sidgwickian sense of the word. Let us assume that I (as a representative of 
the authors) defined them all as clearly and precisely as possible. They are also supported 
by a general consensus of opinion, though the consensus is limited to a very small 
community of like-minded philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. As soon as we step 
into the real world, we meet other communities where liberty is partly replaced by 
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paternalism; where equality is a counter-intuitive concept, and instead gender or caste are 
thought of as natural criteria for treatment; where calculation rather than fraternity is the 
imperative of tax-payers; where neutrality is an offence against God; where the revealed 
word is the one and only good reason conceivable; where the fairness of fines is an 
accidental outcome of the arbitrariness of control; or where the political will to do justice 
simply "depends on the circumstances". The seven principles are, furthermore, not testified 
as self-evident on reflection. When these theorists come to the point of basics, we find 
little or no reflection, often just an uncritical or even unspoken acceptance of postulates. 
Sidgwick's demand for mutual consistency is also evaded (though legitimately, as I 
pointed out above) by looking at another question: how can these principles be reconciled 
in practice? 
Thus we find that there seems to be a hard core of key-notions characterizing the 
liberal paradigm of social justice, of which the question of the proportional contribution of 
the seven ideals just mentioned to principles of distributive justice is a vital ingredient. 
And of course, as Aristotle might have said, distributive justice is a matter of just 
proportions. Nevertheless we have also missed another important ingredient of a paradigm: 
the good reasons for believing in this hard core. 
Section 12: On conceptions of justice 
By convention, theorists often make a distinction between the concept and various 
conceptions of justice." A concept is abstract and general, and it is made up of the 
elements common to all (e.g. a society's) conceptions of justice, whereas a conception 
reflects an individual's views on justice. Rawls, for example, very humbly presented his 
views on justice as a conception, but of course tried to prove that his conception is in fact 
the concept of justice; just as I shall try to convince the reader that my conception is 
really a concept, one that should be shared at least by any community of liberal-minded 
individuals. Rawls (1971: 130 ff.) characterizes the concept of justice in terms of some 
very general criteria like generality and universality. Yet the consensus among liberal 
theorists is broader and deeper: they may share Rawls's criteria but they certainly share 
certain ethical ideals - and these, rather than the general Rawlsian criteria, form their 
concept of social justice, i.e., the hard core of the liberal paradigm of social justice. 
Up to now we have in fact been engaged in identifying the borders of a concept of 
social justice that defines a certain community of liberal-minded theorists. Justice as 
impartiality includes or permits a wide range of possible conceptions, those satisfying the 
conditions of technical, subjective and objective neutrality; it excludes others. Obviously, 
the sets of both included and excluded conceptions can be infinitely large; listing them is 
useless. In this section I shall instead discuss some vague but crucial characteristics of 
both categories. 
To start with the range of excluded conceptions: justice is not a matter of aesthetics 
but of ethics. Confronted with the choice between a symmetrical and an asymmetrical 
distribution of goods, our theorists will never prefer one or the other because of the beauty 
of their graphical representation. The principle of subjective neutrality does allow 
aesthclical considerations to rule private lives, but outside the private sphere aesthetics are 
33 The distinction is originally Hart's (Cf. Rawls. 1970: 5n). 
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taboo. If beauly were a social product that could be distributed according to objectively 
neutral criteria, it would matter whether ugly people or pin-ups of both sexes lead a just 
life. Yet there is and remains an intuitive difference between aesthetics and ethics, 
between distributing beautiful things justly, and distributing just things beautifully. A 
second obstacle for aestheticism is the intuitive notion that aesthetical principles cannot be 
as uncontestable as ethical principles. Which of these two intuitions is decisive, and 
whether they are correct, are questions that must remain unanswered here. 
Secondly, justice is not a matter of definite truth but one of rational debate. 
Theorists who silence their critics by claiming to have private access to the revealed 
ethical truth (as e.g. a Thomist34 might be tempted to do, confronted with strongly 
dissenting opinions) duck the question of objective neutrality. The same goes for all 
substantive ethical theories. Self-evidence is never self-evidence for the chosen only. Prior 
principles must at least potentially be open to debate, and conceptions of justice must be 
proven to be consistent with these premises. 
Thirdly, questions of justice are not answered by an appeal to convention or to the 
optimal solution for self-interested individuals. There is an important element of conven-
tionalism in theories of distributive justice. A scheme of justice must be supported by 
actual people to be viable. Enforcing a particular conception of justice against the will of a 
society is a self-defeating strategy, a contradiction in terms, resulting in tyranny. Yet like 
institutions, conventions are not sacred. They must be confronted with a conception of 
justice, and if the two conflict, maybe both need to be adjusted. Rawls's strategy of 
balancing convictions and ideal theory until a reflective equilibrium has been found is 
probably the best known example of this sceptical approach. 
In real life, the optimal solution self-interested individuals would choose or prefer 
often plays as much a central role as it does in rational choice theories. Liberal justice 
theorists acknowledge this role, but as with convictions, they try to counterbalance it with 
ethical considerations. We can refer lo Rawls again for an example. His people in the 
original position arc unaware of their social identity and, consequently, of their actual self-
interest. All they can do is grant the existence of self-interest as such and work out a 
solution for all seasons, without the strategic advantages like threats and offers that 
knowledge of one's actual self-interest could bring. What is more, Rawls's impartial 
judges have another trait rational egoists often lack: the capacity for a sense of justice, 
forcing them to look beyond self-interest and personally optimal solutions (Rawls 1971: 
145). Brian Barry, to add another example, used the same sense of justice to defend a 
qualified social choice theory. The level of resources, welfare or utility available to each 
person in a situation without cooperation must be the distributive base-line of a cooper-
alive enterprise (like society), but above this level considerations of justice rather than the 
individual's bargaining power should be decisive. His argument calls to mind the principle 
of objective neutrality: justice, Barry claims, is a basic motivating force of man. Denying 
this would devaluate any theory of society, as that would make the real world at least 
partly incomprehensible (Barry 1989: 364 ff.). The image of man as (nothing but) a 
Thomas Aquinas, like most representatives of established religious organizations, of course fiercely 
opposed the Idea of private revelation (of the kind e.g. Quakers are now famous for) along with other individuali-
zed, "ungulded", religious activities. The point however is that he did defend private access to the revealed truth: 
the individual must perform an act of failli to see the light. 
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rational egoist is non-neutral: it is contestable as it denies the uncontestable, i.e., the 
content or even the existence of a concept of justice. 
Justice can - and now I turn to the range of included conceptions of justice - be 
looked upon both from a ideological and from a deontological standpoint. To see why this 
is so, we should make a distinction between methods and explanandum. An explanandum 
need not necessarily be explained by one and only one method. There may be other 
defensible ways of explaining. Sometimes a hammer can do the job of a screwdriver just 
as adequately. We may be able to prove that a certain conception of justice is just in 
reference to some prior principle (the teleologica! approach) as well as that it is just in 
itself (the deontological approach), even under neutral conditions. From a teleologica! 
point of view it is clear that impartiality is, or can be, one of these prior principles. For 
deontology the case is a little different: impartiality can be its essence. If we try to prove 
the justice-in-itself of a distributive principle, we certainly have to prove that it is 
objectively neutral, that is, as uncontestable as "the moral law inside of me"35. On some 
interpretations of deontology (like Rawls') one could also want to prove that a principle is 
subjectively neutral. By not looking at the consequences of it in some or all possible 
circumstances, but only at the principle itself, one does away with all contingencies - an 
idea that is compatible with the kind of impartiality subjective neutrality creates: the 
elimination of all contingency in the lives of individuals. 
Michael Sandel's typificalion of liberalism may supply a further argument for 
believing in the theoretical compatibility of liberal justice and deontology. He makes a 
distinction between moral deontology (opposed to consequcntialism) and foundational 
deontology (opposed to teleology). Foundational deontology justifies first principles 
without a reference to "any final human purposes or ends, nor any determinate conception 
of the human good", moral deontology describes "categorical duties and prohibitions" 
which cannot be overruled by "other moral and practical concerns" (Sandel 1982: 3). 
Moral deontology is by definition compatible with impartiality: it is one of those duties 
that cannot be overruled. Foundational deontology can be compatible with impartiality 
only if the first principles are neither biased at the individual level nor at a general level; 
in the first case it would be biased in favour of conceptions of the individual's good life, 
in the second in favour of a certain idea of the good society. 
Section 13: Transcendant meditation 
Let us pause and recapitulate for a moment. We have looked in some detail at the 
meaning of a notion central to liberal theories of justice: impartiality. We have established 
that these theories of justice cannot be completely impartial, and we have identified the 
sense in which they nevertheless aim to be impartial. We have analyzed two substantial 
elements of this liberal conception of impartiality: objective and subjective neutrality. In 
short, we have seen why there must be principles prior to justification procedures, and we 
have seen what these principles are. The question we now confront is this: how are these 
principles integrated in justification procedures? How exactly is impartiality embodied in 
the justification of principles of justice? 
The full quote: "Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Oemiit mit immer neuer und zunehmender llewunderung und 
Ehrfurcht...: Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir" (Kant 1928: 221). 
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Recent contract theories like Rawls's - the ubiquitous example of a justification 
procedure - are often regarded to be as fictitious as the contracts and covenants of late 
medieval and early modern political theorists. Yet neither contracts, nor ideal observers, 
invisible hands, or whatnot, are "just" rhetorical tricks. They play a substantial and 
fundamental role in the creation of theories of liberal social justice. Impartiality and 
related ideals offer little help in constructing such theories. Instead, they support scores of 
theories developed over the last twenty years, and infinitely more that have not yet been 
bred. Part of the differentiation among theories can be explained by the way in which 
different authors fill in the details of these ideals and by the relative weight they attach to 
them. For another piece of explanation we have to look elsewhere. Logically prior to the 
process of creating moral arguments is the question what can count as a moral argument 
at all - and that is where justification procedures come into the story. 
The metaphysical axioms, principles, or rather side-constraints described above are 
then one side of the rules of the game. We shall now discuss the other side, that of 
technical neutrality: which procedures) can certify principles as principles of jusricel; 
How do we measure what we want to measure? Now these procedures as actually 
encountered form a very colourful pattern of widely diverging approaches and strategies. 
Nevertheless they share at least three related characteristics: they try to sail between moral 
relativism and moral absolutism (section 13), they tend not to be impartial towards 
existing morality and society, and they (sometimes gladly) risk ending up in utopianism 
(section 14). As in previous sections, I will illustrate these claims with references to a few 
mainstream theorists. Unlike in those sections, I shall now also give attention to the so-
called communitarians, because one element of their critique of mainstream theories is 
exactly that they would be loo Utopian, too far removed from everyday life to generate 
viable principles and sound judgements. 
A critical examination of the claims to non-relativism and non-absolutism of liberal 
theories of justice, and of the question whether we can avoid relativism and absolutism at 
all, will have to wail until Part II. For now, I am interested in only two things: in 
describing a trend and its implications, and in defending its legitimacy. 
To judge and justify principles we seem to have, in essence, only two alternatives: 
the low road of moral relativism in all its subtly differing forms (e.g. nihilism, scepticism, 
pluralism, subjectivism, conventionalism), and the high road of moral absolutism, again in 
many forms (naturalism, realism, revelation, historicism, etc.). The archetypical examples 
of these views can be found in Plato's Republic, where Thrasymachus and Socrates argue 
about the nature of justice and morality in general (Plato 1974: 338c ff.). The view that 
moral theory is ultimately an either-or matter, either absolutism or relativism, is shared by 
many.36 Of course, in the real world of moral theorizing the extremes are, to say the 
least, rare. The interesting thing about liberal theories of social justice, despite their variety 
in positions, is that they try to build on a third way next to, rather than a mixture of, the 
high and the low road to morality. On this third view, the source of valid moral arguments 
is the human capacity to be impartial. 
See for example several of Ihe contributions to Copp's and Zimmerman's Morality, reason and truth 
(1985)· Copp (1985: 5 ff.), Harman (1985: 27). Sturgeon (1985: 50), and Zimmerman (1985: 79); see also 
Jackson (1988: 312) and Oalsion (1980: 5). 
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This role of impartiality can be described both negatively and positively. Negative-
ly, it differs fundamentally from absolutism in denying the moral relevance of the natural 
order of the universe, divine commandments and so forth, whether such an objective order 
exists or not. Michael Walzer illustrated this point in one of his Tanner Lectures with a 
story from the Talmud: Rabbi Eliezer stood alone in his interpretation of the law, and after 
failing to convince his colleagues on his own, he asked for divine help. But a tree lifted 
high in the air could not convince them, nor could a river flowing backwards, nor the 
tumbling down of the walls of the school, nor, in the end, a thundering voice from heaven. 
Eliezer's greatest opponent, Rabbi Joshua, only commented that the law was not in heaven 
(Walzer 1988: 29-30). 
Impartiality must also be distinguished from relativism. Parallel to the fact that a 
judgement from the point of view of impartiality will only accidentally agree with one 
from nature,37 it will also only accidentally agree with the judgement of normal persons 
in actual, non-reflective circumstances. Impartiality is independent of whatever makes a 
moral view "relative": our present culture at this or any point in time and space and the 
social, political, economic or personal circumstances in which we actually live, work and 
act. 
A positive statement of what impartiality is about is more difficult, as il is 
essentially a negative concept: non-partiality. It can only be done if, first of all, absolutism 
is so defined as to exclude general characteristics of man or human nature (e.g. equality, 
freedom, a sense of morality or most of all rationality) from the realm of natural law, the 
kingdom of ends - and if, secondly, relativism is so defined as to exclude that same area 
of what is common to humans. Positively stated then, the point of impartiality is to 
transcend contingent society, persons and personal views, and thereby take a detached 
view on man sub specie aeternitatis - Spinoza's phrase, taken over by Rawls (Rawls 1971: 
587). Impartiality contains elements of both relativism and absolutism. On the one side it 
is still the human mind and not some kind of absolute universal Reason that dictates the 
moral law, but on the other side this is man at his most absolute. On one side, the outer 
world of facts is irrelevant, in the sense that no is outside the human mind can ever justify 
an ought within, yet on the other side it is nothing like universal voluntarism: the physical 
laws cannot be and are not transcended - should is limited by could. 
To detach oneself from contingency, from all that is accidental about our life and 
way of life, is one thing - to decide what is accidental and what is not is another. 
Although theorists of liberal social justice agree in principle that the construction of 
principles of justice requires an impartial justification procedure, they disagree profoundly 
about the border between the realms of the impartial and the partial. Let us consider a few 
examples. 
The veil of ignorance in John Rawls's original position is the clearest example of 
an attempt at an impartial justification procedure.38 He asks us to imagine (ourselves in 
the position of) persons who are partially omniscient and partially suffer from amnesia: 
we, or they, are to be made free and equal in every relevant aspect. We do not know the 
An exception would be Spinoza, one of ibe earliest "impartialists" - bul that is a mailer of metaphysics 
and epistemology rather than one of ethics. 
38 
Cf. Bell and Schokkaert (1992: 249). For a contrary opinion, based on a definition of absolutism that 
Includes trans-cultural, human-made criteria see Jackson (1988: 312-4). For another, accusing Rawls of relativism, 
seeGalston (1980: 5). 
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accidental facts of our existence (sex, religion, wealth, capacities and disabilities, the 
society in which we live), but we should have complete knowledge of the objective facts 
of life (the laws of economy, sociology, politics, nature, etc.) (Rawls 1971: 137). These 
and other conditions, such as our knowledge of the circumstances of justice and of the 
concept of right (Rawls 1971: 126, 130), best express "the conditions that are widely 
thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles" (Rawls 1971: 121). They are, in 
turn, reasonable because they rule out everything that is contingent about our existence, 
i.e., everything that is morally irrelevant on the one side, and, as giving rise to unfair 
bargaining and bargaining results, unacceptable on the other (Rawls 1971: 137). 
In Ackerman's contract theory, the persons in whose places we are to imagine 
ourselves know what their desires and abilities are. They are real persons, albeit situated in 
a SciFi-adventure, where they are about to colonize a planet and create a new society. 
Impartiality is guaranteed here by two conditions: the people in the contract have no 
possessions or relations, which gives them equal starling positions without prior ties, and 
there are certain limits to the arguments they may use in designing their society and 
dividing the resources of the planet. They must be rational, i.e., prepared to defend their 
claims on pieces of the cake with reasons instead of oppression, these reasons must be 
consistent with reasons used on other occasions, and they must be neutral, which means 
that no one may claim to be superior or have a superior plan of life (Ackerman 1980: 4-
11). As with Rawls, Ackerman's reason for imposing these constraints lies in the 
conviction that only transcendence can legitimize a distribution principle. Ethical absolut-
ism cannot do that job as it can be suspected of authoritarianism, and neither can 
relativism, as that would only result in a struggle for power and subjection (cf. Ackerman 
1983: 384). 
Nozick, no contraclarian, comes closest to both absolutism and relativism. He 
employs two strategies to support his theory of justice: a Smithian invisible hand pro-
cedure, explaining how a night watchman-state with its typically unequal distribution can 
come into existence without violating any individual natural right (Nozick 1974: 12 ff.), 
and a choice model, explaining almost the same thing but now without violating anyone's 
choice to live in the society he or she prefers (Nozick 1974: 299). The principles of justice 
Nozick defends, cquuting a Just distribution over society with any distribution as long as it 
came about by just acquisition and just exchange, arc an inseparable part of his argument 
Both procedures are attempts at impartiality. At one point, his starting point, 
Nozick makes what could be called an absolulistic move: he presumes that the Lockean 
natural rights are universally valid, though he acknowledges that the point is still open to 
debate (Nozick 1974: xiii). In all other respects absolutism is rejected. Within his 
framework of a just society any "absolute" way of life can be legitimate, provided that it 
is freely chosen and respects the natural rights of others. Outside, i.e., in the justification 
procedures themselves, absolutism is rejected by an appeal to impartiality. What justifies a 
moral view, according lo Nozick, is not the way the natural world works, but the way 
human beings, transcending their private convictions, would impartially evaluate it. 
How are we supposed to do this? Following Nozick's first strategy, by imagining 
ourselves in a state of nature, without specified private holdings, interests and beliefs, 
subsequently by following the logic of the situation, and finally by confronting the results 
with our everyday beliefs about things like redistribution (the Wilt Chamberlain example, 
Nozick 1974: 161), equality (Nozick 1974: 232 ff.) or workers's control in firms (Nozick 
1974: 250 ff.). Or, following his second strategy, by each of us imagining the kind of 
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society we would most want to live in and by giving the people we imagine to exist in 
those societies (genuine persons, with the same powers of imagination we have) the 
freedom to choose the society in which they would desire to live. Only a stable society, 
one in which no one wants to trade places, can be legitimate (Nozick 1974: 298). The 
result will be a meta-utopia, a confederation of small societies in which particular views of 
the good life are realized; the structure of the meta-utopian society itself is the same as 
that of the night watchman-state. 
Pluralistic as the results may be, in the last instance Nozick is not a relativist.39 
Both justification procedures invite us to vote for his programme for reasons other than his 
or our varying and variable preferences. In the first case - the invisible hand procedure -
we leave our society and private interests behind us to start from scratch in a world where 
we could be anyone. In the choice model we are supposed to do the same, essentially: we 
imagine ourselves to be in the position of Everyman in Everywhere, that is, we should 
transcend our particularity and background.40 
So much for mainstream theories. In the past decade a wide range of critiques of 
mainstream thought has emerged, united - mostly in the eye of the beholder - under the 
flag of communitarianism. The concept of community {Gemeinschaft, as opposed to 
Gesellschaft) is indeed almost the only thing they have in common. Justice, 
communitarians argue, must have a basis in real society rather than in imagined worlds, 
and society must have internalized this common morality, it must be a moral community, 
if it is to accept and sustain a just system. The system must fit the people, not the other 
way around. In Hegelian terms, the communitarians confront the mainstream preoccupa-
tion with Moralitat with its neglect of Sittlichkeit (cf. Jackson 1988: 316). They must have 
touched a weak spot there, as prominent mainstream thinkers like Bernard Williams and 
John Rawls explicitly or implicitly conceded this point (cf. Williams 1985: 104, Mulhall 
and Swift 1992: 13-18). On a meta-ethical level, communitarians maintain that the 
individual and his or her conception of morality are, for the greater part, products of 
society and its moral tradition, and not, as they accuse mainstream thinkers of believing, 
the other way around (cf. Gulmann 1985: 308-9). Finally, they claim that theories of 
justice cannot be justified by an appeal to the judgement of impartial individuals, at least 
not as mainstreamers understand impartiality. As beings without aims, beliefs, interests 
and relations, as "unencumbered selves" (Sandel 1984: 86), they have nothing in common 
with what we real people hold to be our deepest self (cf. Mulhall and Swift 1992: 9). 
There are communitarians in sorts and to degrees.41 Most of them are critics, few 
of them creators. Some of them are Marxists (Gerald A. Cohen), others Hegelians 
(Michael J. Sandel), some are anarchists (Michael Taylor), and some Aristotelians 
Not In the binad sense as the antithesis of absolutism, nor In the stricter sense of "anything goes": not 
every morality, way of life, or plan of life can be ruled into Nozick's Ideal society, even though he seems to 
think so. 
Both the point concerning the essential agreement about (he idea of Impartiality, and that concerning the 
disagreement on how Impartiality Is to be given shape can be Illustrated further by some of the comments on 
Rawls's theory in, e.g., Daniels's Reading Rawls (1975), on Nozick's In Jeffrey's Reading Nozick (1981), and on 
Ackerman's by a.o. Barber, Flshkln, Flathman, and Williams in a special Issue of Ethics (1983). 
What follows in this paragraph is for the most part derived from Bovens's (1990b) description of the 
communitarians. 
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(William A. Galston, Alisdair Maclntyre). Some are more interested in ethics, meta-ethics, 
metaphysics, or the critique of present-day cultures (Sandel, Maclntyre, Michael W. 
Jackson), others more in politics (Cohen, Galston, Michael Walzer). Some of them, 
notably Maclntyre, are straightforwardly hostile towards mainstream liberalism, others are 
sympathetic - Walzer, for instance, or Marcus G. Singer (Singer 1976: 286). Singer 
criticized Rawls on various occasions for disrespecting the traditions of societies, of which 
the individual's morality is partly a product. He (Rawls) would be more interested in 
convincing people than in helping them to make up their (split) minds (Singer 1987: 520), 
and not interested at all in the history of existing institutions (Singer 1976: 307 ff.). But 
even the father of mainstream social justice theory, Rawls, is "going communitarian": over 
the years, he has begun to stress more and more the idea of considered judgements in 
reflective equilibrium as a culturally and politically situated idea, at the expense of the 
universalistic claims of his contract theory (see e.g. Rawls 1985: 245, 1988: 4). Still, 
Rawls maintains that his theory is more Fit for a pluralistic democratic society than for a 
community in the strict sense of a society ruled by one and only one comprehensive idea 
of the good (Rawls 1993: 42). 
Both the communitarian critique of mainstream "model making", "ulopianism", 
"abstraction" (see e.g. Jackson 1988: 311, Walzer 1981: 383, 387 ff., Walzer 1983: 79). 
and their stress on the social basis of morality suggest that the communitarians are 
relativists - which they are not, at least not necessarily. Let us lake two quite moderate 
communitarians. Walzer and Galston, as examples. Both turn out to make the same claim: 
a viable morality or theory of justice must be based on the human capacity to be impartial. 
William Galston is one of the least communitarian among the neo-Arislotelians; in 
fact, he is less than happy about being called a communitarian (Galston 1991: 43). Rather 
than criticizing liberalism and liberal political philosophy, he developed an alternative 
theory of justice, based on Aristotelian conceptions of the common good, human goods 
and virtues, measures for distribution (need and desert), and the polity. In his Justice and 
the human good he often refers to the community as a necessary condition of the 
individual's development (Galston 1980: 4, 192) and he regards justice as a "criterion for 
the desirability of a community" (Galston 1980: 108) - but he is mainly interested in 
individuals, or rather, in the golden mean between individual and community (Galston 
1980: 2-3). 
Though Aristotle himself understood justice as a virtue defined on the one hand by 
nature and on the other by convention, Galston tries to avoid both in his argumentation. 
He is highly reluctant to accept Aristotle's metaphysics - and thereby the naturalistic 
foundation of Aristotle's categories - (Galston 1980: 12) and he opposes relativism: "there 
is no a priori reason to assume that the assent (of a rational individual, MW) is the source 
of justification for the principle (of justice, MW)" (Galston 1980: 5). Instead, Galston 
wants to present an impartial argumentation, one in which there is room for "utopianism", 
for transcending time, place, and person, to construct ideal theories of justice containing 
principles that are intended to be both universally valid and reflections of our (situated) 
experience with our own ideas of a good life (Galston 1980: 15-16). Intuitions about 
justice and the human good are important, but they must be supported by arguments rather 
than preferences only (Galston 1980: 7, 57). Those arguments in tum should provoke a 
kind of agreement "...rooted in widely shared features of human existence. If basic 
characteristics of human beings were different, or if our circumstances were radically 
transformed, the content of our moral beliefs would be different" (Galston 1980: 58). In 
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short, Galston asks us to agree not because he reveals some absolute truths about God or 
Nature, nor because we can discern the reflections of our dreams in them, but simply 
because his reasons would be universally convincing if we use our capacity to transcend 
our selves and become impartial. 
More than Galston, Michael Walzer stresses the idea of a shared morality as the 
main condition of a viable system of justice. Distributive justice, he claims, is a product of 
interaction. The distribution rules in each sphere of each society are constantly and often 
subconsciously redefined or reinterpreted with every new distributive action. The rules are 
also constantly reconsidered or reinforced as a result of attacks from outside, i.e., when the 
rules of other spheres intrude. Morality is not a system of rules that can be imposed from 
above or outside. It cannot be imposed on one sphere nor on a whole society. It cannot be 
dictated in the form of legal rules (Walzer 1981: 393 ff.), or in that of an ideal theory of 
justice derived from some Idea of society and man. Morality is evaluative, backward-
looking, derived from the reality of this society and its culture here and now (Walzer 
1988: 33 ff.). 
Yet this is what makes theories of justice for spheres and societies viable, not 
necessarily just. Justification requires more than a close fit between current beliefs and 
critical theories: it requires a certain degree of detachment on the side of the critic as 
subject and on that of the criticized reader as objecL Unlike other communitarians, Walzer 
has no intention of denying the validity of the mainstream mode of theory-building, nor 
that of its appeal to the human capacity for impartiality. "They provide a framework for 
any possible (moral) life, but," so he continues, "only a framework, with all the substan-
tive details still to be filled in before anyone could actually live in one way rather than 
another" (Walzer 1988: 23, cf. 14). His objection to mainstream theory-building is instead 
that it must be supplemented by less detached criticisms42 - not the comments of a man 
from Mars, but something more like John Locke's loyal yet critical analysis of England 
and its institutions, which he developed on a psychologically short distance from home, in 
exile in the Netherlands (Walzer 1988: 45). It is impossible to look at the world from "no 
particular point of view" and discover objective truths. Walzer believes, and even if those 
truths were possible and convincing, they would still not be justified. Yet it is necessary to 
step away from the world, if only for a short distance, to be "stripped of encrusted 
interests and prejudices" (Walzer 1988: 7, cf. Walzer 1984: 318). To be a social critic at 
that distance is not far enough for total impartiality - but it is far enough for transcen-
dence, and it is, again in the eyes of Walzer, the most successful way of being as 
impartial as epistemologically possible. We can only discover the truths that are "already 
here", the "features of ordinary life" (Walzer 1988: 7). 
Section 14: Methodological utonianism 
One seldom writes about justice just for the pleasure of writing or out of an Ivory 
Tower kind of interest, however praiseworthy both motives may be. Despite its philosophi-
cal character and despite the importance in it of notions of neutrality and impartiality, the 
Here Walzer apparently agrees with Galston, who remarked that Immanent critique, "a kind of dialectical 
argument that reveals contradictions between Ideals and practices" (Galston 19RO: 23), must be supplemented by 
transcendent critique to allow Tor the rejection of either ideals or practices. 
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present debate on social justice is by no means a playground for the politically disinter-
ested. Michael Jackson is therefore probably wrong when he writes that: "The length and 
complexity of contemporary books on justice like A Theory of Justice make it all too clear 
that they are directed exclusively at other professional philosophers who are paid to read 
each others books" (Jackson 1988: 312). Political philosophers, especially those whom we 
are discussing, often influence politics and politicians - and they often also intend to. John 
Rawls has changed the language of politicians all over the world when it comes to 
questions of legitimation; Robert Nozick spent at least one odd day in politics; Ronald 
Dworkin's pen is where the action is: in the U.S. Supreme Court; Murray Rothbart has his 
own libertarian party - and so on. According to at least one very angry man in the field, 
Wallace Maison, the theory of justice is even basically corrupted by political ideology: 
"Is it any longer possible to talk seriously about justice and rights? Are 
these words corrupted and debased beyond redemption? There is no need to 
multiply examples of how anything that any pressure group has the chulzpa 
to lay claim to forthwith becomes a right, nemine contraddente. Nor is this 
Newspeak restricted to the vulgar. (... For instance, MW) our most 
universally acclaimed theoretician of justice has shown at length that justice 
is a will perpetual and constant to forcibly lake goods from those who have 
earned them and give them to those who have not" (Matson 1983: 94; the 
"leading light" is of course Rawls). 
The appeal to the human capacity for impartiality, and on occasion the use of 
counterfactual situations as vehicles of transcendence, inspired William Galston to apply 
the most radical term in politics, utopianism, to theories of social justice and to Rawls in 
particular. In one sense, the epitaph is misplaced. In another, it is not only correct but also 
inevitable. Theories of liberal social justice must and should be Utopian - in a sense. 
Galston characterizes utopianism as the attempt "to specify and justify the 
principles of a comprehensively good political order" (Galston 1980: 15). Utopian thought 
has six general features: 
(1) ils principles are intended to be universally valid; 
(2) its idea of the good is derived from but not identical to our present experience 
with that idea; 
(3) it is a "city of words", a counterfactual image of a belter world; 
(4) a historical trend towards, or the realization of, utopia docs not validate its 
principles; 
(5) it is realistic in assuming the technically and humanly possible rather than the 
desirable impossible; and 
(6) it is a guide for, not a programme of, political action - it tells us what to strive 
for, not how to get it (Galston 1980: 15-16). 
These features cover most modern theories of liberal social justice, in fact to some degree 
or other probably most political theories of the past 25 centuries, including those conven-
tionally called Utopian. However, the convention on the meaning of the lerm utopianism is 
a bit more strict. Bolh critics and apologists agree that utopianism is also radical, even 
revolutionary, in its intentions, that it is highly critical of existing practises and society, 
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and that its idea of the good is substantial, i.e., the good of man, life, or society is 
explicitly pre- and circumscribed in terms like happiness or harmony."" 
On this view Galston is wrong. If we follow the convention, theorists of social 
justice can hardly be called Utopians. For one thing, they may be spokesmen and -women 
for pressure groups, as MaLson insinuated, but they are only rarely representatives of a 
revolutionary or radical reform movement. Critical as they can be, most of them defend 
the institutions of the societies and liberal democracies in which they live; they are 
reformers rather than revolutionaries. Secondly, most of them are champions of subjective 
neutrality and not of substantive ideas of the good life. Thirdly, they are concerned with 
the just, rather than the good, slate of affairs. Utopians often practice the "supply side 
solution" (cf. Goodin 1984: 1) to problems of distributive justice. They enlarge the cake, 
whereas theories of social justice are restricted to dividing and redividing the cake. The 
Utopian comment on that restriction would look like the text on a button I wore in the 
1980s: "We don't want a piece of the cake, we want the whole bloody bakery". Fourthly 
and finally, although both Utopians and theorists of social justice have some ideas at the 
backs of their minds about the better world (even, or especially, the communitarians with 
their counterfactual moral communities), the former do and the latter do not identify the 
ideal "city of words" with the ideal justification procedure. For Utopians, to see is to 
believe: to read how Utopia, the New Atlantis, Nowhere, Boston in the year 2000, or 
Ecotopia will look, is to know that the ideals the writer and the reader share can be put 
into practice. In contrast, theorists of social justice do not think that the ideal world can be 
identified with life in a spaceship, or society ten years after the stale of nature, or 
existence in the misty world of the original position, let alone an existence wilh no-
particular-point-of-view. 
Nevertheless, theorists of social justice can be called Utopians in a third sense, 
more strict than Galslon's and less strict than convention would prescribe: they are 
methodological Utopians. Their attempts at transcendence lead them to using counterfactual 
worlds as instruments of justification. First, the appeal to impartiality is presented as an 
appeal to extract an idea of the essence of man and society from the "real" world by 
eliminating contingency. From there on, it is a small and often easily taken step towards 
translating this abstract idea into a more appealing illusion: the original position, the state 
of nature, godlike ideal observers, a desert island or a funny new planet where all 
resources fall from the sky. The last step is one that makes a crucial difference between 
justice theories and conventional ulopianism: rather than living happily ever after, the 
inhabitants of the imaginary world of essentials start negotiating principles to rule the 
world of contingency to which they intend to return. 
Before turning to the advantages, I want to point out some of the disadvantages of 
methodological ulopianism: paradoxes. In the first place, mainstream philosophers reject 
relativism, but still want their theories to have a basis in society, in a convention, in 
shared beliefs - which implies that they risk founding them on a contingent, thus 
relativislic, basis. They try to immunize themselves against this risk by inventing "objec-
tive", "no particular", points of view, either human or acceptable for humans, ranging from 
the view from out of space to that of rational man after a purifying brainwashing session. 
But this again means turning away from Sittlichkeit, from the ethos of real human beings. 
Cf. for Instance Goodwin (1978, esp. 7-9), Goodwin and Taylor (1982: 15 ff.). Kateh (1972: 4-9), Olson 
(1982: 143 ff), Popper (1960: 67 ff). Wlssenburg (1989: 393-395). etc. etc. 
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Secondly, ihcy often work with purified conceptions of the real world, excluding 
phenomena like fundamentalism in religion and ideology, industrialization and other social 
and environmental problems, or even any property of a particular society at a particular 
point in lime. This all adds up lo a second risk: that of ending up with theories about just 
distributions for an ideal rather than a just world, with dogmatical and inapplicable rather 
than convincing theories. 
Finally, the opposition within the debate, the communitarians, manifest a third 
paradoxical trend. In reaction to the mainstream approach, which most communitarians 
perceive as being too theoretical and unrealistic, they reject idealized people and idealized 
worlds in favour of - what they imagine to be - real people in real communities, claiming 
to end up with a just distribution for a non-ideal, quite real, world. Yet in trying to avoid 
shipwreck on the cliffs of absolutism, they develop their own way of professing utopian-
ism: the idealization of a communitarian world that never existed - barring parallel 
universes. 
Transcendence, impartiality, methodological utopianism, seems to be possible only 
at the price of paradoxes. What then makes theorists of social justice prepared to pay that 
price? My suggestion is that they have two reasons, one tactical, the other meia-ethical. 
Tactically speaking, procedures to justify political theories depend for their success 
on their veracity as well as on their appeal. Particular points of view - relativistic or 
absolutistic - only appeal to those already convinced, a minority in any modern pluralistic 
society. To appeal to most if not all points of view - as the participants in the justice 
debate intend to - a compromise is needed between what is true (according to the 
philosopher) and what can be legitimized in the minds of humans, between ideal decision 
rules for making up one's mind, and the imperfect rules followed by imperfect people in 
everyday life. Out of the plurality of opinions in society, one opinion has to be distilled 
that appeals to all, a will of all, transcending particular views but not estranged from the 
individuals carrying those views.44 
From a meia-ethical point of view, this will of all must be a general will. If we 
want to be moral (and that is a major premise), principles of justice must be as "absolute" 
as possible, although, because of the fact that we are not omniscient, neither relativism nor 
absolutism can be proven to be true. Starling with the first part,45 let us suppose that 
there are two or more true answers to one, or to each of a greater number of, particular 
question(s) of the form "what should I do, given situation XT' If the two (or more) 
answers have nothing in common, nothing at all, then the most extreme form of relativism 
would be true - but in that case every moral proposition would be true, or nothing would 
be true. Blame, guilt, praise, pride, would in practice all be meaningless; morality would 
be an impracticable empty thought. If, on the other hand, the two or more answers have 
something in common and could therefore be reduced to one meta-answer, absolutism in 
one form or another might be true, and barring other non-compatible answers it will be 
There Is an alternative route: postmodern liberalism. Ils best known representative. Richard Rorty. would 
deny the relevancy of the absolutism-relativism issue, and drop the whole question of justifying foundational 
beliefs. 
Despite the Rousseauian terminology, the following argument Is nol Rousseau's but derived from the 
first propositions of Spinoza's Ethics, the reductio ad absurdum of the idea thai more than one substance can 
exist. 
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true. Therefore, if we want to be moral our principles must be based on the possibility of 
some sort of absolutism. 
Yet, as said before, neither absolutism nor relativism can be proven. It is, from 
every possible human point of view, epistemologically impossible to pass a final judge-
ment on this question. If absolutism is true, there must be moral facts; if relativism is true, 
there cannot be any such facts. However, we cannot know for certain whether such facts 
exist, and whether we would recognize one when we encounter it. Absolutism cannot be 
definitely falsified, or relativism verified: one future day we might discover an ethical fact. 
Nor can absolutism be verified, and relativism falsified. Even presupposing that we agree 
on that matter, what would count as a moral fact will be defined by humans and only 
counts for humans. In other words, it may still be a contingent instead of a universal fact. 
A theory of justice must then be as absolute as possible - but it cannot be else than 
human-made, it cannot be anything but a general will. How the impartial point of view, 
which we need to formulate this general will, can be found is another matter - the subject 
matter of Part II. 

PART Π: THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT 
"The people of France recognize the existence of a Supreme Being and the 
immortality of the soul." 
Decree of the National Convention, 18 Floréal An II 

CHAPTER 3: THE MEAN BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND NATURE 
Section 15: Social justice: temporal, substantial and impartial 
The liberal theory of social justice, we found in the previous chapters, is deeply 
committed to social ideals like liberty, equality, and impartiality. It is, furthermore, 
typically interested in distributive justice and in its realization in societies. These basic 
principles however do not in themselves constitute a meaningful theory of social justice. 
For that purpose we also need intermediate premises. 
We can distinguish between two types of intermediate premises in justice theory: 
firstly, those defining a justification procedure that is consistent with the prior principles 
mentioned before; and secondly, those delineating distribution rules consistent with the 
justification procedure. In the four chapters of Part II we shall be concerned with the first 
kind of premises. 
Chapter 4 discusses one of the most disturbing problems for theorists of impartial-
ity: how to value one distributive scheme more than another without preferring one 
morality to another? This is known, with a mind-boggling metaphor, as the search for an 
Archimedean point, the point from which any moral theory or plan of life can be "lifted" 
and included in the theory of a just and impartial society. My version of the Archimedean 
point will simply be called archpoint, or, more precisely, archpoint of view. 
At the basis of the search for an Archimedean point lies yet another question, often 
referred to as the (Rawlsian) problem of the thin theory of the good. It is said that, in 
choosing principles of justice that do not unjustifiably promote some reasonable plans of 
life more than others, people in the original position must have something like a minimal 
("thin") notion of the human good, i.e., a theory of what matters about a person and for a 
person regardless of so-called contingent circumstances like class, culture, sex, race, 
history, or innate capacities. The solution I propose is based on a notion similar to the 
classical idea of virtue: HIS-reasons (HIS = Here I Stand). HIS-reasons are fundamental 
reasons for behaviour, reasons that cannot be denied without also denying that being a 
person matters from a moral point of view. Denying (or "neutralizing", or "impartializing") 
them reduces personality lo a status of moral irrelevancy. 
Another issue deeply dividing liberal justice theorists is that of the shape of the 
Archimedean point. Impartiality must be warranted, either (1) by specifying the special 
circumstances under which an individual cannot but take an impartial point of view, or (2) 
by defining a procedure through which individuals can collectively generate the same 
results as would have been reached from an impartial point of view, or finally (3) by 
doing both, by ensuring both individual rational behaviour and collectively rational 
results - as Rawls proposed. Among all the different shapes currently en vogue - auction 
schemes, bargaining, cognitive psychotherapy, ideal observers, invisible hands, shared 
understandings, etc. - the Rawlsian type of contract theory seems to be best fit to secure 
impartiality. 
The central problem of contract theories, the knowledge available to the contracting 
parties, will be addressed in Chapter 5. I shall hold on to the categories of knowledge as 
Rawls distinguished them, but change their content. Speaking in broad terms, I shall 
defend the view that "archpointers", my equivalent of people in the original position, can 
be allowed to know a good deal more about themselves than a Rawlsian theory would 
allow, simply because knowledge about one's self need not prejudice a person. My 
position on objective knowledge, i.e., knowledge about the real world for which the 
archpointers are to design principles of justice, is less easy to express in a few strokes. It 
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involves redefinitions of self-interest, of equality of power, of scarcity, of the idea of full 
scientific knowledge and of the related "facts about the world" known to the archpointers. 
Chapter 7 recapitulates the conditions of the archpoint as described in Chapters 3 
to 6 and puts them in perspective. I shall sketch two fictitious contract situations, both of 
which can be said to satisfy the conditions of the archpoint. The first is called the final 
position,46 and portrays a group of people biding their time at the end of times. The 
second, "Philadelphia", describes a society of friends; it is an extension of one of 
Aristotle's arguments on friendship. Finally, I stop to ask (again) why one should consider 
the judgements of archpointers to be morally binding for the real world. 
Before we can turn to all this, however, Chapter 3 addresses the role or roles 
which the concept of society should not play "below the surface" of an impartial theory of 
social justice. It is obvious that judgements of justice can be made about an infinite range 
of states: one unique event, a whole society, a type or set of societies, society as such, and 
so on and so forth. A theory of justice may well be expressly designed to allow only 
propositions about a limited range of stales. In other words: what we may hold to be just 
on such a theory for an impoverished society need not be just in other, more fortunate 
circumstances. 
However, this is still more a question of applying than one of designing the 
justification procedure that underlies a theory of justice. A theorist of justice can choose 
any range he or she likes; the real difference lies below the surface, in the view of society 
with which he or she works. Unsurprisingly, the point of view of a British Conservative 
MP will differ from that of a Finnish communist worker. And so will their judgements -
in everyday life. The question wc then have to face is: from which conception of society 
should a liberal theory of justice depart? This is a special case of the general question 
central to this part of the book, i.e., what should the point of view of a liberal theory of 
justice be? 
The communitarian theorist of justice, Charles Taylor (Taylor 1986: 35, 39 ff.), has 
suggested a distinction between three views on justice and society. In the first place, one 
could distinguish between minimal or natural justice, the code of behaviour for extra-
social life (e.g., strangers meeting in the desert), and distributive justice, which applies to 
life in social settings. Secondly, distributive justice can itself be looked upon from two 
different angles. The first perspective is absolute justice, a conception presupposing no 
(specific) type of society whatsoever. Communitarian justice, on the other hand, recognizes 
(1) that the ideal underlying justice is social equality, and (2) that equality can only be 
understood - and defended - in the terms of a specific society. Based on these distinctions, 
and with a few essential changes in the names to protect consistency in the use of terms, I 
shall describe four views on justice in society: eternal justice, natural justice, minimal 
justice, and communitarian justice. I reject three if these: liberal social justice, I argue, 
must be conceived of as minimal justice. 
In most contexts, in most language games, it makes sense to say that life is a bitch, 
or to cry out that you do not enjoy playing Job. Sentences like these suggest the existence 
of or belief in a point of view outside time and life: eternal justice. If ethical absolutism 
were true, justice and eternal justice would be perfectly synonymous. If it were not, 
eternal justice would still incorporate a point of view beyond that of humans: it would be 
46 The name was suggested by Grahamc Lock. 
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justice as seen through the eyes of the gods or God, or justice as the natural order of the 
universe. Either way it can do without our consent. It could even directly conflict with our 
personal sense of justice, and we may nevertheless accept it as the final word on justice. 
In this context, Larry Temkin's example of a conversation between God and the Devil on 
God's treatment of Jobl and Job2 can serve as a good illustration. Both Jobs are equally 
deserving, but Jobl has had a perfectly successful life for his first 40 years, and Job2 has 
suffered every curse imaginable in the same period. To reward them equally - as they 
deserve - God decides to tum their fates around: during their last 40 years, Jobl's life will 
be miserable and Job2 will be blessed. To which the Devil comments: "Bravo! You really 
are the Master. I couldn't have given a better answer myself." (Temkin 1993: 235-236) 
For our purposes, eternal justice must be considered an irrelevant hypothetical 
category. In the first place, discussing distributive questions in terms of eternal justice 
means looking at the supply-side of the issue. Like the supply-side solution to distribution 
problems, i.e., enlarging the cake to satisfy all rather than dividing it fairly (cf. Goodin 
1984: 1), supply-side critique is not a solution to the distribution question. It comes down 
to ducking the question - to foul play. Secondly, appealing to eternal justice is also 
begging the question. Whereas eternal justice does not need our consent to be put in 
practice - it simply exists or does not - principles of social justice must be supported, 
typically by rational argument. From a human point of view, even a Supreme Being could 
not be without our recognition of its existence. 
Natural, minimal and communitarian justice offer three perspectives on the 
mobilization of rational support What differentiates the three is the kind of constraints 
they pose on a justification procedure. As I already explained in Part I, there are always 
ontological, ethical and epislemological premises built into justification procedures, 
premises which are again reflected in the outcome of the process. 
The most fundamental kind of rational agreement is that on the idea of justice 
itself, on the form without the content, on categorical imperatives. These will be valid 
regardless of the presence or absence of community or of social bonds: they encompass 
both the state of nature and anything "after" that. I shall call this the category of natural 
justice. The category entails three constraints: (1) a demand that we reach an agreement 
(either a negative "no answer possible" or a positive "we hold these truths to be self-
evident"), (2) a demand that this be an agreement on what the idea of justice requires, and 
(3) a demand that we are rational in a minimal sense, that is, that we conform to the rules 
of logic. 
The next kind of agreement concerns minimal justice, the realm of the liberal 
approach to social justice. Once we start to think about the content of justice rather than 
its nature, about what is and what is not "due", a new constraint has to be introduced: 
impartiality with regard to the good or the good life. For reasons discussed earlier, we 
cannot suppose that either absolutism or relativism are true, nor, therefore, that any theory 
of the good is true or that it is as good as any other. A meaningful theory of social justice 
must then depart from impartiality, even if there happens to be accidental agreement on 
one view of the good in the real world. Impartiality is a complex notion; to embody it in a 
justification procedure, as we intend to do in these chapters, other, more precise con-
straints than those of natural justice are required. Together, these constraints will form an 
Archimedean point. 
The fourth and last category is that of communitarian justice. We can drop the 
impartiality condition here because it has become superfluous. Community is defined as 
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sincere consensus on what constitutes the good (life). In theory, conceptions of 
communitarian justice may or may not be consistent with the principles of natural and 
minimal justice. Yet if we want a conception of social justice to be supported by rational 
agreement, the last two, "higher", forms of justice put severe limits on communitarian 
justice. If some act is to be labelled as just in a, one particular, community, it cannot at 
the same time be unjust in all societies, i.e., in society as such, when seen from the point 
of view of minimal justice. For equally obvious reasons, that same act cannot be just in 
one community and unjust in itself, i.e., from the point of view of natural justice. Still, the 
limits posed by more abstract conceptions of justice allow the existence of mutually 
incompatible communitarian principles of justice. Thus, an action, a rule or a system may 
be just in one community and unjust in another - just as long as it is not unjust when 
measured by a higher standard. 
Communitarian justice is also limited by itself. It is predicated on the existence of 
a common view of the good. Consequently, it is only valid as long as there is a commun-
ity, i.e., as long as, in sofar as, and where two or more persons agree on the good life and 
on its translation into principles of justice for those agreeing. In the absence of commun-
ity, in a society where there is little or no consensus on the good life, the best we can do 
is remain impartial between individual conceptions of the good - and thus limit social 
justice to principles of minimal justice. 
Evidently, the four kinds of justice which we just described are subordinated: 
eternal justice, or so one hopes, embraces natural justice; natural justice overarches and 
limits minimal justice; and minimal justice stands in the same relation to communitarian 
justice. 
The separation between especially minimal and communitarian justice is not as 
rigid in practice as it is in theory. One need only recall a point made earlier, to wit, that 
impartiality cannot mean complete impartiality. And in fact liberal theories of justice are 
never completely impartial. This might be taken to imply that their theories are in fact 
communitarian rather than minimal, that the validity of the theories is limited to those 
persons who share the same, however thin, conception of the good - the community of 
like-minded liberals. And this would, in tum, mean that justice cannot actually be 
conceived of as anything but the expression of a community's deepest and most sincere 
convictions. Because such convictions will by definition reflect a particular culture, a 
subjective social consciousness, we would end up with Trasymachus's conception of 
justice: the will of the ruling class. Which is a far cry from anything we intuitively expect 
a theory of justice to be. 
Consequently, the job of constructing an impartial point of view, the archpoint, will 
be a tough job. Before we turn to that task, however, we must first answer some of the 
questions that were implicitly posed but not addressed by the introduction of our justice 
quartet. In the next section I shall ask what the principles of natural justice are and what 
their implications for justice under conditions of impartiality arc. In section 17, the 
concept of communitarian justice and its relation to minimal justice will be investigated. I 
shall in particular try to demonstrate that, and why, we would not want a liberal theory of 
justice to be a communitarian theory. Hence, both sections only describe what lies beyond 
the borders of minimal justice, not what lies within. The latter job is one for the following 
chapters. 
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Section 16: Natural justice 
Principles of natural justice are derived from the formal idea of justice only, with 
no mention of the possible subjects or areas to which the principles will be applied. There 
are no more than three constraints to be reckoned with: a demand that we reach an 
agreement, a demand that it be an agreement on what the bare notion of justice implies, 
and a demand that we are rational. The last constraint is very weak: it amounts to nothing 
more than the acceptance of logical arguments and the rejection of fallacies. The "we" in 
these demands need not be determined too exactly. Let us say that "we" can be everyone 
who is capable of meeting these demands, that is, every rational being capable of 
imagining and communicating the idea of justice. 
Principles of natural justice are, by definition, categorical imperatives. The main 
difference with Kant's categorical imperatives47 is that our imperatives refer to justice 
and not to duty, but the two types of imperative are identical in expressing, what Kant 
called, "das moralische Gesetz in mir", the moral law in me. Like Kant's imperatives, the 
imperatives that express the nature of justice are universal and general: their validity does 
not depend on time, place and culture, nor on the nature of the case to which they are 
applied. Ideally, a categorical imperative is true regardless of whether or not anyone 
believes in it or accepts it or adheres to it. They are - or should be - nothing but a more 
extensive description of the idea for which justice (or duty) is the short expression. 
It might look as if the allusion to "the moral law in me" puts a further constraint 
on the concept of natural justice, namely that we should also want to be just, or at least 
"naturally" just. Perhaps this is true for the inventor of the categorical imperative. For 
Kant, the categorical imperative was no more a joke than anything else in life. In his eyes, 
being convinced of the truth of the imperative necessarily implied the urge - not even 
desire - to act accordingly. Yet there is no necessary link between believing in a principle 
and wanting to act (let alone acting) upon it. It takes an additional theory of the self and 
the will to mediate between conviction and action. I may sincerely believe that killing is 
wrong, always and everywhere, and that I should do anything to prevent at least myself 
from killing. Yet it does not seem to be inconsistent that my will may be tempted if I 
were left alone for some lime with my worst enemy or my suffering and irreversibly ill 
best friend. I might also allow your death if that meant saving my own life. And I risk my 
own life nearly every day by bicycling between my home and the university. To avoid all 
the intricacies of weakness of will (akrasia), of pure moral dilemmas and of duress, I shall 
simply assume that our interest in natural justice is academic: we only want to know what 
justice requires. Whether we will act upon that idea is another question. 
But what then is justice? There are two definitions of justice - both established by 
convention - which have often been taken to be general and universal enough to constitute 
categorical imperatives. One of them, Justinian's, defines justice as giving each his due, 
the other, Aristotle's, as treating equal cases equally and unequal cases unequally. Neither 
of these is very informative. Principles of natural justice, we shall see, are products of 
rationality and semantical convention; without some reference to the world in which they 
are to be applied, they are empty, meaningless. 
One can find more (ляп one formulation of the categorical imperative in Kant's work; for an Inventory 
see e.g. Wissenburg 1991c. 
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The first definition, it seems, presupposes a more substantial concept of justice -
minimal justice, at the least. It is true that the term due, which gives rise to that suspicion, 
does not directly imply that desert is the only basis of justice. It is rather a way of 
expressing that whatever the basis be, if X satisfies its criteria, X should get his due. If 
need were the basis of justice instead of desert, X should get what he or she needs; if 
equality were, we would all get an equal share. But, as Barry argued, following Hume 
(Barry 1989: 149), the problem lies in what a term like due itself apparently takes for 
granted: the existence of an indubitable or universally acknowledged norm. Thus, if we 
were to transform the Justinian maxim in an Aristotelian formula it would tell us that 
cases should be treated according to an objective ethical standard - but at this moment we 
lack such a standard. It may not even exist, for all we know. The bare notion of justice 
does not contain that kind of information. 
One could say that this is no more than a terminological point, which can be 
solved by simply defining justice as treating cases according to a moral standard if we can 
somehow agree on one. But if we cannot presuppose anything, there should also be a 
standard defining cases, a standard which cannot be presupposed in the natural justice 
imperative. The Justinian imperative is then reduced to something like the demand that the 
appropriate thing be the case. It cannot be easy to be less informative. 
The Aristotelian interpretation of justice on the other hand does give us some 
relevant and admissible information. We cannot agree, with the information we have, on 
standards defining cases and rules of treatment But we do have enough information to 
decide that, if (here are cases to which principles of justice ought to be applied, and if 
these cases are equal, then they should be treated equally. This is simply a demand of 
rationality. There can be no reasons - no rationally acceptable arguments - for treating two 
equal cases unequally. If there were, there would be a significant difference between the 
cases; they would no longer be equal - which is a contradiction. It follows that unequal 
cases should be treated in proportion to their inequality. There can be no reasons for 
unequal treatment but those given by the differences between cases; if there were other 
reasons, there would also be other significant differences, which again leads us into a 
contradiction. Other imaginable imperatives will be logical implications of these two, e.g. 
the implication that if one case was treated (un)justly and an "equal" case was treated 
similarly, then this last case must also have been treated (un)justly. 
These two basic imperatives, for equal and unequal cases respectively, may be 
admissible but they are still quite uninformative. They do not indicate what will make two 
cases equal or different, for which reason we cannot in any way apply them to the real 
world. Consider a group of 10 persons which is open to everyone with a trait or capacity 
X. The group consists of three woman and seven men, one person having red hair, the 
others all being blond, eight with a beard, and two without. There are lots of differences in 
this example, differences both inside the group and between the group and the outside 
world. But are these differences relevant? Is there injustice in this distribution, and if so, 
for what reason? 
Stretching the idea of a categorical imperative at bit, we could argue for the 
existence of a third imperative: that good reasons be given for claims about (un)just 
treatment. Lacking a conception of what constitutes a case, let alone an (unequal case, a 
reference to the notion of equal or unequal treatment is just not enough. The categorical 
imperatives of natural justice are simply too uninformative to judge the justice of 
anything. An adequate theory of justice will need more than formal principles, and to 
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develop such principles we need more than a bare convention on the meaning of the term 
justice. We cannot do without the more substantial (i.e., minimal and communitarian) 
conceptions of justice. There is no creatio ex nihilo in justice theory; from a bare idea 
nothing will come. 
Section 17: Communitarian justice 
Social justice depends ex hypothesi on an impartial agreement on principles. An 
impartial conception of social justice allows the existence of a communitarian view on 
justice within the limits posed by impartiality, but it does not allow that the principles of 
social justice are based upon one and only one substantial theory of the good. Clearly, this 
implies a rejection of the communitarians's claims about having unique or privileged 
access to the grounds of moral justification. In this section I shall consider the reasons for 
this veto. 
Note that I take community to be a state of mind rather than a state of affairs. 
Community is a, let us say honest or sincere, consensus on the good life; it exists in sofar 
as, and only in sofar as, two or more persons agree on a conception of the good. Perfect 
community equals full identity of conceptions, imperfect community exists where there is 
only a partial consensus. For reasons of simplicity I shall suppose that there already (or 
still) are (nearly) perfect communities. Communitarian theorists are sometimes inclined to 
think the liberally and democratically unthinkable, that is, that belief in the truth of a 
substantial theory of the good alone is enough to justify its imposition on others, thereby 
imprisoning dissenters in the social structure of a "community" - a community understood 
as a stale of affairs, of course. By assuming the existence of perfect communities, we can 
avoid the issue of the legitimacy of a communitarian coup d'état: if it turns out that 
community is in iLself an insufficient and therefore undesirable basis for a just society, 
there is no reason to even consider imposing a communitarian way of life on ouLsiders. 
As said a few lines ago, I presume the existence of an impartial agreement on 
justice, that is, of an acceptable conception of minimal justice. It is important to see the 
main difference between communitarian and minimal theories of justice. A communitarian 
theory is justified by (and viable because of) its consistency wilh the opinion of the 
enfranchised members of a social group. In essence, communitarian social critique asks 
whether a society lives up to ils own ideals; it compares the theory and practice of a 
society. Mainstream liberals, proponents of minimal justice, go one step beyond this by 
questioning not just the institutions of a society - as a communitarian does - but also the 
ideals behind them. For liberals, the essence of social criticism is to discover what can be 
said about standards, institutions and societies from a point of view beyond that of any 
particular society or person - pace Walzer (Walzer 1988). Mainstream theorists also claim 
that their theories are practical and viable - but only under certain conditions: the members 
of society are to stand open to reasonable and reasoned arguments, and they should agree 
wilh the theorist's idea of what an impartial point of view is and demands, because and 
only because of their reasonability. 
A common point of reference for most communitarians is their critique on 
mainstream justice theories, in particular Rawls's. Wilh regard to their conception of the 
Archimedean point, Rawls and like-minded liberal theorists have been criticized from two 
sides. One strand of critique held that Rawls was in fact "going" conservative if not 
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communitarian, despite Rawls's own denial in his Kantian period, the early 1970s. His 
original position would include a theory of the good which was not thin enough to be 
impartial. Parallel theses, it has been argued, were true for other liberal theories like 
Ackerman's, Dworkin's, and Nozick's. I shall discuss this critique elsewhere. The second 
school insisted that Rawls was, in fact, no communitarian at all. Rawls would have 
proposed a theory of justice that had no relevance to real and ordinary human beings, to 
political beings in the Aristotelian sense. Rawls made no attempt to legitimize his theory 
in the context of a genuine society (read: community). Nor could he: no zoon politikon in 
his right mind would agree to a constitution that might very well restrict opportunities to 
live the good life as he saw it. Instead, Rawls fell back on the notion of a counterfactual 
discourse about considered opinions and on an equally hypothetical contract situation from 
which all kinds of relevant information, including theories of the good, had been excluded. 
(In his latest book. Political Liberalism. Rawls implicitly bows to the critics of both 
schools: he now situates his theory somewhere in a twilight zone between pure communi-
tarianism and unmitigated liberalism. His thin theory of the good, he admits, is too thick 
to be called impartial. It presupposes the existence of so-called reasonable persons, people 
accepting the burdens of reason, the causes of the impossibility to definitely solve moral 
disputes. John Gray, reviewing the book, feels that the appeal of Rawls's whole theory is 
even more limited than that - it would only correspond with the intuitions of American 
East Coast liberals (Gray 1993: 35). On the other hand, the thin theory is still too thin to 
allow the original position to serve as a justification procedure in, or for, a particular 
community (e.g. Rawls 1993: 190-195).) 
On at least one fundamental point, the communitarians are right: a theory of justice 
can only be viable if it takes account of people's conceptions of the good life. In a 
pluralist society like ours, it may be obvious that we shall never agree on the good (which 
gives us a strategic reason to look for an impartial account of justice), but there are other, 
more harmonious societies, and there are niches even in our pluralistic societies where 
communities exist. In communities like those it will be politically pointless to try to 
implement, for instance, Rawls's first principle if (but only as long as!) there exists a deep 
consensus on the unequal value of liberty for separate members of the community. In 
those circumstances, the members of the community will quite certainly resist any such 
attempt, first of all by claiming that Rawls's first principle may be theoretically correct 
(provided that this community accepts the conditions of the original position), but that it 
will not work in practice. 
A theory of justice thus has to be either viable, that is, open to substantial views of 
the good and communitarian conceptions of justice, or, in sofar as it contradicts these 
conceptions, merely evaluative. In these terms, mainstream theories are often academic 
rather than practical, evaluative rather than viable. At first sight, they fail to get their 
message through. As Kukathas and Petlit (Kukalhas and Pettil 1990: 112) summarize the 
communitarian critique of Rawls: if there is a message to us in the original position about 
our practices, why should we listen to it? 
However, this pragmatical critique on liberalism's anti-communitarian inclinations 
is founded on a misconception of what exactly liberal theorists of social justice are 
looking for - a misconception to which many a mainstreamer has unfortunately contrib­
uted. What interests mainstream theorists is not primarily the viability "here and now" of a 
conception of justice, but the viability of justice as a measure to judge the here and now 
by. The intention of non-communitarian, "abstract", theory is to steer clear of justifying or 
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rationalizing the particular conception of justice of a particular society at a particular point 
in time, whether that be the dominant ideology of an imperfect community, or the theory 
of the good defining a perfect community. The reasons for this are simple: the harmony 
on which a communitarian account of justice rests does not exist, and even if it did, the 
existence of perfect community could not guarantee that the principles adhered to are 
genuine principles of justice (cf. Barry 1989: 265-271, esp. 268). 
Communitarian justice is legitimized, if at all, by a community's honest and 
unanimous consensus on what constitutes the good life. This consensus need not be 
explicitly voiced; it can also be "lived" in practices and institutions, in, one could imagine, 
a unity of social consciousness and political reality. In sofar as such a consensus is absent, 
as is the case in modern pluralistic societies, communitarian justice loses ils legitimacy by 
definition. This is in itself a reason to turn to the more basic conception of minimal 
justice. But there are more, belter and less opportunistic reasons for challenging the 
privileges of communitarian justice. Liberal theorists of social justice deeply doubt both 
the actual and the theoretical possibility of a stable moral consensus. The four reasons I 
am about to give for this conviction hardly exhaust the list of complaints against commu-
nitarianism, nor are they conclusive, but they should suffice to shed some doubt on it. 
In the first place, consensus may be a deception. Though this critique on the basis 
of the idea of communitarian justice can be expressed in more liberal terms, it is perhaps 
clearer when given a Marxist wording - which is ironic, as some communitarians are 
Marxists. On this view, there can be no genuinely shared and accepted conception of the 
good as long as there is class struggle, or, in updated versions of the faith, as long as there 
are fundamental conflicts of interest. As long as the goods to satisfy fundamental needs 
are scarce, there will be fundamental conflict. In short: as long as there is scarcity, there 
can be no community. In the current circumstances of scarcity (which we assume to exist), 
any attempt to formulate a common substantial view of the good or to explicate our 
considered judgements on this must necessarily reflect existing power relations. A 
communitarian theory of justice must then be a biased theory - biased in favour of one 
party or another. It follows that it cannot be valid by its own standards: whereas it claims 
validity for a whole society, not all of society's members can honestly and sincerely assent 
to iL 
Yet - still thinking along Marxist lines - we could imagine the existence of a kind 
of academic agreement on a common good, on an end or principle to which we should 
adhere but cannot or will not in a society of conflict. Let us call this agreement the 
Enlightened View. The situation resembles a society-wide prisoncrs's dilemma (i.e., the 
good guys lose) with at least this relevant difference that there seems to be no way 
whatsoever to ascertain the pay-off structure. In clearer terms, it is impossible to determine 
that the Enlightened View of the common good really expresses our deepest and most 
sincere convictions. By implication, it is also impossible to determine that it does so as 
good as or belter than the views currently ruling our actions, views which are based on 
private or class interests (call these the Current Views). The reason for all this is that we 
may think that we fundamentally agree on what constitutes the good life, but we cannot be 
sure that we really do. If our Current View gave us reason to believe in the Enlightened 
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View, then why do we still act upon our Current View - or vice versa?48 We need a prior 
principle to account for the priority given to the common good over particular interests. 
To defend such a principle or refute any opposite principle we cannot, at least not without 
circularity, appeal to the Enlightened View or to Current Views. So we need a pre-prior 
principle which, to be defended, requires its own prior principle. Et cetera ad infinitum. 
Finally, suppose that we do live in a world of abundance. Still following the 
Marxist view, we are now in ideal circumstances to agree on a common view of the good 
life. Unfortunately, we now no longer need that view to support a theory of justice, as we 
no longer need a theory of (at least distributive) justice. By definition, abundance implies 
the needlessness of distribution schemes. 
Next to a Marxist line of critique, there is a sociological or, if you like, anthropo-
logical argument against communitarian justice. Historically, any culture, social conscious-
ness or system of fetishes and taboos is situated: it is partly a product of consciously 
guided action and partly of tradition, yet it will always be a product of specific historical 
circumstances. The system could be different and it could be changed, but unless we can 
transcend it (which goes against the very soul of communitarianism), all reasons (not) to 
change will be either (1) accidental, i.e., imposed from the outside, or (2) internal to the 
system, rationalized but not justified by a society's culture, its language game or its shared 
understandings. "It should be like this because that is the way it was meant to be" is no 
more of an argument in a debate on artifacts than "it is so because that is the way it is". 
Yet these are exactly the kinds of arguments communitarian justice would have to be built 
upon, arguments referring to a basic consensus which is itself little more than an historical 
accident. Unless we can transcend actual cultures, of course, but then we would no longer 
be communitarians. 
Thirdly, and next to the Marxist and sociological criticisms, we encounter a meta-
ethical argument. Communitarianism carries the risk of undermining itself by allowing two 
types of relativism: moral solipsism and moral nihilism. If there are no sound reasons to 
support a particular community's theory of the good except those internal to its culture or 
language game, any individual's theory of the good is just as good, provided it can be 
fitted into a language game. Ethically speaking then, anything goes. If, on the other hand, 
it is not what a community believes that justifies their consensus, but the fact that a 
community believes in some theory and can live by it, then any theory of the good will 
do, as long as the almost unlimited potential of people to convince themselves of the 
improbable is not overstretched. Thus, again, anything goes. 
Fourthly, communitarianism does not only not have an answer to, but even 
implicitly condones, intuitively immoral notions of the good life. (I shall, for the sake of 
argument, assume that we share the same intuitive sense for immorality.) A community is 
free to define "strangers" on ils own terms and draw any line it likes between strangers 
and the incrowd. A community is, by definition, deaf to arguments derived from other 
views on society. To use a Walzerian frame, such arguments could be seen as attempts at 
colonization. Thus, if a community decides that anyone who speaks a foreign language, 
Of course, one theory of action (e.g. self-interest) may prescribe that we (act as if we) believe in another 
(e.g. altruism) (compare Parfit 1984: 23 ff.). But considering this possibility will only complicate, not solve, our 
problem: if the Enlightened View prescribed action In accordance with, or belief in, one's private Current View, 
and the Current Views prescribed the same with regard to the Enlightened View - the legitimation problem would 
remain the same. 
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wears glasses or lives in a town should be treated as a stranger and sent off to be starved 
or tortured to death, no outsider can offer the incrowd a convincing counter-argument. Nor 
can any insider - critique of that kind immediately labels one as a stranger. Picturesque as 
the idea of community may sound, we cannot at the same time think that communilar-
ianism is a complete moral theory and hold that the Pol Pots of this world should not be 
allowed to roam about, whether inside or outside our own community. (Note that this is 
not only a condemnation of communitarianism based on a "gut feeling". It is also the 
mirror image of our third point: how to choose between two normative views if both are 
equally (in)defensible?) 
Neither these four arguments nor any others can prove that the notion of 
communitarian justice is superfluous or that principles of justice based on a consensus on 
the good are by definition immoral, worthless and offensive. First of all, in sofar as 
communities actually exist, communitarian theories of justice exist, and their existence is 
relevant to any theorist of justice, whether communitarian or liberal. In this respect, 
mainstream theorists of justice might try to reverse the communitarian critique on their 
hypothetical status: it is communitarianism that is evaluative and academic, and liberal 
social justice that is practical and viable. A communitarian analysis of justice amounts to a 
description of - with a Husserlian term - the historicity of a community's or society's 
conception of justice, an attempt to reconstruct the way in which a social consensus 
logically must have evolved rather than accidentally did evolve. In this light, a 
communitarian analysis of justice may contain valuable sociological information. 
This is not to say that we (assuming "we" to be liberal-minded) should dismiss 
ideas about liberal social justice "here and now" simply because they are not in line with 
the deepest convictions of an existing community, nor that we should give up the First in 
favour of the latter, nor (least of all) that, on finding no communities at all, we should join 
a monastic order, the last refuge of the communitarian. We should accept a part of the 
communitarian critique on liberal justification procedures: those procedures need a sound 
basis in everyday life. But it does not follow that we should also accept the more 
fundamental critique on liberalism itself, as expressed by communitarians like Alasdair 
Maclntyre (Maclntyre 1985) and Michael Jackson (Jackson 1988), who claim that a moral 
view without a foundational substantive theory of the good Is built on quicksand. (We 
shall, indirectly, address this view in the following chapter.) 
Apart from its practical uses, there is another reason not to throw communitar-
ianism overboard too quickly. What the arguments expounded above show is that 
communitarian theories of justice, in sofar as they are defended with an appeal to the idea 
of community, are insufficiently sustained. The defence is incomplete: one cannot simply 
jostle questions about the legitimacy of theories of the good off the agenda. It has not 
been said that any defence of a communitarian conception of justice is necessarily 
impossible. If such a theory were compatible with and enclosed in a conception of 
minimal justice, this could count as an argument in favour of it: it would imply that from 
a higher, impartial point of view, this particular theory of the good is not principally 
despicable. Or, in stronger terms: even a community needs minimal justice. 
As a mailer of fact, communitarian justice is not only in principle compatible with, 
but also an almost indispensable supplement to, minimal justice. A community needs to 
affirm the principles of minimal justice, but a minimally just society is not necessarily the 
most desirable society. If a liberal theory of justice takes its devotion to impartiality 
seriously, it will not be able to answer all questions of justice conclusively - as we shall 
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see in Part III. Minimal justice is really very minimal. It can prescribe that fundamental 
needs be answered whenever physically possible; it cannot command that welfare benefits 
allow their recipients more than bread and water. It cannot prescribe that forty years of 
service to a society's culture be rewarded with a knighthood; it will demand that honours, 
if admissible in this form, be given to those who deserve them according to relevant 
criteria, and it will determine what makes criteria relevant. 
Minimal justice does not exclude the possibility of a society's having a shared 
conception of the good life and a substantial theory of justice. It only put limits on the 
kinds of acts, intentions, and states of affairs that can be called (minimally) just Hence, 
there is a legitimate role for communitarian justice in a liberal view on society. Where 
minimal justice is incapable of more precision, where it is indifferent between particular 
distribution patterns, it is up to the members of a community to decide or, in the absence 
of community, up to politics. Whereas minimal justice defines the minimal standards of 
justice, the political will defines the upper limit. This makes justice, like politics, an art 
rather than a technique. 
CHAPTER 4: THE ARCHPOINT 
Section 18: The possibility of impartiality 
We have denned minimal justice as the conception of justice that will be chosen or 
endorsed under conditions of impartiality. We have also asserted that the notion of 
impartiality is central to liberal theories of social justice. And, Finally, we have seen that 
the common denominator in liberal conceptions of impartiality is a set of quite broad and 
vague conceptions of neutrality. In this chapter, I shall defend a more precise and concise 
notion of impartiality. 
How should we conceive of impartiality, given the impossibility of ethical 
absolutism? It cannot be "anything goes"; under such circumstances there would no longer 
be moral or immoral ideas - only evaluative or normative fancies. Allowing each and 
every evaluative view leaves us with no point of view at all, not even one from which we 
can account for the "anything goes" rule itself. Because anything goes, nothing goes: both 
the idea that every moral or immoral or amoral code is allowed, and the idea that none 
can be allowed as none can be justified, would be equally valid or - as anything goes -
equally invalid. 
I shall argue instead that impartiality is a negative but not a nihilistic notion. We 
are morally and intellectually situated, like it or not. We all have an evaluative point of 
view, even Camus's étranger. The intention behind our introduction of impartiality in 
theories of justice is to step away, as far as possible, from these particular points of view, 
without excluding their existence or without denying partiality and contingency4*. 
One way not to do this is by asking real human beings to be impartial and judge 
principles of justice. We might trust them to be impartial, but in this respect it is more 
secure to control them. For that purpose a contract theory turns out to be best fit. In this 
chapter I shall discuss the side-constraints that should be posed on a justification pro-
cedure to ensure ils impartiality, and the form best fit for representing such a procedure. 
As for the first part, this comes down to defining impartiality as, among other things, the 
point of view (the archpoint) at which one postpones judgement on the most basic human 
motives. With regard to the form of the justification procedure, I shall argue that the 
collection of contract theories, general observer theories, insurance games, choice and 
bargaining theories and like constructions can be compared to the emperor's wardrobe in 
one important respect. These are all ways to dress up real, naked arguments and thereby to 
add to the authority of argument (hat of imaginability. Both the emperor's wardrobe and 
the collection of justification styles are, in a way, heuristic devices: both are chosen for 
representational purposes to camouflage something more substantial, and both can be seen 
through, given the appropriate attitude. The difference is that not all justification devices 
will fit impartiality. 
In chapter 5 we shall consider what kind of beings we would want to judge on 
principles of justice (i.e., their psychological and moral make-up), by which rules they 
ought to judge, and which knowledge they should have at their disposal. 
First, however, let us discuss the following questions: is impartiality possible at all 
in the context of minimal justice?: If so, in what form?; And is this form a desirable 
interpretation of impartiality? 
That Is, the contingent features of human life: capacities, (dis)abilities, race, sex, figure. Intelligence, etc., 
as well as exterior circumstances like the structure of society, the economic climate, and laws and constitutions. 
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There are three reasons in this context to examine whether impartiality can exist 
First of all, and as remarked in section 15, the separation between minimal justice, or 
justice under conditions of impartiality, and communitarian justice, which is characterized 
by the presence of a substantive theory of the good, is not as rigid in practice as it is in 
theory. No liberal theory of justice goes without some kind of theory of the good. But if 
the initial distinction between minimal and communitarian justice is blurred in this way, it 
would seem that liberal social justice is simply a hybrid form of communitarianism - and 
we found communitarianism to be undesirable. In that case, the one remaining difference 
between communilarian and minimal justice is the absence or presence of the impartiality 
constraint To know if this really makes a difference, we have to know what impartiality 
entails - and whether it can exist. 
A second reason, connected with the "anything goes" problem discussed above, 
concerns a possible inconsistency between the micro- and macro-levels of morality. If 
there can be no sound foundation for conceptions of the good for societies (which was one 
of the reasons why liberals embrace impartiality), then what about the foundations of the 
individual's convictions? Why adhere lo a private theory of the good, or to a plan of life, 
or to a Nietzschean or nihilistic view on life? Why would any of these, or all, be 
legitimate? It seems that if we reject a society's adhering to a theory of the good, we 
imply that individuals should not have one either. Under those conditions, there would not 
be anything to be impartial to; impartiality would be non-existent 
A third reason is inspired by Marx (cf. Lock 1989: 3) and by Karl Popper's 
critique of Utopian planning (Popper 1986a: 160-161): preferences not only change in a 
society, but also as a result of the transformation of a society. This thesis confronts us, 
first of all, with the problem of distinguishing between a person and his contingent 
attributes - talents as well as attitudes. We will deal with that later on in this chapter. 
Secondly, it raises questions about impartiality itself. How can this idea be reconciled with 
a revolutionary Umwertung aller Werte! Will the archpoint itself be the product of an 
ideology rather than stand above ideologies? 
Earlier, I introduced a series of ideas representative of liberal justice theories, a 
cluster of three very indefinite types of neutrality to which I attached the collective label 
"impartiality". Taking these as a starting point, we shall see that a defence of impartiality 
requires a further specification of this concept, especially with regard to the theory of the 
good. Let's recap: 
Technical neutrality: the decision procedure should actively endorse the promotion 
(i.e., detection and selection) of neutral principles of justice. In ordinary English: 
the justification procedure should measure what it is supposed to measure. 
Objective neutrality: rational human beings should all equally endorse the prin­
ciples or reasons behind the justification procedure, by virtue of their already being 
endorsed in their plans of life. In short: the thin theory of the good should be 
reasonable. 
Subjective neutrality: the justification procedure, and the reasons behind it, should 
give equal relevance to individual plans of life or constituent parts thereof. 
I shall take the demand of technical neutrality to be either trivial or, if it cannot be that 
simple (few things in philosophy are), as a postulate. 
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Objective neutrality is a quite strong demand. By insisting on universal approval, it 
apparently excludes all moral notions and ideals except for those that are never denied by 
rational beings, nor ever in history were, nor ever will be. This also implies - but now I 
am running ahead of things a little - the exclusion on grounds of insufficient evidence of 
most current liberal theories about the justification of conceptions of justice, in particular 
Ackerman's belief in a societal modus vivendi, and probably Rawls's belief in a basic 
consensus as well. We shall discuss the details of objective neutrality in a moment. 
Prior to that, however, let us consider subjective neutrality. This aspect of 
impartiality demands two things at the same lime: that you get what you deserve and that 
the system (the distribution rules, not their application) is itself not biased against your 
specific theory of the good. And this spells double trouble. In the first place it requires a 
test (such as, but not necessarily, consistency with the condition of objective neutrality) to 
ascertain the absence of bias. In the second place, subjective neutrality is itself very 
demanding. At the political macro-level, for one thing, it seems to exclude almost every 
conception of society as a system of rules - for how can rules give equal relevance to the 
plans of life of anarchists, libertarians, liberals and other rule-sceptics on the one hand, 
and those of rule-disciples on the other? For another, it apparently allows, at the micro-
level, virtually every individual morality, even sadism, nihilism, terrorism and other codes 
containing so-called perverse preferences, including political convictions holding macro-
level neutrality to be repulsive. 
All this comes extremely close to a contradiction in terms not unlike one of the 
famous paradoxes of democracy. In principle, citizens of a democracy are free to vote for 
the abolition of democracy. To protect democracy, some parlies or political preferences 
would have to be excluded, bul this is as paradoxical as allowing the abolition of 
democracy: democracy would become the dictatorship of the enlightened over those whose 
ideas they no longer represent or tolerate. 
Like this paradox of democracy, the paradox of subjective neutrality can be solved 
by assuming that it is a theory about rather than of something, a meta-theoreiical construc­
tion. The extent to which we do or do not exclude anti-democratic parties and preferences 
from democratic politics (and thus the extent to which we can circumvent the paradox) 
depends on what can be justified (mcta-)democratically. 
Very simply put, the meta-lheory of democracy prescribes that - even if this aim 
may be irreconcilable with other political ideals50 - the political system should somehow 
reflect the preferences of the people, to the extent that this is reconcilable with that 
prescription itself. If the political expression of preferences of type A, preferences 
exclusively directed against reflecting popular opinion, would systematically and struc­
turally hinder the expression of all non-Α preferences, there are grounds to exclude type A 
preferences from the democratic political system. Excluding them means becoming a 
limited (but not necessarily imperfect) democracy - whereas allowing them would mean 
being no democracy at all. Thus, democracy can be compatible with the existence of 
constitutions or Bills of Rights. By the same token, subjective neutrality as a source of 
justification can be combined with a partial or total exclusion of anti-neutral codes and 
theories from social and political life. 
The greatest obstacle to our defence of impartiality lies in the realm of objective 
rather than subjective neutrality. Ultimately, neither the paradox of democracy nor that of 
so Cf. for instance Arrow's Impossibility theorem (Kelly 1988: 80). 
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subjective neutrality can be solved or dissolved without reference to a meta-theory. In the 
case of subjective neutrality, its possibility depends primarily on the way we interpret the 
phrase "individual plans of life or constituent parts thereoF. If, for some reason, we must 
give equal relevance to all aspects of all plans of life, then the paradox cannot be solved 
or evaded. However, if there are good reasons to limit the ban on political biases to parts 
of plans of life only, then perhaps the paradox will not arise, ergo subjective neutrality 
will be possible, ergo impartiality will be possible, ergo liberal social justice will be 
possible. It all depends on one thing: whether all rational human beings will "equally 
endorse the principles or reasons behind the justification procedure", and this for the right 
reason, namely "by virtue of their already being endorsed in their plans of life" - as the 
definition of objective neutrality runs. 
In the Rawlsian nomenclature, this is described as the problem of the thin theory of 
the good. If, in questions of justice, all rational beings would have to agree that what 
matters to and about persons is that their life goes as planned, then we have a problem. If 
what matters is only that some things go right, then the paradox may not arise, in which 
case everything else follows. 
The best known, though unsatisfactory, solution to this problem is, of course, 
Rawls's. In his latest exegeses of his own theory, Rawls has argued that his two principles 
of justice are reasonable (read: realistic or feasible) while acceptable for everyone, 
assuming that there is a "basic consensus" on fundamental values among us (or US 
citizens). It is the purpose of the dialogue between our considered judgements and the 
judgements of people in the original position to let us develop a rational reconstruction of 
this consensus (Rawls 1993: 28, 38-39, etc.). At the moment when both views on justice 
are in agreement and the basic consensus becomes visible, we have reached a state known 
as reflective equilibrium. Now Rawls has done a lot of this work for us. The basic 
consensus, as he sees it, is already embodied partly in the structure of the original position 
itself (e.g. in the freedom and equality of the people in that position), and partly in the 
thin theory of the good as applied in the original position. 
It will be clear why this solution is not satisfactory for anyone who - like us - is 
looking for a universally acceptable Archimedean point. On this new interpretation, Rawls 
explicitly allows for the possibility of a society, even a just society, based on another basic 
consensus than the one he discerns in his own society". Consequently, dissenting 
societies can neither accept Rawls's version of the Archimedean point, nor that which 
follows from an exchange with this original position: the famous two principles. This is 
what gives Rawls's theory its republican52 and conservative twist: it no longer has 
universal pretensions. Rawls now allows justice to depend on a contingent feature, the 
culture of a particular society at a particular moment. Justice as fairness has become the 
alter ego of a rather than any society. 
Bruce Ackerman's modus vivendi conception of the social contract has at limes 
been described as the antithesis of Rawls's basic consensus - in particular by Rawls 
himself (Rawls 1993: 147). In Ackerman's theory the aim of constructing an Archimedean 
Imagine, for Instance, a society where privately owned material goods are considered less important If 
not dangerous - say, among the Kalahari bushmen In Jamie Uys's movie The Gods must be crazy (1980). 
"Republican'' In political philosophy refers to a semi-communltarlan school of thought Inspired by 
Aristotle and Machiavelli, emphasizing notions like civic responsibility and citizenship. Not to be confused with 
the Grand Old Party. 
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point is not to generate a consensus but to do exactly the reverse: avoid and exclude moral 
disagreements, contradictions, and conflicts (Ackerman 1983: 375). Ackerman believes 
that the contemporary disagreement on the most basic values determining our plans of life 
is insurmountable. He therefore denies the legitimacy and authenticity of a Rawlsian basic 
consensus. However, assuming that we are rational and that we would appreciate a debate 
on the reasons for our behaviour over a war of all against all, we can still reach a viable 
live-and-let-live agreement in the form of a social contract. We would need some rules of 
debate - rules Ackerman defends in the first part of his book (Ackerman 1980: 4-11) - and 
we would have to assume that we all need resources (manna). Apart from that, there 
would be no need for any thin theory of the good, nor for that which it necessitates: an 
evaluation of private conceptions of the good. All we need is a good debate on what can 
count as a neutrally defensible reason for action, regardless of the underlying private 
conception of the good. 
Like most theorists of liberal justice, Ackerman has been criticized for not 
representing the idea of impartiality (or neutrality, in his vocabulary) correctly. We have 
done so ourselves, to some extent, in Chapter 2. Ackerman, in refusing to evaluate the 
substance of private conceptions of the good, apparently tries to stand above disputes on 
the good and evil life (which, as will become apparent later on, is not always required by 
impartiality). Yet we also saw that his supposedly purely formal test of the rationality or 
neutrality of reasons still incorporated a range of ethical presumptions, that is, a thin 
theory of the good. And none of these had been tested for the "reasonable uncontestabil-
ity" we expect from intuitions. 
The Ackerman-Rawls controversy illustrates, once more, the problem confronting 
all attempts at designing an impartial justification device. Rawls's choice for one particular 
culture as he perceives it to be is one example; the substantial ethical assumptions both he 
and Ackerman made in presupposing the value of (physical) resources - assumptions 
which many will not share in every detail, and few of the contemplatively living in 
general - is another. It is a problem relevant to every theorist subscribing, in some form or 
other, to the seven ideals which we earlier identified as the core values of liberal theories 
of justice. It is even relevant to the more liberal-minded communitarians like Walzer. All 
of them deny at least the relevance if not the existence of a "true" basis of morality (read: 
of ethical absolutism). They thereby create the impression that their theories are 
ideologies: partial or biased theories offering political liberalism a philosophical disguise. 
Now there is nothing wrong with being an ideologue, except if, by your own standards, 
you should be able to convince everyone of your impartiality. 
We are then, once again, slipping over the Catch-22 dilemma of impartiality. 
Denying (the relevance of) ethical truth, rejecting ethical absolutism, will lead to theories 
that can be branded ideological, but we want to certify that we are impartial. Accepting 
ethical absolutism, on the other hand, will lead to theories that cannot be accepted as 
impartial by those who do not share our privileged knowledge of and access to the Truth. 
There is no impartiality without a theory of the good, and there is no impartial theory of 
the good. Or is there? 
Reluming to the roots of liberalism, I think we can find a way to save objective 
neutrality and impartiality without committing ourselves to a too substantial theory of the 
good. 
Step one on this way takes us back to David Hume's distinction between fact and 
value. Hume's Law holds that ethical judgements cannot be derived from empirical 
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premises - though of course meaningful judgements can only be passed on empirical facts 
or on (possible) counterfacluals. The law can be applied in two ways: (1) we may believe 
there is an ethical truth independent of facts and start looking for it; or (2) we may give 
up the search for an absolute ethical truth independent of the world of everything was der 
Fall ist - for instance because we come to believe that ethical propositions and convictions 
are, as stales of mind, simply another type of empirical fact. In this case we can opt for 
(probably among others): 
- Naturalism, by which I mean the belief that ethical propositions refer to the 
sense-data of a particular body and can only be treated like desires or diseases; 
- Conventionalism, the belief that morality is determined by convention; 
- Scepticism, the belief that we do not or cannot know enough to judge moral 
propositions; or 
- Nihilism, the belief that (1) either there can be no such thing as a realm of truth, 
let alone truth in moral affairs, not even one established by convention, psychiatry 
or medicine, or (2) that the idea of morality is simply silly. 
The first option, ethical absolutism, has already been excluded above. The second offers a 
whole range of new options, though none of them seems to be very promising as a basis 
for objective neutrality. As for naturalism: most sufferers from a moral disease like 
indignation about social injustice will reject tranquilizers and insist on the eradication of 
injustice - but naturalism allows neither the patient nor the doctor to convince the other. 
Conventionalism is premised on ils own conclusion, namely the possibility of an agree-
ment between initially differing opinions. If this premise does not hold, objective 
neutrality cannot follow. Scepticism - at least in this Humeian context - is still partial in at 
least one respect: it accepts Hume's Law. And finally nihilism - well, nihilism denies 
about everything nearly anyone ever believed in. A nihilist would have a hard time 
convincing others that, in fact, they shared his view. 
Step two is a tentative denial of Hume's Law. Let us say that ethical propositions 
can be derived from slates of affairs. This is not an uncommon view, although a bit out of 
fashion nowadays and at places. It is the view of radical SpinozisLs, who believe that there 
is only one natural order of things, one infinite substance of which all things and ideas are 
expressions, modes of existence. It is also the view of Platonisls and Neoplatonists, who 
assume that the adequate idea of X (say, God, the first principle of ethics, or Sherlock 
Holmes) guarantees and implies the existence of X. And it is the view of many, especially 
monotheistic, religions: God (or the gods) reveals himself (reveal themselves) and his 
(their) intentions by token, text, miracle or in the design of this world. Were views like 
these correct, it could be quite well possible to formulate (or rather, discover) an absolute 
ethical truth acceptable to all rational beings, all beings capable of knowing and under-
standing. This would give us a very sound basis for objective neutrality. One of the 
inconveniences of life, however, is the existence of people who are firmly convinced of 
the truth of Hume's Law. 
Step three takes us to the Far East, where we encounter yet another view on 
morality. One day, the honourable Shui-lao appeared before Ma-tsu, asking the Master to 
teach him wisdom. Ma-tsu told him to bow, and gave him a fierce kick on a painful place. 
"Oh wonder, oh wonder!", and the student had his moment of Enlightenment (Ma-tsu 
1981: 107). 
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Step four is an observation: the possibility and shape of objective neutrality 
depends on our metaphysical conception of the world, i.e., on the way we relate facts and 
morals. If we were all Humeians, objective neutrality might be possible but it would 
always rest on shaky foundations. If we were Spinozists or Neoplatonists, formulating the 
objectively neutral archpoinl is only a matter of sound thinking. If we were Ch'an 
Buddhists, objective neutrality would be unthinkable, viz., the idea of the Absolute 
Nothing, or possible but perhaps a bit painful - who knows? And, obviously, we have no 
guarantee that the Humeian conception of objective neutrality is congruent with the 
Neoplatonic, Ch'an, or other versions of that idea. 
Step five is an educated guess: given the actual plenlitude and imaginable 
infinitude of metaphysical theories, given our limited intellectual capacities and the 
suspicion that it may not even be possible to have a meaningful debate on metaphysics, 
and barring the appearance of an angel with a solution, there is little hope that we will 
shortly formulate the definitive metaphysics. Consequently, there is little hope for the idea 
of an objectively neutral theory of the good so long as it is predicated on one or more, but 
not all, imaginable metaphysical theories. 
This leaves us two options. Firstly, we could give up, deciding that any attempt at 
formulating a universally inoffensive theory of the good is fruitless. This means taking a 
very radical Wittgensteinian or postmodern stand, and interpreting justice talk as providing 
us with an interesting opportunity to clarify or analyze the understanding of language 
games, perhaps even without any pretension of contributing to the understanding of justice 
as such. Or, secondly, and without denying the validity of the first alternative, we could 
try to turn the tables in our favour and look for a minimally offensive theory. I shall argue 
that there is such a theory. 
Objective neutrality at the archpoint can be conceived of as a combination of three 
ideas: the revived sceptic idea of postponing judgements, a set of things to postpone 
judgement on, and a super-thin theory of the good. As for the last idea, this is mainly a 
restatement of one of the constraints posed earlier on natural justice. It consists of one 
simple axiom: that it is good to be, and that in fact we are, rational in a weak sense, i.e., 
reject fallacies and accept logically sound arguments. There is, to my mind, no rational 
way to account for rationality; that would require circular reasoning. Perhaps we could 
give a negative defence by pointing - as Karl Popper did - to the undesirable consequences 
of a rejection of rationality and rational argument (Popper 1986b: 232), but even such an 
argument seems to presuppose rationality if it is to hit home. On the other hand, perhaps 
the burden of proof does not rest on us but on anyone questioning that this superthin 
theory of the good is "equally endorsed" by "all rational human beings". Even though we 
do not know what exactly logic is, or why we resent illogicity and uncertainty so much, 
the fact is that we all work with it (i.e., first order predicate logic) and deeply resent 
working without it. Hardly anyone ever questions the rules of logic; in everyday life, we 
only question premises and conclusions. 
In the absence of a thin theory of the good, we shall have to work without a 
particular point of view on the good life (as we intended to), and even without a view on 
meta-ethics or metaphysics. This means that we shall have to perform a trick: we must 
postpone any judgement on right and wrong as if one day it may or will be possible to 
make a final judgement. As any theory of the good can legitimately be rejected, and any 
theory of justice without an ethical starting point will lack authority, this seems to be the 
only option left. Thinking a few steps ahead, one might expect such more-than-Humeian 
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scepticism (it is also sceptical with regard to Hume's Law) to lead once more to an 
"anything goes" approach towards justice. But it does not, as I hope to show. 
Section 19: HIS-reasons 
Of course there must be something on which to postpone judgements. 1 shall 
introduce my object for the postponement of judgement, HIS-reasons, in four steps: first, 
they will be defined; then I shall give some reasons for "believing in their existence", that 
is, for accepting HIS-reasons as a fruitful concept; subsequently, I shall defend the thesis 
that HIS-reasons are of fundamental importance in every reasonable theory of or about 
morality; and finally, I shall discuss the relevance of HIS-reasons for liberalism in 
particular. 
In the real world, we are often uncertain about the way we should act, about the 
quality of our actions, about the reasons for our judgements on both, in short: about 
morality. If we were not, it would be hard to explain why there are so many ethical and 
moral theories to pick from. There may be two reasons for this uncertainty. In the first 
place, experience may at times contradict our intentions: if we do not feel too happy about 
(the consequences of) our actions, we may start to doubt the rules we were following - or 
the wisdom of not following any. Secondly, contradictions between intentions or rules 
themselves may arise, both in an interpersonal context and in personal moral conflicts. It 
is this second kind of uncertainty, connected to conflicting intentions, in which I am 
interested. 
Some of the intentions we have, some of our reasons for acting or judging as we 
do, are basic (cf. Sen 1970: 59 ff.; see also Brandt 1979: 149 ff.). They cannot be reduced 
to other, more fundamental moral propositions, nor to empirical propositions. Of course 
there are bound to be psychological or sociological explanations for their occurrence, but 
explaining and justifying are two different things. Other reasons are, to abuse a Kantian 
term, hypothetical. They can be partly reduced to basic moral propositions, and for the 
remainder depend on non-moral, empirical observations, estimates and rules. 
For instance, my reasons for writing this "for instance" are, among others, a 
conviction that explanations pay off when arguments are made; the certainly that some 
people always need an explanation (two empirical, non-basic reasons); the belief that an 
author should be as clear as possible (a basic moral reason) or that I should be as reliable 
as possible (a HIS-reason); and the feeling that I should try to use all of my valuable 
capacities (assuming there are any) as good as I can (again a HIS-reason). Of course, 
carefulness and self-esteem (other basic reasons, possibly HIS-reasons) may at times 
interfere with clarity and reliability. 
There is a deeper distinction within the category of basic reasons. Some of them 
are of a "Here I Stand" (HIS) character. The expression is of course derived from Luther's 
description of the limits that one's personal conscience poses: "here I stand, I can do no 
other". HIS-reasons are constant, stable, and undeniable - that is, one cannot think of any 
good excuse (in one's own eyes) when acting against them. We can think of them as 
private categorical imperatives. They are part of our selves, our psychological make-up, 
our nature - or rather, in view of the fact that they probably have a social origin," they 
5J Noie , though, that where HIS-reasons actually stem from does not ethically mailer. 
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constitute our second nature. They can operate in our consciousness, in our conscience, or, 
like virtues, subconsciously. HIS-reasons are (as I will argue below) the final reasons 
beyond which we cannot and should not reason as far as justice is concerned. 
About other basic reasons our conscience is more lenient. As compared to HIS-
reasons, they are conditional. We may, for instance, sincerely believe that every human 
life is inviolable, and that therefore killing is wrong, no matter why, by whom or in 
whatever circumstances. Yet in a kill-or-risk-being-killcd situation, and given ample 
opportunity to consider the alternatives, we will soon find out how lenient or firm we are. 
Note that we do not pose any further demands on HIS-reasons. They may be 
characterized as ethical, egoistic, perverse or decent - all in the eyes of others -, and they 
can, as a set, be internally inconsistent, intransitive, cyclical or whatever. HIS-reasons are 
not distinguished by their moral stature (we have to postpone any judgement on that issue) 
or their practicability, but by the firmness and stability of our belief in them. We can 
compare them to plans of life, a category that has often been proposed as a reasonable 
basis for objective neutrality. Plans of life depend on, and often change with, the flow of 
circumstances - war, marriage, divorce, pregnancy, the death of others, changing economic 
prospects, new social mores, religious conversion, mental or physical illness, and so on. 
HIS-reasons, on the other hand, have been purged of references to the contingencies of 
life, and thus delineate the way we would like to live regardless of changing or change-
able circumstances. We need not trade the concept of life-plans for HIS-reasons, however; 
the two are perfectly compatible. Adapting to convention, one can define (1) a person's set 
of HIS-reasons as that person's full plan of life ("full", for want of a better word, in the 
sense of being basically good or satisfactory or successful), and (2) his or her plan of life 
in the regular sense as an extended plan of life or as a plan of a "complete life". It is 
possible to have as many extended plans of life as life itself allows: having HIS-reasons 
does not (or not necessarily) commit a person to one and no more than one way of putting 
them into practice. 
Do HIS-reasons exist? I believe they do, but any answer would contain an 
empirical claim and raise the question of its verification (or falsification). A first step 
towards sustaining or refuting my claim would be to apply a modified version of Richard 
Brandt's cognitive psychotherapy (Brandt 1979: 16 ff.; see also previous chapters) to our 
desires and motives, eliminating the hypothetical imperatives. In sofar as our reasons for 
action turn out to be sensitive to arguments of truth with regard to facts or to consistency 
arguments with regard to more fundamental principles, they are obviously not basic. 
Assuming the reliability of our eliminative therapy, the reasons that survive must be basic 
reasons. Whether these are HIS-reasons depends on their stability - but this is where the 
problems really begin. 
What we need here is a test to identify private categorical imperatives, principles 
that we could want to be laws of our own part of nature. If there is at least one human 
being with at least one private categorical imperative, HIS-reasons exist. Now we can ask 
ourselves to judge realistic moral dilemmas and find out if we value (for instance) our 
own life or self more than that of others. We can even extend the lest procedure to include 
the type of countcrfaclual dilemma Derek Parfit is famous for: "Would you kill a perfect 
copy of yourself, one made five minutes ago, to survive? Even if you were not really sure 
that you were the original and that the other was the copy?" Or we can simply try to 
violale a basic reason and find out if we can still look into our own eyes. But as with 
every inductive or deductive argument, we cannot be certain of any answer. HIS-reasons 
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are, like every concept in science, a theoretical construction of which the validity can 
never be completely confirmed. 
Still, we can make it probable that HIS-reasons exist, by understanding them in 
terms of another, more conventional and less controversial concept: virtue. HIS-reasons are 
very much akin to virtues. Both terms describe our dispositions, our - as Aristotle called it 
- second nature. Both arc the most basic reasons we can give for doing what we do; both 
are character features in which we can excel. We believe in their value not because of any 
ulterior motive, any accidental fact, or any deeper reason, but because we hold them to be 
good as such, good in themselves (cf. e.g. Brandt's description of virtues, Brandt 1988: 
64). What distinguishes HIS-reasons from the traditional conception of virtues is that HIS-
reasons are self-defined and that we can be conscious of them. As to the first aspect: HIS-
reasons are not by definition or necessarily society-based; in fact, HIS-reasons are discon-
nected from any social background. Virtues, on the other hand, derive their meaning in 
ordinary life and language from their relation to either a universal theory of the human 
good, or a particular society's conception of the good and the appropriate (Nussbaum 
1988: 33). Hence, virtues have opposites: vices. HIS-reasons do not - there is no higher 
standard to measure them by. As to the second difference: a virtue is a rule or reason on 
which we act without thinking, without reflection, as if the virtuous act comes instinctive-
ly. I do not demand this of HIS-reasons. I assume that we can, if necessary, be conscious 
of them and even consciously act against them. 
HIS-reasons and virtues have more in common. For instance, neither one can be 
evaluated in terms of the modern distinction between inadmissible egocentrica! behaviour 
and admissible, unbiased, moral behaviour (in Anglo-Saxon political philosophy known as 
rationality versus morality). Each and every one of the virtues - or HIS-reasons - we can 
think of, can be accounted for both in terms of what is best for me and in terms of what is 
best overall. Many virtues - such as modesty, sincerity, authenticity, and prudence - are 
definitely self-regarding (cf. Galslon 1991: 230), and at least one of them, the classic 
mean between egoism and altruism, explicitly acknowledges the moral importance of the 
self. 
A further resemblance between HIS-reasons and virtues is their stability. Both are 
stable in two senses. First of all, at a personal level, they are like all dispositions, hard to 
come by and hard to change. Most often, they are the product of education and socializ-
ation, and sometimes the result of dramatic experiences (in the words of Martha Nuss-
baum (Nussbaum 1988: 38): grounding experiences) that shock or evoke belief in a HIS-
reason - but again, where they actually come from does not actually matter. Secondly, at a 
cultural level, HIS-reasons and virtues have a very long life. A person's HIS-reasons may 
evolve or occasionally change, and different cultures may know and esteem different 
virtues, yet HIS-reasons in themselves are much more stable. Basic moral ideas that have 
often served as personal HIS-reasons54 are not limited to unique persons, times, societies 
or cultures (cf. Maclntyre 1985: 187). 
Finally, virtues and HIS-reasons share one destabilizing characteristic: they can be 
rationally criticized, they can be doubted, discussed, evaluated, acknowledged and rejected. 
Examples arc honesty, authenticity, reciprocity, mercy, obligation, fraternity, patience, honour, humour, 
humility, as well as justice. HIS-reasons do not need to be virtues or potentially "substantial'' ethical Ideals, 
though - more typically liberal HIS-reasons could be described as Kantian categorical imperatives, or as the desire 
to do the moral thing or discover what the morally correct course of action should be. 
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The kind of critique meant here does not touch upon the appropriateness of some HIS-
reason in particular circumstances or a particular society, but on the legitimacy of a virtue 
or HIS-reason itself, sub specie aeternhatis. Although we do not have moral criteria for 
virtues, we can ask whether a virtue is a virtue at all, or a HIS-reason a HIS-reason, or 
whether it is a kind of collective or individual prejudice (cf. Kley 1989: 339). From time 
to time, counting in centuries, critique of this kind leads to the discovery of new virtues or 
the rejection of an old one. Some twenty centuries ago, for instance, the virtues of faith, 
hope, and compassion were added to the list; some thirteen decades ago, Friedrich 
Nietzsche opened an attack on them that is still proceeding very slowly. Admittedly, such 
a slowly changing and fundamentally open list of HIS-reasons is not the most stable and 
indubitable basis for an Archimedean point - but it is the best we have. 
Before we go on discussing this apparent imperfection, we should recapitulate what 
we have established so far. If we believe that virtues exist, we must also believe that HIS-
reasons exist. Comparing HIS-reasons to virtues, we saw that they share all important 
characteristics except one: unlike HIS-reasons, virtues derive their meaning, their moral 
import, from a social context. Virtues, or supposed virtues, can be criticized within a 
society by relating them to a local or universal conception of the good; HIS-reasons are 
exempted from that kind of critique. Consequently, we cannot but postpone judgement on 
the last, i.e., be objectively neutral. Nevertheless, both virtues and HIS-reasons can be 
criticized from another point of view, or so we just claimed. In a mela-social discourse, it 
would be possible to assess the, let us say extra-temporal, virtuousness of a virtue or the 
HIS-ness of a HIS-reason. 
But here we have a problem. If such a mela-social critique is impossible, HIS-
reasons are arbitrary; we would have no reason to value them, or to value anything, for 
that matter. If it is not, there seems to be a higher standard, and thus no reason to 
postpone judgement, no sense in demanding objective neutrality, no future for impartiality 
or for minimal liberal justice. The way out of this possible contradiction is indicated by 
the word seems. We can, without contradiction, claim both that there is a meta-social 
discourse, and that there are no higher standards. 
The discourse in question is the discourse of philosophy and the hermeneutical 
sciences, the humaniora. We cannot be certain that we fully understand the Greeks of 
antiquity, and we are even less certain that we would understand a lion if it could talk (cf. 
also Nagel 1971: 438-442) - but we can interpret the symbols of other cultures, other 
language games, and clarify that which we cannot help to believe or believe in. We cannot 
be sure of the (incorrectness of our interpretations, unless perhaps serious inconsistencies 
come to light. Our interpretations are always ours, not theirs; there is no hope of ever 
really understanding them. All we have is, as a Dutch expression says, the courage of 
desperation: the conviction that there is no other way of learning and understanding than 
interpreting, no discourse but one with dummies. 
Disenchanting as this answer may be, it is probably the only way we can ever hope 
to substantiate claims to truth in moral matters. It is also probably the only possible 
answer to the radical postmodernist critique of liberalism, communitarianism, and any 
other school of moral thought. Postmodern authors deny any philosophical merit to 
attempts at "founding" moral theories (cf. Espigares Talion 1991: 432). In their view, our 
judgements or actions and our reasons (our language games and forms of life) are 
intertwined; neither one causes the other. Instead they cause, reinforce, or transform one 
another in a dialectical process. Talk of grounds and foundations thus only make sense in 
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the context of a particular language game; there is no point of view above and beyond 
them. We have just affirmed these points. One cannot beat postmodernism; one can only 
join it - and carry on in the courage of desperation. 
HIS-reasons are, furthermore, an adequate if not always satisfactory answer to 
some of the other problems encountered earlier. For one thing, we can now partly solve 
the paradox of subjective neutrality that rose in section 18: it is perfectly simple to 
postpone judgement on this category of reasons and give equal relevance to their 
exhibition, without giving equal relevance to all the ways in which they can be exhibited. 
Consequently, both objective and subjective neutrality are possible, as is impartiality, as is 
- ultimately - a liberal conception of social justice. 
Secondly, we can now answer other doubts expressed in section 18. The possibly 
pseudo-communitarian character of mainstream liberalism is no longer an issue. We have 
dropped as much of the idea of thin theories of the good as possible, including all ties 
with the "shared understandings" and language games of particular cultures. Likewise, the 
legitimacy of individual moral convictions, including nihilistic and Nietzschean "moral-
ities", has been principally affirmed by our defence of HIS-reasons. We reject a society's 
adherence to a theory of the good precisely because we have no other basis for attitudes 
than the individual's conscience - or ihe absence thereof, in the case of nihilists. 
The Marx-Popper problem, however, cannot be solved. Even if a theory of justice 
would not reflect a political ideology, it will still reflect a certain culture or social 
consciousness. In other words: the justification procedure for a liberal theory of social 
justice may be impartial regarding ideologies and conventions, predicated as it is on the 
equal relevance shown to HIS-reasons, but it nevertheless reflects our conviction that HIS-
reasons mailer. Any attempt to claim meta-social validity for this view is bound to run up 
against the limits of interpretation. 
I have defined and described HIS-reasons, given arguments to believe in their 
existence and in the advantages of making them the basis of an impartial theory of justice. 
But obviously any theory of justice will be prohibitive in some respects and prescriptive in 
others. Theoretically, HIS-reasons are attractive - but is that enough reason to accept the 
practical consequences of impartiality? 
A first step towards answering this is to establish that if we accept HIS-reasons as 
a basis for justice, we must also accept the results of a reliable justification procedure 
based on these reasons - and act accordingly. The second and last step will be to prove 
that we must affirm the universal validity of HIS-reasons, i.e., their fundamental role in 
every reasonable morality. 
Beginning with the first step, it is clear that there can be no rational reason to 
reject the conclusion of a valid argument based on true premises. But believing an 
argument - even believing an argument that states that we should act in some way rather 
than another - is one thing; acting upon it is another. Why should we? Why should we do 
what we believe that we should do? No doubt about it: this is the eternal "why should I be 
moral?" problem. There is no need to dwell on traditional responses to this mysterious 
question; I refer the reader lo a good introduction to moral philosophy (e.g. Frankena 
1963, Raphael 1981). In a nutshell, "why should I be moral?", or "why should I do what I 
should do?" is not a self-referring question; unless meant as a witticism, it refers to 
situations in which there is more than one option for action, and in which there are 
arguments for more than one of these options. In Anglo-Saxon philosophical literature, the 
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choice is usually one between morality as one set of codes ("should") of behaviour, and 
rationality as another. Morality, in shorthand "that, what is best overall", can obviously 
lead to other prescriptions than rationality, "that, what is best for me" (cf. e.g. Parfit 1984: 
3, 24; Brandt 1979: 14 ff.; Gauthier 1986: 7). 
To solve this kind of dilemma, the initial question must be changed into one asking 
how we can know what to do - regardless of the code(s) of behaviour one may adhere to. 
There are basically two resolution strategies available, one derived from utilitarianism, the 
other from the notion of a weakly rational choice. Note that, by implication, the original 
"why should I be moral?" question can apparently only be resurrected if the answer to the 
new question is epistemologically unsatisfactory. 
The utilitarian strategy tries to overcome the rationality-morality distinction by 
combining them. Its cornerstone is the hypothesis that it is (weakly) rational to have or 
pretend to have a sense of "morality" (Parfit 1984: 45 ff.; Barry 1989: 360), or to 
acknowledge that the (others') demand for moral behaviour is a fundamental and irreduc-
ible human motive and that denying this would be denying the relevant facts needed for a 
rational decision (Barry 1989: 363-366). This way, self-regarding preferences (egocentrical 
morality), second-order preferences (preferences regarding other people's preferences) and 
non-selfregarding preferences (about what should happen to others) can be included in any 
person's preference profile. Provided that we accept the initial hypothesis, this would 
warrant the morality of rational decisions. 
The second strategy denies the necessity of combining the morality and egocen-
trical rationality, and questions the persuasive force of the utilitarian solution. The last 
clearly does not oblige egocenlrics to be moral, or, in an inversion of the argument, 
moralists to be rational; it only obliges one to pretend to be moral or rational - if that is 
advantageous to oneself or to the good cause. What is more, it is not necessary lo oppose 
and (re)combine morality and rationality. 
The weakly rational choice solution does not appeal to the rationality of being 
moral, it merely appeals to rationality as sound thinking. John Rawls's original position is 
a famous example. He asks us to imagine people without commitment to specific codes of 
behaviour, whom we can accept as our (alter ego) agents in moral discourse. 
Subsequently, he lets these agents decide rationally on principles of justice, checks this 
against our considered judgements, and call the result the moral (read: best for all) 
solution. The original position is, however, not a perfect example. Rawls presupposes that 
the people in the original position either have or know that they will have a sense of 
morality (Rawls 1971: 145), that they already are moderately self-interested, and they are 
biased with regard to certain theories of the good - but for now, it is the basic idea of a 
rational decision on morality that counts. The solution I shall suggest has a basically 
similar structure but a quite different content: I shall ask the reader to imagine weakly 
rational persons who are not partial to any code of behaviour, and who postpone their 
judgement on HIS-reasons. These people, the archpoinlers, will then decide for us. If we 
accept the premises, in this case the conditions of the archpoint, we are rationally obliged 
to accept the conclusions, whatever they are - but we can check all that afterwards. 
Bui I am running ahead of things. The point to note about this whole "why be 
moral" dispute is that no resolution strategy will be persuasive if it is not a clearly 
logically sound argument - and if it is not based on premises acceptable to each and every 
one who may be obliged by the conclusion. The cardinal premise of our impartial 
justification device, the archpoint, is that HIS-reasons have overall moral importance in 
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every reasonable theory of morality. So far, my claim has been that HIS-reasons are the 
legitimate primordial material on which an archpoint must be builL Yet provided that the 
justification procedure is reliable, why should we trust this elementary assumption? 
A first reason for accepting the legitimacy of HIS-reasons is plainly negative. 
There is no guarantee that anyone's conscience reflects the, or an, ultimate ethical truth, 
but we have excluded all alternative foundations for justice as questionable. HIS-reasons 
are the only, or at least last, thing for which we have - theoretically - good reasons. 
A second reason is more positive: we can trust HIS-reasons to be a universally 
valid and universally fundamental concept of any moral theory, because (a) HIS-reasons 
are an integral part of human nature, and because (b) ignoring that part implies denying 
human freedom and renouncing the existence of (im)morality. Before I elaborate on this, 
two remarks are in order. Firstly, to be precise, it is the capacity for having HIS-reasons 
that is part of our nature, part of what makes us human. The set of specific HIS-reasons 
that makes an individual out of a human being is part of our second, artificial, nature, the 
dispositions and character traits acquired through education and socialization. We are 
necessarily equipped with a capacity for HIS-reasons but whether and in what way this 
capacity is developed depends on circumstances. 
Secondly, it should be noted that the term nature is not meant as a symbol for 
some kind of philosophical realism, essentialism, determinism or naturalism. Whether or 
not things like human nature, or, alternatively, the human condition, the platonic Form, or 
the ideal-type of the human being exists is of no consequence to us. Using terms like 
nature of essence is merely a matter of convenience. In due course, I shall adapt my small 
exegesis of human nature to non-essentialistic vocabularies. 
What defines the human being? It has been said that the human is animal implume 
bipes, or a plucked chicken. More serious attempts to define human nature are variations 
on classical phrases like Boelhius's animal rationale. The phrase indicates that humans are 
thought of as being capable of giving reasons for their actions, and (consequently) that 
they are self-conscious. As a Neoplalonist, it was Boelhius's aspiration to behold the Form 
of man. Yet the attraction of his definition of human nature was never limited to Neopla-
tonism. Others have presented similar definitions as intuitive truths, either in the ordinary 
sense of direct and unmediated access to a deeper reality, or in the Sidgwickian sense of a 
clear and distinct uncontroversial faith. 
Now remember that throughout this book, and in the whole of justice theory and 
moral philosophy, it has been assumed that neither physical and mental determinism, nor 
chaos, are true, or that even if one of these theories were true this would still be irrelevant 
for moral discourse. There is no sense in talking about right and wrong if every bit of this 
universe, including our ideas, deliberations and decisions, follows an inescapable law of 
nature. The same is true in the other extreme case, chaos, where there is no relation 
whatsoever between ideas and decisions, between decisions and actions, actions and 
results, results and perception, and so forth - in a foreign word, where only happenstance 
happens. 
On this assumption, rationality implies both freedom of mind (autonomy) and 
freedom of action (agency).55 Autonomy and agency have been incorporated in numerous 
broader ideas on human nature, including concepts like the good life, plan of life, theory 
The two are often used interchangeably, together defining for instance (see Griffin 1984: 72-3) 
personhood. 
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of Ihe good, virtue - and HIS-reasons. Among these, and notwithstanding the relevance of 
other concepts, HIS-reasons are the most economic and therefore most indispensable 
means of representing human freedom. Without them, we cannot be Boethian-rational; we 
would be incomplete, merely potentially human. 
If, for starters, we think of action as being caused by external forces, instinct and 
other uncontrollable inclinations, and reasons, then agency is only possible if the only 
controllable factor, reasons, is to some degree autonomously caused. To the degree that 
our reasons are caused by, once more, external circumstances and internal predispositions, 
they cannot be autonomously determined. Hence we must think of reasons as being caused 
somehow and to some degree by other reasons, so that autonomous behaviour must 
ultimately have its source in basic reasons. If at least part of these basic reasons are not 
HIS-reasons but reasons of a more wavering kind, our agency will be erratic and unac­
countable, even and especially to ourselves. In that case it would be a practical joke to 
ascribe agency, autonomy or rationality to man. If there were no basic reasons at all, the 
reasons we do have would show a cyclical character: we would believe in A because of B, 
in В because of C, in С because of D, and in D because of A. In this case, our actions 
may not be erratic, but they are still ultimately inexplicable and uncontrolled. If, finally, 
we do not think of reasons in causal terms, all reasons will be equal, none would be 
stronger or weaker than any other, and the same problem of unaccounlabilily would recur, 
only on a larger scale. Our actions would now be fully unaccountable, and agency, 
autonomy and rationality would be altogether meaningless. In the words of Joseph Raz, 
"The ideal of autonomy, if you like, makes a virtue out of necessity" (Raz 1986: 390). 
This, I think, establishes the indispensable role of HIS-reasons as part of man's 
rational nature - if we use an essentialist vocabulary. To establish the same from a non-
essentialistic perspective, we need only change the wording a bit. Instead of being part of 
our nature, we must now think of HIS-reasons as part of our self-image, part of what we 
would like our nature to be if we had one. We do not have one - on this view - but we 
still need to imagine one, similar to what on the essentialistic view is called a second 
nature. Not having anything like an essence, we enter life and the world naked, stripped of 
everything but blood, skin, nerves and brains, an undetermined abstract entity. Without 
rules and reasons we cannot in any way be autonomous (self-ruling) let alone rational. 
There is no option but to re-create oneself, or create a self, and become a concrete being. 
If we do this perfectly, we will in the end find in ourselves rules and reasons, basic 
reasons, and HIS-reasons. Identifying the process that brings this re-creation about is not 
important right now. It may be a social or solipsislic process, a combination of both, or it 
may have any other source. What counts is that there must be some kind of self-creation 
entailing the formulation of rules, values, and reasons. 
Whether man has a nature or imagines or creates one is therefore of no conse­
quence. The heart and soul of the argument remains unaffected: the capacity for develop­
ing HIS-reasons is inherently part of what defines man as a potentially free and rational 
being; their actual occurrence makes a being genuinely free, rational - and morally 
responsible. 
If there is any decisive argument for believing in HIS-reasons and, provided that 
the rest of the justification procedure is found reliable, for adhering to principles of justice 
derived from that idea - it must be one along the lines just sketched. To summarize 
Timmons's lucid catalogue of views on ethical foundationalism (Timmons 1987: 602): 
even if fundamental ethical propositions do not need justification, a more reasoned defence 
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than an appeal to intuition will not harm; if, on the other hand, they do need a defence, an 
appeal to a theory of the person will not harm either (after all, ethics is supposed to affect 
persons); and if that theory could also be one about the person's necessary rather than 
contingent features, we would come as near to an ultimate proof as imaginable. 
Let me finish this section - as promised in the beginning - with a few special 
reasons for liberals to accept the postponement of judgement on HIS-reasons (i.e., our 
version of objective neutrality) as a basis for impartiality. Earlier, in Chapter 2,1 described 
seven ideals that were typically reflected in the thin theories of the good at the heart of 
liberal theories of justice. For liberals, the charm of this new conception of objective 
neutrality lies in its compatibility with these seven ideals. 
We have already seen above that HIS-reasons and subjective neutrality were quite 
compatible - indeed, that the first was vitally important for the existence of the other. It is, 
secondly, easy to see that postponing judgements on HIS-reasons is compatible with the 
ideal of rationality in the sense given to the word in Chapter 2, that of the duty to have 
and if necessary give good reasons for behaviour and principles. Objective neutrality 
exempts no act, no argument, and no reason from analysis - with an exception only for the 
most basic, irreducible and irrefutable reasons. In accounting for ideas and actions, we 
cannot go any further or deeper than HIS-reasons; they are ultimate arguments. 
Postponing judgement on HIS-reasons may also be compatible with fairness (the 
willing acceptance of rules for the equal treatment of equal cases); we have at least 
discussed some arguments for the "willing acceptance" part. However, it is as yet 
impossible to say whether an impartial justification procedure based on HIS-reasons will 
do with regard to the equal treatment of equal cases. The same can be said with regard lo 
a fourth liberal ideal, the demand that each be given his due. As long as we have not 
indicated what the grounds of desert are, or how a relevant difference between cases can 
be discovered - we simply do not have any argument pro or con objective impartiality. 
Probably the most persuasive arguments, as far as liberals are concerned, can be 
found in the correspondence between objective neutrality and the classic liberal ideals of 
liberty, equality, and fraternity. 
Objective neutrality satisfies the demand for liberty in a much broader sense than 
"being capable of developing and executing plans of life or vital parts thereof' - as we 
vaguely defined before. There is an important element of negative freedom in it, freedom 
from interference. Being obliged to postpone judgement on the most fundamental and 
sincere convictions a person can have, we may personally think that X is wrong to believe, 
or a fool for believing, what X believes - but no creature or institution can be given the 
authority to correct X's error. Next to this, objective neutrality also incorporates the aspect 
of freedom that Sir Isaiah Berlin once passionately described as follows: 
"I wish my life and decisions to depend upon myself, not on external forces 
of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other 
men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by 
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which 
affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a 
doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by 
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a 
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slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and 
policies of my own and realizing them." (Berlin 1969: 131)56 
Positive freedom - the freedom of which Berlin spoke - demands respect for individual 
autonomy, for the development of individuality. Objective neutrality, with its postpone-
ment of judgement on the roots of individuality, expresses this respect at the most 
fundamental level. 
The choice to postpone judgement on HIS-reasons does not imply that critique on 
less fundamental reasons has become impossible. To judge the last, we still have standards 
like rationality, appropriateness, or consistency with known facts, as well as methods to 
incorporate those standards (e.g. a modified version of cognitive psychotherapy). Which 
brings me to the second of liberalism's cardinal virtues: equality. 
Objective neutrality as sketched above supports the demand that each person 
should be considered as being equally worthy of moral consideration. It takes the good of 
the individual as its background, rather than that of the collective (cf. Galslon 1991: 120 
ff.), and it does so without judging and discriminating the individual's most sincere 
convictions. Hence, it meets Bruce Ackerman's critique of Rawls's concept of a thin 
theory of the good (see above): truly impartial principles of justice cannot distribute 
goods, rights and freedoms on the basis of the correspondence between an individual's 
aspirations and a society's, however thin, theory of the good. 
Impartiality based on respect for HIS-reasons commits us to a kind of perfection-
ism that is still compatible with equality, but not to the more authoritarian kind that 
measures the claims of people by their moral worth, and their moral worth by the value of 
their convictions and plans. We may agree with Joseph Raz that an autonomous life "is 
valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects and relation-
ships" (Raz 1986: 417). Objective neutrality obliges us to accept that we can blame or 
praise ourselves and others for our or their projects, and that we can criticize their views 
or our own. In doing so, in helping to perfect lives, we express our respect for the 
autonomous life. Yet this is as far as we can go. Encouraging autonomy is one thing; 
actively discriminating between agents is another. Neither we nor a government can be the 
judge of anyone's conscience. We can doubt and discuss HIS-reasons either indefinitely or 
until the courage of desperation leaves us. There is no other end imaginable because there 
simply is no yardstick for the morality of HIS-reasons. 
Finally, impartiality as it has been described here supports fraternity, the desire to 
maintain and reproduce the social bond. HIS-reasons do not entail claims to ethical truth, 
let alone to the truth of ethical absolutism, at least not beyond the body and mind of the 
person believing in them. In this, HIS-reasons are typically liberal: they tell us that we 
have reached a point where a sensible debate becomes impossible, where, in the words of 
Rawls, the burdens of reason allow no further polemics, and where only the original 
principle of liberalism remains: tolerance. Albeit a negative motivation, the awareness thai 
one's deepest convictions will be tolerated is a strong reason to support the instruments of 
toleration. 
Note thai Berlin did not criticize the idea of positive freedom as such but the consequences of political 
attempts to further individual positive freedom. 
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Section 20: On forms and contents 
This seems to be a good moment to recapitulate the results our inquiry has so far 
uncovered. We set out to investigate the notion of impartiality because, as Chapter 3 
indicated, any attempt to take justice, in particular communitarian justice, seriously, must 
be based on an adequate conception of minimal justice, justice under conditions of 
impartiality. I then argued that such an adequate understanding required the following 
elements: 
- technical neutrality, i.e., the justification device representing impartiality should 
determine the content of principles of justice rather than that of (principles of) 
anything else; 
- subjective neutrality, or the absence of bias with regard to the essential parts of 
plans of life; and 
- objective neutrality, i.e., the principles behind the justification device should be 
acceptable to all reasonable beings. 
Finally, I focused the attention on objective neutrality, to find that this demand is best 
satisfied by (1) a very thin theory of the good, axiomatizing the merit of everyday logic, 
in combination with (2) the sceptic postponement of judgements on HIS-reasons. Together, 
these three forms of neutrality constitute the impartial point of view on distributive justice, 
the archpoint. Our next concern will be to give this conception of impartiality a represen-
tative look. 
Earlier I claimed that justification devices serve a heuristic end, that of wrapping 
up the ethical propositions demarcating an Archimedean point enough to bridge the gap 
between justification and legitimation, between being right and being put in the right. In 
the last twenty-odd years, the justice debate has sired an impressive family of justification 
devices. Not all of these are equally fit to represent the (i.e., our) archpoint. A specific 
type of contract theory, the single-mind contract pattern, turns out to most suitable. So as 
not to waste time, I shall only discuss a few of the more popular but less appropriate 
justification models, and this only in sofar as needed to show why they are less appropri-
ate. Of course, we shall dwell a good deal longer on contractarianism. 
Richard Brandt's cognitive psychotherapy, for one, focuses on the rationality of 
desires. It satisfies our superthin theory of the good, but falls short in some other respects. 
First of all, it only operates in the sphere of truth, subsuming morality to rationality. 
Brandt is convinced that the first question we should ask regarding the moral code of a 
person is: "What kind of social moral code, if any, would you most tend to support for a 
society in which you expected to live, if you were fully rational?" (Brandt 1979: 185) This 
is, to a large extent, a fruitful strategy - as explained in the previous section. It can be 
used to distinguish hypothetical from basic reasons, or to analyze and criticize both 
empirically and/or in terms of rationality. But this is where cognitive psychotherapy stops 
being useful: it results in the exclusion or transformation of illogical (irrational) reasons, 
and what remains are "rational" reasons and their justifying basic moral reasons. There is 
no certainty that cognitive psychotherapy leaves us with one and no more than one moral 
code. In other words, it is inconclusive. 
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Secondly, even if cognitive psychotherapy would result in the choice of (only) one 
moral code, we would have no reason to assume that (his one code was impartial. 
Cognitive psychotherapy demands that even HIS-reasons are subjected to criticism - which 
is in itself a quite legitimate demand. Now any set of HIS-reasons can be internally 
inconsistent: justice and mercy, mercy and prudence, or prudence and honesty, may at 
times conflict with one another. If we were true to Brandt's rationalistic intentions, we 
would have to "purify" our HIS-reasons until they formed a consistent system. If luck 
were on our side, we might in the end all share the same system of ultimate reasons and 
desires, the same moral code, the same theory of justice. However, such a code would no 
longer be our code; it would be one for people with whom someone had been meddling. 
Now, notwithstanding other possible good reasons in favour of accommodating basic 
motives in specific (e.g. psychiatric) cases, this is not a good idea where an impartial 
theory of justice is at stake - for at least two reasons. 
First of all, any theory of justice that answers to the adjusted HIS-reasons of people 
is no longer an answer to their original desires and convictions; it is a supply-side 
solution, based on changing the parameters of the problem, rather than a solution to the 
original problem. 
Secondly, desires or at least basic desire cannot be criticized without a sound 
theory of rational and good desires (Daniels 1985: 127). But there is no defensible way of 
criticizing HIS-reasons, nor consequently one of correcting or calibrating them, not even 
on grounds of internal inconsistency, for the simple reason that there is no higher moral 
point of view from which to judge HIS-reasons. There is, in particular, no higher judge 
able to determine whether rationality should overrule (other) HIS-reasons because doing so 
would require a (rational) defense of rationality itself, which, as we also saw before, is 
quite infeasible. Finally, it is hard to see how coercive interference with someone's basic 
motives, the core of his or her personality, can be harmonized with the basic respect due 
to persons and with the condition of subjective neutrality. 
A second justification device, Robert Nozick's invisible hand explanation of the 
minimal state, is based on the axiom that there are natural rights (rather than natural 
might) and that these rights are Inviolable. ΙΓ we support this axiom, the model makes 
sense. But we cannot. Nozick somehow turns nature, an is, into nature, an ought, and 
subsequently into justice, another ought. An impartial theory of justice cannot take sides 
on such issues as whether (let alone which) natural rights exist, whether any fact can in 
any way result in any norm, or what the metaphysical qualities are that apparently make 
nature so exceptionally fit for service in ethics. All it can do is make archpoinlers 
recognize rights. The fact that such recognized rights can coincide with natural rights is 
irrelevant. 
Yet the invisible hand is nothing more than a black (or rather transparent) box 
changing input into output. We could fill it up with another type of fuel than natural rights 
- say, objective neutrality. Instead of primitive libertarians who. Fighting over their own 
against other person's rights, one day wake up to find themselves in a minimal state, we 
could try to imagine primitive impartialists who, in the process of executing their own and 
respecting other people's HIS-reasons, create a minimally just society. There is, I think, 
only one objection to using Nozick's contraption in this way: it could turn the whole 
justification procedure into determinism of a rather crude sort. Whatever the results of an 
invisible hand process be, they will come about despite rather than because of voluntary 
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actions aimed at those results. At best, the description of an invisible hand guiding the 
actions of impanialisLs will convince us - or the impartialists - that the output had to be 
the way it is, not that it is what it should be. In short, the invisible hand procedure lacks a 
property that is essential for any justification procedure: it leaves no room for the creation 
of consent. (I shall say more about the importance of consent for justification in a 
moment.) 
A third model, highly popular especially among utilitarians, is that of the ideal 
observer, an imaginary person, or perhaps computer, capable of seeing the whole world 
and taking in all available or relevant information, including that which behaviourists 
cannot see: our true convictions and desires. As this General Observer at a Distance, this 
god-like figure, has no ideas or emotions of its own, only a purely rational brain, it can be 
trusted to give an impartial solution for any moral problem we impose on iL Or so the 
story goes. For our purposes, we could inform this creature that it is to follow the rules of 
the game as we see them, in particular, that it is to postpone its judgement on HIS-
reasons. 
Again, we have to reject a model. The ideal observer, despite its divinity, lacks two 
characteristics that are highly desirable in justification procedures: participation and 
consent. It is one of the virtues of the invisible hand procedure that it at least allows for 
participation instead of the ideal observer's sublime deliberation, and as we shall soon find 
out, the advantages of contract and bargaining theories arc that they have, respectively can 
have, both traits. Now participation is a psychological feature. For a justification procedure 
to be effective, it seems to be more important that one can voluntarily affirm the prin-
ciples of justice it generates than that one actually contributes, or can imagine oneself as 
contributing, to the formulation of those principles. To use an analogy, if we can trust our 
lawyer there is no need to defend ourselves in court. For the moment then, I shall neglect 
this trait. 
Consent is a more serious problem. The standard objection to an ideal observer's 
judgement on justice is that there are no independent reasons for me to act in accordance 
with its decrees, unless it has been made clear that its judgement is based on ethical 
premises to which 1 already subscribe. Only then can I consent to the ideal observer's 
decisions. On this view, the ideal observer device becomes a kind of contract theory, i.e., 
a contract between the observer and me - though unlike an ordinary contract, this one 
establishes little more than a common understanding. Contract theories themselves, on the 
other hand, do not necessarily need the fiction of a contract: the unanimous decision in 
Rawls's original position, it has been argued, could very well have been taken by one and 
only one person behind a veil of ignorance, as Rawls's model leaves no room for 
disagreement on either moral or empirical premises. What Rawls's contract theory really 
needs, what in fact every contract theory and every impartial observer needs, is consent. In 
the case of Rawls's theory of justice, consent is guaranteed by the reader's considered 
judgements in reflective equilibrium on what it is reasonable to require from an original 
position. 
Thus it seems that this model is uneconomical. If an ideal observer's judgement is 
to be convincing, we must be certain - in advance - that its point of view will be one we 
share. However, we will want our observer to be impartial, and once we have ensured that 
it is, we find that we no longer need it. The reason for this is simply that there is 
something else we need even more, a necessary ingredient of justification, namely consent. 
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We need real people in the real world to take the impartial point of view and agree on 
principles of justice. 
I shall call the fourth justification device, a bit inappropriately, the bargaining 
theory model. Bargaining theories, of which David Gauthicr's social choice version 
(1986), James Buchanan's games theory version (1975), and Ronald Dworkin's auction 
scheme (1981) are the most widely known examples, should be well distinguished from 
formal political theory as such, or the application of the rational choice apparatus to 
questions of political philosophy. The last is nothing more (and certainly nothing less) 
than a set of new ways or formats, as their wieldcrs would say, that allow us to test the 
purely formal consistency and coherence of political theories and principles. Formal 
political theory is simply ordinary political theory, translated into symbols and subjected to 
the unsurpassable scrutiny of mathematics and logic. A classic example of pure formal 
analysis is Amartya Sen's liberal or libertarian paradox (1970: 87-88), which shows that it 
is impossible for a society to combine an unlimited political agenda and Parcto-optimality 
with unrestricted respect for individual liberty. 
A bargaining theory - the name is a pars pro toto label - is a representation of the 
problems that are involved in social cooperation and distribution. Without committing 
myself to any specific rational choice format, I suggest that we think of a bargaining 
theory as, for instance and for the moment, a complicated process of negotiations about 
claims to a cooperative surplus. We start by presupposing the existence of two persons χ 
and y who, purely on their own, would be able to produce amounts a and b of useful 
goods. Cooperating, they would be able to produce more: a + b + c. A bargaining theory 
then looks at possible answers to the question how с should be distributed, one of which 
could be "rational", in our example, a 50-50 division seems intuitively rational, but once 
we have more information our answer may change. Suppose, for instance, that у can force 
χ to work for у without any repercussion. If у were a complete egoist, the rational division 
from y's point of view would be 0-100. If χ can survive on less than a, у could even seize 
part of x's original production. Or suppose that с can only be produced if χ brings in his 
500 resources and у her 1000; the rational proportions can now be set at 33-66. Obviously, 
the model can be refined by introducing η persons, more resources and other bargaining 
advantages, a variable cooperation surplus - or, of course, by given more adequate 
information about the individual's preferences and about (e.g. moral) cooperation rules. 
Now there is a difference between what bargaining theories - as rational choice 
theories - can do in principle, and what bargaining theorists actually did. Formal theory 
assesses the validity of propositions. It can only presume, not decide on, the truth of basic 
moral propositions or the morality of preferences. Hence, it can establish the logical 
possibility or impossibility of theories. The claims of bargaining theorists have gone far 
beyond such modest (im)possibility results; they have claimed truth, or at least direct 
relevance, for the real world when showing that justice is possible if certain (only at First 
sight innocent) conditions are met. Unfortunately, precisely these conditions are the reason 
why bargaining theories have - so far - failed to convince. Of course, this is not an a 
priori reason for rejecting a formal approach to justice. We would have no reason at all to 
mistrust an impartial bargaining theory, a theory predicated on the conditions of subjec­
tive, objective and technical neutrality as described in the last section. But if try to 
develop such a theory, we soon Find that we need more "innocent" conditions than we can 
по 
JUSTICE FROM Л DISTANCE 
allow - if we are to remain impartial. Consequently, this model cannot be used to 
represent impartiality. 
Some of the problems involved in adapting the bargaining structure to impartiality 
are merely technical; they do not constitute fundamental objections to our attempt. For 
instance, one of the standard assumptions in bargaining theories is that the members of a 
cooperative venture will each want as great a part in the surplus production as possible. In 
an impartial version of the bargaining device, this assumption would have to be changed 
to account for the strange preferences genuine persons can have. Consider the Franciscan 
friar, whose only interests are the possession of a pair of sandals, a habit and something to 
eat; or consider his seducible brother, whose preferences are the same up to a point where 
he starts to give in to seduction, from whence on he becomes an ordinary rational egoist; 
or a caricatural version of the Benedictine friar, who eats and drinks and enjoys all the 
pleasures of life, never having heard of the law of diminishing marginal utility, till death 
makes him part; or a schizophrenic, who cannot decide for herself where her best interests 
lie. Another assumption that would need revision concerns the measure for the social 
product. Usually this is welfare or utility. In an impartial bargaining theory, however, we 
cannot use such a measure unless we know in advance that it is acting upon HIS-reasons 
that counts, rather than the opportunity to act upon them, or anything else. 
At this point, we encounter a real obstacle for the application of the bargaining 
theory device: where do such hidden assumptions come from? For there are a lot of those 
assumption needed: we must know in advance who, in a real society, can and cannot 
claim or deserve part of the social (surplus) product; we must know how to measure the 
social product; we must know which preferences, tastes, desires, and arguments are 
allowed in the negotiating process (i.e., what are the relevant differences between persons 
that determine the size of shares); and so on and so forth. These are, without exception, 
substantial questions of justice, the kind of questions that we wanted to answer - from an 
impartial point of view. Obviously, a bargaining device can at best only represent that part 
of the process of formulating principles of justice which comes after the basic principles. 
Nevertheless, the bargaining model also has certain advantages, most notably that 
of being a radically democratic device: the decision on distribution principles is made by 
the interested parties themselves. For them to be both genuine persons defending their own 
interests, and impartial judges of claims, they must be schizophrenic. Their position thus 
equates to that of any reader of Rawls's A Theory of Justice or any other theory of liberal 
social justice, who is asked to place herself in a position of impartiality and at the same 
time consider the implications of impartiality for her own life. In this respect, the 
bargaining device is a sincere reflection of reality. 
Of course, there is no reason to suppose that a bargaining theory, enveloped in a 
more general formal framework explaining the formulation of the theory's assumptions, 
cannot represent impartiality - on the contrary. Such an extended translation of impartiality 
into symbols would have enormous advantages in terms of precision, making its composi­
tion a worthwhile enterprise for any formal theorist. Unfortunately all this may well go at 
the cost of immense complication. 
And so we turn to the various types of contract theories, again to Find that most 
versions of the contract cannot represent the archpoint of view. The basic idea of a 
contract is that a certain group of people, reasonable representatives of the reading public, 
agree to arrange certain public affairs in certain ways, that they feel the obligation to 
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respect the agreement, and that their adherence to the agreement is stable over a consider-
able period of time. We will have to be more subtle than that: a contract based on a 
comfortably vague description like this contains no details about the range and legitimacy 
of the obligation, nor about the way it embodies the archpoint. The contract might very 
well be the result of a plebiscite, valid only because, in sofar as, and as long as the 
contracting parties feel the same way about its content - for whatever reason. It derives its 
validity from the existence of community. A contract like this will only accidentally 
duplicate the impartial solution that would be reached at the archpoint of view. 
Michael Walzer has taken one step away from the plebiscite by introducing "shared 
understandings" as the source of legitimation for a social contract. His solution however 
lacks something we would want a social contract to have, i.e., stability. In fact, it is not a 
social contract at all. Nor is it contractarian enough to warrant representation of the key 
principles of the archpoint. 
Walzer claims that his conception of a constant redefinition of principles and 
spheres of interaction, by means of which the "shared understandings in society" are 
mirrored in the actual structure of society, constitutes a social contract (Walzer 1983: 82-
83).57 It does not and it can not. First of all, building a social contract on shared under-
standings in society is a contradiction in terms; the idea of a social contact is to create a 
society ex nihilo rather than reform one that already exists. 
Secondly, unlike the contract as wc know it. Walzer's contract is based on perhaps 
coincidental and certainly for the main part subconscious opinions. Of course. Walzer 
rejects all talk of justification based on would-be impartial reasons; arguments of that type 
would lack the necessary force to convince people living in a community and sharing a 
communitarian social consciousness - but that is exactly what distinguishes a justifying 
contract theory from a legitimizing consensus. Transporting a term like social contract 
from one language game (contraclarianism) to another (communilarianism) necessarily 
results in a change of meaning for that term. If we still want to call Walzer's theory a 
contract theory, we will have to stretch the meaning of the term beyond recognition - and 
call even Nozick a contractarian. After all, his theory is no less one of agreements guided 
by an invisible hand. 
Thirdly, Walzer's contract lacks stability. It is not a foundational contract, merely 
an agreement to stick to certain rules for the time being, until someone changes his or her 
mind. Consequently, it is not even a fundamental contract, in the sense that it is based on 
tacit consent rather than on an explicit agreement acknowledging whatever may be tacitly 
believed. Not resulting from a conscious act, Walzer's contract does not serve any purpose 
which is not already served by the community's shared understandings. In sum: any 
reference by Walzer to a social contract is superfluous in a communitarian, and misplaced 
in a contractarian, context. 
Even if Walzer's doctrine could be called a contract theory, the structure of his 
contract would still not do for the archpoint. Shared understandings, whatever they may 
be, are not necessarily HIS-reasons; indiscriminately "living" those understandings is 
A few pages laier. Walzer makes the more modest claim that this conception catches the "deepest 
meaning'' of the social contract (Walzer 1983: 91), that of reconciling social consciousness and social practice. 
However, that cannot be a good reason to call his theory a contract theory. Even brain surgery could produce that 
result. 
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therefore quite the opposite of objective neutrality, i.e., postponing judgement on the 
validity of HIS-reasons without excluding other motives from rational investigation. 
We are, then, left with two types of contract theory: the multi-person contract of 
which Bruce Ackcrman's theory is representative, and the single-mind contract known 
from Rawls. The (analytical) difference between the two is obvious: in the first theory, the 
contract derives its legitimacy from the support it gets from individuals, people as 
differing from one another as possible, whereas the force of the single-mind contract lies 
in its being backed by (separate but) equal minds, representative of the rational nature that 
unites us, rather than the whimsies that divide us. 
Of these two, only the single-mind contract turns out to be able to represent 
impartiality. A multi-person contract like Ackerman's appears to violate objective 
neutrality. After all, Ackerman explicitly demands that the contracting parties hold any 
conception of the good to be as good as any other; objective neutrality only asks that all 
sets of HIS-reasons be treated that way. But this, it seems, is more a peculiarity of 
Ackerman's than a necessary trait of every multi-person contract. We can easily imagine a 
contract situation in which differing persons with differing views of life and the good are 
asked to be less neutral than Ackerman asks, i.e., to be objectively neutral. Doing so, 
however, means changing the multi-person contract into a single-mind contract: the terms 
of the contract no longer depend on what divides us. Here then is a more fundamental 
argument against multi-person contracts: if, and in sofar as, the contingent differences 
between the contracting parties influence the terms of the contract, it no longer embodies 
an impartial point of view. The idea of impartiality is best served if the contractors are 
forced to stand apart from their particular point of view - including their HIS-reasons. 
Having taken the sting out of the multi-person contract, there seems to be no 
reason to hold on to what remains, i.e., the fiction of separate persons. A quasi-multi-
person contract is uneconomical: we do not need all the baroque details of widely 
differing persons with all their private points of view to represent an impartial point of 
view. It may give a bit of flavour and charm to a contract theory, but we really do not 
need it. The reader will noie that this is obviously an inconclusive and purely cosmetic 
argument: it concerns the question how we can best represent impartiality, not whether a 
quasi-mulli-pcrson contract can represent it at all. 
We may also note another point: a contract theory without the fiction of separate 
persons will look suspiciously like an ideal observer theory. It has, in fact, been argued 
against Rawls that his contract is expendable (Singer 1976: 239, Sandel 1982: 127 ff.); the 
original position would lead to exactly the same conclusions if there were only one person 
in it. A contract. Singer argues, is only a contract when there is some kind of bargaining 
going on, even among equals, and that is not what happens in the original position. The 
people in that situation are basically clones: they have equal talents in the intellectual and 
rhetorical field, they have the same psychological make-up, the same non-history, the 
same rights, duties and possessions (none), the same information, and the same task - so 
of course they will think alike and come to a unanimous decision. Following Singer's line 
of thought, the job could have been performed as effectively and more efficiently by the 
Weltgeist in meditation. 
There is little reason to see a fundamental challenge to Rawls-like (single-mind) 
contract theories in Singer's objection - or to ideal observer theories, for that matter. 
Contract theories, whether single-mind or multi-person, are not designed to gel the people 
in a fictitious contract situation to disagree, debate, and agree; they arc designed to create 
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a moral obligation in the real world towards the agreement reached in a fictitious slate of 
grace. The real contract is one between us readers and the person who gets the royalties 
for the book, the author of the theory.58 Together, we agree that the author is right, that 
justice is what he or she calls justice, and that we should act accordingly. Note that this is 
precisely the same agreement an ideal observer - another alter ego of author and reader -
hopes to bring about Note, furthermore, that this makes a single-mind contract as 
uneconomical as we found the ideal observer to be: once we have ensured that the 
contracting parties are impartial clones, we no longer them. 
My reasons for opting for a single-mind contract theory rather than an ideal 
observer are, consequently, by no means substantial. The difference between the two is not 
a matter of being able or unable to satisfy the conditions of the archpoint, the principles of 
impartiality. It is a psychological difference: even though a single-mind contract is by 
definition based on unanimous agreement, even though there is no bargaining of whatever 
kind, and even though the contractors are ideal if not angelic beings, the contract results 
from participation. It is not a divine decree. Still, as none of us, real persons, partake in 
their feast of reason, there is good reason to ask why this would matter. 
First of all, participation might make a difference for the legitimacy of the contract. 
The judgement of one is not obviously as legitimate as that of a forum. An adequate 
picture of the archpoint will be more convincing if it reflects the structure of real world 
moral discourse. Nevertheless, the difference remains purely acslhelical: real people can 
criticize a forum as easily as a single observer. 
In the second place, our last argument suggests another reason of a different kind 
based on a tactical consideration: a forum creates its own support, whereas a dictator 
creates mistrust. But even if this were generally true - and not just true for the enlightened 
citizens of modern Western democratic societies - it would be the wrong kind of argu-
ment. We want to be convinced by reason, not by self-deceit. 
Thirdly, the idea of a forum might go some way towards dealing with an at least 
on the Continent highly influential strand of critique of Western moral philosophy, a 
critique that is inspired by Emanuel Levinas's work. The forum could, to some extent, 
overcome the difference between an egoistical and a social ethics. Unfortunately, this 
argument will not work for a single-mind contract. Levinas's has always argued that 
Western philosophy does not take l'Autre seriously, the other human being as fundamen-
tally different, fundamentally incomprehensible, fundamentally uncontrollable; whenever 
philosophers give guidelines for social action, they are based on conceptions of the other 
(l'autre, lower case a) as fundamentally alike to oneself. If there is one thing obvious 
about the single-mind contract, it is that there are no Others present at the archpoint, only 
others. There is a pleasant note to this, however: the single-mind contract is in good 
company. There is no device at all that could ever adequately represent an Other - as 
every attempt at representation must be an attempt to comprehend and control, and as such 
attempts must therefore fail. 
Fourthly and finally then, only the writer's rhetorical argument (inspired by Kley 
1989: 268, 274) remains: identification with the heroes. It is simply easier, both for an 
author and his or her audience, to imagine a multitude (however detached) as representing 
For ¡ι similar interpretation of the social contract as rational reconstruction, see Hampton 1986: 269 IT. 
For Hampton's interpretation of Rawls's contract as a device to (reconstruct freedom and autonomy (self-rule 
and self-determination), see Hampton 1980: 337. 
114 J U S T I C E F R O M A D I S T A N C E 
all the different groups and interests in society, than it is to imagine this being done by an 
alien from outer vspace. 
The secret of models representing the arguments for a theory of justice - original 
position, ideal observer, an so forth - is not in the type-casting but in the inescapable logic 
of the roles (cf. Kley 1989: 289-94). An adequate justification device must satisfy a 
principle Voltaire once formulated: if the devil were to take God's place, he would soon 
discover that he must also behave like God. 
CHAPTER 5: IMPARTIALITY OF THE MIND 
Section 21: Categories of knowledge 
Information is one of two keys to any choice or decision, no matter what justifica-
tion procedure we follow; the point of view from which we see things is the other. As 
ordinary human beings, we will probably decide not to jump into a deep hole in the side 
of a mountain if all the information we have is that it looks like a volcano, shakes like a 
volcano and makes rude noises like a volcano. We may decide otherwise if we know that 
the smoke and sounds are fake, that there is a safety net and no chance of missing it, and 
that we will be rewarded generously for jumping. 
In the process of developing an impartial theory of justice, it is sometimes better 
not to know certain things. Knowledge of the facts that you have a talent for making the 
right choices on the stock market and that you deeply enjoy wealth may prejudice you in 
favour of a free market society with profound differences between rich and poor - unless, 
of course, you are capable of overcoming prejudice, have no opportunity or incentive to be 
ruled by prejudice, or are temporarily freed from it. On the other hand, contracting parties 
must know other things - for one, they must know why they have gathered together at all. 
More systematically, the issue looks as follows. In contract theories of justice 
seven categories of information can be distinguished. Each of these categories represents a 
necessary condition for a decision, none of them can be omitted, and no other types of 
information are required. An adequate contract theory of justice must account for the 
assumptions it makes about each of these seven types of knowledge; an impartial theory 
will have to do so in terms of impartiality. 
Two of these categories are necessitated by the fictitious character of a contract 
theory. The parties designing a contract do not have to be the same parlies as those that 
will have to live under the terms of the contract. In the first respect, the contracting parties 
are judges; in the latter, they are subjects. The so-called archpoint of view, the criteria for 
the impartiality of a theory of justice formulated in the previous chapter, places severe 
restrictions on two aspects of our conception of parlies contracting for justice: their 
knowledge about their characters and about the place they might have in a particular 
society should not hinder them from being impartial. A contract theory must account for 
these two constituents; if they were not specified we would have no reason to trust the 
impartiality of the judgement of our contracting parties - whom, by the way, we shall from 
now on call archpointers. 
Two further constituents run parallel to the factors we just introduced: knowledge 
about the human self and about the particular society for which a contract is designed. 
There are two trivial and partly familiar reasons why these categories are indispensable. In 
the first place, we will want to make sure that whatever the archpointers know cannot 
hinder their impartiality. Secondly, we cannot imagine archpointers deciding on anything if 
they do not know that there is anything to decide on, let alone what. What we arc 
interested in is social justice, i.e., justice for individual entities living in a society. The 
archpointers should at least be acquainted with the notion of society and its constituent 
parts. They do not necessarily need to know everything there is to know about either 
subject - as long as we make sure that Ihey know enough. 
The three remaining categories of knowledge are all in a sense end-oriented. To 
decide on justice, on what should be, archpointers must know more than simply what is; 
they cannot work without information about the possible, either possible facts (from a 
teleologica! perspective), or possible dispositions (from a deoniological perspective), or 
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both. In the Rawlsian vocabulary, this constituent is known as the category of general 
(social) scientific knowledge. Secondly, information is useless without a guiding question. 
In designing a contract situation, we must also account for the simplest of its constituents: 
the task posed on the archpointers. Finally, all these types of information must be 
mediated in order to produce some kind of output, i.e., principles of social justice. We will 
want such mediating decision rules to be assuredly impartial. 
In section 22 we shall discuss real-world information, that is, the knowledge 
archpointers must have about the human self and about the society or societies for which 
they are to develop a conception of justice, and the general scientific knowledge available 
about both. As it turns out, the problem with these three constituents is less to decide how 
much information can be allowed without endangering impartiality than of how to control 
the flow of data. Provided the parties establishing principles of justice are archpointers, 
i.e., provided they see things from an impartial point of view, only the absence of data can 
prejudice them. Hence, rather than being barred from real-world information, archpointers 
must have unrestricted access to all possible data. It is up to them to decide, in second 
instance, which types of information are relevant and which are not. Only at this point can 
we put restrictions on the contracting parties's knowledge. 
Section 23, where the character and social background of the archpointers are 
discussed, accounts for the impartiality of the contracting parlies, which had so far only 
been presumed. Obviously this is an area in which restrictions on knowledge are relevant -
and also one in which restrictions can endanger the credibility of a contract. It has been 
argued, notably by Michael Walzer (Walzer 1988: 33), that the less the archpointers's 
point of view becomes ours, the more reason we have to suspect that their judgements are 
(loo) uninformed. To really understand the sense of justice of a genuine society, one 
would have to be part of it and judge it from the point of view of its members. I shall 
argue instead that the omission of a social consciousness and of information about one's 
background will not make Ihe archpointers's decisions uninformed. Archpointers can have 
any amount of information about particular cultures and specific points of view, they can 
even be allowed to "experience" Ihese points of view - as long as ihe information they 
have does nol give them an interest in the choice for one possible conception of justice 
rather than another. For this last reason, archpointers will essentially have to remain what 
they are in Rawls's theory: amnesiacs, as far as the relevant aspects of their own identity 
is concerned. 
Finally, section 24 addresses the remaining types of information: information on 
the task of the contracting parties and on mediating decision rules. The themes discussed 
in this section are mainly technical; they concern (I) the so-called formal constraints of 
justice, i.e., criteria for the form that an impartial conception of justice should have, and 
(2) the order in which the different conditions of impartiality should be satisfied. 
Section 22: Knowing the self, society and possibility 
First things first: in this section I shall often use terms like "human" and "human 
self', and I shall only refer to humans as recipients of distributive justice. This may seem 
to indicate the existence on my part of a prejudice against extraterrestrials, animals or 
other imaginable recipients. The reasons for not (yet) discussing justice towards non-
humans are, however, lack of knowledge rather than lack of imagination. The term justice 
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is applied to intentions, acts, and results. Not knowing any other self-conscious and self-
governing beings, i.e., extraterrestrials, we can for now assume that only a human being or 
a group of humans can want to be (un)just, can act (un)justly and can create just or unjust 
institutions and circumstances. Animals cannot. In a theory of social justice, the only role 
animals can possibly play is that of recipient, as beings to which the distributors or the 
designers of the distribution scheme owe something. However, at this point in the 
development of our theory we cannot yet distribute membership cards, i.e., we cannot yet 
determine if and to which degree animals are recipients of social justice. I shall for now 
simply assume that social justice is an intra-human, intra-social affair only, and patch up 
any holes that may be left later on, in Part III of this book. 
There is, it seems, no reason not to brief the archpointers on everything there is to 
know about humans and their societies. The archpointers, we assume, are detached enough 
to deal with this information without bias, strategic behaviour, or premature judgement 
What is more, the archpointers would by definition be biased if we withheld any relevant 
information. Being, unlike the archpointers, ordinary human beings with a subjective point 
of view, we cannot ourselves decide when information is relevant and when it will be 
superfluous. Hence, we have a prima facie case for full access to all sorts of information -
and for not further specifying the contents of this information. 
Nevertheless, we cannot escape the question of the relevancy of information that 
easily. The data archpointers have about the human self, about society and about science is 
necessarily of our making - or, more precisely, they are what the author through his 
assumptions decides that they are. It is, then, better to be explicit about these assumptions 
and determine what we must assume that archpointers should minimally know, where the 
border lies between knowledge that is necessary and sufficient for their impartiality, and 
additional information that will not alter their judgement. 
Let us start with the issue of knowledge on (he human self, and pose the funda-
mental question whether knowledge of human nature or the human condition is relevant at 
all. A famous reason for an affirmative answer immediately comes to mind: it has been 
argued by - among many others - Hume, Rawls, and to some extent Barry that the need 
for principles of justice arises because of certain human characteristics (the so-called 
subjective circumstances of justice) and certain traits of society (the objective circum-
stances). As I intend to treat these circumstances in a different order, I shall refer to them 
as subjective and objective conditions of social justice. We shall be concerned with the 
subjective conditions, circumstances of individuals rather than societies, first: moderate 
self-interest or, in Rawls's theory, mutual disinterest, and rough equality of power (Barry 
1989: 154 ff., 182 ff.). Justice, it is supposed, would be an impossibility, and the question 
of justice would never rise, if humans were slightly egoistical but not approximately 
equally powerful. In the latter case, a war of all against all would follow in which the 
strong would win and the weak lose. Justice would also be out of demand if we were not 
a bit egoistical or at least a bit disinterested in the well-being of others. With too much 
egoism, the question of fair behaviour would never rise - let alone that anyone would want 
to live up to the possible answer. In a world of altruists on the other hand, a conception of 
justice would be superfluous. No one would bother about fair shares: any sign of need or 
desire would immediately be recognized as valid and, if possible, answered. 
These two conditions do indeed necessitate the question of justice, although their 
exact wording requires some revision. In the first place, as a primitive (i.e., irreducible) 
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motive, selfishness or its alternatives will not do. Neither selfishness, moderate or 
boundless, nor mutual disinterest arc indisputable and omnipresent facts of life, and neither 
one necessarily gives rise to questions of justice. As such, selfishness is a most unsophisti-
cated notion, perhaps able to reduce all human behaviour to an ultimate cause but 
certainly unable to explain any particular act. Taking a cup of coffee can be interpreted as 
selfish behaviour, raising a child can be understood in similar terms, and so can giving 
presents, sharing feelings, having sex, and dying for whatever cause. But why drink vodka 
at this moment rather than later or not, if these are all selfish acts? Why die for your 
country if deserting seems to be wiser? 
To understand human behaviour, motives other than pure selfishness have to be 
introduced. We can then characterize humans, with Hume, as only moderately self-
interested, or, with Rawls, as neither egoists nor altruists but simply mutually Jmnterested. 
But if we do so, we soon discover that the need for justice does not arise merely because 
of the way we think about ourselves as compared to others. The new motives, motives 
other than our self-image, can as easily incite problems of just behaviour or distribution. 
If, for instance, the justice problem arises when Harry Stotlle and Cissy Roo, two 
more or less selfish persons, fight over a penny, the problem will not go away if we turn 
them into, for example, other-regarding altruists. The single difference this makes is that 
we reverse their preferences: Harry now has Cissy's best interests in mind, and Cissy 
Harry's. In a world of altruists, the problem of just distribution and fair shares still arises, 
though in a different form; it would not be a matter of keeping people from fighting over 
shares, but one of getting them to accept any. Of course, we can imagine circumstances in 
which Harry's and Cissy's self-images would not necessarily lead them to posing 
questions about justice - we could attribute Harry with perfect egoism and Cissy with 
perfect altruism, or vice versa. But the fact that no human being perceives a problem does 
not mean that it does not exist. Perhaps one can maintain that, in real life, the question of 
justice surfaces because and in sofar as we are, in whatever sense, self-interested; 
nevertheless, the problem also exists where and in sofar as we have another self-image. 
If there is an indisputable and omnipresent fact of life about human motivation at 
all, it is not that all these reasons for fighting can somehow be brought together under the 
heading of self-interest or mutual disinterest. It is not selves fighting for themselves that 
gives rise to questions of justice; they can also fight for others or, as a matter of principle, 
for an idea rather than a person. The question of justice then arises everywhere where 
separate beings fight about diverse desires. What matters is the separateness of humans 
and the diversity of their reasons for acting in itself - a condition which Rawls, by the 
way, mentions in relation to moderate scarcity (Rawls 1971: 127). I shall call this the first 
subjective condition of social justice: the presence of separate persons with distinct reasons 
for acting. 
A second subjective condition of justice proposed by Hume and the Humeians, an 
approximately equal distribution of power among humans, is at least equally disputable. 
The theory connecting rough equality to justice is simple enough: if Harry Stotlle and 
Cissy Roo are roughly equally powerful and they fight about a scarce resource, say a 
penny, neither of them can win or the costs of winning will more than outweigh the 
benefits. If Harry and Cissy have friends and relatives, they could form coalitions and 
raise their dispule to a higher level - without ever really winning. Rawls writes: "They (the 
cooperating individuals, MW) are vulnerable to attack, and all are subject to having their 
plans blocked by the united force of others" (Rawls 1971: 127). The rational solution to 
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this dilemma is to cooperate, agree on certain principles of distributive justice, and act 
accordingly. Thus, the discovery that we are all approximately equally powerful would 
make justice an issue. However, rough equality of power is not a necessary trait of 
humans, nor is it the only way in which power can give rise to questions of justice. It is 
therefore not the best choice for a subjective condition of justice. 
In the first place, it is either not true that we are roughly equals in power, or it is a 
meaningless phrase. Rough equality means that there are slight inequalities - which is, in 
itself, a plausible thesis. If we were all exactly equally powerful and operated alone or in 
coalitions "blocking" the plans of others (see above), then, with the exception of the 
influence of natural disasters, only the force of reasons and arguments would cause society 
to change and history to develop - which, I suppose, slightly contradicts our intuitive 
conception of world history. 
Whether rough equality will lead to the consideration of justice as a solution for a 
distribution problem depends on circumstances. Consider the sense in which real individ-
uals can be near-equals in power: one is smarter than another, who is stronger, and a third 
is neither strong nor smart but has a talent for making friends with people in high places -
and somehow their potentials would have to even out. Obviously, the question whether 
they are roughly equals in the real world does not depend on their potential only, but also 
on the structure of society - which is seldom fair to all. Thus, for rough equality to lead to 
questions of justice, we must presuppose the existence of circumstances in which powers 
more or less even out. Clearly powers do not even out between each individual at every 
moment in every society, so we must sec things in a broader perspective. Still, things only 
get worse if we think of rough equality as equality between coalitions or equality between 
societies. Some coalitions, for example, are more vulnerable than others. The aspiration to 
prove the existence of equality of power between coalitions will inevitably lead to absurd 
conclusions: to save this notion, its scope must be widened over time and space -
endlessly, so as to make sure that in the end all powers even out, that all winners have 
also been losers and all losers winners. Which would make rough equality of power a 
tautology. 
Secondly, it is cynical to suggest that the question of justice only arises in those 
circumstances of approximate equality of power where bargaining is preferred to fighting. 
Perhaps, as potential losers in the fight between roughly equals, everyone has a reason for 
demanding justice. As Brian Barry once said in another context, the exploited and 
suppressed demand equality and justice rather than a change of places with the powerful 
(Barry 1965: 282). Perhaps the almost exploited have a similar sense of justice. However, 
those who stand to win - and in circumstances of rough inequality, everyone stands that 
chance - have quite different motives for opening negotiations. Under circumstances, the 
slightest inequality in power can be and often has been exploited to rob, rape, torture, 
starve, enslave, or gas the others. If potential winners start to negotiate, their reasons will 
have little to do with justice, morality or kindness, and everything with efficiency and 
greed. For them, agreeing to reasonable distribution principles is simply a belter bargain 
than open warfare. 
Now if the question of justice only arose in circumstances of rough equality, it 
would be an issue introduced by the bargaining parties in their quality of potential losers; 
as potential winners, they must be interested in quite other things. By the same logic, if 
the distribution of power were a little more unequal, justice would not be an issue - the 
winners, if rational, would simply exploit their advantage and lake what they want. In 
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other words, the implication seems to be that questions of justice are out of place where 
people are plainly unequal with respect to their power. Again, the fact that no human 
being perceives a problem - in this case, the fact that no greedy self-regarding rational 
winner is willing to listen to the losers's grievances - will not make the problem disap-
pear. 
In the political part of the real world, approximate equality of power docs in fact 
have something to do with justice. It can be an incentive both to raise questions of justice 
and support the answers, but it is not a necessary condition. In more unequal circum-
stances, constraints on the use of power such as a sense of morality or the unlimited use 
of absolute power by a benevolent dictator, or whatever, can do either job just as 
effectively. 
In another part of the real world, the world of morality, I suggest that we look at 
the connection between justice and power in a different, more lenient way, one that better 
expresses the moral significance of the - especially Rawls's - conviction that justice can 
only arise out of a confrontation of free and equal beings (Rawls 1971: 12). Despite their 
different endowments, humans are in a sense equal regarding power, namely by nature: 
they are equal in having, storing, and on occasion using, power in whatever form or 
amount. I call this the second subjective condition of social justice. 
Apart from one additional premise concerning motivation, these two conditions are 
practically all the archpointers need to know about the human self. It may seem plausible, 
however, to include two other conditions, earlier included in the conditions of the 
archpoint: weak rationality and the existence of HIS-reasons. The advantages would be 
twofold: it would give manageable proportions to the flow of information with which the 
archpointers have to deal, and it would limit the information to what is relevant from an 
impartial point of view. However, neither one is a necessary subjective condition of 
justice, i.e., a trait of human nature that necessitates justice. In the first place, the need for 
justice and compliance to principles of justice can conceivably originate in reasons other 
than HIS-reasons, or under other conditions than (a desire to be) weakly rational. 
Secondly, the desire for justice can be a HIS-rcason, but not all HIS-reasons are desires 
for justice; not every human being may have a deep and sincere desire for justice. Thirdly, 
weak rationality is only a mediator between propositions, not a proposition or fact or 
reason by itself. Fourthly, neither HIS-reasons nor weak ralionality are by definition 
constitutive of the human self; the capacity for either one is. 
The one additional premise that we need explains how reasons, persons and power 
are connected to justice. For questions of justice to arise, it is not enough to presume the 
existence of separate persons with certain kinds and quantities of power to act upon their 
distinct reasons. Once the interests of these persons collide, there are two options, not one: 
voice, i.e., an appeal to justice, and exit.59 In the example given before, where Harry and 
Cissy both want the scarce resource of £0.01, they could start to reason with one another -
or they could decide to forego the penny and escape the troubles of dialogue. To explain 
this choice, we need a theory of motivation. I shall discuss two such explanations, and 
reject both in favour of a more down-to-earth approach. 
For a long lime, one of the basic suppositions of mainstream philosophy has been 
that humans, or in fact every particle of the universe, has an innate desire to persist in its 
I presume for a moment lhal a third option, fighting, only enters the agenda when negotiations are 
unsuccessful, and I presume that capitulation (or voluntary enslavement) Is a special case of exit. 
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existence. In Spinoza's metaphysics, for example, this desire defines the individual entity's 
essence; Spinoza called it the conatus perseverane. On views like these, anything that 
serves the goal of perpetuating existence must necessarily be the object of desire; under 
the conditions of justice, that object would be the object of negotiation. Although a 
persuasive basis for self-interest theories, the desire for continued existence is quite 
incapable of dealing with antithetic desires, desires that are as common in real life as they 
are inexplicable from this metaphysical perspective: suicide, paying taxes where free-
riding would go unnoticed, and so forth. (Clearly, I am assuming that money and death 
can be resources.) 
A second tradition is, on a loose interpretation of the word, hedonistic: it under-
stands action as motivated by a desire to enjoy life, affirm one's existence, realize one's 
nature or potentials, and so forth. Rawls's Aristotelian principle, attributing man with a 
desire to make the best of his capacities (Rawls 1971: 426), is a nice example. In this 
perspective, the evolution of a need for principles of justice is understood in terms of 
means and ends: resources furthering self-realization are worth the effort of fighting for -
or reasoning about, if the conditions of justice obtain. Like self-perpetuation, the hedonis-
tic approach has ils imperfections, one of them being its restriction to purely hedonistic 
ends. On a hedonistic perspective, actions like suicide, having children, or caring for 
future persons or generations, are or can easily be incomprehensible.40 
These examples should suffice: even if we momentarily forget our earlier objec-
tions to metaphysical theories, metaphysics are still inefficient "Deep" theories of the 
human self like these two lend to be incapable of explaining quite common but by their 
own standards perverse acts and reasons for acting. On the other hand, any attempt to 
broaden the scope of concepts like self-pcrpcluation or hedonism to include deviant 
behaviour is bound to end in explanations with the same (lack of) subtlety and sophistica-
tion that characterized the concept of selfishness. 
Instead of designing a new and better metaphysical theory of the self, I suggest we 
let Ockham's razor do its work. As long as we do not try to explain why exactly people 
have the reasons they have, and why those reasons are as strong as they are, we can avoid 
the extremes of under- and over-explaining. After all, there is no reason, other than pure 
curiosity, why we should want to know all this, or why archpoinlers should have to know. 
An impartial account of justice only refers to the distinction between HIS-reasons and 
other reasons, not to their histories, and it does this only in order to postpone judgement 
on the first, not to assess their consistency with some theory of the self. The essential 
point for us and for archpoinlers is simply thai people sometimes have reasons strong 
enough to hold on to, that they have goals, ends and desires which they consider worth 
pursuing: "... they are the interests of a self that regards its conception of the good as 
worthy of recognition and that advances claims in its behalf as deserving satisfaction" 
(Rawls 1971: 127). Hence I propose, as a third subjective condition of social justice, the 
presence of a profound identification of persons with their reasons for acting. 
These three conditions then are all an archpoinler needs to know about the human 
self - needs to know, as other information can but need not be given. There is, in 
Again, I am assuming something: thai (here may not be enough pleasure in having children or caring for 
them to explain the fact that someone has ihem or cares for them. Though she refuses to draw this conclusion 
herself, Susan Moller Okin's quite modest summary of the disadvantages of marriage and motherhood 
unavoidably encourages a certain hesitation about the rationality of procreation. Sec Okin 1989: 139 ff. 
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particular, no need to inform archpoinlers about the sets of HIS-reasons to which real 
persons in a genuine society adhere. By definition of the archpoint, they already know that 
principles of justice which are based on the actual distribution of HIS-reasons in a given 
society may generate a bias against persons, societies, and especially sets of HIS-reasons 
that do not yet exist. 
As an illustration of this claim: suppose that we live in a society without beggars 
or anyone else to whom we can show benevolence, as there is no one to show it to. In 
fact, no-one can even remember ever having heard of someone deserving benevolence. In 
this society, benevolence will not be a reason for action, let alone that it ever crossed 
anyone's mind to tum it into a HIS-reason. A social system based on these data can, 
however, easily tum out to be prejudiced against benevolence. Suppose there is an action 
X that can only be performed as an act of benevolence, and that benevolence can only be 
shown by doing X - say, giving small change lo a complete stranger without asking or 
expecting anything in return, and in the knowledge that the money will never be returned, 
anyway. Benevolence does not exist in our society, and as an implication of a rule against 
bribery, anything that looks like X is forbidden. One day, the first beggar ever to be seen 
in living history turns up on the steps of the cathedral. You, I, Harry Slollle and Cissy 
Roo walk by, and the more humane among us are so deeply shocked by what we see that 
we (re)discover the concept of benevolence on the spot. In due course, we find that 
benevolence is or became a HIS-reason. Benevolence may conflict with another HIS-
reason like prudence, it may sometimes even be wiser to let prudence take precedence 
(Hardin 1990: 101) - but all this does not change the fact that our social system forbids us 
to do X even when, in conscience, we can do no other. The message is clear: principles of 
social justice had better not depend on too precise, too limited, information. 
The archpoinlers are, then, left with two options: that of imagining all possible 
persons, characters and sels of HIS-reasons, and that of leaving the character and HIS-
reasons of possible persons undefined. The first option is unpractical, as it demands the 
archpoinlers to work with a probably infinite amount of information; unconvincing, as the 
archpoinler should be our alter ego rather than an intelligence beyond imagination (cf. 
Kley 1989: 389); and improbable, as we inform the archpoinlers but to my knowledge do 
not ourselves possess complete information on all possible humans. In practice, this leaves 
us and the archpoinlers wilh the second option. 
Once more, it must be stressed that any data we have on the human self, beyond 
the information expressed by the three conditions, can be passed on to the archpoinlers -
provided we actually do have such incontrovertible data. From an archpoint of view 
however, extra information adds no value to an impartial judgement. At best, it allows 
archpointers to add the example of one particular society to their treatise on justice in any 
society. 
All in all, the archpointers have to deal wilh a lot of uncertainties. They know that 
the persons for whom they design principles of justice are separate beings with separate 
reasons wilh which they strongly identify, and Ihcy know that these beings are endowed 
with power to act upon their reasons. They also know that persons and their reasons, 
including HIS-reasons, may be incompatible. Yet they do not know what these reasons are 
and which personalities their clients actually have - nor which persons and HIS-reasons 
could possibly exist. Moreover, they have to allow for the fact that not all actual reasons 
for acting are HIS-reasons, and that some of their clients may not even have HIS-reasons 
or may not want to be weakly rational. 
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So much for the subjective conditions of justice. The objective conditions, the 
properties of society necessitating justice, are twofold: the existence of society and of 
moderate scarcity. Rawls describes the first as the coexistence of many individuals at the 
same time on a definite geographical territory (Rawls 1971: 126). I shall assume that this 
is an unproblemaiical clarification of the first objective condition of social justice: that 
there is a society. 
The second condition poses more difficulties. Ever since Hume and even more so 
since Rawls, moderate scarcity has been looked upon as the most important if not in some 
cases the only objective condition of justice. Hume's argument can be summarized very 
briefly: there is no problem of justice in circumstances of abundance, and there will not be 
any support for justice (just distribution) if the stock is too small. (Brian Barry describes 
the last situation very aptly as universal prédation (Barry 1989: 156).) Therefore, Hume 
concludes, the notion of justice is only relevant in between these extremes, where 
cooperation is mutually advantageous. Rawls adds nothing essential to this extremely 
positivistic account (Rawls 1971: 127). There is, admittedly, no need to in sofar as 
moderate scarcity is a condition of the adherence to principles of justice. Yet in sofar as 
moderate scarcity would be a necessary condition for the evolution of the question of 
justice, it is not clear at all why scarcity should be relevant. 
In what follows, I shall argue that moderate scarcity is not a condition of justice, 
first by attacking the idea of "moderate" scarcity from two sides, and then by criticizing 
the notion of scarcity as such. I claim that we should instead let the archpointers them-
selves decide on the object of distribution. In this 1 follow, first of all, Aristotle, who did 
not include scarcity in any way in his conception of distributive justice but allowed 
convention to decide what goods and bads were to be distributed. My alternative is also 
inspired by William Galston's critique of the necessity of moderate scarcity as an 
environment for justice (Galston 1980: 109-120). 
Moderate scarcity, in Hume's, Rawls', and Barry's opinion, is a mean between too 
much (or at least enough) and too little, between abundance and absence. We can accept 
this definition without comment and also without learning much from it. The relevancy of 
the idea of distributive justice is not limited to things of which enough or more than 
enough can exist, nor does it stop to be relevant where enough or too much of something 
is actually available. 
First of all, it is not clear what defines enough or more than enough. Enough may 
be enough for one generation and one society, or for all generations and/or all societies. 
Enough may be enough to satisfy needs, to satisfy wants, or to satisfy the demand on a 
free market. Moderate scarcity can obviously not be specified any further until it is clear 
who exactly can claim a part of whatever stock is available, on what grounds these claims 
are to be made, and by whose authority all these specifications are legitimately introduced. 
In short: "moderate" is not an uncontroversial, clear or distinct notion. 
Secondly, there may be distributable goods of which there cannot be more than 
enough (or bads of which there cannot be too little). Such goods will be moderately scarce 
no matter how great or small the slock is. Due to the subjeclivencss of the notion of 
scarcity, examples in this field are necessarily controversial. I, for one, belong to those 
who believe that the expression "loo much Mozart" is devoid of meaning; others espouse 
the incomprehensible opposite view. In sofar as the prevention of death can be distributed, 
many seem lo believe that there cannot be enough life nor enough means to that end. Or 
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consider man's best friend: especially for some kids there can never be enough puppies 
(the example obviously does not work for grown-up dogs). 
Thirdly, it is not evident that abundance makes the notion of (distributive) justice 
obsolete, unless we define justice as the distribution of relatively scarce goods - but in that 
case the concept of moderate scarcity is no longer a reason for justice. This, in turn, 
implies that someone has to design a list of scarce (that is, by definition distributable) 
goods, which takes us back to our first objection. Yet even an abundance of goods can be 
distributed, for instance on a "take what you like and let the rest rot" basis, or on the basis 
of a rule apportioning any remainders to specific parties, or according to the principle that 
there is no principle. It seems reasonable to assume that a just distribution rule for 
abundant goods will at least specify that no one be excluded from the enjoyment of 
abundance. Thus, whether we define distributive justice as including or excluding 
abundance of goods is really of no consequence: we still have to distribute, we still need 
rules to do so, and we must still account for these rules in terms of their moral slatus - for 
what else makes one rule belter than or as good as another? Summarizing: the concept of 
distributive justice applies at least to all goods that are more than extremely scarce; it 
stretches out to the distribution of plenty. 
Fourthly, it may be countered that genuine abundance does not exist, that plenty is 
ultimately a plague, one of which we would like to be freed - and the rights to this 
freedom are, of course, a scarce good. The European Community is a good example: at 
times, it produced more cheese than the Dutch could ever swallow, more wine than the 
French could drink and more meat than the Germans could stow away.61 Had there not 
been a world outside Europe, luxury of this kind would have been a catastrophe. Let it be 
true that abundance cannot exist; it will not make a difference. All this establishes is that 
"moderate" scarcity has no upper limit, and therefore cannot be a mean between two 
extremes. 
Having dealt rather extensively with abundance, I will not lire the reader with an 
equally long discourse on the lower limit of moderate scarcity. The most important 
arguments against the exclusion of abundance can, mutatis mutandis, be applied with equal 
force to absolute scarcity. I shall add just one argument to this collection. 
Obviously, there are situations of extreme scarcity in which principles of justice 
will not stand a test of adherence. Imagine real life: famine in Somalia (the example will, 
I fear, not loose its up-to-date character for years to come). At the moment a car with food 
supplies arrives at a refugee camp, the refugees gather around it and do what they cannot 
help doing: fight for their lives. Some of them end up with nothing, some of them end up 
with more than their immediate need requires and occasionally share it with a few of their 
unlucky companions, others keep their harvest all to themselves. Next morning, five or 
fifly corpses will be buried - the remains of those who might have made it through the 
night if the law of the jungle had not been followed. 
Things like this happen, they are understandable, they can often be excused and 
forgiven, but all that does not make the law of the jungle a just law, or the concept of 
justice inappropriate. No one ever promised that justice would not at times be demanding. 
If we exclude an extreme case like this from consideration at the archpoinl, we implicitly 
In December 1993, ihe European Union had 649 grams of butler In slock Tor every European citizen, 
1404 grams of beef, half a liter of olive oil, 342 grams of cheese, and so forth. Source: NRC/1 landelshlad, 22-1-
1994. 
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bow to conventionalism. It would mean letting interested parties decide when a resource is 
too scarce to play by the rules and when instead bargaining or righting advantages should 
be exploited. Seen from an impartial point of view, it may turn out that there is in fact a 
good reason to apply different principles to rich and poor societies, or even to exclude 
absolute scarcity from the working range of principles of justice - but we cannot exclude it 
a priori. It is a mailer for archpointers to decide on, not one for those who sland lo gain. 
So far, we have determined that moderate scarcity is not in itself a necessary 
condition of distributive justice. Both absolute scarcity and abundance pose questions of 
distribution that can be translated into terms of justice. The almost unquestioned practice 
of restricting distributive justice to moderate scarcity is clearly of a conventional if not 
arbitrary nature. Nevertheless, in the real world scarcity and adherence to justice are 
related. We might be tempted to hold on to the notion of scarcity in theory as well, for 
instance by simply including absolute scarcity in the concept, and by moulding and 
rephrasing abundance so that it can at least partly be understood in terms of scarcity, viz., 
as the scarce freedom of a burden. Even then, I do not think that we can save scarcity as a 
necessary condition of justice, nor do I think that we should try to. With or without the 
necessary and possible changes and amendments, scarcity remains a biased term; for once, 
there is something in a name. Its connotations and its inherent ambiguity make it an unfit 
point of departure for an impartial inquiry into justice. 
Firstly, scarcity has a materialistic connotation, even or especially when used in a 
figurative way of speech. Freedom or equal protection by the law cannot be scarce in the 
same sense as perfume, caviar or bread. The term scarcity creates the impression that what 
is important about bread and freedom is that they are rare and hard to come by. They are, 
but noi in the same sense. Scarcity is an essentially economic notion. In economic terms, 
scarce goods can be valued by a standard or in comparison with one another; the value of 
one good can always be expressed in terms of another. The utilitarian and Rawls's 
conceptions of justice allow for the exchange of resources; under circumstances, they even 
allow the exchange of freedom for material improvement (cf. Rawls 1971: 62). As a 
general fact, it may be true that goods can be exchanged, even for freedoms, or vice 
versa - but it is not α law of nature that each and every human being is always prepared to 
exchange one scarce good, say a clear conscience, for another, say a generous bribe. If we 
want to avoid the impression that archpointers are a priori insensitive to certain convic­
tions including HIS-reasons, the use of a term like scarcity may not help much. 
A second problem with the connotations of scarcity, one to which I already pointed 
above, is the uncertainty surrounding its point of reference. Moderate scarcity as under­
stood by Rawls and Hume is most often purely economic scarcity: it exists where the 
supply cannot satisfy present expressed or perceived desires. On a second interpretation, 
scarcity is anything short of the maximum possible level of satisfaction of all feasible 
desires. Without pretending to exhaust the list, there is also a third and fourth interpreta­
tion, both of which can be found in Rawls's list of primary goods: scarcity in Icrms of ihe 
basic and vital needs of life, and scarcity regarding social and political needs, that is, in 
terms of the goods and freedoms required for a decent and civilized life in society. Using 
the term scarcity in an impartial account of justice obliges us to define it, but defining it 
requires selecting one interpretation and excluding others, in other words: predisposing the 
archpointers to choose one source of valid claims rather than another. The whole point of 
the archpoint is, however, to allow an unprejudiced investigation of the relevance of 
various types of claims. 
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If we reject the concept of relative scarcity and prefer not to use the term scarcity 
at all, we must nonetheless admit that, for the question of justice to come forth, there must 
be something outside our bodies worth arguing over. Expressing this something in relation 
to our subjective reasons for wanting it, we obtain a complex second objective condition 
of social justice: the availability of means of action (regardless of the reasons for acting), 
over the distribution of which a conflict of interests is possible. Note that this formulation 
allows archpointers to consider material and immaterial means, as well as things which are 
considered to be good in themselves - such as art for art's sake or liberty for the sake of 
liberty. There is no reason why means cannot also be ends. 
As with the subjective conditions of justice, these objective conditions do not ban 
the archpointers from other knowledge, but further details are irrelevant. Suppose that the 
archpointers had been given all available data on Italy in 1995. We want them to design 
principles of social justice, rather than principles of Italian justice - in fact, we are not 
interested in Italy at all. Would information on Italy damage their impartiality? In advance, 
one might suspect that the archpointcrs's judgement will at least appear to be biased. The 
structure of a particular society often reflects the values of the happy few in that society, 
or rather the other way around: time, place, and social and natural constellation create the 
opportunity for some to become the happy few. Others are either unfortunate enough to 
have their plans of life obstructed by the structure of society, or they have adapted their 
plans to their limited possibilities - which is known as the sour grapes effect. If all this is 
the case in Italy, we must assure that the structure of Italian society and the values of 
Italians do not somehow influence the impartiality of the archpointers. 
We could consider to take away the appearance of bias by simply withholding all 
information on particular societies, which would certainly keep the archpointers from 
favouring or obstructing certain reasons, plans, and lives. To prevent a bias from actually 
occurring, such drastic actions are nevertheless unnecessary. The conditions of the 
archpoint, i.e., the conditions defining impartiality, should suffice to generate the level of 
abstraction that we need to assure that the archpointers's principles are as valid for any 
society as they will be for Italy, 1999. The problem is to make sure that the archpointers 
will stick to those conditions. That, however, Is not a problem of information but one of 
motivation; it will be dealt with in the next section. 
The third type of information archpointers can have, general scientific knowl­
edge,62 is directly related to the types discussed so far. The principal difference between 
knowledge on the self and on society, and scientific knowledge, is that the last is 
concerned with hypotheticals. 
Judgements on social justice in general lead to conclusions about the justice and 
injustice of particular societies or situations in those societies. Those conclusion may in 
turn induce political action, either to change an unjust or preserve a just situation. Neither 
universal judgements on justice, nor political action in particular circumstances, is possible 
without prior information on the way societies and persons can or could function -
provided, of course, that we want a theory of social justice to be practical. If we believe 
As Granarne Lock pointed oui (о me, the people In Rawls's origina] posilion have access only to 
relevant social scientific information. It may be argued that the results of "hard" science - like the Invention of the 
wheel or the discovery of electricity - are equally relevant to the understanding of differences between human 
societies. For that reason I assume that archpointers should rather have access to general scientific knowledge. 
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in, for instance, personal responsibility and retributive justice, we need to know how an 
instance of tax evasion came about, whether it could have been avoided, and who could 
have avoided it; or if we believe in distributive social justice, we have to know at least 
whether and how injustice can be cured or prevented. 
I should stress that general scientific knowledge is not indispensable for a theory of 
social justice, even though it is essentia! if we want the theory to be practical. In moral 
philosophy, there is an axiom known as ought implies can, meaning that an ought-
statement is only a morally relevant or meaningful statement if it is possible to act upon iL 
We could condemn earthquakes, we can say that they ought not happen and that we 
should do everything to prevent them from happening - but as long as we cannot control 
earthquakes, any such statement would be meaningless. If the ought implies can axiom 
were applied to social justice theory, general scientific knowledge would indeed be 
indispensable; any theory would be meaningless without it, not to mention impractical. But 
I hesitate to do so, for at least two reasons. 
First of all, the соя-part in the ought implies can axiom is itself dubitable. Even if 
it were certain what we "ought" to be or do, we do not know for certain what can be or 
what we can do. "It is certain that machines cannot fly if they are heavier than air". Or so 
it was, until the Wright brothers took off. "It is certain that we cannot fly to the moon." 
"It is certain that we can clone and re-create dinosaurs using the DNA retrieved from 
fossils." Of one thing we are certain: that the truths of science are of a controversial and at 
best temporary nature. 
Secondly, if the can-part becomes controversial, the ои^Лг-рагі must follow. If we 
firmly believe in ought implies can, "we ought to fly to the moon" would not have been a 
century ago what it now is: a morally meaningful proposition. Today "you ought to give 
birth to a frog" is at best a disapproving moral proposition in a fairy tale; tomorrow - who 
knows7 Suppose that it were moral, provided that it were also possible, to change deserts 
into coconuLs. And suppose we leam that we cannot do so. Should we now believe that 
"one ought to turn deserts into coconuts" is a meaningless phrase? Or should we not 
instead believe that, perhaps, it does have a meaning - that of a commandment to do 
everything in our power to turn deserts into coconuts, including research to find out if we 
can do so in the future? If the last is true, as I believe it is, the borderline between 
genuine moral propositions and impossible-therefore-amoral propositions starts to blur. 
Now this is not an entirely academic issue; it has specific consequences for the 
liberal theory of justice. For one, it means that scientific knowledge influences its 
feasibility more than its meaningfulness. For another, it undermines a doctrine which is 
quite popular in rational choice theories: the doctrine of complete information, according 
to which individuals, in order to make an informed rational choice, should have full 
knowledge of all the aspects of all the options among which they are to choose. Along 
with this doctrine, it undermines the role John Rawls assigned to scientific knowledge. 
In his conception of the original position, Rawls wants his people in the original 
position to have knowledge of all the 
"... general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and 
the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organiz­
ation and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed 
to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice" 
(Rawls 1971: 137). 
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Obviously, Rawls's contracting parties know a great dea] more than any of us do. 
All in all, complete knowledge is not a very plausible condition. Firstly, scientific 
knowledge is often controversial: proofs are not always definite. Secondly, it is incomplete 
- or if it were not, scientists would all be out of a job. Thirdly, to ascribe to archpointers 
full knowledge of the achievements the natural and social sciences have and (mainly) have 
not made does not add to the credibility of their status as an impartial jury. Why would 
anyone, earlier having been asked to be rational, trust the opinion of beings who are 
supposed to have privileged access to information no rational being can have, let alone 
verify? 
Nevertheless, if omniscience is impossible, we can still assume that archpointers 
have some general knowledge on hypothetical. The kind of general knowledge that is 
needed for sensible can- propositions and o«j?Af-judgcments does exist; the problem is that 
it is of an incomplete and for the most part hypothetical nature. Without omniscience, all 
we have are three less attractive options: (1) either we withhold all or part of the available 
general information from the archpointers, thereby taking the risk of giving definitely 
unrealistic recommendations, or (2) we credit the archpointers with knowledge of the 
definite scientific truth in all areas, at the risk of fraud on the side of the author and loss 
of all credibility on the side of the reader, or (3) we attribute the contractors with all the 
scanty knowledge on general facts that we actually have. The first choice is unacceptable: 
it is impossible to select knowledge on the basis of its relevancy without upgrading one's 
own and degrading others's views on relevancy, on "what matters" in the world. It is also 
unnecessary. Irrelevant facts are, by definition, irrelevant; they cannot influence the 
opinions of rational archpointers. The second choice is clearly unacceptable for practical 
reasons, which leaves us with the last: full access to our limited knowledge. 
The consequence of this third option is, beyond doubt, uncertainty. It has already 
been made clear that the credibility of an impartial theory of justice depends on the 
plausibility of the archpoint. Now we must add a second and equally significant qualifica-
tion: the more the justification of a theory or principle of social justice depends on 
empirical scientific knowledge, the more hypothetical it becomes. 
As the archpointers are to have access to all general scientific knowledge available 
in the real world, we can formulate the following first information condition of social 
justice: scientific knowledge is available but it is, to varying degrees, incomplete and of a 
hypothetical nature. Two other information conditions arc related to the way archpointers 
treat the knowledge they have (all knowledge, not just the information on hypolheticals), 
rather than to their knowledge itself. 
The second information condition, a direct consequence of the conditions of 
impartiality, demands that the archpointers have equal access to the available information 
on general facts, on the human self and on particular societies, lest they cannot manipulate 
or be manipulated. I am not supposing the existence of ill will at the archpoint, but 
opportunities for manipulation do not necessarily originate in privileged information only. 
Suppose that individual archpointers were to have different information. How could one of 
them be certain (a) that the (apparently) privileged information used by another is correct 
and not made up by that other; or (b) that the aggregate information available to all 
individuals equals the whole of the information that should be available? 
Finally, according to the third information condition, the contracting parties should 
be equally (weakly) rational. Some logical constructions, and consequently theories in 
which these are employed, are - as far as we know - incomprehensible for children of a 
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certain age and average intelligence; the more intelligent ones understand them earlier in 
life, the less intelligent are later (see e.g. Hodges 1977: 181). И seems reasonable to 
assume that archpoinlers with differing intellectual dispositions can run into the same 
problem. Thus, if they do not have equal intellectual capacities, they cannot be equally 
well (or equally poorly) informed - which would be a violation of the second information 
condition. 
It follows, by the way and probably to no one's surprise, that if the archpoinlers 
are also equals qua motivation, and if the information they have allows for an agreement 
on principles of social justice, it will necessarily be a unanimous agreement. 
Section 23: Knowing oneself 
We now turn to a second cardinal question: that of the motivation of the archpoint-
ers. What can we allow them to "know" about themselves, or allow them to feel, or to be 
moved by, if we want them to be convincingly alike to us and at the same lime impartial? 
Can they have a personality, a character, a psychological and physical make-up, convic­
tions, HIS-reasons - and if so, of what kind? Should they, for instance, know or be 
motivated by the knowledge that they will be part of the society they design? 
In answering these questions, three issues must be distinguished. Firstly, knowledge 
about oneself or one's interests need not by itself keep anyone from being impartial. The 
danger to impartiality lies rather in being motivated by that knowledge (i.e., being 
prejudiced; cf. Bell and Schokkacrt 1992: 247, Lchning 1986: 101), and in having an 
interest in the society one is helping to design. These two cases are clearly different, 
though not mutually exclusive: it is possible to gamble on one's interests in a society 
without knowing where one will end up in it, and it is equally possible to unconsciously 
impress the private convictions one has as a hindu or butcher on principles for a society of 
vegetarians. Secondly, consciousness must be distinguished from subconscious attitudes, 
motives, etc. To warrant impartiality, it is simply not enough to neutralize the effect of 
knowledge and experience, or the lack thereof. Thirdly and finally, we must ask ourselves 
how exactly, technically speaking, an impartial person can represent real-life persons and 
interests. 
The last issue is of primary importance: any answer to this determines the degree 
to which, or the sense in which, archpoinlers can be "themselves". In representing others, 
impartiality is an ambiguous concepì allowing several interpretations. 
According to David Gauthier (Gauthier 1985: 260), John Rawls and Thomas 
Scanlon interpreted impartiality as choosing in ignorance of one's actual endowments and 
future position in society. However, people in the original position still know something 
about themselves, knowledge without which they would be vegetables. They know that 
they are rational, mutually disinterested, and so forth. The point is that they have no 
knowledge that identifies them as distinct personalities with private interests. What they 
know about themselves, or wc about them, only describes the outlines of all reasonable 
humans; it leaves the details open. As a consequence, they can imagine themselves as 
standing in anyone else's shoes - anyone, no matter who and in what society - without 
identifying with them; the contracting parties are merely possible persons. Let us call this 
interpretation of impartiality omni-partiality. 
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Other inlerpretations of impartiality are equally possible - for example, the 
ecologists's version of impartiality. Green critics of Rawls have accused him of being 
biased against animals if not against all of non-human nature. On (his view, an impartial 
choice requires ignorance about individualizing endowments, about one's position in 
society, and about whether one will be a human. Some of these critics have adapted the 
veil of ignorance accordingly to include animals (in particular mammals), others have 
gone so far as to include the possibility that a contactor wakes up one day to find that he 
or she is a mountain, the ozone layer, or a biosphere (cf. Singer 1988, VanDeVeer 1979). 
Let us label this collection of conceptions of impartiality, in which contracting parties are 
possibly any (living) thing, super-partiality. 
On a third version, Gauthicr's, the contracting parties are impartial if their choice 
for principles of justice is acceptable to everyone in every social position within a society 
(Gauthier 1985: 261). We could call this set-partiality. The difference with Rawls's omni-
partiality is that, on Gaulhier's view, principles must be unanimously accepted by a given 
set of people in society the way they (i.e., the people) are. There is no veil of ignorance; 
according to Gauthier it suffices to let everyone place herself in the position of everyone 
else. 
These three views in no way exhaust the possibilities for interpreting impartiality, 
but they can serve well enough to illustrate why Rawls's - or a Rawlsian - interpretation is 
best fit for a contract theory of justice, why more general variants are superfluous and 
why more specific variants are faulty. Super-partiality, as in the green version, extends the 
range of application of Rawlsian omni-partiality. It does not challenge the validity of the 
basic idea of Rawlsian impartiality, which is (1) that impartial judges may collect and use 
any information available, including the knowledge and experience gathered by imagining 
to stand in someone else's shoes - but (2) that their decision on principles should not be 
taken from, or depend on, "any particular point of view", as Thomas Nagel describes 
impartiality (Nagel 1986: 61 ff., 1991: 10-11). On both theories, the Rawlsian and the 
green, the impartial point of view differs substantially from any particular point of view, 
including the sum of particular points of view. 
These two theories clearly contrast with Gauthicr's, which comes down to giving 
each and every individual in his or her particular circumstances a veto on the decisions of 
contracting parties*'. As claimed before, Gauthicr's idea of impartiality is inappropriate. 
The idea was developed as a critique of Rawls, but is in fact based on a misrepresentation 
of Rawls's position. Ideally, Rawls's principles, though chosen under a different interpreta-
tion of impartial circumstances, should also be acceptable to every real person in every 
real position - not because a unanimous agreement as such is sacred but because everyone 
would, in reflective equilibrium, agree that impartiality is best represented by Rawlsian 
people behind a veil of ignorance. Gauthier, however, did not extend his critique on 
Rawls's theory to the core of the argument for omni-partiality, the notion of considered 
judgements in reflective equilibrium. Hence, he gives us insufficient reason to think of his 
and Rawls's interpretations of impartiality as alternatives; what remains are simply two 
descriptions of two different things. 
A more fundamental objection to Gaulhier's interpretation of impartiality was 
already implicit in my characterization of his views: set-partiality is a result of adding up 
The faci thai in Gaulhier's model ihe contracting parties are particular persons imagining themselves in 
the shoes of all others is irrelevant: we can clearly distinguish both roles. 
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all particular points of view or of giving each a veto. It is not by itself a point of view, it 
is "no point of view" rather than the Nagelian "no particular" point of view. Gauthier-like 
set-partiality would not be impartial even if we extended the reference set to include all 
possible persons and societies - for the same reason. In ordinary life, being impartial 
means that one can stand back from one's own personality, interests and beliefs, look 
upon things from a distance, and let other interests or persons prevail if they deserve to 
prevail. This kind of impartiality allows that claims are evaluated, ranked, and even 
rejected - unlike set-partiality, but consistent with the views on impartiality defended in 
the previous chapter. Gauthier denies that claims can be judged: all claims, all plans of 
life, all revealed preferences (whether sincere or not), have equal value or relevance. My 
view of impartiality is different. Up to a point, reasons for acting can be criticized and 
claims can be evaluated: some are better or more valid than others, and some - but only 
some - are even beyond judgement. What makes the interests of individuals morally 
relevant, from the archpoint of view, is not the fact that individuals have interests or 
reasons, but that some of these reasons are irrefutable basic reasons - HIS-reasons. The 
respect archpointers show for these reasons over others gives them a point of view which 
differs from any particular point of view, yet does not leave them without any point of 
view. 
It thus seems that omni-parliality, i.e., judging without self-knowledge and 
identification, but with a capacity to stand in anyone's shoes, best expresses the spirit of 
impartiality. Nevertheless, there is no need to be so radical as to demand that archpointers 
"be ignorant" about their own and their fellow archpointers's characters and places in 
society (cf. Galston 1982: 501). It is, as we shall see in a moment, enough to demand that 
they disregard such information, that is, to demand that they cannot or do not identify 
themselves with any person or place or set of places in society. Ideally, everyone is equal 
at the archpoint. It makes no difference who takes an impartial standpoint, or whether an 
impartial judge has a personal identity at all, whether he or she is a who at all - what 
matters is that anyone whom we demand to be impartial is manifestly capable of doing so. 
Turning then to the question of the self-knowledge of archpointers, we find that 
archpointers can know as much or as little about themselves as we care; self-knowledge is 
not an essential factor for impartiality in the sense of omni-partiality. First of all, having 
or not having self-knowledge is clearly an irrelevant matter in sofar as one's character is 
concerned; whether such information has any impact at all depends on the motivation of 
archpointers. A bad temper, paranoia or arrogance may obstruct any negotiation process, 
but they will not influence the outcome of negotiations at the archpoint. After all, we have 
already demanded that the archpointers be equally well informed and equally rational; if a 
desire to choose rational principles of justice is all that motivates them, the archpointers 
will simply take one another's shortcomings for granted and negotiate until a satisfactory 
agreement has been reached. 
Secondly, something similar is true for knowledge about one's place in society. 
Clearly, anyone with the least bit of self-interest has a (not: every) reason to prefer a 
Hayekian society of freedom of opportunity and freedom from state interference over a 
Rawlsian social democracy, if she knows herself to have a talent for making the right 
investments. The reverse is true for a self-interested risk-avoider. Still, not knowing one's 
place in society is no guarantee for partiality. Consider the fact that, in most of the 
societies that exist or have existed, wealth never was on the whole a social disadvantage. 
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Few would bet that most rich consider their wealth as a personal disadvantage. Poverty, on 
the other hand, probably has more and more often disadvantages than advantages in either 
respect. Similar arguments could be made regarding the knowledge of being a parent, a 
prisoner, a prime minister, etcetera. Even when oblivious of their actual place in society 
(i.e., when choosing under conditions of uncertainty), the archpointcrs can have an 
incentive to promote their private interests - if the incentive attracts and motivates them. 
Finally, one might argue for one particular exception to the rule that any kind of 
self-knowledge is allowed provided that the archpointcrs are motivated in the right way. 
Archpointers who are aware of the bare fact that they will be part of the society they 
design could be prejudiced, no matter what their motivation and no matter how little else 
they know. Being rational, knowing that the conditions of justice obtain in their future 
society, and thus knowing that they will have interests and will identify with these, the 
archpointers cannot help wanting to protect their future interests. Yet even here no 
exceptions need to be made. It does not matter whether archpointers are informed or not; 
this very general kind of knowledge is not enough to prejudice them in favour of any 
particular principle, person or plan of life. In either case they will be omni-partial: all they 
can do (given the right motivation) is imagine themselves to be in each distinct social 
position and show equal consideration for all positions. After all, we have assumed that 
they have the right motivation, so that even if they had full knowledge of their identity 
they would not take sides with any particular person - including themselves. 
Adding all this together, we find that our contracting parties should be immune to 
"particularizing" types of information, though they do not need to go without. For the 
concrete shape of the contract situations and contracting parties, we can choose any of a 
large number of options, all of which could satisfy omni-parliality if our claim about the 
decisive role of motivation is correct. We could, first of all, imagine them as Rawls's 
people in the original position, humans who do not know the society to which they will 
belong, or the capacities they have, but who do know that they satisfy the previously 
discussed conditions of justice. Some of his critics have argued that by depriving his 
contracting parties of individual knowledge, Rawls would not take the difference between 
persons seriously, but obviously that is not the issue. What Rawls disregarded is the 
difference between the contracting parties themselves, and this (i.e., the contractors^ not 
having a personal identity) furthers rather than hinders the cause of taking every real 
person's ideas and plans seriously. 
Still, even the appearance of prejudice - Rawls's creatures are not totally disinter-
ested in anyone's fate - can be prevented. A second option then is to lake one step back 
and imagine the archpointers as "self-effacing" beings for whom not even the conditions 
of justice obtain. They would not just be ignorant of their position in society and of the 
society in which they are to participate, but they would also know, positively, that they 
will not belong to a society at all. Angelic as they now are, they look most like an 
assembly of impartial observers. 
Thirdly, we could go the opposite way and enlarge the archpoint with a representa-
tive selection of possibly or actually existing persons, with Martians landing on Trafalgar 
Square, with genetically manipulated dogs with the intelligence of humans, with people 
with full knowledge but no social bonds (quasi-emigrants), with ordinary people - or 
ultimately with you and me. The essence of a contract theory is that the parties are 
representatives, agents for whomever their motivation allows them to represent, whether 
normal humans, Martians, or animals. Which brings us to the third and last issue, one that 
5: IMPARTIALLY OF THE MIND 133 
I have been careful to evade so far: that of motivation. What is it that moves the arch-
pointers to be impartial, or that can move any being to be ал archpointer? 
Part of the answer lies in the absence of motivations, the absence of identification 
with any of their reasons for acting. Thus, the third subjective condition of justice should 
not obtain for archpointers. In general, the more contracting parlies are alike to us, the 
easier it is to identify with them and to share their conclusions on justice - but we would 
trust them as replicas of our separate selves and our separate interests, rather than as 
impartial agents. At least in the area of motivation, archpointers should be unlike us: 
neither greedy nor liberal, neither self-interested nor altruistic, neither progressive nor 
conservative, neither good nor bad - but beyond all that There are intuitive and semantical 
reasons to link impartiality with lack of private interests or motives, but another, technical 
reason is even more important: impartial agents cannot at the same time have (HIS-
)reasons and respect those of others. At best, they can tolerate them if forced to by an 
external power. Any, or probably any, HIS-reason or reason for acting can come into 
conflict with impartiality. For example, an archpointer motivated by the deep and sincere 
desire to be benevolent will not be able to fully respect a political order in which 
benevolence is limited by prudence, nor can he or she be convinced of the morality of any 
principle of justice prescribing such an order. An archpointer who would be totally 
committed to sincerity or honesty would find it extremely difficult to embrace a demo­
cratic order, as democracy requires compromise, and political compromises tend to be at 
odds with the honest and sincere expression of preferences. Allowing archpointers to have 
HIS-reasons, or allowing them to have any reasons for action at all, will lead to deadlock: 
their debate would be one about the a question that cannot be settled, that of the priority 
and relative worth of reasons for action. 
If we do not want archpointers to be consciously motivated by private reasons, we 
surely cannot want them to have another typical trait of humans: a subconsciousness. To 
be unaware of one's reasons for acting and still act upon them contradicts the demands of 
impartiality even more clearly than conscious partiality. 
In summary: we can allow archpointers to imagine themselves in any social 
position and to experience everything anyone can experience, from torture and rape to 
riches and fame, from justice to injustice - provided they do not identify themselves with 
these experiences, or with these roles, or with these persons. We can also allow them to 
know themselves, their own society, their own motives - provided they do not feel 
motivated by this. We cannot allow them to have any reason for their interest in the issue 
of justice without - by definition - motivating them, and we cannot motivate them without 
running the risk of admitting interests, prejudice and bias at the archpoint. The only 
motivation we can safely ascribe to archpointers is an entirely impersonal one: an interest 
in knowledge for its own sake, an intellectual curiosity about the problem of justice - or 
more precisely, about the task that will be assigned to them in the next section. 
Section 24: Knowing what to do 
The mind has a tendency to wander, a tendency that cannot be taken away by 
choosing an impartial point of view. The archpoint is a point of view like any other; we 
can try to stand on it, become archpointers, and look in any direction and at any object we 
happen to like. If we want to motivate the archpointers to stick to the issue, discuss justice 
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and formulate impartial principles of minimal justice, their task has to be circumscribed as 
precisely as possible. 
Up to a point, the definition of this task is an arbitrary affair. The archpointers are 
asked to formulate a set of rules defining the domain of social justice (i.e., describing 
society), the objects of distribution and the basis for comparisons between these objects, 
the distributor and recipients, the grounds for desert, and the rules of distribution. The 
archpointers will, furthermore, be forced to respect the boundaries of the archpoint, i.e., 
the conditions of impartiality, justice and knowledge. I shall refer to the whole set of rules 
as the metric of social justice, or simply as the principles of social justice. 
As justice is predicated both of individuals and of society, and as the just society 
presumably cannot exist without just citizens, we can also ask our impartial agents to 
sketch the implications of their metric for individuals and their actions and convictions (cf. 
Kley 1989: 265). Moreover, justice as seen from the archpoint is minimal justice, justice 
for a society of strangers. In order to fully assess the consequences of minimal justice, we 
might therefore want to examine the relation between minimal and communitarian justice. 
However, we shall discuss these issues only superficially in the last chapter, as I cannot 
give a complete account of social justice in this book. I have limited myself to liberal 
social justice for a good reason: communitarian justice presupposes a consensus on values 
and purposes that does not seem to reflect the natural state of man and one that does not 
seem to be open to grounded support or critique. The detection, description or composition 
of a conception of justice for a community, no matter which community, is a colossal 
problem worthy of another book in its own right. The same is true for the question of 
individual attitudes towards minimal justice: for a serious appraisal of that problem, we 
need theories of education, of socialization, of personality, and so forth - issues that are 
too big to deal with in this context. For this reason, I shall discuss both problems only 
summarily; the rest must be silence. 
In contrast to the definition of the object of inquiry, the delineation of the output of 
the archpoint, the contract, is not a simple matter of convenience. John Rawls (Rawls 
1971: 130-136) has argued that principles of justice should be general (i.e., they should 
not contain proper names or "definite descriptions"), universal in their application (i.e., 
relevant to all moral beings), public (known to all members of society), capable of 
ordering conflicting claims, and fit to serve as the final court of appeal in matters of 
justice. Rawls hastens to add that these criteria are not innocent. The condition of 
generality, for instance, demands that principles of justice should not contain proper 
names; it thus bans egoism. A vindication of these so-called formal constraints of the 
concept of right can therefore only be given by way of "the reasonableness of the theory 
of which they are part" (Rawls 1971: 131). This immediately raises the question of their 
compatibility with what I hold to be the reasonable theory of impartiality as reflected in 
the archpoint. 
Generality, universality, and publicity can pass without comment. If the necessary 
changes in terminology are made, Rawls's arguments can be transplanted to our contract 
theory without any problem. Finality, the status of the principles as the last word on and 
highest resort for justice, must be taken with two grains of salt. In the first place, the 
finality of principles, both Rawls's and those of the archpointers, actually depends on the 
"reasonableness of the theory of which they are part", in other words, on the adequacy of 
premises - so there may be a higher judge. Secondly, as the archpointers, unlike Rawls's 
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people in the original position, do not have full knowledge of general scientific facts, the 
finality of principles also depends on the absence of relevant new information. 
Under the heading of the demand for an ordering Rawls in fact poses three 
demands: completeness, transitivity and morally acceptable reasons for the ranking of 
claims (Rawls 1971: 134). Completeness requires that the principles of justice can be 
applied to all claims that are likely to arise, a requirement that can again pass without 
comment. The other two demands need some extra attention. 
Transitivity, i.e. Vx,y,z: (xRy л yRz) -» xRz), can be demanded without violation of 
the conditions of the archpoint. It is plain that we may ultimately leam that some 
alternatives are equally good or just, or even that all are: дг.у: xRy л yRx. If this turns out 
to be the case we have still learned one thing: that principles of distributive justice do not 
have an answer to all problems of distribution. 
It follows that in absence of a unique best element,6* distribution problems can 
only be solved by introducing an element of chance. We might flip a coin, or rotate the 
disputed resource, or, if it turns out that nearly all differences between humans are 
irrelevant, as far as justice is concerned, we might even turn our whole society into one 
gigantic redistributive lottery, as Barbara Goodwin recently suggested (Goodwin 1992: 43, 
199 ff.). We do not need to restrict ourselves to chance: a rule ranking alternatives by 
means of irrelevant characteristics, one that can be fully unreasonable or based on 
something other than justice, e.g. aesthetics, is equally possible - provided that the 
additional rule does not involve wrong, partial, criteria for the further ordering of claims. 
It is up to the archpointers to decide whether chance should be introduced, for what 
reason, and in which form. Until they prove the opposite, any rule, even trial by combat 
[pace Rawls 1971: 134), and any result is equally just 
The possibility that no unique best element is chosen may seem to pose a funda­
mental objection to an impartial conception of justice, as it allows questions of justice to 
remain unsolved, apparently in contradiction to the demand of finality. Yet such results do 
not change the finality of principles of justice: they can still be the court of final appeal, 
the last word on maners of justice. The irrésoluteness of principles can, in some cases, 
even be a virtue. In a paragraph on retributive justice, the medieval political theorist, John 
of Salisbury, confronted a comparable dilemma. He relates how the case of a mother, who 
had killed her husband and son for vilely slaying another son from an earlier marriage, 
could not be resolved by any ordinary court 
"Consequently, the matter was referred to the members of the Athenian 
Areopagus, as the more venerable and more experienced judges. However, 
upon examination of the case, they ordered the return of the plaintiffs and 
the woman in a hundred years." (John of Salisbury 1990: 58) 
There is one final guideline for the output of the archpointers's deliberations, which 
remained implicit in Rawls's theory, and which I should like to stress: simplicity (cf. 
Braybrooke 1982: I). If we want principles of justice to be legitimate as well as justified, 
ordinary beings in real society should be able to discuss and evaluate the reasoning and 
conclusion of the archpointers. Thus, the principles should be as clear and intelligible as 
Or in absence of an ordering In Icrms пГ strict preferences, as the alternative that is ranked highest may 
be the most just alternative but need not be politically feasible. 
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possible for real persons with ordinary intellectual capacities. Like ordering, this is a 
practical condition rather than a matter of principle. 
Next to a task and some requirements for the form of the contract, archpointers 
need instructions in one further respect. We have described them as ordinary or extraordi­
nary persons with a definitely extraordinary motivation, who are to consider principles of 
justice for societies characterized by the conditions of justice. They are to do so within the 
limits of the conception of natural justice, they should be weakly rational, and their point 
of view should be the impartial point of view described above. Thus, the archpoint 
contains several rules for the formulation and evaluation of a metric: objective and 
subjective conditions of justice, demands posed on the contracting parties's self-knowl­
edge, and the conditions of impartiality themselves. It is in particular this last set of 
conditions that could cause trouble. Ideally, archpointers will come up with a conception 
of justice that satisfies all the criteria for an acceptable conception of minimal justice: it 
will conform to natural justice, it will be rational, and it will be technically, subjectively 
and objectively neutral. However, it is obvious that these five demands may conflict 
Hence, the final rule for contracting parties at the archpoint will have to be one that 
determines the relative weight of each of these criteria. 
In the first place, we can rank (1) weak rationality over (2) consistency with the 
principles of natural justice. Without weak rationality there is no sense in talking, let alone 
in talking about justice. Any principle overruling rationality cannot be accounted for; any 
evaluation based on such an overruling principle is pure mysticism. The reader may recall 
that weak rationality was also - and not by coincidence - a prerequisite of natural justice. 
Secondly, we can rank (3) technical neutrality third. Once the arena for a meaningful 
debate on minimal justice has been defined - by the conditions ranked first and second - a 
debate becomes possible, and technical neutrality determines that this debate will be one 
about minimal justice rather than anything else. Thirdly and obviously, the conditions of 
subjective and objective neutrality should be ranked below technical neutrality. Finally, (4) 
objective neutrality should overrule (5) subjective neutrality. As we saw earlier, in section 
18, we need a definite description of the object of impartiality before we can be subjec­
tively neutral; we cannot give equal relevance to all aspects of all plans of life without 
getting tangled up in paradoxes. 
A further reason for ranking objective neutrality in the fourth place and subjective 
neutrality fifth is less formal and more controversial, but should not come as a surprise. 
The archpointers have been obliged to show equal and impartial consideration for all 
persons and for the ways in which they express their personality, i.e., their reasons for 
acting and plans of life. Nevertheless, some reasons behind some plans of life are simply 
irrational and "just no good", whereas others are "mere inclinations", and still others are 
reasonable but not reasonable enough - the plans lack a foundation, or the foundation is 
itself unstable. HIS-reasons, on the other hand, are the ultimate foundation; unlike other 
reasons, they cannot be rejected from an impartial point of view. Under these circum­
stances, the priority given to objective over subjective neutrality can be defended in two 
ways. One could claim, or try to claim, that objective neutrality best embodies Dworkin's 
minimum requirement for a moral theory: that it shows equal respect to, or equal concern 
for, all persons. Objective neutrality would do this by respecting the integrity of the real, 
matured person, the rational being with HIS-reasons. An argument like this is probably 
sensitive to the objection that it only shows respect by insulting those to whom it does not 
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show respect. I rather prefer a second argument: the priority given to objective neutrality 
expresses our conviction that we should give precedence to good reasons over just any 
kind of reason. 
CHAPTER 6: DIES IRAE 
Day of the king most righteous. 
The day is nigh at hand. 
The day of wrath and vengeance. 
And darkness on the land. 
Day of thick clouds and voices. 
Of mighty thundering, 
A day of narrow anguish 
And bitter sorrowing. 
The love of women's over. 
And ended is desire. 
Men's strife with men is quiet. 
And the world lusts no more. 
St. Columba's O Í « irae" 
Section 25: Premises, premises 
In the last three chapters I gave an outline of the foundations of a liberal theory of 
social justice. One distinctive feature of this theory is the central role which a particular 
conception of impartiality plays in it; another is the sheer magnitude of this role. If we 
recall for a moment the picture of liberal theories of social justice as sketched in part I, 
we find that, in comparison, the significance of impartiality in those theories was much 
more modcsL There, impartiality was merely one among several ideals that liberal 
theorists look as defining marks of a liberal theory of justice. Consequently, impartiality 
sometimes had to give way to more substantial ideals and views of the good. The 
conception of liberal justice sketched in this part, on the other hand, gives precedence to 
impartiality over any notion of the good or any other reason for acting. It starts from the 
idea that impartiality should be taken extremely seriously - in fact, that the implications of 
impartiality (tolerance, freedom, equal respect, moderate scepticism) make it the corner-
stone of liberalism. 
The process of developing said new foundations has led us to the point where we, 
or our belter selves acting on our behalf, should be able to formulate principles of social 
justice. Before we tum to this our second task however, I want to complete our picture of 
the Archimedean point by adding two details. In the first place, I have so far stacked 
condition upon condition, requirement upon requirement, and level upon level. It thus 
seems appropriate to spend one section - this one - on a systematic synopsis of all these 
premises. Secondly, I still owe the reader visualizations of archpoint and contract. I shall 
give these in section 26. 
At the beginning of part II, we distinguished four views on justice in society: 
(1) Eternal justice, or justice seen from a point of view outside lime and life; 
(2) Natural justice, or the categorical imperatives of justice; 
(3) Minimal justice, or justice under conditions of impartiality; and 
65 Translation by Helen Waddcll (Waddell 1968: 78-9). 
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(4) Communitarian justice, justice under circumstances of a honest and sincere consensus 
on the good life. 
We immediately dismissed the notion of eternal justice as irrelevant. Natural justice was 
specified as a view on justice under three constraints: 
(2.1) The demand that we reach an agreement; 
(2.2) The demand that this agreement be one on what the pure idea of justice requires; and 
(2.3) The demand that we are weakly rational; 
which resulted in three rather uninformalive imperatives: 
(PI) Treat equal cases equally; and 
(P2) Treat unequal cases in proportion to their inequality. 
(P3) Claims about (un)just treatment need to be sustained by good reasons, other than and 
in addition to PI or P2. 
Minimal justice, which should generate the good reasons mentioned in P3, contained two 
new constraints and two that were already part of the natural justice model: 
(3.1) The demand that we reach an agreement; 
(3.2) The demand that this agreement be one on the content of justice; 
(3.3) The demand that we are weakly rational; and 
(3.4) The demand that we are impartial with regard to theories of the good (life). 
Finally, we described communitarian justice as minimal justice minus the impartiality 
constraint. Communitarian justice can exist if and only if there is community, i.e., as long 
as, in sofar as, and where two or more persons agree on the good life and on its transla-
tion into principles of justice for those agreeing. Consequently, it can only exist within the 
limits of natural and minimal justice. 
In Chapter 4, we turned to the notion of minimal justice, and thereby entered the 
realm of the liberal theory of social justice. To satisfy the impartiality constraint (3.4), we 
invented the archpoint or archpoint of view, which stipulates the conditions allowing for 
an impartial judgement on matters of justice. These conditions specified impartiality as 
follows: 
(CI) Technical neutrality, i.e., the justification device representing impartiality 
should determine the content of principles of justice rather than that of (principles 
of) anything else; 
(C2) Subjective neutrality, or the absence of bias with regard to the essential parts 
of plans of life (HIS-reasons); and 
(C3) Objective neutrality, i.e., the principles behind the justification device should 
be acceptable to all reasonable beings. This condition was found to be satisfied by: 
(C3.1) A very thin theory of the good, according to which it is good to be, 
and we in fact are, weakly rational, i.e., we accept second order predicate 
logic; and 
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(C3.2) A sceptic postponement of judgements on HIS-reasons. 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the formal details of the so-called single-mind type of contract 
theory, which was earlier found to be the most suitable way of representing the archpoinL 
We discovered that there was no reason to limit the availability of most types of informa-
tion. Instead, I formulated some minimum standards, requiring that the least contracting 
parties ought to know about the world outside them was: 
(Rl) The first subjective condition of social justice: the presence of separate persons with 
distinct reasons for acting; 
(R2) The second subjective condition: humans are equal in the respect of having, storing, 
and on occasion using, power in whatever form or amount; 
(R3) The third subjective condition: the presence of a profound identification of persons 
with their reasons for acting; 
(R4) The first objective condition of social justice: that there is a society; 
(R5) The second objective condition: the availability of means to acting, over the 
distribution of which a conflict of interests is possible; 
(R6) The first information condition of social justice: the contracting parlies share all the 
scientific Knowledge available to us in the real world, which implies that it is available in 
limited amounts, and that it is, to varying degrees, of a hypothetical nature; 
(R7) The second information condition: the archpointcrs have equal access to the available 
information on general facts, on the human self, and on particular societies; and 
(R8) The third information condition: the archpointers should be equally (weakly) rational. 
As for their self-knowledge, we found again (hat there was no need to keep archpointers 
ignorant of any facts about themselves. The danger to their impartiality, the danger that 
they identify with any particular interest, comes from the side of their motivation. 
Consequently, we accepted a further requirement: 
(R9) Archpointers are best imagined as (only) having an entirely impersonal motivation: 
intellectual curiosity about the problem of justice. 
Finally, I posed some demands on the form of the contract and on the deliberations of the 
contracting parties, beginning with the demand that the archpointers slick to their task, 
which was to formulate principles of distributive social justice, or in other words: 
(RIO) The archpointers are asked to define the domain of social justice, the objects of 
distribution and the basis for comparisons between these objects, the distributor and 
recipients, the grounds for desert, and the rules of distribution. All this is to be done under 
observance of the conditions of the archpoint (Cl-3) and the conditions of knowledge (Rl-
9, 11-17), and in accordance with the principles of natural justice (PI-3). 
The guidelines for the form of the contract, i.e., for the principles resulting from the 
archpointers's deliberations were, for the most part, taken over from Rawls: 
(Ril) principles of minimal justice should be general; 
(R12) they should be universal; 
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(R13) they should be public; 
(R14) they should be the final court of appeal in matters of justice; 
(This did not mean that their infallibility can be guaranteed; finality still depends 
on the "reasonableness" of the rest of the theory of justice and on the absence or 
presence of relevant new information.) 
(R15) they should allow a complete and transitive ranking (ordering) of alternatives; where 
the principles are indecisive, an impartial chance rule should be followed. 
(R16) they should be simple. 
A last guideline determines the order in which the conditions of the archpoint and the 
principles of natural justice should be satisfied, if such a rule should be necessary. 
(R17) The constraints posed by natural justice and the conditions of the archpoint should 
be satisfied in the following order: 
(1) Weak rationality (2.3, 3.3); 
(2) Consistency with the principles of natural justice (Pl-3); 
(3) Technical neutrality (CI); 
(4) Objective neutrality (C3); 
(5) Subjective neutrality (C2). 
Section 26: The final position and Philadelphia 
With the list of conditions from the last section in hand, we can turn to the matter 
of designing a credible and convincing contract situation. As established before, there are 
no fundamental objections to any shape or form that we might want the debate between 
the contracting parlies to have - just as long as the archpoinlers are equally rational, 
equally well informed, equally motivated by pure curiosity and not hindered by other 
motives. Nevertheless, practical objections to experiments with credibility are an altogether 
different subject, as the debate on Rawls's conception of the original position and in 
particular his selection of people for the original position has shown. 
Let us suppose that Rawls's "heads of families" with emotional tics to at least two 
future generations (Rawls 1971: 128) are the most restricted population imaginable for any 
impartial contract theory, any archpoint. I shall call this population A. The first and most 
obvious objection that could be raised - and indeed has been raised - is that A is a gender-
biased rather than representative selection of real-life humanity. A docs not obviously 
include women - Okin remarks about the average person in the original position that 
Rawls never reveals "his" sex but only refers to "his" ignorance about "his" place in 
society, "his" status, "his" capacities, "his" plan of life, and so forth (Okin 1989: 91). 
What is more, A seems to include a quite particular conception of family life, that of the 
Western ideal of a nuclear family situated in a separate private sphere (Okin 1989: 93-96). 
The last of these two arguments should not be relevant, even though, as Okin 
showed, it is relevant for at least Rawls's theory. If archpoinlers were really impartial, it 
should not matter who or what they are. Information on the structure of society, on the 
mode of family life practised in that society, and on the social role impartial agents would 
have, were they to live in a real society, would not in any way influence their judgement. 
As impartial agents with the right kind of motivation, the sexist male would reach the 
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same conclusions regarding justice (whatever those conclusions be) as the most ardent 
feminist - or, alternatively, as any child raised in a traditional tribe by something like 
thirty mothers and as many fathers, or, finally, as everyone else. 
Okin's first argument brings us to an issue that is relevant to any contractarian 
theory. Of course it is true that we could people the archpoint with Nazis and still make 
them say the right things; it does not matter who the impartial judge is, as long as (s)he is 
impartial. But (hen it should not matter either whether an archpoint is peopled by an 
actually representative selection of humanity. Admittedly, a theory of justice advanced by 
Nazis would look a bit suspicious, as would a theory proffered by an all-male, or all-
father, all-female or all-mother, convention. The objection to such selections is, neverthe-
less, not that they are biased or suspicious; the point is that they are arbitrary and as good 
as any other selection. As far as the theory of justice is concerned, it is all a matter of the 
most contingent of features: credibility. As far as potentially neglected groups are 
concerned, it is a matter of politeness that they be nonetheless visibly represented. 
However. One can easily go too far in these things. An impartial parties's contract 
would be no less valid if it were approved by a representative body, which had in turn 
been appointed by an equal opportunities or affirmative action committee that ensured the 
presence in said body of the right proportions of all physical and mental permutations of 
woman and man. It would nevertheless look slightly silly. It would look even more silly if 
we tried to enlarge this representative body by bringing in other generations, past or 
future, extraterrestrials, foreigners or representatives of other nations and animals - though 
not all for the same reason. 
Why should one want to include animals or Martians as contracting parties in a 
contract theory? We have just seen why women ought to be included - or rather, why 
admission to the negotiations on the contract should not be limited to well-meaning 
housefathers: as women have an interest in social justice, their absence among the 
representative agents diminishes the credibility of deliberations and contract. At least the 
major premise, the interest in justice, is also relevant to other neglected categories like 
animals and Martians. Although this means that I will be running ahead of things, let us 
for a moment consider their interests. (The issue will be discussed at more length In Part 
III.) To avoid all loo lengthy phrases, I shall - in general - use the term extraterrestrial for 
nearly all non-members of our present societies: future and past generations and 
foreigners. Their properties and qualities are basically the same, though more potential for 
the first and more actual for the last. Animals however are another case. 
First of all, there is an argument based on the capacity of experiencing (injustice 
and the interest certain groups have in a fair treatment. It is obviously true that foreigners 
can suffer or enjoy things and events as much as members of our own society. The same 
could be true for intelligent extraterrestrials (I rank non-intelligent extraterrestrial life in 
the animal class). And there is good reason to believe that animals can suffer · if it bleeds 
and shrieks and trembles like a duck, the duck must be suffering. If all these beings can 
suffer or enjoy things, it seems that they deserve the same kind (though not necessarily the 
same degree) of protection that we give to the so-called incompetent: (he comatose, the 
mentally handicapped or the mentally disturbed. 
Then there is an argument based not on the possibility of receiving justice, but on 
the capacity to act responsibly or justly, an argument, by the way, that seems to be of 
little help for the case of animal suffrage. Like members of our own society and 
foreigners, extraterrestrials are, we assume, capable of making and keeping promises. If, as 
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some have argued, the possibility of reciprocity delermines whether someone or -thing can 
be a partner in a contract, then extraterrestrials qualify - and animals do not, at least not in 
this respect. 
Thirdly, extraterrestrials have another extra that would make them the moral equals 
of the human members of our own societies. They have or could have some characteristics 
known to us, like intelligence, rationality, or a sense of morality. Again, it has been 
argued that such traits are criteria for the moral relevancy of humans (see e.g. Nozick 
1974: 46-47) - ergo they should also count for extraterrestrials. 
Fourthly, there is an argument specifically relevant to past generations. Whereas 
future persons and extraterrestrials can be harmed or treated unjustly, past generations or 
persons have been treated unjustly. Clearly, this gives them in abstracto an interest in 
justice, and their descendants a real interest in compensation (in sofar as that would work 
out to their advantage). The latter may deserve a larger part of the social cake because of 
the disadvantages of descending from victims of injustice. Arguments like this have been 
used in defence of the claims of native peoples or, somewhat more questionably, in favour 
of affirmative action programmes. 
Now perhaps it is true that a theory of justice should lake account of the claims of 
ducks or, absurd as it may seem, the possible claims of creatures we have not even heard 
of. Yet that is neither a reason to exclude them from, nor one to include them in, the 
representative body that designs the justice contract. Again, the issue is one of credibility 
and legitimacy, not of justification. If we allow animals to act as themselves at the 
archpoint, their contribution to the debate would be negligible. If we endow them with 
speech and a human brain, on the other hand, they will probably either be incapable of 
focusing on the debate, or (and this point bears on the presence of extraterrestrials as well) 
incapable of specifically representing themselves or their species - depending on the 
degree to which we allow them to remain "themselves".6* Once more, they will not add 
any value to the debate - but their presence will damage the credibility of the outcome (cf. 
Wissenburg 1993: 17). 
Obviously, this argument is predicated on the possibility of representing animals 
and otherworldly creatures. One may however wonder whether that possibility exists. The 
problem with the inclusion of groups like these is that we do not really know where there 
interests lie, nor, consequently, what it is they want or need or deserve. We simply invent 
or interpret their interests. Adding them to the archpointers would therefore add nothing to 
the debate - except confusion. 
As a general rule, there is no reason to represent at the archpoint any special group 
with a possible interest in social justice. If their interests are relevant, information to that 
effect will be available to, and will be treated similarly, by any impartial agent. As another 
general rule, whether some group should be represented at the archpoint depends not on 
their possible contribution to the available information or to the discussion itself, but on 
the psychological effect that their participation would have on the reader. If their presence 
challenges the imagination, they damage the credibility of the contract device. And human 
John Rawls recently wrote a most enlightening contribution to this debate: a play in which Ayer, 
Anscombe, Barry, and Rawls himself are supposed to play the roles of characters from "Peter Pan" In circumstan-
ces not unlike the original position. The outcome of (heir deliberations is uncertain; in fact, it is uncertain if there 
can be any solution to this kind of situation at all (Rawls 1990: 28-30). 
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imagination is, unfortunately, highly conservative; we cannot play too many tricks on iL I 
believe this last rule is satisfied by: 
The final position 
Let us imagine a group of ordinary people, reasonably well educated and reasonab-
ly intelligent. For the sake of argument, we could say that it includes Wittgenstein, 
Elizabeth Taylor, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Gandhi, Marilyn Monroe, Peter Kropotkin, Jack 
Rawls and any other odd clone of familiar persons (cf. Nozick 1974: 310). 
We assume that they have nothing belter to do than discuss justice. To ensure that 
this is the case, wc free them from all other worldly concerns by postulating that they live 
somewhere in the far future, at a moment when the sun is about to bum up. They are the 
last humans and, by coincidence, meet on the steps of the Library of Congress. They have 
made a campfire of the last wood and gathered around it to wait for the inevitable. At 
times, they get up and pillage the Library's restaurant; at others, they wander through its 
corridors and read. Having nothing belter to do at nights than to look at the fire and 
discuss the latest, or in fact last, gossip, they go over a whole range of topics: why the sun 
is dying, what killed the dinosaurs, who killed John F. Kennedy, and so forth. At some 
moment they decide to discuss social justice. 
Being well-educated humans, we may assume that they are equally rational. Having 
the Library all to themselves, they are equally well informed and presumably have access 
to all the scientific knowledge about human nature, history, and other subjects that 
mankind has gathered over the last million and odd years. Thus, they satisfy the three 
information conditions for an impartial contract theory (R6-8). 
Next, we can make either of two assumptions: either we let chance determine the 
course of events, or we help it a little. In the first case, our library fans will, to some 
extent, behave like an immortal monkey behind a typewriter, bound to type Hamlet one 
day: at some moment, the question of social justice will be posed and debated in the right 
way. In the second case, some one or other immediately discovers a 20lh century 
bestseller, Wissenhurg on Justice, and poses the right kind of question. In either case, 
condition RIO is satisfied and the debate can begin. 
The people in the final position will soon find that the pure notion of justice is of 
no help in their quest; although they accede to the principles of natural justice (Pl-3), they 
feel that this tells them too little to work with. A quick glance at Plato's Politela has 
taught them that the meaning of justice depends on your point of view. Consequently, they 
split their task in two: first, they are curious to find out what the right point of view is, 
and only then will they discuss the principles of social justice themselves. After this they 
return to the Library to learn more about concrete societies and concrete questions of 
justice. From time to time - at lunch, or at night round the fire - they compare and discuss 
their findings and decide upon the following targets for research, as if looking for a 
reflective equilibrium. Finally, and if my arguments on these points are correct, they 
discover the conditions of the archpoint and the subjective and objective conditions of 
social justice. With this, they satisfy Cl-3 and Rl-5. By the same token, Rl 1-17 will be 
adopted. 
The question then is: do these people satisfy R9? They may have formulated all the 
requirements of the archpoint of view, and they may have all the necessary information 
for an impartial judgement from that point of view, but are they also capable of doing the 
right thing? Do they have the correct motivation? The easy way out is to make sure that 
6: DIES IRAE 145 
they do: we simply suppose thai the strain of living under a dying sun has eradicated 
every trace of individual character in them. They have repressed all (heir desires and 
personal memories to keep them from going insane, and they have done so more effective-
ly than Freud could ever dream of: they succeeded in repressing even their subconscious 
id. Nothing now can stop them from being only and merely curious about justice. 
Fortunately, I do not think that we arc obliged to choose this easy way out. For the 
people in the final position to be motivated as archpointers, it suffices to claim that, as 
rational beings, they ultimately cannot have any interest in the outcome of the debate. In 
the circumstances in which these persons find themselves, society is gone, the fighting's 
over and done. Obviously, whatever direct interests in the principles of distributive justice 
they may have had, have now vanished. They have nothing to win, nothing to lose, and no 
ties to any vested interests. The influence of feelings like resentment, regret, pride, passion 
and preference are negligible. Being the rational beings they are, the near-perpetual 
criticism of one another's views in this herrschaftsfreier discourse will slowly filter out 
these subconscious predispositions and their possibly adverse effects on impartiality. 
Finally, their HTS-reasons, whatever they were, either no longer await fulfilment or if they 
do, their realization will not jeopardize impartiality. Once the archpointers have decided to 
put themselves to the task of judging justice principles, they know that this may be the 
last thing they will ever do. For some of them this may mean that their last opportunity to 
realize a HIS-reason has passed. For others, the justice debate is an excellent opportunity 
to effectuate HIS-reasons once more. Yet the only lasting influence this can have supports 
the curiosity motive, for instance by raising the sincerity of the debate and the complete-
ness of the arguments. As with subconscious dispositions, the critique of others will filler 
out any influence HIS-reasons could have on the form or substance of the principles of 
social justice. 
Admittedly, the people in the final position are still rather eccentrically motivated 
persons living under exceptional circumstances. Unusual circumstances may be indispens-
able for a contract situation in which both impartiality and an intention to come to an 
agreement must be guaranteed, but perhaps it is possible to come a few steps closer to 
reality and do away with the typical (want of) motivation of the final position. What we 
need then is to imagine a motivational structure that is conventional enough not to alienate 
the contracting parlies from us, yet one that at the same lime does not in any respect 
obstruct pure curiosity. There may be other possibilities, but I believe that at least 
Aristotle's description of friendship in his Elhica Nicomachea will satisfy our desires in 
this. Aristotle wrote: 
"Friendship then, being a necessity of human nature, is a good thing and a 
precious. So we praise those who love their fellow-men. And one notices in 
one's travels how everybody feels that everybody else is his friend and 
brother man. Again, it is pretty clear that those who frame the constitutions 
of stales set more store by this feeling than by justice itself. For their two 
prime objectives are to expel faction which is inspired by hate, and to 
produce concord - concord being like friendship. Between friends there is 
no need of justice, though men can be just and yet lacking in friendly 
feeling, which some go so far as to think an element in the highest form of 
justice, which we saw to be equity." (Aristotle 1980, 1959: 1155a 19-28) 
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Philadelphia 
A group of friends has jusl spent a weekend off at a chalet somewhere in a distant 
valley of the Italian Alps. It is summer, and on Monday morning the warmth of the sun 
causes a tremendous avalanche, completely isolating them from civilization. There is no 
telephone, no electricity, no gas, and very soon the refrigerator decides to take up studies 
for a career as a black hole in space. After a day or two, a small plane comes over and 
drops an enormous load of food and medicines, some books, a recent paper, and a 
message. The Italian authorities, it says, deeply regret any discomfort tourists in the area 
may experience due to a piccolo bit of ice on the roads, promise to rescue them as soon as 
possible, and apologize for the expected three weeks delay in the rescue operation because 
of a strike of government personnel. In the meantime, a plane will fly over every day and 
drop emergency resources for fifty persons. 
Fortunately, the friends are unhurt and healthy, and the Italian interpretation of 
food aid turns out to be royal, especially since they only count thirty. Nevertheless, our 
friends have to find something to do for the next 21 or more days. They decide to do what 
they always do: philosophize. They have formed a network of close personal friends ever 
since they studied philosophy together, and not being members of a lost generation, they 
were all able to make philosophy their profession. In fact, they came to Italy to celebrate 
the 25lh anniversary of their friendship, though because of their philosophical zeal they 
had all filled the hidden compartments of their suitcases with books and pencils and 
notes - in case they would find an odd moment of spare time. 
A first subject for their conversations naturally presents itself: what if no help 
arrives, what if they were forced to form a lasting society on their own? Naturally, that 
society would be one of friends, so they decide to call it Philadelphia. Of course, they are 
too old to start a new society, but the subject fascinates them too much to simply dismiss 
the question. After a while, their attention is drawn to the problem of distributive social 
justice - and here they encounter the most intriguing problem of imagining envy, self-
interest, conflicts of interests, scarcity, in short: the absence of friendship. Like Aristotle 
said, they do not need justice or principles of justice themselves, neither under their actual 
circumstances nor, they think, In the hypothetical case under review. After all, they are 
friends: they love and respect one another, they enjoy their company, each one of them 
would give at least some others everything they might need, and for each of them there is 
at least one other who is even prepared to die for him or her. They can of course imagine 
the absence of friendship - they have temporarily left a whole world of envy and scarcity -
but it is impossible for them to imagine themselves as not being friends, let alone as foes. 
In most respects, the reasoning with regard to Philadelphia is the same as that for 
the final position. Because these philosopher-friends are well-educated human beings, we 
can again assume equal rationality (R8). Next, we may assume that the suitcases contained 
all the information required to directly satisfy R6. Being friends, our philosophers will not 
keep any information from one another, and they will consequently also satisfy R7. If my 
case was supported well enough, the society of friends will reach the same conclusions as 
I did, that is, they will recognize Cl-3, Pl-3, Rl-5, and RIO-17. Finally, they have the 
right motivation to satisfy R9: they are curious by nature and disinterested, and we may 
again assume that they are critical enough to filter out the undesirable effects of conscious 
and subconscious reasons and inclinations. Hence, Philadelphia is a suitable representation 
of the archpoint. 
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The reader may have noticed a certain similarity between Philadelphia and the 
community as communitarians would desire it to be. Our philosopher-friends seem to 
share a deep consensus on their mutual relations and on the basic end of life, philosophiz-
ing. The similarity is intentional. First of all, it should draw attention to the relation 
between community and communitarian and minimal justice. If the Philadclphians need a 
conception of justice at all - if Aristotle was wrong, even angels may need laws - then we 
have established that they can imagine minimal justice; they are not destined to think of 
justice purely as communitarian justice. Belter still: not only can they imagine minimal 
justice, they will be forced to do so and forced to make it the foundation of the conception 
of communitarian justice they eventually - may - develop. We have assumed that the 
Philadelphians are rational. It is irrational to expect new generations or less fortunate 
members of society to share the view of life of the society's founders; it is irrational to 
expect a system of education and socialization to work that perfectly (if not at times 
immoral to want it to work that way); it is irrational to think that a system based on 
friendship cannot at times falter or ultimately totally collapse. Designing an appropriate 
precautionary system of minimal justice is, then, the sensible thing to do. 
A second motive for matching Philadelphia to the communitarian archetype is to 
draw attention to the dark side of political theory and contract theory in particular: its 
objective of establishing obligations. The issue is not whether we should live together and 
close a contract, rather than strive for autonomy or even Nietzschean freedom of (freedom 
from) morality. Nor am I interested in the question why we should abide to the terms of a 
contract. Both questions have been dealt with both above and (belter and more extensive-
ly) by others (see e.g. Scanlon 1982: 111). The question is rather one about the possibility 
that a political theory is vindicated with an appeal to authority: why should we accept a 
contract they - phantoms created by theoreticians - supposedly back? Justified or not, how 
can a contract be legitimate without visible support? Like politicians in a totalitarian 
democracy (Talmon 1970: 251), theorists and philosophers tend to monopolize access to 
the volonté générale to a sometimes dubious degree (Walzer 1981: 383). In a society, 
legitimacy ultimately depends on access to and participation in an open political debate, 
and the realization of justice in turn depends on the legitimacy of the conception underly-
ing it (Nagel 1991: 5). Fictitious contracting parties can justify a theory but they cannot 
give it legitimacy; ultimately, the readers must decide on the credibility of a theory 
themselves. 

PART III: PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
"Wei aen dan, wie van ons had oyt Broots ghebrek, en was te ghelijk 
bekommert om de Booter?" 
"Pray tell me, who of us was ever in need of bread, and at the same lime 
worried about the butler?" 
Franciscus van den Enden (1992: 204; my translation) 

CHAPTER 7:... DO WE NOT BLEED? 
Section 27: The elements of principles of justice 
Justice demands that we treat equals equally and unequals in proportion to their 
inequality. However, we cannot define a measure for (in)equality, a basis of desert or a 
criterium for eligibility as a recipient of justice at will: justice and arbitrariness are 
incompatible. Consequently, we need a theory that explains why one claim rather than 
another should be recognized, why one person rather than another should get a piece of 
the social cake, why one principle of justice should be adopted rather than another. To mis 
point, we have been occupied with the lay-out of this so-called Archimedean point, a point 
of view from which we would be allowed to impartially assess different claims and 
different theories of distributive social justice. The time has now come to apply this 
justification device. 
In this final part I shall discuss the elements of a metric of social justice separately 
and systematically, slowly erecting a multi-storey building. In this chapter, I start by 
asking who or what the recipient of minimal justice ought to be. In fact, it deals with three 
different but inseparable questions: me criteria for recipiency, the criteria for calling 
someone a recipient of social justice in particular, and the criteria for ordering the 
recipients's claims to social justice. The reason for treating these three questions in one 
single chapter is that the answer to each of these questions depends on the identification of 
relevant differences: differences between rocks and humans, between members and 
strangers, between the fortunate and less fortunate. 
Principles of distributive social justice, to repeat my own words, determine who 
will give what to whom, on what grounds and in what quantities. "From each according to 
his capacity, to each according to his needs", is perhaps the best classic example of a 
metric of justice. However, a formula like this leaves much unspecified: who exactly is 
"each"?; What arc needs and capacities?; How are they to be measured? The same 
ambiguity would be present in a fictitious Lockean constitution giving "each person" an 
equal share in political power. The formula looks innocent enough until one realizes that 
on a Lockean view servants and women cannot count for real persons as they lack 
autonomy: they are expected to follow the will of their husbands and masters. Clearly, if it 
is our intention to present sensible and defensible principles of justice, we cannot dodge 
the issue of the criteria for attributing recipiency (i.e., the quality of being a potential 
recipient of justice). Should the concept of social justice be extended to include themes, 
persons and things like foetuses, future generations or persons, foreign aid, 
extraterrestrials, crocodiles or garlic? 
Though perhaps politically overcorrect, I shall from now on address all creatures or 
things that can be the subject of (in)justice as recipients and not as humans, mammals or 
animals. Not all recipients deserve the same treatment, though. The variation in their 
endowments and in the circumstances in which they exist, or, with a somewhat outdated 
term, the variation in their attributes, makes it necessary to differentiate between degrees 
of recipiency. The degree of recipiency is an important indicator for the amount of 
distributable goods a recipient can legitimately claim. Sometimes there is reason to believe 
that a potential recipient, Cissy Roo, cannot be morally relevant to us, at least not as a 
recipient of justice - say, because Cissy is dead. Consequently, one cannot make claims on 
Cissy's behalf. Sometimes there is reason to believe that Cissy could be morally relevant 
but that she is not - say, because she is a Martian and there is no way in which we can 
influence her fate. Again, no legitimate claims can be made. And sometimes Cissy can be 
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morally relevant only to a degree, because we are not responsible for every aspect of 
Cissy's fate, or because she cannot experience (un)just treatment to the degree that we 
can. In the latter case, we do not immediately have to think of Cissy as an animal; tickling 
the foot of a human who has lost all feeling in his limbs may be undignified and psycho­
logically cruel but it need not be unjust. In both last examples, Cissy can make legitimate 
claims to a piece of the social cake, but only to the degree that she is a morally relevant 
subject. 
After discussing some bad reasons for recipiency (section 28), I discuss three 
cumulative grounds for attributing recipiency: life, consciousness, and agency (section 29). 
I then turn to the most obvious category of grounds for recipiency, responsibility, and 
confront the intricate question of the differences between moral and causal responsibility 
(section 30). Section 31 deals with a special case of this problem, that of membership of a 
particular society as a reason for deserving preferential treatment by that society's 
distributive institutions. In section 32, I ask whether possible persons - in particular, 
members of future generations - can be recipients. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 8), I discuss the object of social justice, the things or 
rights to which the notion of distributive social justice can be applied. It is obvious that 
certain things cannot (yet) be distributed for plain practical reasons: we still do not have 
the elixir of eternal youth or the capacity to distribute innate intelligence. It is, on the 
other hand, not at all clear that there are also moral reasons against distributing specific 
rights, which would thereby end up in a sphere where the possession, exchange and 
enjoyment of rights depended on individual choices. It seems mat there can always be a 
good reason in favour of distributing something, overruling any reason against it. I shall 
take this observation as my point of departure, and argue for a distinction (based upon 
their relevancy to a person's plan for a full life) between rights that are beyond distribu­
tion, rights that are absolute and irreversible, and conditional rights. 
Incidentally, I shall also attempt to prevent any confusion that may arise as a 
consequence of the diversity of the "things" that could in principle be distributed: goods 
and benefits and burdens, rights and duties, activities and experiences, freedoms, obliga­
tions, and so on. To describe all these distributables with no more than one word I have 
selected one term, rights. Rights in this universalistic sense will be defined in terms of so-
called right-molecules, i.e., as the complete and absolute authority to decide whether ρ or 
not-p will be the case; ρ is always the smallest possible domain (in lime, space, and use of 
anything) over which someone can exercise this authority. 
"Justice is free of change, forever and entirely pure" (John of Salisbury 1990: 135). 
Humans and circumstances are not. All kinds of contingent circumstances make a 
difference for the way in which the idea of justice should be implemented. The justice of 
the distribution of rights over recipients depends at least partially on the value of the 
distributed rights. Treating recipients in proportion to their (inequality is impossible 
without an intersubjective measure of the value or meaning of rights. Technically, such a 
measure is referred to as an cqualisandum: the property that is to be "equalized" or 
distributed in proportion to the recipients's (in)equalily. In Chapter 9, I shall defend one 
equalisandum for each of the two categories of distributable rights: option equality as an 
equalisandum for (rights to) basic needs, and envy-containment for (rights to) further 
wants. 
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In Chapter 10 we shall reach our destination. Here, the conclusions reached in the 
preceding three chapters will be reformulated so as to arrive at a more systematic list of 
principles of minimal social justice, a metric. 
In a short epilogue I shall address some of the strong and weak points of the 
conception of social justice defended in this book. Without giving away more than this, I 
already want to make one claim: one of the strong points of justice as impartiality is its 
lack of precision, its openness to contingent circumstances, especially political circum-
stances. It has been claimed, notably by Michael Oakesholt, that in particular the social 
sciences either have emerged in answer to the petit bourgeois's demand for etiquette 
books, books telling him how to conform to the lifestyle with which the elite grew up; or 
that they evolved out of a similar desire to control the incomprehensible by means of 
handbook knowledge (Minogue 1975: 127). It seems to me that at least the last motive is 
relevant to the theory of social justice. There are of course good reasons to strive for a 
reduction of questions of justice to technical questions, questions at the level of hand-
books. One of these is undoubtedly the political need for our modem and relatively young 
democracies to mobilize support and preserve their legitimacy. Yet desirable as it may 
seem to have a maximally precise and complete metric, a metric sensitive enough to 
calculate each and every one's fair share under all imaginable circumstances down to the 
last penny - despite all this, the quest for such a final word on justice is bound to fail. 
There is no such metric, nor can there be one. Judgements on justice can be neither very 
precise nor near to definite; exercising justice is an art rather than a technique. Or so I 
hope to show in the following chapters. 
Section 28: Four bad reasons for attributing recipiency 
A theory of distributive social justice cannot be complete or even adequate if it 
does not specify who the subjects of distribution, the recipients, will be. A liberally loose 
specification like "all humans in society" or "our fellow citizens" is too imprecise: it is too 
insensitive to relevant differences between fellow members of society, loo insensitive to 
relevant similarities with non-members or non-humans and too dependant on an undis-
closed definition of a thing called society. Designating "all humans in society" as 
recipients could have been a tolerable way to avoid a debate on recipiency, were it not for 
the long list of candidate-recipients proposed by animal rights theorists, environmentalists, 
internationalists and, indeed, by liberal theorists of justice themselves. 
Consider the human foetus in relation to "us", a group that consists of already 
recognized recipients - no foetuses included, of course. If a foetus were to be recognized 
as a recipient of justice, as someone whom we should treat as an equal (or at least in 
some respects), then it should be true that there is no relevant difference between it and 
us. As a consequence, we can begin to ask if (read: doubt that) there is a relevant 
difference between a foetus and a future person or future generation, or between future 
persons and fictitious persons, or between helpless babies and equally helpless farm stock 
or endangered species, or between humans and (supposedly extremely intelligent) 
extraterrestrials. If we deny recipiency to the foetus, then, on the other hand, it must be 
true that it differs from us in at least one relevant respect, say, consciousness. In that case 
someone might argue for further restrictions on recipiency. Why not also exclude fictitious 
persons, future persons and generations, animals - or the comatose? 
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By questioning the naturalness of the borders of the reference group of recipiency, 
we also put our own moral relevancy in question. Any attempt to illuminate why anyone 
deserves to be considered as a recipient of justice - as someone who can deserve some­
thing, be it more or less or as much as others - any such attempt must answer the 
following question: by virtue of which aspects, which attributes, can someone or some­
thing be morally relevant? 
Why do we bother about the borders of recipiency? Why do theorists of justice 
persist in their attempts to bring animals, the unborn, future generations and foreign aid 
under the heading of social justice? One explanation would be causal or instrumental. As 
the sociologist Keith Tester argued with regard to animal rights activists, the desire to 
represent the weak can serve at least two purposes: that of acknowledging one's own 
strength and strengthening one's self-image, especially if one finds oneself in a marginal 
social position; and that of contributing to the civilization process and the fight against 
human beastliness (Tester 1991: 149, 177-178, 196 ff.). Tester, in short, argues that we 
have turned animals into fetishes, that we have invented rather than found their interests 
and moral status (Tester 1991: 207). 
Tester's analysis occasions two remarks. If animals are fetishes, then perhaps the 
same is true for other groups that theorists of justice are eager to include. If a foetus could 
talk, perhaps its interests would turn out to be not at all what we think they are. If a future 
generation could voice demands, it could surprise us by insisting that we care for our 
contemporaries only. If we really listened to children as children and not as mentally 
disturbed adults that need some kind of rehabilitation, we would perhaps give them food 
and eternal peace and environmentally friendly Nintendos instead of medicine and 
grammar and political security. My point is this: even if there are more legitimate reasons 
than ego-boosting and civilization for representing the voiceless, we will still represent 
fetishes, interpretations of interests, rather than the interests of the represented themselves. 
Any defence for a decision to attribute recipiency to some category of beings should then 
be accompanied by a defence of the fetish, of our conception of that group. 
The second thing to be noted about Tester's sociological analysis is that it is not 
concerned with the content of the reasons that animal rights activists offer for animal 
rights, whereas it is precisely this content that should concern us here. Ad hominem 
arguments do not invalidate sound arguments. A butcher who claims that red meat is 
healthy may be right "even though" he is a butcher. For the truth of an argument it is 
irrelevant who voices it. 
Consequently, we must deal with the issue of recipiency in terms of arguments 
rather than (instrumental) explanations. Before turning to possibly good reasons, I want to 
discuss in this section four bad reasons for recipiency. They are, it should be noted, not 
bad reasons in themselves - they are all relevant in political contexts, and some of them 
are important for moral questions. They just happen to fit badly in the context of social 
justice. We have already encountered two such bad reasons: ego-boosting and civilization. 
Neither one tells us why, for example, animals should be considered as recipients of social 
justice and not as objects of kindness, compassion or the art of cooking. 
A third bad reason for recipiency is membership of a group. Though it is a rather 
trivial point, it cannot harm to dwell on it for a moment. In everyday politics, distributive 
justice is applied to groups rather than persons. Dealing with mass societies, politicians 
have in practice no other choice than to design schemes of justice for categories: "the" 
jobless, "the" illiterate, "the" single-parent family, "the" aged, "the homeless, "the" 
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orphans. Now categories create victims. A rule or law for a category is never so perfect as 
not at times to benefit or harm some persons more than the average member of a category 
and more than was intended. If, for instance, unemployment benefits are cut by five per 
cent to give the jobless an incentive to find work, and if there is work at all, an unem-
ployed mother of four who, through no fault of her own, is both single and pregnant, will 
probably feel more motivated (more coerced) to go out and get a job than an unemployed 
bachelor - but one may doubt if this is really the desired effect, let alone a just effect. 
Even though practice may ask for compromises, there is no reason why the group 
should also be the form in which recipients are represented in principles of justice. Justice 
is a standard by which to measure the real world; it should not be compromised to avoid 
difficult cases - especially not those who are most vulnerable, the victims of 
categorization. A metric of justice must deal with individuals, not merely with their 
attributes. Individuals cannot be treated unjustly because of their attributes but only 
because of what their attributes - their "differences" - mean to them; only then do 
differences become relevant. 
A fourth bad reason for recipiency, intrinsic value, deserves more attention. I shall 
approach it from an unconventional side, that of environmentalism, as the most far-
reaching consequences of accepting intrinsic value as a reason for recipiency concern 
nature and in particular animals. 
In environmental ethics and green political theory, the controversy over 
anthropocentrism and biocenlrism is one of the most discussed topics. The two are 
fundamentally opposed views on the relation between man and nature. On an anthropocen-
tric perspective, man is the measure of all things; the value of nature is determined by its 
utility, value or importance for humanity. Anlhropocentrists will only feel morally obliged 
to think and act green (environmentally friendly) in sofar as parts of nature sufficiently 
resemble man. If their capacity to experience pleasure and pain makes humans morally 
relevant, for instance, then the anthropocenlric green will argue that we should try to avoid 
letting either humans or animals suffer for the exact same reasons - nor should we eat 
them, if possible. Vegetables arc of course another matter. Biocenlrism, as the word says, 
puts life at the centre of consideration. It is the egalitarian variant of ecologism, measuring 
the value of all single acts, beings and things by their impact on all other life. One of the 
main arguments in favour of biocenlrism has been the intrinsic value of life, a notion that 
is central to biocenlrism but seems to be incompatible wilh anthropocentrism. 
The concept of intrinsic value has been designed to describe or perhaps even 
explain some of our basic moral intuitions. The recognition of intrinsic value would 
explain why we sometimes hesitate to do something X, even though we can think of no 
good reason to stop us, and even if there are good reasons to do X. A classic example is 
the Last Person Argument. Imagine yourself being the last human on earth, indeed the last 
somehow intelligent being in the whole universe. You are about to die, and you have two 
options: to push a red button and blow up the whole planet and all the plants that still live 
on it at the moment of your death, or to push a green button and simply fade away. (We 
suppose that there is no third alternative, i.e., you cannot refuse to choose.) No one, the 
story goes, would push the red button. Let us make the case even more difficult: suppose 
that you do not care about your impending death, you either do not believe in a God or 
think the gods do not care, and suppose further that the universe is about to implode in a 
day or so. Who would push the red button? 
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Those who think ihey would not apparently have no other choice than to claim that 
either the act of destroying or the consequence of the act, the annihilation of a whole 
living planet, is a bad thing in itself. After all, no one and nothing will be harmed; tree 
and plants do not suffer, as far as we know. In either case, we seem forced to appeal to 
intrinsic value. Of course, I do not want to exclude the possibility that our intuitions, the 
intuitions of the non-destructors, can be explained in other ways. What matters is that 
hypothetical cases like this one give us at least a prima facie reason to take the idea of 
intrinsic value seriously.67 
Nevertheless, the whole story of intrinsic value is irrelevant to issues of social 
justice. I shall argue, in this order, that intrinsic value is an impractical notion, that if it 
were practical, it would still be suspicious, and that even if neither were true, it would still 
be reducible to the category of non-intrinsic, anlhropocentric values. 
In the first place, a conception of recipiency based on the intrinsic value of 
recipients would be quite impractical as it would only allow distinctions between good and 
indifferent (having or not having intrinsic value), and not between degrees of goodness or 
deviation from indifference. Now suppose that we are forced to choose between saving a 
human and saving a lion, both being intrinsically valuable creatures. We would have to 
look elsewhere for a justification for the choice we make - and whatever that reason may 
be, it cannot be the intrinsic value of either threatened party. Suppose, to the contrary, that 
intrinsic value can be represented on some sort of scale. If that were true, there would be 
a morally defensible way to measure the value, the intrinsical goodness or worthlessness, 
of a lion and that of a human being. In other words, there would have to be some set of 
attributes determining the greater or lesser degree of intrinsic value - which is a contradic-
tion: intrinsic value exists by definition independent of attributes. 
Secondly, an account of recipiency cannot be based on the notion of the intrinsic 
goodness or badness of certain acts. Let us suppose that intrinsically bad acts are always 
bad and not just bad in certain contexts68 or more or less bad in different contexts6' - so 
as not to get mixed up in questions about attributes again. Now it may be true that torture 
is morally bad, but it does not follow that any subject of torture is a recipient of justice or 
- in this case - injustice. The relation works the other way around: in order to be sensibly 
applicable, the concept of torture presupposes the existence of (victims or) recipients. In a 
world without recipients torture cannot be bad in practice but only as an idea. Summariz-
ing: the idea of intrinsic value as applied to acts or to subjects tells us nothing that is of 
any help in attributing recipiency. 
Even if the notion of intrinsic value could be applied in a sensible way, it would 
still be a suspicious concept. All the proof we have for its existence is necessarily based 
on intuition, on the subsistence of a conviction after all reasons for the instrumental value 
of a thing have been eliminated. What we call intuition may well be a product of culture 
and tradition, or, worse, it could be the last resort for the perplexed, a name given to the 
inexplicable. In either case, the absence of definite proof can just as easily be turned 
against the concept as it can be employed in its defence. 
For further literature and discussion of this and similar Last Person Arguments, see Lee (1993). 
68 
An intuitive example: cannibalism need not be bad if there is no other food except the body of someone 
who died in the same disaster that left us without food. 
Another example: theft of food can be excusable the more one starves. 
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Finally, let us assume thai intrinsic value is both a practical and credible notion. 
Belief in the intrinsic value of a lion would then have to be conceived of as a conviction 
that we cannot help having. There is no reason to assume that, from an impartial point of 
view or from a view beyond lime and space, judgements of values would be the same. All 
that an intuition of intrinsic value tells us is thai we have either decided to value some-
thing or decided to recognize its value. In both cases, we could have denied our conviction 
and we could have decided otherwise; and in both cases, it is we who decide what 
actually has value. Belief in intrinsic value is thereby reduced to a specific type of 
anthropocentrism (cf. Wissenburg 1993). 
If we are to think of recipients in terms other than those of intrinsic value, we shall 
have to refer to attributes, and in doing so we will have to confront dilemmas of a 
distasteful kind: wc shall have to explain - to give an extreme example - why a mentally 
and physically handicapped comatose human is either "still" more of a recipient than an 
animal, or, alternatively, how an animal can be the equal of a human. 
This is the moment then to introduce a new character whom we shall encounter 
regularly in the coming sections, a hard case - Evelyn Hardcase, as a matter of fact. 
Evelyn suffers from a mysterious disease which at first made Evelyn completely lame -
unable to move even the eyes. Some time ago, Evelyn recovered physically but at the 
same time became completely menially handicapped: there was no trace of a self, of self-
consciousness, self-control, intelligence or intuition, left in the body. In a third phase, 
which lasted until yesterday, Evelyn was both physically and mentally completely 
handicapped. Finally, today, Hardcase fell into an irreversible coma. We do not know if 
Evelyn is still handicapped - the body just does not move and the life-signs are extremely 
low. Evelyn can go on existing like this for the next fifty years. 
Section 29: Life, consciousness, and agency 
As seen from the archpoint, intrinsic value could perhaps have been a good reason 
to qualify things or beings as morally relevant, had it been practicable. As it stands, the 
best intrinsic value can do for us, if we believe in it at all, is indicate whether or not some 
particle of the universe could possibly qualify as a recipient - for intrinsic value is in itself 
not enough to qualify. Perhaps the Giaconda has intrinsic value, but that seems to be 
insufficient reason to give a picture the same rights as a citizen, or to deny the same rights 
to a picture produced wiih the latest software. The question now rising is whether an 
alternative account of recipiency is possible, an account that concentrates on the attributes 
of things rather than on the things themselves. 
Such an account will have to be based on reciprocal recognition: if I am a recipient 
of justice by virtue of my having certain attributes and/or lacking others, and if you have 
and/or lack the same attributes, you should also be recognized as a recipient. This is 
simply a complex version of the prime directive in justice, the demand that equals be 
treated equally. 
Reciprocal recognition presupposes a point of reference and departure, a primary 
recipient with whom we can compare the claims (made on behalf) of others to lhat status. 
We can, for instance, choose man as the basis on which to assess whether other members 
of the world of flora and fauna are morally relevant; or we can choose citizens as the 
basis for the assessment of claims to recipiency made by strangers and those living in 
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Third World countries, etcetera. In the first case we can be accused of anthropocentrism, 
in the sense that we measure everything by standards derived from the interest of man, in 
the second we can be suspected of chauvinism. Evidently, reciprocal recognition is biased 
in favour of its point of reference, but this methodological bias does not need to have 
morally unacceptable consequences, to violations of impartiality - as I hope to show in the 
following paragraphs. 
Accusations of an initial bias would have some ground if there was only one 
method available to us: that of case-implication critique. This approach, described by 
Amartya Sen (Sen 1980: 197) works as follows: we take a principle, apply it in different 
contexts to different cases, and compare the results to our intuitions about desirable 
consequences. Suppose that we feel that consciousness in some medical sense of the word 
qualifies a being as a recipient. If we apply this principle to Evelyn Hardcase, we could 
end up with rather nasty consequences. On the other hand, if we adapt the principle to 
include the comatose by assuming that the mere possibility of consciousness is enough, a 
healthy ape might just as easily qualify as a recipient. Now perhaps we do not believe that 
humans, in whatever condition, are the moral equals of apes - a controversial intuition, but 
let us assume that even the most fervent members of the Animal Liberation Front share iL 
Consequently, we will try to invent a new principle next to consciousness, which we 
subsequently test in a similar way. Repeating this spiral process towards an adequate 
conception of recipiency, we may feel after a while that we have reached something like a 
reflective equilibrium, and stop. 
Fortunately, there is a second method: that of prior-principle critique, that is, the 
evaluation of one principle in the light of another, higher principle (Sen 1980: 197). In our 
case, impartiality can serve as the higher principle, and the corpus of arguments for the 
attribution of recipiency to specific groups as the principles under examination. On this 
approach, all arguments will be treated equally - those in favour of the adult human 
citizen as well as those for the unknown soldier of the future or the average cabbage on 
the field. While focusing on the consistency between these potentially biased arguments 
and impartiality, the need to argue for e.g. either human/animal differentiation (the 
existence of a "prima facie difference") or human/animal continuism ("diverging but not 
basically different"; cf. Benton 1993: 17) disappears. 
One respect in which an analysts based on this method - or these two methods, if 
combined - can still be said to be biased is that of its origin. The probably finite, possibly 
incomplete and maybe suspiciously selective list of arguments for recipiency is, after all, 
of our modern human making. Yet the fact that any analysis of moral relevancy is more or 
less destined to be incomplete and inconclusive, the fact that - as Robert Nozick expressed 
it - moral theory is underdetermined (Nozick 1974: 45-47), does not make that which it 
can positively sustain false. If Z,5 is a requirement for recipiency, the discovery of another 
requirement Zu will not alter anything in the status of ¿¡
у
 Anthropocentric or whatnot-
centric and partial to existing knowledge as the idea of reciprocal recognition may be, one 
can at least say to its advantage that it warrants a certain basic kind of morality and moral 
action: it poses an important and indispensable limit on arbitrariness by demanding that we 
do not deny the moral relevancy of others if, in similar circumstances, we would 
legitimately claim the status of recipient for ourselves. 
Let us begin our investigation of the grounds for recipiency with the intuitively 
attractive supposition that the harm rule must obtain. The harm rule demands that for X to 
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be a recipient, some act(s) or siale(s) must in some comprehensible70 way benefit or 
harm X. 1 shall use words like harm, pain, benefit, pleasure, advantage and disadvantage 
as innocent terms, everyday words that are not in any way indicative of any prejudice on 
my part for or against hedonism or utilitarianism. They simply mean what they mean in 
ordinary conversations: that something happens which we feel hurts or pleases us. Note 
that I do not claim that something cannot be good or bad if it is good or bad for no one in 
particular; my far more modest claim is that it cannot be just or unjust if no one is 
affected. 
Unless the harm rule obtains, it seems that X cannot be a relevant subject of moral 
consideration, a "someone" who can be treated immorally or, justice being a component of 
morality, (un)justly. Consider, once more, the Giaconda. If we prick it, it will not bleed; 
nor will it in other experiments show any reaction remotely resembling the experience of 
pleasure or pain. It simply makes no sense to say that the Giaconda can benefit or suffer, 
or that it receives more or less than it deserves. It simply makes no sense to call the 
Giaconda a recipient. It can of course make sense to say that a distributor has spent too 
little money on the Giaconda - but a proposition like that does not entail the recognition of 
the Giaconda as a recipient. What it really means is that the Giaconda is a resource for 
undefined recipients and that the distributor has not done enough on their behalf. 
Harm and benefit come in many shapes, and not all are equally important. Firstly, 
the good and bad things of life differ quantitatively. As a rule, losing your sight is worse 
than missing the bus or Finding a companion for life is more beneficial than finding a 
penny. Secondly and more importantly, forms of harm and benefit can be distinguished 
qualitatively. It makes a difference, a relevant difference, if the subject of harm is alive or 
not, if it possesses (self-)consciousness or not, and if it has the capacity to be an auton-
omous agent. 
Life as an attribute of a potential recipient71 is no less - but also nothing more -
than a necessary condition for recipiency; it is not a sufficient condition. This means that 
without the attribute of life, a creature cannot be harmed or benefitted. It also means that a 
creature cannot be harmed merely by taking its life or benefitted merely by giving it life. 
If the classification of an event as harmful or beneficial is a matter of the individual 
experience of the recipient of life and death, it depends on whether the recipient's life was 
or will be worth while in his or her own eyes. A person suffering from an incurable and 
very painful cancer may well judge life to be intolerable and death beneficial. If, at the 
other extreme, there is an objective standard which determines that life is by definition 
beneficial and death by definition harmful, then the words harm and benefit lose all 
relevance for concrete human beings: the harm done by taking someone's life is no longer 
harm to a person but only to some abstract principle. It is harm in a purely metaphorical 
sense, a harm to no-one. A meaningful evaluation of harm and benefit must somehow take 
account of individual experience and must regard the presence or absence of life as 
insufficient evidence of recipiency. 
We cannot be held responsible for not understanding that which Is incomprehensible. Hence, if Evelyn 
can be harmed or benefitted without our being able to recognize this and without our attributing Evelyn with 
recipiency, we are not at fault - to Evelyn's misfortune. 
I leave "life" undefined; until dr. McCoy aboard the Enterprise finds something that "... is life Jim, but 
not as we know it", our everyday conception of life with all its borderline cases is quite sufficient for my 
purposes. 
160 J U S T I C E F R O M A D I S T A N C E 
Note that, by making life a necessary condition for recipiency, we can confidently 
throw out fictitious persons like Sherlock Holmes and Tolstoy's Natasha in War and 
Peace. Lacking life, they cannot be recipients except, figuratively speaking, in their own 
worlds where their fictitious equals can harm them - and where their author can, somewhat 
more metaphorically, kill them or, as in the case of Tolstoy and Natasha, kill their 
character. Future persons are another matter; unlike fictitious persons, they may one day 
actually live and become recipients. I shall discuss their status later; for now, let us 
consider them to be ordinary people. 
If pleasure and pain are to mean anything to anyone, what is required besides life 
is consciousness, or more precisely, self-consciousness. Pain (or pleasure) must have a 
place in order to be experienced, and that place must be a self if it is to be morally 
relevant. Thus, X,s pain over the bad treatment that Y gets makes X rather than Y a 
recipient; whether Y is also a recipient depends not on X's feelings about him or her, but 
strictly on the existence of feelings on Ts side. 
Time is a complicating factor in this context. I may be under narcosis now, yet the 
sedation and the operation the doctor is currently performing on me can be said to be 
beneficial even though I am currently living without self-consciousness (or so we assume). 
Had I not been under narcosis, I would have experienced a lot more discomfort than I do 
now, and when I awake in a few hours I shall be able to enjoy the benefits of the 
operation. Hence, the capacities for pleasure and pain seem to go on existing even while 
the self is temporarily absent. 
On the other hand, it is impossible to prove that a recipient can still be harmed if 
(s)he falls into an irreversible complete coma. Evelyn Hardcase, for instance, can be either 
of two things. Either Evelyn is aware of pleasure and pain but unable to show it, or 
Evelyn's self can be said to be permanently absent - the body is alive, but no more than 
that. We, observing Hardcase, just do not and cannot know which of these cases is true, 
although we do know that both can be true. Let us suppose the latter: let us say that 
Evelyn is permanently absent. This is still not enough to allow us to do anything we like 
with the vacated body. If the occupant of a house leaves her house for a walk or forever, 
she does not thereby give anyone a licence to burn it down. By the same token, no one 
can claim possession of Evelyn's body until we have determined who can legitimately do 
so. Justice may even require that we keep on treating Evelyn as a pro forma recipient and, 
for instance, respect whatever wishes Evelyn expressed before being hit by this mysterious 
disease. Besides, in real life it is hardly ever possible to be 100 per cent certain that a 
person's self-consciousness has permanently left the still living body. 
Once we accept potential rather than actual self-consciousness as a criterium for 
recipiency, we will find that the numbers and kinds of possible recipients of justice are 
enormous and quite diverse. You and I could be recipients, but so could future persons, 
Martians, animals, and foetuses. (I shall discuss the issue of "potential" recipiency at more 
length in section 32.) We will also discover that (potential) self-consciousness exists in 
degrees, as far as we know: a fish and a dog seem to be more aware of themselves than 
bacteria, and less than Evelyn Hardcase might or could be. It is probably impossible to 
determine exactly how self-conscious a creature can be, yet the concept itself is extremely 
relevant. Being unprepared to consider what a parrot would say if it could talk, I must 
leave this question for what it momentarily is: unanswered. 
Some readers will recognize a familiar argument for animal rights in the argument 
for self-consciousness as a ground for recipiency: Peter Singer's. Singer, a utilitarian, 
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argued straiglhforwardly that what ultimately mattered about humans was their interest in 
(the utility derived from) avoiding pain and experiencing pleasure. Animals, he claimed, 
have the same interest; it follows that they deserve to be treated as our equals (Singer 
1979: 48 ff.). My conception of recipiency is however not based on self-consciousness and 
the capacity to experience pleasure and pain alone, nor do I argue for equal rights for 
animals. As we shall see in a moment, the capacity to be an autonomous agent allows us 
to make a qualitative difference between humans and animals as recipients. Nevertheless, 
both arguments for animal recipiency can be criticized for the same reason: they would 
neglect the fact that the relation between man and animal is asymmetrical. Animals are 
incapable of entering a contract, keeping a promise, returning a favour, and so forth. There 
is, in other words, no reciprocity in the relation between animals and humans, and there 
would therefore be no sense in giving animals an equal status. 
It is true that animals differ markedly from humans, and it is true that the differ-
ence is a morally relevant difference. As said before, I shall take account of this difference 
in a moment. However, the asymmetry argument goes beyond insistence on a gradual 
difference between animal and human. It asserts that the relations between recipients of 
justice must needs be symmetrical, reciprocal. But this version of reciprocity cannot be 
taken as it stands. If we demand reciprocal relations rather than reciprocal recognition (as 
argued for at the beginning of this section), then we would not only exclude animals but 
also Evelyn Hardcase and many others. We would exclude children, especially the 
newborn, as they are about as helpless as animals. Any demand for a reciprocal repayment 
in the future for the favours which we bestow on them now (such as citizenship, food, 
shelter, protection) comes down to pure extortion and violates reciprocity: newborn 
children are in no position to choose, let alone agree. We would also exclude the dying: 
we can do anything to them we want. They can never get back at us. In fact, it seems that 
if we require reciprocity for recipients, the concept of justice can only be relevant in sofar 
as we cannot get away with any atrocity we happen to feel in the mood for. Which does 
not appear to be an intuitively attractive conclusion. 
Earlier, I argued that recipiency presupposes a "someone" who can experience 
pleasure and pain. On this view, the argument for reciprocal relations adds nothing to our 
understanding of recipiency, at least nothing that we did not already know. If we try to 
revise the argument in order to deal with the objections raised against it, we cannot avoid 
admitting (1) that the interests of children and other "unequals" are morally relevant 
despite the asymmetry in our relations with them; (2) that the reason for the relevancy of 
this similarity between them and us lies in their capacity to experience harm and benefit, 
i.e., in their self-consciousness; and (3) that their interests are theirs and not someone 
else's, in other words, that they are subjects like us and not objects like the Giaconda. 
With that, we are thrown back at a more modest conception of reciprocity: recognition of 
relevant similarities. 
Animals then are similar enough to humans to count as recipients. Yet they are not 
our equals. The relevant differences between humans and animals may not be as funda-
mental as a proponent of reciprocal relations would like them to be, they are nevertheless 
important enough to prevent animals from being the kind of first class recipients that 
humans are. There is one difference between us and them that cannot be either denied as a 
fact, nor underrated as a moral reality: they cannot be autonomous agents. 
Freedom of mind (autonomy) and freedom of action (agency; see section 19) find 
expression in plans of life. Now the capacity for developing and executing plans of life is 
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not something that comes with a certain degree of self-consciousness. It is a further 
condition for recipiency in its own right. As to the first point: conceptually speaking, self-
consciousness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the development of 
plans of life. One can be conscious of oneself without doing anything, without even 
feeling the need to decide not to do anything. Moreover, it only takes a memory to devise 
and stick to a plan. Either consciousness in not required, or our computers are not what 
we think they are. 
The second claim, that the capacity for having life-plans is a condition of recipi­
ency on its own, can be defended intuitively as well as analytically. Intuitively speaking, 
there is a difference between our evaluations of the harm done by killing an unwilling 
chicken and the harm done by murdering a young human being. The immorality of the 
latter seems to be of a different quality than the first. A possible reason for this bias 
against poultry is that we do not expect a chicken to have a long and meaningful, let alone 
a planned and remembered, life. Hence, and apart from the cruelly of killing itself, killing 
a chicken seems little else than hastening its natural death, whereas the murder of a human 
being entails the annihilation not only of that single individual before his natural lime, but 
also the destruction of his future and ihe future selves to which he is already emotionally 
attached. 
However, the argument from intuition is inconclusive. We will probably judge 
more moderately if we know lhat our murder victim suffered from a painful and fatal 
disease, and lhat he expressly desired death more than anything else. In this case, death 
was part of the dead person's plan of life, and our judgement about this fact is influenced 
by this fact. Apparently then, there is more to the moral relevancy of ihe capacity for 
having a plan of life than its mere existence. 
A second argument, one that is not based on intuition, throws a better light on this 
matter. The capacity for having a plan of life can only justify Ihe attribution of (a special 
kind of) recipiency if there is (a special kind of) harm done in obstructing it or benefit in 
advancing it. This in turn means that self-consciousness is required: there is no pain 
without someone suffering. We can imagine a plan of life without self-consciousness, but 
we cannot think of it as morally relevant without that quality. It also means that we must 
ask ourselves what it is that makes the capacity for having a plan of life so special. I have 
already given away part of the answer: we value a plan of life because it expresses the 
two typically human attributes of autonomy and agency. For a further defence of the worth 
of agency and autonomy I refer the reader to Chapter 4, section 19. There is no need to 
repeat the argumentation here. It is because of the special value we attach to agency and 
autonomy that each of us finds himself or herself to be morally relevant. Reciprocity then 
demands lhat if I am a recipient of justice by virtue of an attribute Z, you should also be 
recognized as a recipient if yours is the same attribute. As a consequence we are obliged 
to attribute recipiency to other humans but not to animals. 
Unlike self-consciousness, autonomy and agency do not qualify someone as a 
recipient to the degree lhat he or she has these attributes. One qualifies when having the 
capacity for both, and is disqualified when lacking them. In the first place, we cannot 
measure these qualities by their performance. Stoics, fatalists, monks and Buddhists will 
appear to be less autonomous and less agents than an average New York businessman, but 
that depends on the observer's different assessment of the possibility of human freedom 
and action. It thus depends on the reasons, possibly basic reasons, lhat different people 
have for believing themselves to be autonomous agents (or not, if that is what they 
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believe) - and as we saw in Part Π of this book, there is no impartial and objective moral 
standard for the evaluation of basic reasons. 
Secondly, I do not believe that we can measure autonomy and agency by the 
degree to which these capacities exist either - thereby putting Evelyn Hardcase in the same 
category as ourselves during the early stages of Evelyn's illness, and in that of future 
persons and animals in later phases. The only supporting argument I can think of is 
inconclusive and perhaps queslion-begging; on this point moral theory is likely to remain 
underdetermined. An animal may deserve the title of recipient less than a human being 
even if neither one is an autonomous agent, due to a difference in their genetic make-up. 
The animal never had it in its genes to be a self-conscious self-determining actor, the 
human did. As a consequence, Evelyn should still be considered a potentially autonomous 
agent, and the animal should noL While in coma, this potential is destined to keep on 
being potential, but it is still there - probably. 
Section 30: Causal and moral responsibility 
Whether a person or animal can be a recipient of justice depends partly on whether 
(s)he or it can be harmed or benefitted, but it also depends on what we do. The distribu­
tors have to be in a position to influence the existence of a recipient if (s)he or it is 
actually to count as a recipient. A living, self-conscious Martian who happens to be an 
autonomous agent can be a recipient of justice - but not a recipient of our justice, not as 
long as we do not live on Mars. Moreover, influence itself is not enough for recipiency; 
causal responsibility is not the same as moral responsibility. (I shall assume, in what 
follows, an understanding of responsibility that is both conventional and essentially 
Aristotelian: to be causally responsible one must (a) be able to influence or change 
something in the world, so that responsibility does not end when one refrains from doing 
something; (b) know that one can influence or change something; and (c) be able to know 
how the chains of causality work, more or less, so that one cannot be responsible for 
completely unpredictable consequences.) 
Our inquiry into the moral relevancy of responsibility, to which this section is 
devoted, will lead us to recognize that a distributor's moral responsibility for the welfare 
of prospective recipients is necessary to qualify them as recipients and, consequently, to 
serve as a ground for desert. This again will lead us to investigate a quite different but 
equally important question concerning responsibility: is a recipient's responsibility for his 
own welfare a ground of desert? On the latter issue, our conclusion will be an unsatisfac­
tory and provisional "yes, but..." However, before we temporarily concentrate on grounds 
of desert, let us first discuss the theme of recipiency and ask what it is that distributors 
"influence". 
We influence the future by turning left instead of right, meeting another partner 
and in due course causing other people to exist, and we influence present lives when 
driving people down - but giving a million pounds or life everlasting lo a genuine stoic 
will hardly influence her feelings or peace of mind. We can cause circumstances to change 
and persons (not) to exist, yet do not thereby necessarily change anyone's feelings, such as 
those of being treated unjustly or unfairly. But then again, not everyone is a stoic. 
Now we should distinguish two issues: the influence that a distributor has on 
people's feelings of being treated (un)justly, and the distributor's influence on their shares. 
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their rights. Ideally, the two come down to the same. Justice as impartiality is predicated 
on the existence of a society of reasonable persons. We, or the archpointers, are assumed 
to see things from the archpoint, looking only at what a reasonable distribution scheme 
would be. The conditions of the archpoint force us to consider feelings of support or 
disapproval only in so far as they are based on the reasonable desires and expectations of 
reasonable persons. Hence, archpointers judge the justice of distribution schemes on the 
basis of a universal measure for the meaning that allocated rights have to normal people, 
the equalisandum. (The equalisandum, or rather equalisanda, will be discussed in Chapter 
9.) Ideally then, influence can be defined both in terms of shares as causing a recipient's 
amount of equalisandum to change, and in terms of feelings as causing a recipient's 
feelings about his or her amount of equalisandum to change. 
Yet as this is not an ideal world, I shall stick to the first of these definitions only. 
In the case of the stoic described above, no amount of earthly goods could influence her 
feelings, though perhaps there are rights to other things that might influence her. In some 
other cases however, the allotment of rights and the feelings about allotted rights cannot 
be harmonized by an adequate definition of the equalisandum or by a better understanding 
of the recipient's feelings. A spoiled child can get as much as it asks, even more than any 
fair share could ever be, and still be unsatisfied. Alternatively, one of the greatest worries 
of children is to discover one day that their parents are becoming senile and are starting to 
behave like spoiled children. In cases like these, where the only logic in feelings is 
pathological, it is practically impossible to influence feelings in any predictable way. They 
can only be treated justly on an as-if basis: as if the recipients were rational persons. 
Defining influence as causing a recipient's amount of equalisandum to change still 
leaves us with our initial problems: what do we mean by causing?; and is any cause a 
good cause - does the simple fact that we as distributors influence, for instance, present 
and future species of animals create a moral responsibility on our part, and does this make 
them recipients? 
To start with the first question: if we want to make sense of notions like 
accountability, shame, agency, education, morality and in particular justice, we need an 
account of responsibility In terms of causality. In principle, the problem can be solved 
quite simply by following custom, that is, by considering every being that is capable of 
premeditation to be causally responsible for everything it knowingly caused. To deal with 
deliberate ignorance and uncertainties in calculations, it is reasonable to add that one is 
also responsible for the risks one takes and for consequences that could have been known. 
But in this apparently innocent description of causal responsibility, three elements prevent 
it from being understood as an all-or-nothing concept One is never "simply" responsible 
or not responsible. 
In the first place, responsibility is often shared. Consider just one grisly realistic 
example: as a representative of the government, you personally see to it that Mrs. A, a 
Tamil refugee, is put on a plane to Sri Lanka. Based on the ambassador's reports, your 
superiors decided that she would no longer be in danger in Sri Lanka and that she should 
therefore be sent back. The next day, your embassy reports that Mrs. A is murdered by 
unidentified terrorists. Of course, her killers are responsible for her death, but who is 
responsible for endangering her life in the first place? You, your superiors, the ambassa-
dor? Or perhaps your country's parliament which, after all, created or condoned the 
structures that allowed all this to happen? On our conception of causal responsibility, all 
those involved in Mrs. A's repatriation and in everything that caused it were partly 
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responsible, but it is extremely difficult to assess exactly who was responsible for which 
part. 
The problem of shared responsibility obviously also complicates the evaluation of 
moral responsibility and the prevention of further disasters. If we blame the organization, 
we may appear to be clearing the individuals; if we blame the individuals, it looks as if 
the structure of the organization needs no change; and if we blame both, we may induce 
divide-and-rule policies with the disadvantages of both other strategies (cf. Bovens 1990a: 
89 ff., 123 ff.). 
Fortunately, shared causal responsibility and the complications of responsibility in 
complex organizations are not directly relevant to the issue of recipiency. To be a 
recipient of justice, it suffices that one's share of the equalisanda can be changed by a 
distributor, no matter who that distributor is. (The latter point will be discussed briefly at 
the end of this section.) But these are not all the complications involved in apportioning 
responsibility.72 
Chance, of course, is another well-known source of complication. Consider a few 
simple dilemmas. (1) If you know that there is a 10% chance that your doing X to У 
causes harm to Z, are you responsible for Z"s misfortune? (2) Are you responsible if there 
is a 1% chance that your doing X to Y will cause Y to harm Z? (3) Are you responsible for 
causing X if you know there is a chance of X happening without knowing how high that 
chance is? (4) Are you responsible for causing A, which may cause B, which may in turn 
cause C, and so on down to Ω, endless generations from now - all with either known or 
unknown probabilities? Or, for a more complex example: (5) one's responsibility for a 
distributive action with a 90% chance of being 100% effective may well be judged to 
differ from that for an action with 100% effeclivity for 90% of the récipients. But then, 
can responsibilities be ranked at all - are you more responsible in case (1) than in case (3), 
for instance? 
In one respect, chance is directly irrelevant to the issue of moral responsibility. In 
general, we do not hold X responsible for what others Y, whom X has affected, do, on the 
assumption that (and in sofar as) these others Y are themselves capable of responsibility -
that Is, if and to the degree that Vs behaviour is not fully determined by X. In 1991-2, for 
instance, a television commercial showed fictive pictures of nice couples like Mr. and 
Mrs. Amin (parents of Idi) and Mr. and Mrs. Hitler (parents of Adolf), followed by the 
text "if only they had used Jiffy condoms". The condom makers had a point: the Hitlers 
and Amins were causally responsible for the existence of their children. Still, no one holds 
the Amins and Hitlers morally responsible for what their children did; they - the parents -
simply could not help it. 
Naturally, in sofar as we fully determine someone else's character or behaviour, 
moral responsibility cannot be passed on. Suppose that it is a uniformly known law of 
nature that anyone who was beaten by his or her parents during childhood will, with either 
100% or 50% certainty, one day beat up at least one person without any reason at all. For 
the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that the parents are autonomous agents, i.e., their 
actions are not caused by some outside source. In cither case, the moral responsibility is 
the parents', not the child's. The first case is simple enough: the parents carry full 
responsibility. In the latter case however, the complications involved in causal responsibil-
For further discussion of shared and unattributable responsibility see e.g. Bovens 1990a or Denton 1993: 
128 ff. 
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ity turn up again. They have taken a risk and are now obliged to explain why they thought 
it worth while or necessary to lake that risk. 
Yet in cases where chance complicates the apportioning of moral responsibility, it 
turns out to be irrelevant to the question of recipiency. We can think of the example of 
child beating again, or better still, a more complicated case involving shared responsibility 
such as the effect of the occupation of Somalia by several UN member states on justice 
and peace in the country. What matters for the attribution of recipiency is not the relative 
degree of moral responsibility that invaders and supporters and opponents of the occupa-
tion carry - but the fact that the people of Somalia actually became recipients, perhaps of 
some nations and perhaps, through (non-)membcrship of the United Nations Organization, 
of each and every nation of the world. 
Ignorance, subjective lack of available knowledge of one's actions or their 
consequences, is a third factor that complicates issues of moral, though not of causal, 
responsibility. To distinguish ignorance from chance, consider the following case. You are 
a general practitioner, and one of your patients has a heart attack. On the basis of recent 
research it is known that any patient suffering from a heart attack has a 40 to 50 percent 
chance of not surviving the next hour; it is as yet unclear which factors make it certain or 
more likely that a patient will survive. This is chance: absence of precise knowledge, of 
knowledge with 100 percent certainty. Now suppose that two of your patients have a heart 
attack at the same time. You cannot be at two places at the same time, so whom shall you 
attend to? One of the two is a heavy smoker, with a 50 percent chance of getting a second 
and probably fatal heart attack within a week; the other has no known dangerous faults. If 
you do not have access to this information (e.g. because the smoker hides it from you), 
you will act in ignorance involuntarily; if you do know these facts, however, you cause 
yourself to act in ignorance. Ignorance causes one to act - perhaps - differently than one 
would have done knowing more. It does not however change one's role as a cause nor, 
necessarily, one's causal responsibility. Voluntary ignorance in fact adds one more chain 
of the course of events to one's responsibility. 
Sometimes ignorance is unavoidable, in which case the consequences of acting in 
ignorance (may be, and provided that the act is not Intrinsically bad, as I suppose to be the 
case for the sake of argument, are) excusable. Consider all you could know about the 
effects of eating a particular sandwich. By the time you have calculated all the certain, 
probable and possible consequences for yourself and all others, you will have been dead 
for aeons. Or consider the relation between America and Europe before 1492. In ignorance 
of one another's existence, the Europeans could not be responsible for the fate of the 
Americans - and vice versa. 
At other limes, ignorance is premeditated, i.e., one causes oneself to be ignorant 
where this could have been avoided. Premeditated ignorance can make an enormous 
difference for moral responsibility. It need not: if the information you deprive yourself of 
is irrelevant but, human as you are, might tempt you into acting immorally - say, in the 
case of the doctor above, if the information concerns the criminal records of both 
patients - acting in ignorance can be a virtue. Yet it can also be a vice. We do not go 
about catching other people to hang them on hooks through their cheeks, swing them 
around for a while and be photographed with them, except perhaps in certain houses of ill 
repute. A principal reason for not doing this is because we know that it may seriously hurt 
a human being. Some of us do such things to fish, though, and do not bother to find out if 
their bizarre reactions to being pierced and hung and swung about arc not perhaps more 
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than simple reflexes. Assuming that the question can be answered at all, no amount of 
action or inaction taken to remain ignorant diminishes the fisher's moral responsibility. 
Now where do all these complications take us? Firstly, to the rather straightforward 
conclusion that the least bit of moral responsibility on the part of X for the well-being of Y 
suffices to qualify a living, self-conscious and autonomous agent К as a recipient in 
relation to X. Secondly, we observe that these complications also hinder attempts to 
answer a few other questions that relate to distributive justice: 
1. Should a distributor, who is only in part morally responsible for a recipient's 
amount of equalisandum, take full responsibility for the recipient's fate? For 
example: should the German government or the West German taxpayer cover the 
costs of the environmental problems in East Germany, given the fact that the 
greater part of these problems dales back to before the unification in 19917 (I 
assume for the purposes of this example that no other potential caretakers exist.) 
2. If there is more than one distributor for the same recipient or set of recipients, 
which one should take first responsibility? For example: in a country with local, 
regional and national governments, social security could be a task of each of the 
three or of a combination of them - or, alternatively, they could each try to put the 
responsibility in the hands of the other levels. 
3. Does a recipient's (absence of) moral responsibility make a relevant difference 
for his or her claims to the equalisandum? 
The first two questions are, for one thing, a bit out of place in this chapter. They pertain 
to a question that cannot be fully answered until we reach chapter 10, namely that of the 
designation of the distributor. They are also, in themselves, relatively simple. 
Moral responsibility is either taken seriously, down to the last consequence of the 
last act, or we might as well forget about it. Imagine that you walk past a pond where a 
child is drowning. There is no-one else around, no way of getting help, and you can swim. 
In a way, this makes you the distributor of the little child's life. By not doing anything, 
you will kill her. Even though you have not caused her to be in these circumstances, you 
are now morally responsible for her life. By the same token, even if a distributor is only 
partly responsible for X's current situation, his influence on X's share in the social product 
makes him morally responsible for Jfs well-being. All this is, of course, under the 
condition that X can legitimately claim the distributor's help. If the girl in the pond turns 
out to be merely a pretender who can swim like a fish, her cry for help requires no action. 
The second problem, that of shared responsibility for the distribution of the 
equalisanda, is essentially a question of priority and not of responsibility; it will be dealt 
with in Chapter 10. Suffice it to say here that, by the same logic as before, all potential 
distributors are responsible. If one of them ducks his responsibilities, the others lake over, 
willy-nilly (cf. Singer 1985: 252-253). 
The last question, about responsibility as a basis of desert, is the most complicated 
of all. A positive answer will immediately raise two further questions, namely how to 
determine the degree of responsibility (a question that I have so far carefully avoided), and 
how to weigh responsibility relative to other grounds of desert (a question that cannot 
possibly be answered until we know what these other grounds are). And the answer must 
unquestionably be positive: moral responsibility really makes a relevant difference. If we 
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were to set it aside as irrelevant, we would nol take agency and autonomy seriously, nor, 
as a consequence, the existence of reasons for acting, nor the recipients's HIS-reasons -
which would imply a severe violation of impartiality. 
In one respect, moral responsibility is relevant because we apportion praise, blame 
and other things that can be expressed in terms of the equalisanda, on the basis of 
responsibility. This is the view on justice which we inherited from Antiquity (cf. in 
particular Arislolle 1959, 1980: 1135b9 ff.). In the light of justice as impartiality, it is quite 
understandable that responsibility is seen as a basis of desert: it is consistent with the 
demand that reasons for action are taken seriously. Of course, there is little an impartial 
distributor can do with moral responsibility except recognize that something should be 
done with it. To the degree that reasons for acting are moral rather than empirical, and 
given the absence of a criterion for the worth of such basic reasons, all a distributor can 
say is that HIS-reasons should be respected. But we will save this question for later. There 
is another, more urgent problem to be dealt with first. 
Paradoxically, in a second respect we apportion units of the equalisanda on the 
basis of absence of responsibility, and this in exactly opposite ways: in a way, good luck 
is often punished and bad luck rewarded. Or so it seems: the more you earn, the higher 
the taxes; the less you earn, the higher the subsidies. Arguments for distribution on this 
basis invariably refer to the fact that a person's misfortune came about "through no fault 
of his own", respectively that her fortune was "not of her own making". 
In antique times and in pre-modern Christian thought, (bad) luck without responsi-
bility was not seen as a matter of justice at all; it was thought of in terms of caritas and 
divine judgements. In modern liberal theories of social justice however, somehow luck and 
bad luck have become the substance of social justice7'. This might seem to be a minor 
historical detail, adding up to little more than a new name for the same old rose, but it is 
more: the inclusion of fortune and misfortune as grounds for distributive justice indicates a 
paradigmatic change in the way we think about responsibility. 
Enlarging the scope of social justice to include compensation for bad luck (caritas) 
and good fortune means, essentially, that the responsibility for the well-being of recipients 
has been assigned to society regardless of the reason for changes in the recipients's 
fortune. There no longer is a direct link between causal responsibility for the creation of 
an "unnatural" or unjust stale of affairs, and moral responsibility for ils readjustment or 
recompensation. In classical terms, fortune and misfortune are no longer seen as a reward 
or punishment from God or the gods on the one hand, and as invitations for man to show 
mercy and admiration on the other - they are now simply cases of repairable and unde-
served good or bad luck. Nor has the link between justice and reciprocity of relations 
survived. Justice is no longer directly associated with an obligation to restore an equilib-
rium between services rendered and rewards deserved, as was the case in the classical 
(Aristotelian) conceptions of retributive and distributive justice. 
In a word, justice has been burcaucralizcd: to make a legitimate claim to justice, it 
now suffices to show that a change or lack of change in the amounts of a recipient's 
equalisanda docs not harmonize wiih a society's criteria for such changes. Thus, to 
A noteworthy exception to this rule Is offered by libertarian anti-dislribution theorists like Robert 
Nozick, In whose theory redistribution Is nearly always an Illegitimate violation of Individual natural rights. Even 
(hough libertarians will agree that good or bad luck arc In a sense undeserved, they find thai to be insufficient 
reason to justify the violation of other people's rights. 
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elucidate (he paradox detected above, responsibility is now seen as a ground for desert in 
sofar as the criteria for social justice demand that one deserved a change in one's amounts 
of equalisanda, whereas any change in absence of responsibility is judged to be an 
undeserved change which therefore ought to be compensated or repaired. 
It will be clear then that there are at least two views on (absence of) responsibility 
as a ground of desert. In the first and classical sense, responsibility does, and absence of 
(causal) responsibility for good and bad luck does not, qualify a recipient as deserving 
treatment according to the principles of distributive justice. On the second view, that of 
modern liberal theories of justice, both grounds are considered good enough - but never on 
their own. The absence or presence of responsibility, together with the evaluation of 
changes in well-being as fortunate or unfortunate, determines if and to which degree 
society should compensate changes in well-being. 
Once more, the difference may seem to be one only in name; either we call all 
society-based acts of redistribution distributive justice, or we call a specific class of 
redistributive actions acts of mercy. I could be perfectly happy with either option, if it 
were not for two things. In the first place, there is good reason to believe that the classical 
view can violate impartiality. To see good and bad luck as judgements of the gods 
certainly presupposes an objective (divine) and substantial criterium for desert - a non-
impartial view of the good, in other words. 
Of course, one can also think of (mis)forlune as calling for corrective redistribution 
without invoking the idea of divine judgement. But at this point a second objection can be 
raised, to (he effect that such an act of corrective redistribution no longer differs in any 
relevant respect from an act of distributive justice. Firstly, there is no difference in the 
way mercy and justice are applied. In either case, whatever it is that is distributed ought to 
be distributed justly: equally to equals and in proportion to the inequality of uncquals. 
Thus, an act of mercy should follow the same principles as an act of justice. Secondly, 
there is no difference in the amounts distributed under the guise of mercy or justice. 
Nothing has been said so far about the total amount of rights or goods that ought to be 
distributed in cases of mercy and justice respectively. Intuitively, an act of mercy is 
limited only by what distributors or contributors are willing to give, whereas the upper and 
lower limits of the amounts assigned in an act of distributive justice are defined by the 
available new stock (e.g. this year's Gross National Product). But our intuitions in this are 
misleading. 
What happens when (mis)fortune strikes, say, Harry Stottle's wallet? Either money 
moves from him to Y, or to him from Y, or it falls from the skies, or it disappears into 
nothingness. In all these cases, the change not only influences Harry Stottle but everyone 
else as well: relative to Harry Stottle (and sometimes Y), everyone's share in the social 
stock changes. Moreover, not only Harry Stottle's (mis)fortune was undeserved - but so 
are, obviously, all these other relative changes. If we want to judge whether any corrective 
redistribution is called for, we shall consequently have to look at the complete sum of 
undeserved advantages and disadvantages. In short, there arc definite upper and lower 
limits to the amounts that can be redistributed in an act of mercy, and these limits arc not 
determined by good will; they are identical to the limits for acts of distributive justice. 
With this, we have answered one part of the question which we set out to answer, 
i.e., how to determine the exact degree of (a recipient's) relevant responsibility or absence 
of responsibility. We have seen that the latter part is simply irrelevant. The absence of 
responsibility is no reason against nor in favour of the distribution resulting from 
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(mis)fortune, nor one for or against a corrective redistribution (such as an act of mercy), 
nor one for any exact share in the redistributable stock. If we are looking for criteria for 
caritas, we have to look elsewhere, that is, we have to look for grounds for desert other 
than (absence of) responsibility. 
This still leaves us with the problem of measuring responsibility. Unfortunately, 
there can be no measurement of responsibility, at least not an impartial measurement. As 
we saw before, there are ihree complicating factors, chance, ignorance, and shared 
responsibility, which prevented us from determining exactly how responsible a distributor 
is for the well-being of a recipient - had it been necessary to determine this. The same 
trinity prevenís us from measuring a recipient's responsibility for his own welfare. 
Determining each person's contribution in a case of shared responsibility is a 
technical problem, but one of a complexity that can hardly be underestimated. We would 
have to map all events and actions connecting each person to an ultimate consequence -
but the chain of causes leading to such a simple consequence as the author typing the next 
word is already far beyond the capacities of anyone to describe. What is more, any rule or 
system apportioning personal responsibility in a collective enterprise presupposes the 
impossible, namely that all external influences can be sifted out: chance, ignorance, and 
duress of all sorts (ranging from physical coercion to subtle meddling with the uncon-
scious and to educational factors). 
The problems with ignorance and chance are moral rather than technical. To 
determine when ignorance is excusable we need a conception of "reasonable" ignorance, 
allowing us to weigh the costs and benefits of gathering or neglecting information. It is 
clear that this implies that we need a more substantial theory of the good than weak 
rationality alone: a criterion for ignorance demands that the moral meaning of conse-
quences, (he value of the good and bad things in life, can be measured and scaled. But as 
we cannot assume the existence of an objective theory of the good without violating 
impartiality, we cannot impartially assess ignorance. 
The same problem hampers any measurement of chance: we need a theory of 
"reasonable" risks, and there can be no such theory that does not somehow favour some 
views of the good life over others, or favours some HIS-reasons more than others. 
Analogous to the principle of reasonable ignorance, it would need to be based on a theory 
about the worth of consequences. Moreover, a principle of reasonable risks would be 
based on a theory about the proper attitude towards risks, describing whether or not to 
take a chance when the odds are 10 to one, or what to do when the chances are unknown 
but the consequences predictable. And again, such a theory cannot be impartial. Consider, 
for instance, Rawls's preference for the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty, which 
"tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the 
alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcome of the others" 
(Rawls 1971: 152). Clearly, the maximin rule can conflict with HIS-reasons like courage 
or self-sacrifice for the sake of others, or simply with the desire to live dangerously.74 
The conclusion which we must drawn from the examination of these obstacles is 
highly ambiguous. Responsibility is a ground for desert, but it cannot be measured 
impartially. It must be given weight when distributing, but any specific weight given to it 
is arbitrary and will quite probably constitute a violation of impartiality. Whatever weight 
See Jlarbcr (1975 292 ff ). Koller (1987 93) and Rawls himself (1974 37-8) for Rawls's non-neutral 
reasons for choosing maxirrun. see also Lehntng's discussion (Lchning 1986 124 ff, 205 ff ) of this Uieme. 
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the principles of minimal justice can give to responsibility seems bound to be purely 
formal. In Chapter 9, I shall inquire to which rights the concept of distributive justice 
applies, and on that occasion further develop the idea of a purely formal acknowledgment 
of responsibility. For now, I must leave the issue as it stands. 
Section 31: Society and exploitation 
So far, we have determined that a recipient of justice is a living, conscious, 
autonomous agent for whose well-being at least one distributor is morally responsible. Our 
next goal is to find out if each recipient of justice is also a recipient of social justice. The 
answer will, on the whole, be negative. We shall examine several arguments to sustain the 
intuitive feeling that the welfare of our next-door neighbour does not just matter more than 
that of a future lobster (we have already determined that in section 29), but that his 
welfare also differs qualitatively from that of lobsters. It will prove to be more difficult to 
maintain that our next-door neighbour's well-being differs qualitatively from, and is more 
important than, that of a far-off foreigner. I shall argue that we can only distinguish 
between social and extra-social justice if we are prepared to give up the quest for a perfect 
definition of society distinguishing it flawlessly from some outside world, and instead 
accept a radically individualized conception of the recipient of social justice as one who is 
involved in a network of exploitable social relationships. The latter has the benefit of 
being subtle, but the disadvantage of being less easily quantifiable. 
As a rule, mainstream theorists of justice circumvent this problem by simply 
assuming the existence of a self-sufficient society. Strangers and foreign countries come 
into the picture later, if possible one by one - perhaps due to an idealized and rather 
controversial interpretation of American history. Rawls opens his book with the implicit 
assumption of the existence of a society (Rawls 1971: 3), and only after a very long time 
incidentally touches on justice between nations - nation apparently being a synonym for 
society (Rawls 1971: 378). In Nozick's theory, the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders (relative to a stale) is at least defended as legitimate: it arises out of the invisible 
hand process that transforms individual security contracts into a minimal stale. But there is 
no indication in this theory that there are limits to membership: the minimal slate could be 
a world state or as small as the Vatican. Ackerman, as the reader may remember, lets 
society start from scratch. The voyagers on his spaceship simply define society, and only 
after they have set up their tents and divided the available resources among themselves do 
strangers enter the stage (Ackerman 1980: 72, 89). 
Mainstream theorists of justice tend to frame recipiency in such a way that the 
question of distinguishing on morally relevant grounds between members and strangers, 
intra- and extra-social recipients, can hardly be problematical. The difference seems to be 
there already, as a matter of fact - which it is not. It is an illusion to think that we are 
born with the freedom to choose to sign protection contracts or to think that any society is 
self-sufficient (Beitz 1979: 143 ff.) or entitled to the resources that would make it self-
sufficient (Beitz 1979: 136 ff.) - and it has been some time, quite probably thousands of 
years, since colonists discovered really uninhabited lands. 
The most serious recent attempt (in the field of social justice) to indicate why 
being a member of a society makes a moral difference for a person's claims as a recipient 
has been made by the communitarians. They see the exceptional quality of social bonds in 
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partaking in, or unconsciously contributing to and profiting from, society. Man, so they 
say, is born in society. He does not create it or choose it, but at best reforms it. In their 
view, society is something else than the company of others. It is the company of and 
intercourse with all those with whom we share a particular trait: a common understanding 
or culture. We, as a society, can decide freely whom to apply our standards of justice to, 
but the problem is that the application of our principles to outsiders is not justice, really, 
but rather a gift - one that may not even be welcome. The Western understanding of 
freedom of speech and thought is not something that is very much appreciated by muslim 
countries, as the case of Salman Rushdie may illustrate. Or, for another example, the 
European conviction that capital punishment is morally and judicially wrong, that it is 
even more wrong to execute people after twenty years of torment on death row, and that it 
is barbaric to execute juvenile delinquents does not seem to impress Third World nations -
or the Americans. 
Although justice is a human creation, it is not a creation of conscious beings. Its 
content, its meaning, is determined by the dark processes that change and differentiate 
cultures. Hence our conception of justice is not the same as that of the French was in 1784 
or as that of Eurasian society in 2084 will be. Absolute judgements of justice are 
impossible: what we call just, they may well call unjust. Recipiency is then defined by the 
simple quality of being able to receive justice as such, that is, by the quality of being able 
to understand the conception of justice of one's own society and of appreciating it as a 
conception of justice rather than of anything else. 
The communitarian view presupposes several problematical ideas, such as the 
futility of an exchange of views and ideas between societies: even if mutual understanding 
between cultures were possible, it would be impossible to voluntarily deny our own 
culture and adapt our views to those of others or vice versa; and even if adaption were 
possible, there would be no standard by which we could determine which society would 
have to adapt its culture in which respects to which other culture. But such problems do 
not need to concern us here; they have already been dealt with in previous chapters. More 
stressing is the discovery that communitarianism does not solve our problem; it only 
displaces it. The communitarian view is already predicated on an understanding of society 
or culture, one that is justified on the basis of a matter-of-fact (subconscious) consensus 
only. But can we really agree on a definition of society, and if so on which, and for what 
morally sound reasons? 
I shall distinguish five different interpretations of society, each of which is to some 
extent implicitly embodied in communitarian or mainstream conceptions of society - and 
each of which turns out to be either not the whole truth, or even if true insufficient to 
justify exclusion and inclusion, or both. The first three should be familiar enough; they are 
respectively Rawlsian, communitarian, and Aristotelian. The fourth has, for some time, 
been popular in the circle of environmentalists, and the fifth represents common-sensical 
realism: 
(1) Society as a cooperative venture for mutual benefit; 
(2) Society as an entity defined by a common culture; 
(3) Society as an Aristotelian polis in which man is free to choose rules that 
deviate from the laws of necessity; 
(4) Society as each person's self-proclaimed moral environment; and 
(5) Society as a political unity (state). 
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The first of Ihcse interpretations is inadequate for two reasons: society is both more 
and less than a cooperative venture for the production of a surplus relative to the fruits of 
individual efforts. It is more because not every beneficial cooperation of two or more 
individuals is a society. One would hesitate to apply the term society to the exchange of a 
grocer's cauliflower for a client's money, or to a cooperative venture of American and 
European scientists - or gangsters, for that matter. Thus, the idea of society requires more 
than mutual benefit. It must at least include the structure that allows and protects projects 
of this kind. Yet society is also less than a cooperative venture. It does not necessarily 
operate through cooperation nor to the benefit of all its members. It can exploit them -
"them" including citizens of foreign nations that have been forced rather than asked to 
cooperate or, if the concept of exploitation can be applied to them, even animals (cf. 
Benton 1993: 68). It can even without collapsing kill them by millions in some great 
cause. 
Still, supposing that the description of society as a cooperative venture for mutual 
benefit were actually adequate, it would still not be morally adequate. Whether there can 
be any mutual benefit in cooperation depends on (1) a working consensus on what 
constitutes a benefit, and (2) on the arbitrary characteristics of the parties involved, on 
traits that no one can help having. An example may illustrate this. We known that 
cooperation between three or more people can lead to a redistribution of work. Let us say 
that it allows two people to produce food for three and that it allows a third to spend his 
time philosophizing about justice. The third man in this is barely fit enough for physical 
labour to produce his own food, but he is better than the two others at theorizing, whereas 
the qualities of the others are of an opposite nature. These then are our undeserved and 
therefore morally arbitrary capacities. Now I, the philosopher, may think that I add 
something to society, but whether we three will cooperate, and whether our cooperation 
will be profitable, also depends on the value the others attach to my capacities, i.e., on 
morally arbitrary considerations. 
Secondly, "cultural" societies no longer exist, if ever they did. The borders of 
cultures are or have become too diffuse. At times, an international "shared understanding" 
and cooperation is the only way to fight war, plague, famine and death - and the number 
of international organizations founded this century show that this is possible. At other 
times, regions which consider themselves part of a more extended ("multinational") society 
- but nevertheless culturally differ - could in principle sustain themselves. Countries like 
Scotland and Bavaria are perfect examples of this. Cultures are not congruent with what 
we usually call societies: American codes of behaviour and taste have conquered the 
civilized world, while the U.S. itself offers room to relatively independent cultures like the 
Amish, Mormons, orthodox Jews, or Chinese.73 
Thirdly, like Aristotle's polis, a society can "outlaw" itself in relation to the laws 
of nature and choose its own terms of membership, operation and cooperation by means of 
a constitution. However, the Aristotelian polis had an ideal size. Its lower limit was 
defined by the population and area needed for self-sufficiency, and the upper limited was 
determined by the size at which a state's constitution stopped being effective (Aristotle 
1981: 1326b2). In our modem limes these criteria have lost their clarity. The requirements 
I should add that. In sofar as a culture incorporates a substantial conception of the good (It need not, as 
Granarne Lock once remarked: Scotsmen do not have to believe that they are better than others to hold on to their 
own ways and language). It can be neither impartial nor serve as an impartial starting point for a theory of justice. 
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for self-sufficiency depend on the level of luxury or frugality we - the "international 
society" rather than isolated slates - desire and believe possible to sustain, whereas it 
seems to be possible to warrant the effectivily of a constitution for hundreds of millions of 
U.S. citizens nearly as well as for Aristotle's thousands. 
Fourthly, as the three previously discussed more or less objective criteria for the 
characterization of societies fail to single out society as a matter of fact, let alone as 
morally unique, it seems that we are thrown back at subjective criteria: societies seem to 
define themselves. For the sake of argument, we can even go so far as to suppose that 
society is each person's self-proclaimed moral environment. 
Some writers, in particular in the field of environmental ethics, have in fact based 
theories of just action on individual proclamations of society. Their key proposition is that 
exchanges and contact create responsibility (Wenz 1988: 316). Other creatures are 
vulnerable; the more I or we interact with them, the more I can influence them for better 
or for worse, and the more responsibility I consequently carry for their well-being. On this 
view, the world is seen as a set of concentric circles of diminishing moral importance, 
starting with the actor at the centre, and spreading out from friends and family to 
neighbourhood, animals, other societies, and the whole of nature. The private circle of 
interaction determines what is due to whom. Everyone and everything / (as the individual 
at the centre of the circles of interaction) know or could know would be a recipient of 
social justice, the justice of my private society. Every interaction involving me would have 
to be judged in terms of my social justice. 
The ecological concentric circles theory obviously disregards any fundamental 
difference that may exist between humans and, say, a snail, an oak, or a river. But this 
cannot be held against the theory: it is perfectly immune to that sort of critique. Even the 
actual absence of any living person overtly adhering to it cannot disprove it. Ecologisti, 
aware of the intuitively implausible inflation of titles to which the theory gives rise, have 
nevertheless introduced auxiliary theses about the possession of consciousness, sentience 
or plans of life, to establish that some parts of nature are less capable than others of 
interacting, and hence also less morally relevant and less deserving in terms of justice. 
Still, this cannot keep an individual from being more concerned about her pet than about 
her neighbour if she so desires. 
The only way to successfully contradict the concentric circles theory is by asserting 
that even if it were a good basis for individual ethical behaviour, and even if it were true 
that society is founded on individual acts of recognition of individual responsibility, i.e., 
that it does not take two to tango - even then the theory fails to give any reason for 
distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, except individual fancy. On this view, the 
extent of society is defined by what or whom I feel responsible for, and worse, by the way 
in which I decide to understand responsibility. Thus, regardless of whether the concentric 
circles society is a matter of fact or not, it offers no morally sound distinction between 
intra- and extra-social recipients. 
The fifth and last conception of society, society as a political unity, perhaps 
conforms best to the conditions of real life. What we call society nowadays is most often 
defined in purely pragmatic, constitutional terms as an area of land, its native or natural-
ized inhabitants, and their common institutions - in short, a state. This definition has the 
advantage of apparent clarity and relative simplicity, but is as arbitrary as the concentric 
circles theory. For one, we are often subjects of more than one set of common institutions. 
In the former Soviet Union and in the present-day European Union, both national and 
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supra-national governments claimed, respectively claim, authority. A citizen of one of the 
member states of the European Union is at the same time a European citizen. Also, each 
and every one of us can be prosecuted for crimes against humanity by one of the many 
world-wide common institutions. 
Moreover, a distinction based on nationality is often evidently morally arbitrary. 
Even if a government or slate can be shown to be morally legitimate, which appears to be 
rather difficult, it cannot fence itself off from the outside world, nor from the conse­
quences of its actions on the outside world (cf. Beilz 1979: 79, 122). Suppose that the 
government of nation A decides to build a nuclear reactor, which will produce enough 
energy to export some of its output to a second country B, at the border with that second 
country. In doing so, the government of A distributes health risks to its own citizens as 
well as to people who live right across the border. It is hard to maintain that the formal 
difference between citizens of A and citizens of В (the latter arc legally and on paper none 
of this government's concern) can justify a decision to treat the (health of the) citizens of 
A differently from those of B. 
What I have done so far is explain why some of the definitions with which one 
tries to catch the essence of society, a term which we use and understand without much 
difficulty in everyday life, fail to point out why membership of society makes a relevant 
difference in matters of justice. I now want to introduce a new conception of society that 
does not have these disadvantages, while nevertheless incorporating elements and ideas 
typical of the five rejected notions. 
A first mistake that we need to avoid is that of thinking of society merely in terms 
of the attributes of individuals, as the concentric circles theory would want us to. An 
adequate understanding of social justice as social starts with the observation that recipi­
ency has nothing to do with the qualities I may happen to share with you - life, sense, 
responsibility, or whatnot. What we really want to know is how a special type of relation­
ship between persons can give rise to special questions of justice. 
Moreover, a relationship cannot give rise to questions of justice if there is nothing 
we can do about it. The relation or the structure of the relation must be potentially open to 
change by one of the parlies involved - in accordance with the Aristotelian conception of 
society. I call relations of this kind social relations, as distinguished from unalterable 
natural relations. The relation between the sun and the planets is (currently and from the 
human point of view) unchangeable and poses no problems regarding justice. The relation 
you, gentle reader, and I have is, on the other hand, of a changeable nature and can give 
rise to questions of justice - such as whether this book is worth its price. 
Next to having a social character, relations need to be changeable in a special way: 
they must be exploitable or open to the avoidance of exploitation. The notion of exploita­
tion to which I refer here is derived from (Philippe van Parijs's reformulation of) John 
Roemer's interpretation of exploitation as X-exploitation: a person is X-exploited (X-
exploits) if she could be better off (worse off) if X were equalized (cf. Van Parijs 1992: 
157 ff.). On my interpretation of the idea, X stands for anything that influences a person's 
share of the equalisanda. The relation between employer and employee is both changeable 
and exploitable - the employer can make the employee worse off (or belter off) in terms 
of wages, the employee can make the employer belter off, or worse off, in terms of labour 
performance. The relation a confessing Catholic has with his or her confessor is, on the 
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other hand and ideally, inexploitable: neither the confessing nor the forgiving parlies can 
be made worse off or better off than canon law allows.76 
Three things should be noted about this rather open definition of exploitation. In 
the first place, it includes relations characterized by an active avoidance of moral 
responsibility. If neighbour A's house is on fire, fl's decision to do nothing, not even call 
the fire brigade, can still count as establishing an exploitable social relation between A and 
B. Secondly, the existence of X-exploitabilily does not make an X-expIoiled relation 
morally wrong or avoidance of X-exploitation morally right. The observation that a 
particular relation is based on exploitation is a statement of fact, not of value. The fact 
that Cissy Roo is politically exploited by us if she does not have the right to vote like we 
do, need not be unjust or undeserved: Cissy may be a tourist or a criminal. Thirdly, note 
that X-exploitation, unlike the conception of society in terms of mutual benefit, is not 
predicated on (consensus on) any particular theory of the good. All we need to discover X-
exploilability is the existence of someone's interest in or desire for some right.77 
Finally, society is in essence more than an exploitable social relation: it is a 
particular structure, an ordered system, of such relations. I already remarked that a society 
is more than an accidental encounter between two or more individuals. What we usually 
understand to be a society is a whole set of interconnected persons and relations, an 
association that does not end with the entry or departure of one or more persons. One 
special and, for matters of justice at least, highly relevant trait of this system is the fact 
that, as a structure, it shapes and influences (other) social relations and, consequently, the 
well-being of individuals. 
To clarify this we can contrast a society with a single-parent family and with the 
state of nature. In their roles as distributors, a single father or mother has direct personal 
influence on his or her children; the people who run a society and act as distributors, on 
the other hand, can only act through the channels and within the limits of social institu-
tions. In a state of nature, any relation is possible as long as nature permits it and others 
do not interfere. Unlike the last, a society provides checks, balances and obstacles to 
human action next to and other than the actions of other persons inside or outside the 
system. Some of these restraining factors are legal, others cultural, economic, political or 
psychological. There is no law in the stale of nature, no tradition, no norms for correct 
and proper behaviour, no guaranteed prices for international trade, no tax, no stable market 
structure, no police, no authority, no social control. Together, these restraints add up to a 
new factor with its own independent influence on the well-being of recipients, i.e., on their 
share of the cqualisanda - a fact that, by definition, makes membership of society morally 
relevant. 
Understood in this sense, as the structure of exploitable social relationships, society 
is a ground for recipiency in the same way that life, consciousness, agency or moral 
responsibility were: membership of society is a trait that makes recipients out of creatures, 
whether they like it or not. Yet the significance of membership is also fundamentally 
different: it does not create or differentiate recipients as such, but rather adds to and 
fragments the influence a distributor has on their well-being. 
My formulation of the criteria of exploilability and changeability make it difficult to see how the human 
concepì of "society" could be applied to (he "social" life of animals - pace e.g. Ted Denton (Denton 1993: 53 ff.). 
Compare conditions Rl and R3 of the archpoint in section 25 above. 
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Noie, finally, that recipients can be embedded in more than one structure, more 
than one society: a local community or a city as well as a province, state, federation and 
the world community (cf. Beitz 1979: 145). I shall discuss the consequences of this 
complication - it raises the question, again, of determining which distributor will have the 
first responsibility for the well-being of recipients - at more length in chapter 10. 
Section 32: Being there 
Can possible persons be concrete recipients? So far I have assumed that they can, 
but the arguments concerning agency, responsibility, and membership would not in any 
way loose their strength if possible persons - or possible animals, for that matter - were 
excluded. There is some reason to consider the exclusion of future generations: it sounds 
quixotic to speak of the agency of, responsibility for, and society of, creatures that do not 
even exist. With this intuitive argument against justice between generations in mind, I shall 
first look at some reasons that point in the other direction: care and impartiality with 
regard to generations. We shall find these to be insufficient. Next, I shall examine whether 
perhaps future individuals can be recipients of present-day justice, instead of future 
generations. Again, our conclusions will be negative. Neither possible generations nor 
possible persons can be recipients; consequently, there is no place for them in the 
principles of justice - at least, not as subjects. 
The case for justice between generations is often very poorly sustained. A 
surprising illustration of this thesis is John Rawls's treatment of the subject - surprising, as 
Rawls is not exactly known for inaccuracy. In Rawls's theory, the contracting parties are 
expected to be mutually disinterested. They neither care for nor detest the well-being of 
others. As a consequence - as one of the consequences - each person's interests carry the 
same weight. A major exception78 to this rule concerns their relation to future gener­
ations, or more precisely to their direct descendants - for which it turns out that the people 
in the original position do care. That is, it is assumed "that a generation cares for its 
immediate descendants, as fathers say care for their sons" (Rawls 1971: 288). The 
contracting parties must be seen as representatives of family lines, not knowing to which 
generation they belong, or otherwise "there is no reason for them to agree to undertake 
any saving whatever" (Rawls 1971: 292). To protect the interests of future generations, 
Rawls argues, the people in the original position will want the principles of justice to be 
constrained by a just savings principle (Rawls 1971: 284 ff.). 
But why assume that we, or people in the original posilion, or archpoinlcrs, should 
care for future generations? One reason Rawls mentions is that "men have a natural duty 
to uphold and to further just institutions and for this the improvement of civilization up to 
a certain level is required" (Rawls 1971: 293). Elsewhere he defends this duly as inspired 
by "the desire to obtain similar liberties for the next generation" and by the duty to 
represent the interests of others by choosing for ihcm in the way we believe they would 
choose themselves (Rawls 1971: 208-9). But this seems to be tautological, for the fact that 
our present choices will influence future generations is in itself no reason to care for what 
happens to Ihcm, unless it is already presupposed that we care. 
There is α second limit lo the equal representation of each person's interests in justice: the assumption of 
a self-sufficient society principally excludes the interests of foreigners - whatever foreigners may be. 
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Rawls's second argument is that "persons in different generations have duties and 
obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation ... is bound 
by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define justice between 
persons at different moments of lime" (Rawls 1971: 293). The argument seems to derive 
its force from an analogy: if, as Rawls argues one section later, we must be impartial 
towards the different periods in our life instead of opting for (e.g.) instant satisfaction of 
present desires at the cost of later benefits, then we should also be impartial between one 
generation and the next instead of ... etcetera. The best I can make of it is that the latter 
choice is itself inspired by the fact that the contracting parties do not know to which 
generation they belong, yet know that they care for future generations. Which again 
presupposes the conclusion. Apart from this, it is an argument that might convince people 
in the original position but not archpointers. It is none of the archpointers's business to 
determine that one way of looking at the distribution of welfare over a life is belter than 
another - to suppose the opposite would come down to a negation of neutrality towards 
HIS-reasons. 
What Rawls shows when arguing for the just savings principle is that if (1) we 
have obligations to future generations, then (2) it is reasonable to suppose that the people 
in the original position have the right attitude of care for the interests of future gener-
ations. As a consequence of this altitude, (3) the contracting parlies choose for a particular 
principle for the treatment of future generations, and (4) we as inhabitants of the real 
world are, by implication, obliged to follow this just savings principle. In other words, 
Rawls succeeds in arguing for a particular principle, but he fails to show why it would be 
rational to care about our descendant's fate in Ihe first place, and why we should care for 
future generations in general rather than for our own flesh and blood in particular. 
Absence of proof is, however, nol the same as a refutation. First of all, it may be 
true that we should care about our own descendants and, consequently, about future 
generations. Secondly, it may be true that we should care about future generations 
regardless of any attachment to our own descendants. To positively exclude future 
generations from the class of recipients of social justice we must refute both theses, as I 
shall try to do now. 
The first argument seems to be Rawls's. I already quoted him as saying "that a 
generation cares for its immediate descendants, as fathers say care for their sons" (Rawls 
1971: 288; my italics). It is reasonable, both in Rawls's original position and from the 
archpoint of view, to demand that any consideration for future individuals be distributed 
impartially on the basis of reciprocal recognition. The fact that one child has a caring 
parent is not a relevant difference between one child and another. A particular child 
deserves its (caring) parents no more than the parents deserve the child, and no more than 
other children deserve not to have those caring parents. Moreover, the archpoint of view 
prescribes that one should be impartial towards certain reasons for action rather than 
towards ihe carriers of those reasons; in this respect, a special attachment to some rather 
than all future individuals cannot be justified. 
Now the conclusion of this Rawlsian argument may be sound, but the premise is 
not. That is to say, it is not necessarily rational to want to have children, nor therefore to 
care for them (as long as they are possible persons), nor to care for future generations in 
general. In the Rawlsian frame, one can point to the obviously negative if not disastrous 
effects lhal becoming a mother or being expected to become one can have on life-plans in 
most societies. Having a more than 50% chance of turning out to be female, the people in 
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the original position would have lo be rather hesitant - to say the least - about calling 
procreation rational. Seen from the archpoint of view, procreation is an issue regarding 
which one should be impartial. Ft is always possible that someone disapproves of procre­
ation and that this feeling of abhorrence goes so deep as to be a HIS-reason. For this 
person at least, it is rational not to have children. 
Hence there is no sound reason either in favour of or against procreation, and no 
reason to believe that care for one's offspring is in itself a good reason to consider future 
generations as part of our present society. Of course, if one has children and is responsible 
for their welfare, it is by implication rational to care about the children of others - but that 
is a very bad reason for principally including future children in the metric. Unlike others 
for whom we may care because of their vulnerability and our influence on their well-
being, this is a responsibility that need not arise. 
Having rejected the first reason for the inclusion of future generations, let us now 
consider the second argument: that we should care about future generations, regardless of 
any attachment to our own descendants. In the absence of a Rawlsian defence, this 
conviction could perhaps be supported by an assumption to which Brian Barry occasional­
ly referred, to wit, that no one deserves to be born in this (fortunate?) generation or time 
(e.g. Barry 1993: 224). From this assumption it nevertheless does not follow that those 
who come after us can legitimately claim a share in our possessions. In fact, they cannot, 
as I am about to show. The reason for this is that generations cannot be hurt; only 
individuals can be recipients, and possible individuals are not individual enough to be 
morally relevant or relevant to justice in particular? 
What marks an individual? In his Reasons and Persons (1984), Derek Parfit 
convincingly argued against both physical and psychological identity over lime: each of 
our parts, including our plans, aspirations, and mentality, can in principle change or be 
changed without causing a distinctly new personality to exist. He also rejected a concep­
tion of the self as distinct from the things I so far called attributes, like a flagpole in 
comparison to the flags on it. There is nothing to individuate a self without attributes. 
Instead, he suggested that the distinctive feature of personality (individuality) is a so-called 
relation-R, a sense of continuity with regard to previous selves, previous memories of 
one's self. Hence someone who has been brainwashed by her psychotherapist or the KGB 
and has begun a totally new life with new aspirations, new knowledge and new feelings, 
yet still remembers her former self, is the same individual as the former self she remem­
bers. If, however, the memory of this past self is a result of the brainwashing itself (to 
replace the memory of a "real" former self), she is no longer the same individual she was 
before. Similarly, the product of one particular sperm and one particular ovum will be a 
different person if it is born at a different point in time because its memories and life will 
differ from the beginning; the result of cugenetics applied to a foetus creates a different 
person than the foetus could have been; and obviously different sperm and ova also 
produce a different person. 
Accepting R-connectedncss as the basis of individuality creates immense problems 
for any theory of distributive justice, even more than explanations in terms of psychologi­
cal or physical continuity over lime. As each and every little action that could take place 
differently may cause different people to exist, the question rises whether we benefit those 
individuals whom we cause to exist, and harm those whose existence we prevent, or vice 
versa. If we take the difference between persons seriously, the (dis)advantages of one's 
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existence cannot be compared with those of one's non-existence, let alone with those of 
others's (non-)existcnce. 
Part of the problem can be evaded. Parfit suggested, by making absolute rather 
than relative comparisons: counting each individual and his or her well-being for one and 
measuring it by an independent standard (Parfit 1984: 358 ff.). Thus, once an individual 
exists, there is no need to compare the incomparable, i.e., the life of a once-merely-
possible-now-real person with either his non-existence or alternative (once possible, now 
impossible) persons. The trouble lies in causing their existence as such: is it good or bad 
to be born - or neither? 
Derek Parfit's theory rests on the assumption that proposilions like "I wish I had 
never been born" make sense. But can we say beforehand that a life will (not) be worth 
living? Even if we could know the level of technology, the history etc., of that future 
society this seems contentious. Imagine the next generation inheriting from us only stone 
and wooden objects and the skill to make them; we and all the gadgets and materials with 
which we lived suddenly evaporated. Is the life of this future generation not worth living -
a life lived before by countless generations? Well-being depends, first and foremost, on 
how the individual living a life feels about life, and only in second instance on how others 
tell her to feel about it in comparison to, say, the glorious past. 
Nevertheless, let us assume that there is a certain basic level of welfare below 
which life is not worth living and at which wishes to be "unborn" start to make sense, 
alternative policies involving the creation of different persons can - according to Parfit -
be judged in terms of justice. This theory however invokes another, less explicit and less 
convincing, assumption, namely that future individuals have something like a right to a 
basic level of welfare and to the avoidance of a life below that level - put in another way, 
a right lo a decent life or no life at all. 
First of all, judgements on the quality of life are difficult, regardless of whether 
they are retrospective or prospective. They require an unambiguous point of reference as 
well as answers to the old disputes on what man's basic needs really are, and to what 
degree an individual's judgement about his own welfare should be trusted or respected. 
Secondly, if we suppose that the first problem can be solved (as it should be in any 
sound theory of justice), we still have a more fundamental problem to deal with: the right 
to a decent life or no life at all is meaningless and (or rather: because) impractical. Only 
in retrospect can we say if a life or part of it was worth living, and only during the short 
season of Welfare State security might one have ventured to predict futures in terms of 
welfare over a life. Life is too hazardous for an individual to calculate life-long welfare 
levels in advance with any degree of certainty. 
It should be clear that in this context welfare docs not merely refer to material 
well-being. It is equally hazardous to predict whether the life of Evelyn Hardcase will be 
worth living - in Evelyn's own eyes, as wc arc nothing but agents calculating and deciding 
in Evelyn's place. Even in a world that hales the disabled, the coloured, the second sex, 
members of these groups may leam to surprise us and enjoy life. By the same token, no 
natural or social inequality is sufficient reason to believe that it makes life not worth 
living - or that it makes life extra worth while. (Past generations tried to benefit us by 
industrializing, but our harvest from the past also entails an ecological crisis which, 
according to some, more than offsets the benefits of progress.) Only under very special 
circumstances can we be nearly, but only nearly, certain about the value of life - for 
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instance, if we known lhat a newborn baby has only six monihs to live and that it will 
suffer from a horribly painful disease during each of those 180 days and nights. 
Now suppose (i) contrary to what we assumed in the last two paragraphs, that 
welfare over a life is predictable or at least predictable enough to know whether or not the 
borders between a worthy and an unworthy live will be crossed. Suppose furthermore (ii) 
that having children or not having them may cause other people's welfare, for instance 
that of their parents, to change and fall below or rise above the basic level. For my 
purposes, it suffices to assume finally (iii) lhat the existence or non-existence of at least 
one individual Ζ will cause at least one other person's welfare to cross the border between 
a life worth living and one lhat is noL 
If (i) is the case, the only choice parents X and Y have regarding the life of their 
child Ζ would be one between having or not having that particular child. Yet by assump­
tion (iii) the possible consequences of this choice must already be accounted for in their 
own parenis's (i.e., the parents of X and Y) decision made under assumption (i) to give 
birlh to them (i.e., X and Y), as well as in the decisions of other parents to create the 
contemporaries of X, Y, or Z. Thus, by (i), X and Y do not have a choice, and, by 
repetition of the argument, neither did Iheir parents, grandparents, contemporaries, etc. If 
the choice for one predictable life is predetermined, all are, and if all choices are fixed, 
none are really choices. 
Thus, if we accept both (i) and (iii), there is no choice and there is no "right" to a 
decent life or no life at all. To save Parfit's thesis we must either reject (i) and accept a 
deadlock because of Ihe uncertainly of real life, or reject (iii), which can only be done if 
we are fully certain that (ii) is untrue - which is absurd. As Parfit's thesis cannot be saved, 
we must conclude thai the right to a decent life or no life at all resembles the right to be 
loved, honoured and cherished. It is at best a promise to try, at worst a lie. 
This leaves us with the conclusion lhat, as far as questions of justice are concerned, 
it does not make sense to talk of future recipients wishing never to have lived, and it does 
not make sense to talk of future individuals as current recipients of justice. It does make 
sense in terms of an already ongoing life (euthanasia and sometimes abortion), as there is 
an existing individual to which Ihe concept of recipiency can refer, someone for whose 
opinion we can ask, or about whose ideas we can make an educated guess - unlike a 
possible person, who merely might one day be an individual. 
This conclusion may come as a bit of a surprise. Intuitively speaking, the welfare 
of future generations matters. Imagine a world in which the starting positions in life 
determine later success, and imagine a parent who has the means to save money, wants 
children, subsequently has children, but prior to iheir birth decides not to save for their 
future. Or suppose that we - as a society - know lhat there will be a next generation and 
yet deplete an important part of ihe earth's resources. How can we maintain that both 
practices are unfair towards the children of ihe future if future generations cannot be 
recipients of justice? 
There are two answers to this. Firstly, in the real world a generation does not 
simply emerge at the moment lhat a prior generation ceases to exist; generations live side 
by side. As a consequence, there is a continuous transfer of institutions and rights between 
going and coming, rather than present and future, generations. This lakes care of one pari 
of Rawls's arguments for justice between generations, namely our "duly to uphold and to 
further just institutions" (Rawls 1971: 293). 
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Secondly, principles of justice can protect the interests of future generations in an 
indirect way. In the following chapter I shall argue that using rights in a way that depletes 
resources is not simply bad luck for those who come after us; it also constitutes 
improper - unjust - use of rights and resources, depriving existing persons from future 
benefits. Natural resources are not up for grabs. From an impartial point of view, few 
things are ours to distribute, own and desinici; most things we merely borrow for a while. 
Hence the operation of principles of justice will be constrained by a duty not to leave the 
world worse that we found it on entry - whenever possible. 
Let me close this chapter with a brief summary of the criteria for recipiency. We 
have found that, to be a recipient of social justice, it lakes: 
1. existence; 
2. life; 
3. potential consciousness; 
4. autonomy and agency; 
5. membership of society understood as a structure of exploitable social relations; 
and, on the side of the distributor, 
6. moral responsibility for the well-being of the recipient. 
These criteria are not all equally easy to apply. Consciousness, as we saw, differs 
with the species. We were able lo avoid a whole class of complications by distinguishing 
between class-Α recipients (specifically humans) and others, but animals remain neverthe­
less positioned on an unspecified scale of increasing moral relevancy. The conditions 4 
and 6, membership of society and moral responsibility on the side of the distributor, make 
it possible that a recipient of social justice has to deal with, or be dealt wilh by, more than 
one distributor. 
This fuzzincss of Ihe concept of recipiency puts us up wilh two problems. Firstly, 
no priority rules have yet been given, not for determining the relative weight of Ihe 
interests of clnss-A and class-B recipients or that of members and strangers, nor for 
attributing the prime responsibility for just distribution. I shall, of course, try to solve 
these questions in the following three chapters. 
Secondly, as a private person we may feel that our family or friends deserve 
priority over others (members as well as strangers), but as an archpointer it remains to be 
seen whether this kind of priority can stand the test of impartiality. I do not consider this 
to be a problem of social justice but more one of justice as a personal virtue, and will 
therefore ignore it in this treatise. However, if pressed for an answer, I would say that 
there is an analogy between the circle of friends and the greater sphere of society. Both 
are essentially structures of exploitable relations, systems in which we operate and through 
which we influence the well-being of others in a special way; both therefore give rise to 
special obligations and responsibilities. 
CHAPTER 8: THE DISTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS 
"I have been assured by a very knowing American of my Acquaint-
ance in London, lhat a young healthy Child, well nursed is, at a Year 
old, a most delicious, nourishing and wholesome Food, whether 
Stewed, Roasted, Baked, or Boiled; and I make no doubt lhat it will 
equally serve in a Fricaste, or Ragoust. 
Jonathan Swift, "A Modest Proposal" (Swift 1959: 260) 
Section 33: Owning - the stringent view 
Distribution is a matter of at least one distributor, at least one recipients, and of 
course at least one object of a certain value - young healthy Irish children, for instance. In 
this chapter I shall look at the last category, that of the objects to which the concept of 
distributive justice ought to be applied. Now rights and other things are distributed in 
various social contexts - the family, classes at school or in university, neighbourhoods, 
communities, nations, continents, unions, churches, clubs, and so forth. For reasons of 
simplicity I shall only talk about distribution in the context of society, without attention 
for the possible relevancy of my conclusions in other social contexts. 
Our discussion of this issue is inspired by two almost classic problems in the social 
justice debate: self-ownership and original acquisition. The first problem was detected by, 
among others, Rawls's critics. As neither a new-born child nor its parents "own" the 
child's natural endowments nor "deserve" them, should these endowments not be con-
sidered as resources for a society - and should not society then decide on the development 
and use of its cilizens's endowments? One does not even have to think of the nourishing 
qualities with which children are reputedly endowed to understand that the consequences 
of a dictatorship of society can be deplorable: imagine a society coercing its members to 
serve as slaves in the interest of the state for a period of one to five years. On the other 
hand, we often find it reasonable that governments keep people from using some of their 
endowments at the costs of others (their driving skills, for instance, in favour of safely) or 
that it forces them to use their capacities differently (e.g. by forcing a good doctor to work 
in a poor rather than a rich neighbourhood). 
The second issue, lhat of original acquisition, was raised by Nozick's critics after 
the publication of his Anarchy. State and Utopia (1974). His whole theory is predicated on 
the inviolability of natural rights but, like his source of inspiration, John Locke, Nozick 
never took the trouble to account for the existence of natural rights. Once we reject the 
natural rights assumption and with it seemingly all moral rights or claims before the 
creation of political institutions, it becomes quite difficult to see how any form of original 
acquisition could be justified - or any subsequent transfer of goods. On the other hand, if 
there is such a thing as justifiable original acquisition, notions like (re)distribution and 
distributive justice might well lose their meaning. No transfer of any good would be just 
without the explicit consent of the rightful present and next owners. Hence the term 
distribution would be a mere metaphor for a set of just transfers, just only in terms of 
commutative justice. 
Now let us suppose that (1) distribution is about the assignment of ownership of 
goods (I shall introduce a more precise interpretation in terms of moral rights in the next 
section). Let us (2) furthermore think of ownership in moral rather than legal terms and let 
us begin with the following provisional definition of ownership: owning something is 
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defined as being morally privileged to control its fate (deciding on use, forms and terms of 
use, destruction, conservation, etc.), in distinction to possessing or using something. I call 
this the stringent conception of ownership.79 It is then (3) clear that the two debates to 
which I referred a moment ago embody two diametrically opposed stands on distribution. 
One is a radical interpretation of Rawls, according to which everything not specifically 
and totally attributable to an individual is a possible object of distribution owned by the 
society, the other a radical interpretation of Nozick as claiming that by definition nothing 
can ever be distributed, as only individuals own things. In between these two positions lies 
every imaginable set of distributable and tradcable goods. 
A theory of distributive justice would be incomplete if it did not lake a position on 
either side of this dispute or somewhere in between. I shall present and defend my own 
position by, in this section, questioning the stringent conception of ownership which 
underlies the controversies about original ownership and public versus private ownership. 
The gist of my argument will be that such a stringent notion of ownership is incompatible 
with impartiality, as impartiality requires that claims to (most) goods are permanently open 
to moral scrutiny. In the next section (34) I introduce a rather formal concept of rights to 
represent all that could possibly be distributed. This concept enables us, in section 35, to 
deal with the problems of our provisional stringent conception of ownership. We shall 
formulate a more flexible understanding there, one that results in, among other things, an 
important distinction between conditional and unconditional rights. Following this, we 
shall take a look at a second distinction, that between commutative and distributive justice, 
between rights that can but should not be distributed, and rights that both can and should 
be distributed (section 36). In section 37 a third distinction will be made between two 
kinds of distributable rights, quite simply labelled as Basic Needs and Further Wants. 
Section 38 finally discusses the aspect of rights to which principles of distributive justice 
should be applied: the acting and receiving individuals and collectives, the structure of 
social interaction, or results. 
On the radical Rawlsian view, natural resources and undeserved individual endow-
ments are assets for society, simply by virtue of the fact that there is no one other than 
society to possess them. It has been noted that this is a non sequitur, the two premises 
according to which (1) there are only individuals plus an entity known as society, and (2) 
no individual has an original right to either his own possibly socially useful endowments 
or to the previously unpossessed resources he finds around him, do not support the 
conclusion that (3) society alone has an original right of acquisition, transfer and distribu-
tion (cf. Sandcl 1982: 77). The claims of individuals to their endowments are as legitimate 
or illegitimate as those of society, because neither party deserved them. Any claim to non-
human (that is, all other) resources is hampered by both this problem and the deeper 
problem of justifying real original acquisition - looting nature - as such. 
The radical Nozickean doctrine, it seems, provides a clear solution to the problem 
of the original acquisition of natural resources and, metaphorically speaking, the acquisi-
tion of personal endowments. It unambiguously ascribes original ownership rights to one 
category of claimants, individuals, at the exclusion of all others, and it gives a reason for 
Throughout this chapter, I shall use originally legal terms like ownership and rights as if they were 
purely moral concepts without any legal meaning. Thus, when I say that someone X does not (legitimately) own Y 
or should not have ownership rights to Y, I merely say that X's having (possessing) Y is not morally defensible. 
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this: natural rights. Incidentally, it also prolecis the liberty of individuals against assaults 
from the side of the collective. However, on closer looks the solution turns out to be far 
from perfect. There is more than one possible theory of original acquisition, and the 
reasons for choosing either of these are insufficient 
Let us consider four idealized positions on the issue of original acquisition. I do 
not pretend that they exhaust the list of possibilities, but they will suffice to illustrate my 
point that theories of original acquisition are underdetermined as far as proving the 
morality of ownership is concerned. Rights cannot be rights unless every reasonable 
person should recognize them, and these theories of original acquisition fail to give the 
necessary reasons for recognition. For perspectives like that of a social contract theory or 
Nozick's theory of voluntary associations, this comes down to saying that once a society is 
established, all prior rights or things called rights, whether they already existed or not and 
regardless of their former validity, have been voided; they have to be acknowledged "once 
more". 
According to a first theory, which one occasionally encounters in class rooms, 
issues of original acquisition and just transfer should be solved by reference to the law and 
jurisprudence: justice would consist in gelling and giving what the law prescribes. 
However, positive law only determines whether possession is legal, and legal and moral 
justice only occasionally sleep in the same bed. Being concerned with the distribution of 
rights over a group, the law is subject to judgements based on principles of social justice; 
the law offers no justifications, but requires justification itself (cf. Brehmer 1980: 21 ff.). 
A second solution in terms of natural law would run as follows. Suppose that an 
object Ρ was unpossessed until now. A person or group X takes it (a) either because X 
badly needs it to survive or, on a less stringent interpretation, (b) because X just likes it. 
There is no conflict with others, either now or in the future, as X leaves enough objects 
similar to and as good as Ρ for others to take. We could think of Ρ as a breath of fresh 
air, for instance, something X badly needs to survive. The theory of natural law would call 
this act of original acquisition legitimate: nature does not prohibit it in any way. We do 
not take any risks in adhering to this theory: if nature does not prohibit something, one is 
obviously free to do it. Still, that does not make it right: ought may imply can, can does 
not imply ought80. 
This difficulty is a threat not only to the credibility of the extended natural law 
thesis (version b) which ultimately boils down to the Marquis De Sade's creed that 
anything goes that can be done. Suppose that we reduce the doctrine to alternative (a), 
thus justifying original acquisition exclusively in cases where vital needs are at stake. On 
this version, anything goes that can be done and saves a life. Clearly, this will not be 
enough to solve the problem of ownership once and for all, for as soon as scarcity strikes 
the principle allows (murder and) any involuntary transfer that saves a life. Nor will it 
work if we also demand that conditions of affluence obtain. Consider a Nozickean (1974: 
176) dilemma. The first human takes the first breath of air, the second a second, the n-th 
an n-th, and by that lime the air is out. Person η obviously did not leave enough air for 
n+1, ergo her act of acquisition was illegitimate; n-2 did not leave enough for n-l and л, 
which makes his original acquisition illegitimate; and so forth down to the first human. Of 
course, the first person's first breath of air only becomes illegitimate at the moment n+1 
enters the world, and until that lime there is nothing rotten in the world, but this ncverthe-
80 In Voltaire's words- all sons have fathers, bui noi all fathers have sons. 
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less means lhat ownership rights cannot be altribuled definitely. There may always come 
an n+1. Moreover, natural law does not give any rule for original acquisition and further 
transfers other than the law of the jungle - without any deeper justification. 
A third conceivable scheme, not too much different from natural law, relies on the 
natural rights of man to vindicate original acquisition. On this view, one is entitled to 
something by - for instance - one's natural right to survival, rather than merely permitted 
by natural law to procure it." Apart from inheriting some of the problems of the natural 
law approach, the idea of natural rights puis us up with a new problem: lhat of finding a 
criterion to distinguish between the entitled and the rightless. Again, the deeper problem 
will be to explain how an is can be turned into an ought, how a natural desire or need, for 
food or water or shelter, can be transubstantiated into something like natural desert. Which 
takes us back to the archpoint: no matter from which source natural rights stem, the law is 
on earth, to paraphrase the Talmud again (Walzer 1988: 29). In absence of an authoritative 
source of morality, even, or particularly, a divine decree specifying natural rights requires 
validation and affirmation from a point of view that we can all irust - the archpoint. 
Without this approval there is no reason why the principles of social justice should respect 
private property and property rights. 
Finally, we could consider strong determinism as a solution. On this view, the 
whole question of justice and just possession never arises. If X takes something from 
nature and reserves it for himself, he does so because he has no option. Even if there "are" 
other options in the eyes of God or in the light of eternity, X himself is a predestined or 
determined creature and not in any way an autonomous agent. And without choices, 
questions about the morality of choices are quite beside the point. 
This solution will only work for what is called strong determinism. Any type of 
determinism allowing subjects the least bit of freedom of choice (so-called weak 
determinism) must choose sides. On the one side, it can be a morality-sensitive 
determinism, allowing lhat some choices are called morally better than others (cf. e.g. 
Inwood 1985: 72, 81; Sharpies 1986: 268 ff.). In lhat case we would be back were we 
began: looking for a justification for ownership. 
On the other side, it could be a determinism that rejects the possibility of assessing 
the morality of choices and instead explains choices in terms of, for example, chance. The 
latter approach shares with strong determinism the disadvantages of, firstly, not taking the 
subjective experience of freedom seriously, and of, secondly and more importantly, not 
answering the question directly. Both the strong and the chance variants of determinism 
can still account for the theory and practice of ownership and justice, but this account will 
be only a metaphor of justice as seen from the archpoint of view. Instead of justifying it, 
both determinisms will explain ideas about justified original acquisition and ownership in 
terms of power, power relations, human psychology and motivations. Yet in the end, such 
an analysis comes down to the same thing as the archpoint: it amounts to an explanation 
of why we should believe in the ideas behind an instiiution like property. In this respect 
then, the difference between determinism and morality is metaphysical but not political. 
I have tried to show with these examples lhat any theory about the morality of 
ownership is underdetermined if it does not give arguments to persuade us into believing 
in it. As argued in Part II of this book, the only way in which we can be defensibly 
Thai Is. there is no longer a need (o make a claim, (hereby еГГесіиаіе one's natural freedom and create 
an entitlement; the pure and objective existence of a natural right is enough to create an entitlement 
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persuaded is by means of the archpoint. The question then rises what the opinion of 
archpointers would be on the justifiability of original acquisition and of ownership as 
provisionally defined above. 
We can treat both questions under the same heading, that of legitimate ownership. 
Morally assessing the effect of a transfer is not fundamentally different from assessing that 
of original acquisition. The question in a case of original acquisition, as we saw, was why 
a reasonable impartial person should approve of X's owning P. That very same question 
must be asked in cases of transfer of ownership. Suppose that Harry legitimately owns P, 
and voluntarily transfers it to Cissy. Being the legitimate owner, Harry is absolutely free 
to make that transfer. On a natural rights view, this would imply that Cissy now is the 
legitimate owner of P. But is this also plausible from an impartial point of view? Let us 
change the example: suppose that the German government voluntarily gives me all its 
army personnel and equipment, or that it sells all government agencies to Kuwait. Is it still 
plausible that I or Kuwait are now the morally legitimate owners of former German 
property? 
I shall argue that the first thing archpointers would want to do is revise our 
provisional and very stringent definition of ownership as sovereignty. Remember that 
ownership was conceived of as justified possession. The two most prominent characteris-
tics of possession are, firstly, the exclusion of others from controlling the fale of whatever 
it is that one possesses, which includes using the thing - unless, until, and in sofar as not 
proclaimed otherwise by the current possessor; and secondly the subjection of the 
possessed to the possessor. If both can be justified for at least one posscssable item, the 
idea of ownership as absolute sovereignty is itself justified. There are certain items for 
which this is true, as I shall argue in following sections. It is true, in particular, for the 
basic determinants of personality. 
So far, so good. But the rigid definition of ownership neatly divides the world into 
two theoretical classes: the class of legitimately ownable things, and that of not 
legitimately ownable things. All we know about this latter class is that these goods cannot 
be owned in the strict sense of the word, which does not imply that they should not be 
used. Imagine that you and I are starving, and in front of us lies a loaf of bread. We do 
not own it - it belongs to a rich and well-fed woman who will not give it to us - and we 
cannot buy it, because we also happen to be poor. We are alone and will remain alone 
(with this loaf) for at least the next two weeks. Should we let it rot, or should we eat it -
are we allowed to, morally? The point that I shall be making is that there exists a grey 
zone between absolutely legitimate and absolutely illegitimate possession, one that forces 
us to take a more lenient view on ownership and redefine this concept. 
We only have to concentrate on the first aspect of ownership to discover this grey 
zone: are there any good, i.e., impartial, reasons to allow anyone to decide exclusively 
whether anyone else will be granted or denied the use of something, call it a gadget? To 
begin with a relatively simple case of original acquisition, assume that only Harry Stoltle 
is able to give others access to the gadget. Without Harry, the gadget would be inaccess-
ible if not non-existent - as is the case with, for instance, original thoughts, ideas and 
capacities, but not with their physical reflection. As no one else can possess gadgets like 
this one, Harry is evidently its exclusive possessor. It is equally evident that if Harry's 
gadget can save millions of lives, we may see reasons to force him into giving others 
access to it, which means that we would be denying him the right to own it. But unfortu-
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nalely we cannot: Harry has threatened to destroy the gadget, or kill himself, or he simply 
refuses to cooperate, or perhaps it is physically impossible to force Harry to cooperate. 
In a case like this wc may believe that Harry's behaviour is repugnant and unjust, 
but there can be no question about his right to possess the gadget. There is nothing we can 
do to change the fact that he possesses it, and we can neither deny him the right to own 
his gadget nor give him that right. It is not a question of feasible rights, or practicable 
rights, or non-formal rights - Harry's possessing it is simply a matter of fact. 
The picture changes when we assume that Harry can be forced to cooperate. This 
time, possession is no longer a mere mailer of fact. We can do something about Harry's 
control over the gadget: we can acknowledge it, thereby establishing Harry's ownership 
rights, or deny him ownership. Why should his autonomy, or whatever else is hurt in the 
process of compelling him, weigh more than the lives - and autonomy - of millions? 
Framed in this way, there is hardly any space for doubt as to the intuitive morality of 
"repossessing" Harry's gadget and assigning ownership lo a more trustworthy institution. 
Whether Harry should be compensated for his loss or honoured for his work is another 
question, and one that we need not go into here; what is important is the discovery thai 
Harry's ownership rights are not indisputable. 
Next, consider a third and a fourth case. In the third case, Harry possesses a unique 
gadget that could enable exactly one other, already happy person named non-Harry to feel, 
for a fraction of a second, the smallest possible amount of extra happiness. In the fourth 
case, Harry is no longer unique in possessing a millions-of-lives-saving gadget; there are a 
few other people who possess equivalent gadgets. In both cases, Harry's cooperation can 
be enforced. 
In the third case, we will be indifferent or almost indifferent between Harry's (and 
our!) options of giving access to the gadget and withholding access. From a utilitarian 
point of view, for instance, simply asking Harry to cooperate may be discomforting 
enough to compensate for the gains of cooperation. From a non-aggregative consequenti-
alist point of view, the effects access for non-Harry will have on Harry and non-Harry 
cannot be balanced against one another - they are not the same person. If Harry himself 
would feel the least bit of hesitation about non-Harry's access to the gadget, that would be 
enough for us to conclude that access is not all good. From a deonlological point of view, 
Harry's choice is not a matter of principle. There is no duty to make non-Harry happy or 
happier, though joy may be a side-effect of the fulfilment of duty; consequently, happiness 
itself is not an argument either for Harry or, if Harry disregarded his duty, for us. There 
could be a duty not to keep gadgets to ourselves, but a duly like that could only be a duty 
if it concurred with a categorical imperative, which does not seem to be the case here. 
The fourth example is more complicated. Obviously, if someone else offers her 
gadget in Harry's place, there is no direct need to force Harry to cooperate, but there still 
is no clarity about his right to own a gadget and deny others access to it. If no one else 
wants to cooperate, we may have a new dilemma, that of choosing who should be 
pressured or even tortured first - but at least we now know lhat all gadget-possessors are 
in the same situation as Harry was in the second example. 
In all these cases an archpointer, not judging as we did on the basis of intuition 
only, would need more information than the examples gave. The archpoint demands lhat 
we postpone our judgement on HIS-reasons, not on others. As a consequence, archpointers 
should know whether any HIS-reasons are involved. They would want to know why Harry 
made his gadget and wants to own it, and why any non-Harry wants to use it. With lhat 
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information, they would be able to assess whether assigning ownership to Harry or society 
is reconcilable with impartiality. Clearly, this is still not enough to settle the issue of 
ownership once and for all. Yet there is nothing more archpointers, as archpointers, could 
say. 
Adding still more information would change little; the archpointers would simply 
become more like us. Suppose that we add a few facts. If it is known that the millions 
whom Harry could save have no lust for life, in fact suffer intolerably and fiercely dislike 
life, and Harry's gadget would not change that, the archpointers's moral judgements on the 
cases presented might be influenced. Hence, they would need information about the 
particular society's current morality or (in absence of consensus) moralities, information 
that will not increase the value of the archpointers's judgement. In sofar as no HIS-reasons 
are violated, an archpointer can add nothing to the public debate on the morality of 
ownership, as she can only have a different, not a better, view on issues involving other 
reasons than HIS-reasons. As we saw in Part II, there is no yardstick for the better point 
of view. 
Our four examples however give enough information to draw one general con­
clusion: we have found that, in any individual case and given the moral context of a 
society, there may always be a more weighty reason against X's ownership than there is in 
favour of it. Even if exclusive possession of the gadget is of vital importance to X (he 
may die without it, his personality may cease to exist, or he may lose all joy in life), who 
has HIS-reasons sustaining his claims to ownership, others could attach the same value to 
X's not excluding them. Preferring one person's HIS-reasons over those of others is unfair, 
as we should treat equals equally and the claimants are equal in an extremely relevant 
respect - yet clearly a decision must be made. Any decision in such cases will necessarily 
be unfair towards someone, as someone's HIS-reasons and life-plans will be frustrated. 
There may be a less and a more fair solution, and none will perfectly satisfy everyone, but 
whatever the solution turns out to be, it clearly cannot be one that gives any weight to 
claims, reasons and arguments, and at the same time builds on a conception of ownership 
as absolute sovereignly. As long as there are rival claimants, possession is a source of 
conflict and ownership rights remain open to debate. We must therefore reconsider our 
definition of ownership. 
Section 34: What it is to have a right 
Our discussion of the provisional definition of ownership given above led us to the 
conclusion that ownership, the moral privilege or right to possess something, must be 
(re)affirmed by a reference group, society, under the constraints posed by justice as 
impartiality. We also found that not all ownership rights have to be unconditional rights, 
rights with which no one may interfere: there was a case for believing that at times an 
ownership right will be a right to use rather than (absolutely) possess a thing, and to use it 
only in particular ways, places, periods, or circumstances. 
Before I turn to the ensuing question of distinguishing and justifying conditional 
and unconditional rights, I want to reflect a moment on a more technical question: how 
should we conceive of rights? After all, social justice is not only concerned with the 
distribution of properly; principles also allocale non-material liberties and duties, benefits 
and costs, goods and bads. Can all these different things be put under the same heading of 
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"rights"? In this section, I shall introduce a conception of rights that allows us to do so, 
i.e., that enables us to talk about "that which is distributed" with this one single term, 
rights. The account I give of this new conception is, I admit, not perfect - on occasion it is 
even fairly superficial. However, my first aim is to present a conception of rights that 
works for us, not one that fits in perfectly with the ideas about rights that are normal in 
deontic logic. I shall discuss the links between my conception of rights and the conven­
tions in deontic logic at the end of this section. 
In everyday speech, one has a right to something (a book, a house), a right to do 
something (freedom of press, opinion and speech, the right lo vote), or a right to be 
something (happiness, freedom, survival). One has such rights if and only if one has the 
authority to decide whether or not to exercise, enjoy, profess, utilise, or whatever, the right 
in question. If the authority is lacking, the term right is used in the very different sense of 
a right (in the first sense) that is limited by external obstacles, or by internal inhibitions 
like a sense of duly or morality. In either case we are, for the sake of this argument, 
talking about rights in a metaphorical sense only. 
A bit more formally, a right in the simple non-metaphorical sense is the undivided 
authority to decide (this phrase will be explained shortly), or the full control over, whether 
or not a specific X will be used in a specific way Y to a specific purpose Z. Against this 
background, I define: 
X as a set {*,, x2, .... *,,} of objects; 
Y as the set {y„ y2, .... yn] of means; and 
Ζ as the set [zt, z2, .... z,} of ends. 
Note that I do not assume that Χ, Y and Ζ are disjoint. A book can function as a means or 
as an object. 
The basic material out of which rights are made will be called - for want of a 
better word - right-molecules or r-molecules*2 They define a person's physical and moral 
freedom, at one particular moment and place, to autonomously determine whether one 
particular object shall be used in one particular way to one particular purpose. More 
formally, an r-molecule is: 
(1) an element (*„, y„, z„) from the set XxYxZ; 
(2) at one particular moment in time and on one particular place (t,p); 
I shall make two assumptions regarding r-molecules: 
(1) condition ©, the condition of absence of instrumental obstruction: it is not true 
that it is physically impossible to influence (x
a
, y„, z
a
). The absence of instrumental 
obstruction is what distinguishes a genuine right from a formal right (I assume, for 
/?-moleculcs can be seen as elements of what is known In deontic logic as atomic rights (Lindahl 1977: 
38 ft.). Although it Is odd to see molecules as the basic stuff of atoms, I decided it was safer to deviate from the 
conventional terminology: I would not want to pretend that my r-molccules are α-lomos, indivisible. 
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the sake of argument, thai there are no other conditions inhibiting the exercise of 
rights)"; 
(2) an r-molecule is something over which one and only one person i has sole and 
exclusive control, i.e., i sees to it that (cf. Lindahl 1977: 28) one of the two 
possible worlds will exist: the one in which i sees to it that (x
a
, y„, zj is the case at 
(t,p), or the one in ι sees to it that (x
a
, y
a
, z
a
) is not the case at (/,/»). 
In summary, an r-molecule is a quintuple denoted as /: ©(*„, y0, za, U p), or, shorter, as 
i*{x
a
, y0, z„), or, still shorter, simply as a, b, c, etcetera. 
An example of an r-molecule would be i*(xb, yb, zb), in which xb stands for this 
book, yb for burning it page by page, and z,, for the purpose of expressing outrage. 
You*(xb, ye, zh) means that you can throw it out of the nearest window as well, and 
you*(xb, yc, zc) means that you can also do that to express confusion. All this of course at 
the appropriate time and place only. 
It is impossible to count and catalogue all possible r-molecules; there is too much 
time in eternity and too much space in infinity. Moreover, the exercise of authority over r-
molecules can cause other r-molecules to exist. Research activities, for instance, can lead 
to the discovery of new possibilities for action and to the invention of new machines or 
techniques - all of which comes down to the unexpected creation of new r-molecules. 
Luckily there is often no need to be too precise. In practice, we assign complexes of r-
molecules and call these complexes "rights". They can be (nearly) all-purpose rights, for 
instance a right to read one particular book for (nearly) any purpose; or (nearly) all-object 
rights, such as a right to save a life at (nearly) any cost; or (nearly) all-means rights, such 
as a right to use a book in (nearly) any way to teach a class. A right can also be a 
complex of such complexes. My freedom of expression, for instance, would be the M.L.J. 
Wissenburg-version of the following human right for European citizens: 
citizen: Щх,.„, y¡.m, г
Ьр
, life, European Union) 
in which *,_„ stands for all the capacities required to think and communicate, y,.
m
 for all 
the means needed to communicate, and zUp for the purpose of expression any public or 
private opinion. 
In everyday life, we often take it for granted or do not bother to check that 
complexes like these can be imprecise and incomplete, i.e., that my right to make tea, for 
example, may interfere with or be limited by other rights. I am perfectly free to drink tea, 
or bathe in it, or colour my ceiling with it, or offer it to a guest, or do anything with it 
that I want to, as long as I do not use it to drown someone, which would interfere with 
other, higher rights. Even if we would want to assign complete complexes of right-
molecules, we would not be able to do so. It may be possible to give a complete listing of 
ail the things one can do with a knife, but it is space- and time-consuming to describe 
Condition С is perhaps controversial. Its implication appears to be (hat rights cannot exist when they 
cannot be excercised - Cissy's right to vote, for Instance, would supposedly not exist as long as (here were no 
elections, or ΙΓ there were but she happened to be held hostage. However, these two cases must be distinguished. 
In the latter, someone violates Cissy's right, which is nol the same as denying its legitimacy or creating a law of 
nature (hat makes it utterly impossible for her to vote. In the first case, during the absence of elections. Cissy 
does still have a righi to vole: a right to vote as soon as there are elections. 
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with perfect precision when and where one can do all those things, as time and space, the 
conditions (t,p), can be divided infinitely. 
Although I also define a right as a set of r-molecules, I nevertheless prefer to use 
the term right in a more specific sense. I assume the existence of precise "moments" and 
"places". For reasons of simplicity, I shall mainly speak of rights as rights to have 
something, ^„-rights. As such have-rights are sets of r-molecules, they can also be 
expressed as rights to do some things ν,.„ or as rights to be some things z,.„,. Thus, I do 
not want to suggest that one cannot have rights to free speech or to happiness (in sofar as 
compatible with condition ©); it is simply more efficient to pretend that only one variant 
of rights exists. 
There are several types of rights.84 Remember that an r-molecule was defined as 
i*(x
a
, y„, z„), and denoted simply as a, b, c, etcetera. Rights are complexes of r-molecules. 
A basic right r
a
 is defined as a right over one single r-molccule a: 
(1) r
a
 is the authority to decide that a and the authority to decide that ->a; or 
(2) r
a
 means that it shall be the case that i sees to it that a, or that ι sees to it that 
-4J. 
A basic duty, to describe just one other possible type of right, is a limited basic right, 
limited by taking away the element of choice. A basic duty d
a
 is the authority to decide 
that a, a basic duty d^, is the authority to decide that -w. Basic duties give one an 
authority to do something rather than to choose to do it. 
A complex right is a set of one or more basic rights and/or basic duties, e.g. (r
a
,rb). 
Incidentally, the addition of more basic rights does not mean that one's choice of 
alternatives grows to the same extent. Suppose that: 
a is г'*(дг„ v„ ζ,); 
b is i*C*„ y2, г,); 
с is /*(дг3, yA, г5); 
d is ;'+(*„ y4, г,). 
A complex right (r
a
,r
c
) gives one four options, four possible worlds: (a,c), (-e,c), (a,-v) 
and (-ια,-ч:). The complex right (rb,rc) also gives four alternatives, but (га,г,,) only gives 
three: (a,-ib), (-w,6), and (-47,-*). In English, this means that one cannot have one's 
pudding and eat it. 
Some complex rights, like the complex {r„,rd) in our example above, consist of 
basic rights with at least one common denominator, a shared x, у or z. A complex right is 
a perfect right 9br0, 9lve or ÎRz,, if it contains all possible basic rights with regard to an *„, 
ya, or za. Suppose that (ra,rd) is the complex right to use a particular fruit knife either to 
stab in self-defence or to cut an apple with. If these were all the things one could do with 
that fruit knife, it would be a perfect right of the %r,,-type. Rights in the real world are 
always imperfect or conditional rights, in other words, perfect rights with a long list of 
exceptions. 
See also our discussion of ihc standard rights concept in dcontic logic at the end of this section. 
For the exact meaning of the operators see (Lindahl 1977: 52 ff.). 
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By analogy, we can see a complex duly as a combination of two or more basic 
duties, and a perfect duly as a universally valid complex duly. In ordinary language, the 
last would be expressed like this: "whatever you use to whatever purpose, see to it that 
you use it only in this the right way". The third version of Kant's categorical imperative, 
demanding that one should always act in such a way that mankind and each human are 
never merely means but also ends (Kant 1974: BA66), is a beautiful example of a perfect 
duly with two common denominators. Note, however, that complex duties are merely a 
special case of complex rights. 
By definition, an r-molecule cannot be at two places at the same lime or at two 
moments on the same place. This allows us, in theory and at the end of time, to neatly 
divide the universe in r-molccules and, as no two persons can be attributed with the same 
r-molecule or right, to assign all rights once and for all. In practice, of course, things are 
different Real-world rights are in general defined as if they were perfect rights with 
implicit exceptions, exceptions that are given by the legal and jurisprudential context and 
by what is physically possible. It is often impossible to describe and assign conditional 
rights with the same degree of precision that the theory allows us to imagine. 
I shall assume that the archpoinlers take a mean position between these extremes: 
their principles of social justice should assign complex rights with perfect precision - but 
they can only assign those rights that are already known to be in existence. In other 
words, I assume that the archpointers are capable of determining exactly who is allowed to 
use the wordprocessor I am currently using, and when and where, provided the parameters 
of the problem do not change. Archpointers cannot definitely decide on my wordprocessor 
if a new claimant can fall from the skies, and they cannot assign rights to cars running on 
grass as long as these have not been invented. 
The theoretical precision of this conception of rights has a second practical 
disadvantage. The complex rights that social justice distributes can, as we saw above, 
include liberties as well as duties, the good and the bad things in life, the profitable, the 
useless, and the disadvantageous. The model can represent all these things in a simple 
way. Yet ihere is one kind of duty that it cannot represent this simply: the complementary 
duty others (can) hove to respect or even protect the rights of individual i. As an r-
molecule can only be assigned once, it cannot be the subject of one individual's right and 
of another individual's duty. A complementary duty would have to be expressed in terms 
of its implications: if I have, in practice, a duty lo respect your freedom of speech, I have, 
in our model, a (complex) duty to see to it that certain things (r-molecules) that would 
physically obstruct your complex right to free speech do not happen. 
This brings me to the last subject of this section: the fit between this model and the 
existing convention in deontic logic on the proper description of rights. We have already 
implicitly dealt with one difference in modes of expression: whereas my complex rights 
are defined in terms of an individual and certain objects, rights as understood by a leading 
deontic logician, Kanger, are relational: they describe the relation an individual has to 
another individual regarding objects (e.g. Kanger and Kanger 1966: 86). As I just said, we 
can take account of relations, of the complements of one individual's complex rights in 
the rights bundles of others. We do not need lo, though: there is no reason why we should 
not think of a right as a general principle assigning some kind of authority to an individual 
i, as a consequence of which / has this authority with regard to all or some other persons. 
A more important difference between the conception of rights presented here and 
current conventions in deontic logic concerns the notion of simple rights as first described 
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by Ranger (Ranger and Kanger 1966). In Ranger's taxonomy the following four types of 
simple rights exist: 
(1) a claim: X has versus Y a claim that S(X,Y) means that: it shall be that Y causes 
S(X,Y); or, in Lindahl's terms: У shall see to it that F. 
(2) a freedom: X has versus Y a freedom that S(X,Y) means that: not: it shall be 
that X causes that not-S(X,iO; in Lindahl's terms: it is not the case that X shall see 
to it that not F. 
(3) a power: X has versus Y a power that S(X,Y) means that: not: it shall be that 
not: X causes that S(X,Y); in Lindahl's terms: X may see to it that F. 
(4) an immunity: X has versus Y an immunity that S(X,Y) means that: it shall be 
that not: Y causes that not-5(X,F); in Lindahl's terms: it is not the case that Y may 
see to it that not F. 
The expressions S(X,Y) or F in these descriptions refer to imaginable stales of affairs 
between the right-holders X and Y (cf. Ranger and Ranger 1966: 87-88, Lindahl 1977: 43). 
Consistent combinations of these four simple rights and their counterparts (the counter­
claim of X versus Y that not S(X,Y), etcetera) are called atomic types of right (Ranger and 
Ranger 1966: 92). 
The model of /--molecules and basic and complex rights which I described in this 
section is perfectly compatible with Ranger's - if we disregard condition © for a moment, 
a condition that limits the application of the notion of a right to possible instead of 
imaginable worlds. The (x„, y
a
, z
a
, t, /7)-part of an r-molecule describes a state of affairs. 
As the absence of a relational aspect in r-molecules is unproblemalical (see above), we 
can therefore simply "translate" i*(x„, y
a
, z„, t, p) as S(ij) according to Ranger's vocabu­
lary, or as (ij,F) according to Lindahl's. I defined a basic right r„ as meaning that it shall 
be the case that i sees to it that a or that ƒ sees to it that ->a. In Lindahl's vocabulary, this 
would be expressed as Shall Do(/',F) or Shall Do(r',->F). Hence, like freedom, power, 
immunity, their counterparts and the atomic rights which can all be described in terms of 
implications (i.e., special cases) of η claim (Shall Do(/,F) - cf. Lindahl 1977: 52 ff.), basic 
rights can be translated into simple rights. Conversely, simple and atomic rights can, as we 
saw, be expressed in terms of r-moleculcs. The reason why I discussed rights in terms of 
basic rights and duties rather than in those of simple and atomic rights is that, for practical 
purposes, the everyday notions of (basic) rights and duties are sufficient to illustrate the 
possible range and force of complex rights. 
Section 35: Ownership - the rights version 
The conception of rights introduced in the previous section furnishes us with a new 
definition of ownership: to own a thing is to have a complex right to it. It does not 
provide us with any answers to the problem of justifying and assigning ownership, though. 
Can ownership, unconditional or not, be justified at all? In particular, can the aspects of 
subjection and exclusion, which are inherent to ownership, be justified? Are there things 
beyond rights - things that cannot legitimately be owned, or to which the (affirmation of) 
rights is irrelevant? 
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In this section, I shall distinguish four separate spheres regarding rights: the 
spheres of conditional and unconditional ownership, that of unassignable rights, and, the 
sphere to which I turn first, that of what lies beyond the reach of rights. The distinctions 
made here will be merely formal; a specification of the various categories of rights will 
follow in subsequent sections. 
There are things that cannot be distributed or legitimately owned except in a purely 
symbolic way: triangular cubes and square circles, gnomes and goblins, unicorns and the 
perpetuum mobile. Of course, one might try to distribute rights to such things, but the 
rights would be empty. They are totally irrelevant to the issue of social justice, and were 
fortunately already excluded with the help of condition © in the previous section. 
However, I want to draw attention for a moment to one thing that, despite the fact that it 
stands beyond possession and ownership rights, is relevant to social justice: the self, or 
more precisely its vital parts, HIS-rcasons. 
We can choose between two extreme positions with regard to self-ownership: either 
the self including body and mind owns itself, or it does not. If it docs, as in Nozick's 
theory, a basis has been established for claims to the fruits of one's labour, as mixing 
one's labour with an object like an apple tree or the hardware of a computer would imply 
that one mixes the self with the world. In a manner of speaking. If the self docs not own 
itself, it is free for grabs. Society would have the same rights to it as the self itself, or 
perhaps even more as society in a way mixes its labour with particular selves, offering it 
education, opportunities and cooperation. In mixing itself with a self, society then becomes 
that self - and might, the theory goes, claim it for its own purposes. In practice this could 
mean that society has a right either to force an individual to become the excellent doctor 
he could be even though he himself would rather become a mediocre tennis player - or 
that it has the right to tax an individual for the contributions to society she could have 
made by becoming a diplomat, but does not because she decided to become a rugby 
coach. 
The position I shall choose is dictated, on the one hand, by the conception of the 
self chosen in previous chapters, and on the other by the grammar of our new conception 
of rights. I shall split up the Nnzickean self of body, mind and thoughts in (1) a core self, 
the vital parts of the self to which the notion of subjective neutrality referred, (2) the 
natural endowments (abilities and capacities) of the self, in sofar as these are essential to a 
full plan of life, a life in accordance with one's HIS-reasons, and (3) other endowments. 
The first category is beyond rights - it does not fit in with the grammar of rights; to the 
second category a self has inalienable rights, and to the third its rights are conditional 
though in practice still inviolable. I shall discuss them in this order. 
A body, a mind or a person can be possessed and perhaps even owned - it is 
imaginable, though untrue, that someone's HIS-reasons are best served by a life in slavery, 
that he assents to enslave himself, and that slavery is justifiable. The relevant aspects of 
the self however are beyond possession. 
The idea of self-possession or self-ownership would make sense in a context of 
natural rights, as with Nozick, and in general in the context of theories where the self is a 
physical rather than analytical entity (cf. Cohen 1986: 110). In the context of our grammar 
of rights however, it is nothing short of mysticism to talk about self-ownership or about 
the self as "owned". From the point of view of a distributor, the self is something that 
drops from the sky right through her hands. It cannot be snatched and possessed like a 
house or a shoe, it cannot be owned in the sense of a right to do ya with something x„ for 
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the purpose of ζ„, it can only snatch and possess itself. Any attempt to take and redistrib­
ute a "self requires that the self (the R-related memories or, specifically, a person's HIS-
reasons) is separated from the physical body in which it exists, and the result is its 
annihilation. 
Of course, one might suggest that annihilating a self is one thing - the only thing 
next to not annihilating it - that an outside force can do with it, for which reason it could 
be the subject of a right. Yet to (have a right to) destroy this analytical entity, one has to 
(have a right to) destroy the physical entity housing it; one cannot destroy the elves 
without destroying the books and minds within which they exist. Hence it is impossible to 
create an independent right to a self. The existence of such a right contradicts condition 
β - it would be like giving a blind man the right lo look in a mirror. 
The relevant aspects of the self, HIS-reasons, are beyond rights; things other than 
the self are not. To some of these things inalienable or unconditional rights exist, due to 
the fact that the conditions of the archpoint diciate equal respect for every imaginable set 
of HIS-reasons, and hence imply the existence of a basic freedom of consciousness for 
each creature capable of developing HIS-reasons. To the extent that a person's natural 
endowments are necessary conditions for her life in accordance with her HIS-reasons, to 
that same extent one has an inalienable right to these endowments. 
By natural endowments I mean all the physical and mental abilities that go with 
being a particular individual: one's own innate endowments as well as endowments that 
only develop later in life (e.g. an ability to grow a beard or bear children). The concept 
excludes the abilities of collectives (the ability of some couples to procreate), abilities 
acquired with help from others (e.g. better sight due to spectacles), and all endowments an 
individual could have had but does not actually have. Thus, the ability to see is not one of 
a blind woman's endowments, whereas the exceptional abilities of an idiot savant or a 
mutant are (their) natural endowments. 
Note that I am not saying anything on the source of innate endowments - that is, 
on the difficult problem of whether distribution of natural endowments by means of 
genetic engineering can be allowed. Supposing for a moment that genetic engineering is 
not an intrinsically bad thing - the question is unresolved - it is still, in terms of its 
consequences, not an issue of distributive justice. Genetic engineering is not simply a 
matter of allotting abilities and opportunities to selves, but - at limes, and the demarcation 
line is vague - also one of causing different people to exist. Making, lo use a euphemism, 
adaptions in an embryo so that it will not have a freestanding ear lobe changes hardly 
anything (in most societies), but changing the sex of an embryo will make a fundamental 
difference: the child will have different hormones, different abilities, a different status and 
different chances, different experiences, different memories, different plans of life, 
different reasons and, all in all, a different life. It will be a totally new child, a different 
self. The same will be true if the embryo were to be adapted to our ideal of health -
giving it limbs if it has none, curing ils diseases before they even develop, ensuring that it 
will later produce the right hormones in the right amounts, etcetera. Nevertheless, genetic 
engineering and beliefs about the desirability and distribution of disabilities or spectacular 
capacities are undeniably ethical issues, issues of great importance and increasing practical 
relevance - but they are not a matter of distributive justice. 
A moment ago, I introduced the terms "inalienable" and "unconditional" without 
any explanation, I shall explain them now. By unconditional I mean that there can be no 
better reason against the existing distribution of these rights to ine natural assets that are 
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essential lo the full life (i.e., against the way nature distributed them), no reason forceful 
enough to trump their importance to the possessor of these rights. A right is inalienable if, 
even though it is actually possible to enslave people and hence "alienate" (heir rights, it is 
morally forbidden to do so - for instance because those rights are unconditional. 
The reasons for attaching the adjectives inalienable or unconditional to rights to 
vital natural endowments are twofold. Firstly, and this accounts for their not being 
"beyond" rights: rights to natural endowments are not beyond judgement. Natural 
endowments can be grabbed and used: people can be enslaved, they and their abilities can 
be means and not ends. Secondly, to account for their inalienability: having or discovering 
natural endowments creates, helps to create, and helps to live according to, HlS-reasons. 
Finding out where one's strengths lie often helps to choose a course in life, to develop the 
dispositions required for that life, and to discover the reasons that ultimately rule one's life 
and choice of a plan of life. If rights to natural endowment were conditional, it would in 
principle be permitted to take them away or to manipulate them. Indirectly, this opens up 
the way for judgements on HIS-reasons, which would be a breach of subjective neutrality. 
To illustrate the impact of unconditional ownership of natural endowments, image 
three cases. In the first, Cissy Roo's full plan of life, her HIS-reasons, can only be 
satisfied if she leads a physically active life, for instance as a sports woman or as a doctor 
or a priest, on call for 24 hours a day. In this case, she has an inalienable right to her 
kidneys, without which she would be unable to live her full life: each alternative and 
essentially equivalent way of life requires two healthy kidneys. 
In a second case, imagine that her kidney could save a life including certain HIS-
reasons, but that giving it would destroy Cissy's prospects on a full life. The kidney is and 
remains Cissy's unconditionally. Observe that this does not imply that we prefer one set 
of HIS-reasons (Cissy's) over anyone else's. It is simply because we cannot choose 
between both sets that we should not even think of choosing between both lives (contrary 
to what a utilitarian might do). 
The bad news is in the third case. If there is a chance that Cissy could be a good 
priest with one kidney only, her right to the second kidney is theoretically conditional. As 
this is a general principle and not one for Cissy only, the consequences could be most 
bizarre: one can envisage a society in which a government of body snalchers forces its 
subjects to adapt their lives and bodies every time it thinks that brains and limbs and 
organs are required elsewhere. However, the practical consequences of this criterium in 
terms of alienability are far less worrying. The dictatorship of the body snatchers, the 
enforced redistribution of natural assets, implies the enslavement of people in the interest 
of other people's plans of a full life, which violates impartiality. To defend the redistribu-
tion of your capacities to Harry, the distributor would have to assert that Harry's plan of 
life is better than yours, and that the distributor's judgement on plans of life and HIS-
reasons is better than yours. (The argument does not work the other way around: a 
"decision" not to redistribute natural assets does not imply that Harry's plan of a full life 
is less valuable than Cissy's. Impartiality makes it impossible to choose between the two, 
and it is for that reason that natural assets cannot legitimately be reallocated.) Hence any 
right lo any natural asset is inviolable and we can, for all practical purposes, consider any 
right to natural assets as unconditional. 
Although this section only discusses the formal distinctions between the various 
spheres of rights and absence of rights, it might help the imagination to have some 
examples of unconditional rights. One is the - general - right to life: no individual, in 
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particular no individual attempting to fulfil a full plan of life, can do without this natural 
endowment. As a consequence, governments cannot legitimately distribute and redistribute 
rights lo life. A second example of an inalienable rights is the right to the capacity to 
influence the polity and to excel in this capacity: it may be required to protect one's 
chances on living a full life. However, not every individual needs or wants this protection; 
it depends on the individual's set of HIS-reasons. The same is (rue for other inalienable 
rights like those to further the full life of others, to one's intelligence, to good looks, to a 
misshaped nose, to pain, to one's digestion and other bodily functions. 
Turning now to conditional ownership, the first thing to observe is that the word 
conditional implies that a claim is being made, that arguments to sustain this claim are 
possible and demanded, that claims can be contested, and that counter-claims can be made 
for which these same things are true. A conditional right to own X exists in sofar as, and 
so long as, reasons against it do not overrule those in favour of it. What makes them 
conditional is the fact that no matter how scarce or abundant they are, claims to them can 
be compared, evaluated and ordered. Respecting HIS-reasons demands that we at least do 
not obstruct their execution, where and whenever possible. This gives every recipient a 
prima facie right to whatever furthers his or her full life - though the rights of others often 
put limits on the degree to which valid claims can become genuine rights, even if they 
satisfy condition С Moreover, even in absence of competing claims a claim need not 
become a right. That only one candidate appeals for an available scholarship is not enough 
reason to give it; we also need a positive reason for recognizing the candidate's claim. 
Hence it depends on the strength of arguments whether we should agree lo a particular 
distribution of conditional rights and accede to an instance of ownership, transfer or 
expropriation. 
I shall not bother the reader with more examples. By definition, conditional rights 
cover everything that is part of the three other spheres, i.e., everything that is not beyond 
rights, an inalienable right or unownable. Within these boundaries, conditional rights exist 
to everything that is either one's own or someone else's natural endowment but not 
indispensable for the full life,86 to everything that is not a natural endowment but 
conducive to someone's full life, and to everything that is simply pleasant, without any 
relation to full lives. 
Finally, we reach the realm of the untouchable. Unlike the sphere of unpossessable 
things, this sphere consists of things that can be possessed but to which rights are 
unassignable. The distinguishing characteristic of this sphere is that it contains a particular 
type of right that can but should not be given: the right to destroy objects of conditional 
rights. Alternatively, and according to the grammar of complex rights, one could say that 
conditional rights are complex rights, complexes of on the one hand simple rights to an 
object and, on the other, of a set of simple duties dictating things one should not do with 
the object. In these terms, the sphere of the untouchable consists of such duties alone. 
There are things we just should not destroy unless using them is unavoidable and 
there is no other way to use them but by destroying them. Even then, we ought lo try to 
replace it by the best possible substitute. As a matter of fact, we should not destroy 
anything that could be owned by anyone else, anything that is not absolutely but only 
conditionally ours: the resources making up the whole of non-human nature, other people's 
capacities, and the artifacts created by mankind, including political and social institutions. 
Remark thai, as said before, conditional rights of this kind are In practice inviolable. 
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The reasons for this have little to do with the intrinsic value of things or with 
future generations - but everything with the six or more generations of actually existing 
individuals around us. Conditional ownership depends on arguments, on reasons of which 
the soundness may change over lime or depending on the information we have. Today, my 
wordprocessor is of almost vital importance to me, but tomorrow I may no longer need il 
and it may become indispensable for my neighbour at the university. At this moment, my 
government could decide that it ought to pay a part of Zimbabwe's national debt, but 
within minutes it may learn that Chad has been flooded and needs the money more, 
forcing the government to withdraw its earlier decision - as long, of course, as it has not 
actually been effectuated. 
Others may turn out to have better claims on goods than I have - they merely have 
not yet made those claims, have not been able to do so, or have not been heard. They may 
even be unaware of their own good reasons, as it takes lime lo develop or discover (HIS-
)reasons. In this context then, the first-come or finders-keepers principle is not a warrant 
for justice - my claim may be prior in lime without being prior in terms of urgency or 
necessity. As far as the morality of individuals and distributors is concerned, the best thing 
to do is to follow a safe-bet principle: avoid doing anything you would not want to be a 
universal practice. 
Of course, theory is often an unpractical thing. Following a general duty not to 
destroy the objects of conditional rights unless unavoidable means starving or thirsting or 
freezing to dealh - whichever comes first. The best and most practical way of saving at 
least the spirit of this duly is to demand that an object should nol be destroyed unless 
unavoidable, that if il must be destroyed it should be replaced by an identical object, that 
if this is impossible an equivalent object should be made available, and lhat if the last is 
also impossible, a proper compensation should be provided. This duty, which is expected 
to protect the interests of other recipients, also protects those of future generations in a 
roundabout way. Its effect will be lhat we leave the world no worse lhan we found it on 
entry - in sofar as that is humanly possible. 
Section 36: Conditional ownership - the sphere of distributable goods 
We now have some idea of the kind of goods that are distributable. Excluding 
unconditional rights for a moment (as societies should recognize rather than distribute 
these), the category of distributable goods is identical to that of the objects of conditional 
rights. Our next question is whether all that is distributable should in fact be distributed 
and judged in terms of distributive justice, or if there is also room for the free exchange of 
rights and hence for commutative justice. In simple political terms: should the state be the 
omnipresent all-powerful judge of all its citizens's acts, or can individuals and organiz-
ations operate on a free market - and if so, to which extent? 
Selling books or giving marks to students can be seen as both matters of commuta-
tive and of distributive justice. The distinction between the two is, as explained in Part I, 
first of all a matter of a vertical or horizontal perspective: a transfer can be assessed as an 
act of distribution if it is public (from the whole of a group to separate members), and as 
an exchange if it is a private affair between formally equal persons. In the case of just 
distribution, the value of the distributed goods equals the value a person has deserved, 
whereas a just exchange is one of things of equal value. 
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Thus, paying one's only employee can be judged as distributively just or unjust in 
terms of the division of the product of a cooperative venture, and as commulatively just or 
unjust in terms of the balance between the employee's labour and the employer's financial 
reward. If labour itself were the basis of desert, both perspectives would lead to the same 
assessment of the employee's just income, and the difference between the two approaches 
would be trivial. The allotment of incomes over a society can, by the same token, be 
analyzed as the distribution of the social product, or as the sum of all exchanges between 
individuals. 
By convention, liberal theorists of social justice make a distinction between 
commutative and distributive justice on the basis of "ultimate" ownership. In the grammar 
of complex rights this means that a right is the subject of principles of distributive justice 
if each transfer of it requires the approval of society, and that it is subjected to principles 
of commutative justice if only the parties to the exchange need to approve. If society 
ultimately owns something, transfers are called distributive, whereas if individuals or 
organized groups within society (including, incidentally, state agencies) are the ultimate 
owners, transfers arc seen as exchanges. Which perspective we choose thus depends on the 
conditions we, as archpoinlcrs, attach to the rights that we - initially - distribute. 
Even in a system of mostly conditional rights, either distributive or commutative 
justice, either public or private ownership, must somehow ultimately take precedence over 
the other, or cither one must have its own sovereign sphere of goods to rule over. The 
reason for this is that the claims we can make in terms of distributive justice and those in 
terms of commutative justice tend to clash, and without some priority or demarcation rule 
such conflicts of interest can not be resolved. Consider a randomly chosen individual's 
vocation. Jill sincerely wants to be a doctor, but it is the slate and not the university that 
assigns the right to study medicine, and the state does so on the basis of distributive rather 
than commutative considerations: its criteria arc society's demand for doctors and the costs 
of their education, instead of the willingness of students and universities to enter into a 
contract. Consider another person's inheritance. Jack's mother died, and left him nothing 
but an antique and quite valuable silver teapot, which she inherited from her grandmother, 
who in turn hod inherited it (etcetera). Jack would never even think of selling It; all the 
worth it has for him is purely emotional. Its commercial value would not play any role 
until after Jack's own death, when his barbaric children will want to sell it. Yet six 
months after his mother's death, the state knocks at his door and, in the name of equality 
of opportunity, demands that he pays taxes over his inheritance - thus forcing him to sell 
the teapot. Or consider, finally, a collective good. The inhabitants of a small village 
somewhere in Scotland decide that the main road through their village, which has been 
ruined by their own traffic as well as by outsiders, needs to be reconstructed. They pay for 
this with their own and borrowed money, making serious debts, and afterwards start taxing 
outsiders for the use of the road. Again, the stale interferes in the name of equality of 
opportunity and freedom of movement and whatever olher reasons, prohibiting what it 
calls "this kind of robbery". 
Why is it that the arguments for distribution and those for exchange clash? Firstly, 
because both types of principles are often to someone's disadvantage. Distribution, as 
every defender of pure capitalism can affirm, limits the freedom and opportunities of 
possible sellers, whereas exchange, according to another once popular creed, leads to the 
extortion of those whose bargaining power is weakest. Obviously, the opposite is also true: 
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distribution can be to the advantage of the weakest, and exchange to the advantage of the 
seller. 
A second and less self-interested reason is that both systems offer opportunities for 
(im)morality: private ownership creates numerous forms of individual responsibility, 
distribution creates similar forms of collective responsibility, both to be exercised in good 
or bad faith. Hence, a choice for one system or the other implies choosing for a particular 
view on man and responsibility. 
Thirdly, but in fact prior to the other reasons, the two systems can conflict with 
one another simply because they can apply different standards to situations. In a distribu-
tive scheme, an individual's share in worldly goods and freedoms is determined by an 
independent standard for desert; in exchanges, the standard is based on a compromise 
between the parlies's individual standards of (not desert but) desire. 
Still, there are situations in which distribution and exchange are theoretically 
compatible, due to the fact that some goods are to some extent interchangeable. Food can 
be distributed without taking away anyone's freedom to prefer certain types of food or 
anyone's freedom to exchange rice for food-stamps - in the ideal situation in which there 
is no real scarcity of any kind of food. Likewise, we can imagine a situation in which 
food in general is freely exchangeable, with the exception of one scarce good (say, caviar), 
to which each member of the population is given an equal purchasing right. For distribu-
tion and exchange to be fully compatible here, we must also allow anyone who chooses 
not to buy caviar to have the freedom to sell her right to interested others, and we must 
assume that everyone will end up with the exact amount of caviar he or she desires after 
all exchanges have taken place. The problem with these theoretical cases is, however, that 
they presuppose a world without scarcity or, were that condition satisfied, one without 
strife, as scarcity is not a necessary condition for disagreement about claims to rights. 
The choice then for a collective or private system of ownership or a "mixed 
constitution" is not simply a matter of convention, unlike the difference between commuta-
tive and distributive justice. It is a choice that involves an evaluation of one class of moral 
arguments (those for private or collective ownership respectively) as being better than 
those for the other system. Ultimately, it is a choice between the rights of the individual 
who claims the ownership of all he or she creates or appropriates, and society which 
claims that there are no rights to appropriation unless acclaimed by society, and no rights 
to the monopolization of the fruits of one's labour if - as it claims to be - society itself is 
ultimately responsible for creating those fruits. 
So how would archpointcrs deal with this question? At first sight it seems that the 
question could never even arise: complex rights are assigned unambiguously to one 
particular individual. Transferring a right is impossible; the only thing that comes close to 
it is a situation in which one individual's complex right ceases and another's begins. 
Nevertheless, even archpointers can choose between a free market and collectivism: they 
can decide not to assign certain complex rights. When and where they do so, the question 
of a distributively just transfer ceases to exist; it has then been moved to another realm, 
that of private transactions (gifts, theft, inheritance) and commutative justice. The question 
that does not disappear is the one about original acquisition. The archpointers still have to 
decide whether to allow individuals to exercise authority over aspects of the world without 
being controlled by society, archpointers or principles of social justice. Do the archpointers 
have a reason to do so? 
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Let us note, first of all, that our discussion of rights has as yet not resulted in a 
bias in favour of either an all-powerful state or that other extreme, libertarian capitalism. 
Conditional rights are universally contestable: it docs not matter who has the conditional 
right to, for instance, this book or to the nomination of cabinet members - the right 
remains conditional upon the existence of good reasons. If there is no (longer a) good 
reason for giving Harry a welfare benefit, he should not (or no longer) receive one; and if 
there is no good reason for an act of original acquisition, there is no right to whatever was 
acquired. 
Recent debates on original acquisition have resulted in a stalemate. To summarize 
the course of events, it began with Locke's classical liberal theory of acquisition, later 
adapted and defended by libertarians like Nozick. Nozick argued that an individual, having 
created an object (having "mixed his labour with a substance", as Locke might say, and 
leaving enough and as good), is thereby free to decide what to do with it - sell it, destroy 
it, give it away, or whatever. (Note that in Locke's own theory mixing one's labour is 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for justifiable original acquisition.) Then 
came the social liberals, for the last quarter of a century primarily represented by Rawls, 
who argued that no one deserves the abilities (natural endowments) that allow her or him 
to create certain objects to or perform certain practices. By default of other legitimate 
authorities then, the ultimate decision on transfer and possession is society's. Finally, some 
sharp minds noticed that lack of good reasons on the side of individuals does not amount 
to a positive proof of the legitimacy of society's claim on the individuals's products. To 
make il a sound argument, one would have to suppose that everything "on" an individual -
natural endowments, social training, products - is ultimately the product of society and/or 
of social cooperation. 
However, such a move would not be very convincing. First of all, the conclusion 
would still not follow from the premises: we have, as yet, no reason to assume that "we 
made it" implies that "we own it" - i.e., that creation justifies ownership. The same 
argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to Nozick's justification of private ownership. 
Secondly, the argument reifies society: "caused by society" may also mean "caused, to 
varying degrees, by a limited number of other autonomous individuals" (parents, teachers 
and preachers). A parallel argument applies to the case of libertarianism, where the 
individual is more or less reified, as if she were fully autonomous and as if nothing on her 
had been caused by any outside force. Thirdly, whereas Nozick cum sociis disregard the 
claims others, as causers of the causer, may have on the product that an individual caused 
to exist, social liberalism basically denies human autonomy. 
The way I offer out of this dilemma is only a partial solution. It affirms the 
justifiability - in principle - of private ownership but still presupposes that "mixing one's 
labour" is a necessary condition for ownership. Its point of departure is William Galston's 
conviction that, though neither the individual nor society may have deserved the natural 
endowments of individuals, the way an individual directs the development of his talents 
should be considered a private achievement (Galslon 1991: 131). Society or individuals in 
society influence me but they do not make me; they merely create the favourable 
circumstances in which, or the duress under which, I develop and employ my talents. My 
natural endowments, my talents and genetic make-up, do not necessarily make me either. 
Given a minimum level of intelligence and self-consciousness, I am capable of choosing 
whether I shall develop, use or ignore certain talents - and which. I build my own 
character, I am ultimately responsible for what I do with my assets; my vote in the 
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process of production and acquisition of the fruits of my labour is decisive. Society or my 
causers in society cannot claim credit for the use I make of my talents, nor demand 
anything in exchange for facilitating my activities - not unless I voluntarily and in advance 
agreed to their help, and not unless they are also prepared to compensate me for the loss 
of my dreams when it turns out that society could live with, but docs not want, more 
painters, pools and artists. Otherwise, society's claims to my products amounts to nothing 
short of an attempt at extortion. 
It follows that I can lay a valid claim to part of my products; it does not follow 
that society or others cannot also claim some of it - in so far as they actively cooperated 
with me, rather than forced me into something. The employer can claim her share in what 
I make using her tools rather than my hands only, but society cannot claim its share in the 
extra profits I make after it forced me to become an unhappy physician instead of a happy 
artist. However, the valid claims of other persons or cooperations are of the same kind as 
mine: they derive their force from personal and voluntary decisions to develop and use 
some talents rather than others. Either way, archpoinlcrs have a good reason to allow 
private ownership, i.e., to give individuals uncontrolled authority over the rights they 
legitimately acquire. 
Then again, what does not follow is that an individual should not agree to give up 
or (in the language of complex rights, metaphorically speaking) hand over his rights to 
society - under circumstances and given good reasons. And there can be good reasons for 
overruling the reasons in favour of private ownership. Firstly, without as yet claiming that 
they are better and stronger, there can be reasons against private ownership. If society has 
a moral obligation to distribute, say, financial support for the elderly, it also has an 
obligation to acquire the necessary means whenever possible, and its citizens have an 
obligation to make these means available. Secondly, reasons of (his kind can be better, and 
can therefore overrule, justified claims to private ownership. The point of reference for 
judgements on the strength of arguments is, as always, the archpoint. What matters about 
rights from that point of view is their meaning for, their impact on, the realization of 
individual plans of life. 
Earlier, wc mode a distinction between two kinds of life-plans: plans for a full and 
for a complete life. The first consists of HIS-reasons only, the second concerns all aspects 
of a life and includes specific ways of realizing the plan of a full life. As to the first, an 
archpointer wants to be impartial between HIS-reasons, but she will give precedence to 
(the protection of) HIS-reasons (the full life) over other, more disputable reasons (the 
complete life). Hence, she will judge that an individual should give up any "privatized" 
right if the individual in question cannot use that right to live a full life, and if it is 
essential to the fulfilment of someone else's plan of a full life. I shall assume for now that 
this is the complete verdict an archpointer would give (the issue is pursued further in the 
next chapter). It may however be possible to go further and demand that a right that is 
essential to Cissy's full life should also he given up if the present owner, Harry, needs it 
less - that is, even if Harry could use the right for his own full life. In this case Cissy's 
reasons are still stronger than Harry's. Of course, if my (indivisible) food is equally 
indispensable for both your and my prospects on a full life, there is no reason for me to 
give it up. Finally, it may be possible that the archpoinlcrs go so far as to judge that Harry 
should give up any right merely because Cissy needs it more (not: cannot do without it) 
for her full life than Harry for his. 
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With regard to the second type of life-plan, an archpointer cannot judge on the 
value of different (plans for) complete lives. All she can say is that plans for a full life 
take precedence and that, for this reason, the opportunities to live a full life should be 
safeguarded. Hence, she will decide that Cissy should give up non-essential conditional 
rights (i.e., rights that do not bear any relation to her full life) if political necessity so 
requires, that is, if the redistribution of those rights is a necessary condition for the 
survival of the social structure that allows full lives to be lived. Again, I shall not suppose 
but can imagine that the archpoinlers take a more radical stand: they might decide to apply 
this principle to rights that do influence Cissy's prospects on a full life but are not 
indispensable. 
Thus, to summarize this section: there is some reason to exclude certain rights 
from distribution and to recognize the institution of private property. Yet property is not 
sacred; property rights can be overruled. By way of an illustration: I should accept 
taxation (add some of my rights to the social stock), firstly, for the relief of famine unless 
that would cost me my own life; and I should accept it, secondly, if it was used to raise 
unemployment benefits to a level allowing the deaf to buy a stereo TV-set instead of 
mono, if that were the only way to prevent a civil war, and if the arguments of the deaf 
were consistent with the principles of natural justice and the demands of impartiality. (I 
shall explain this last condition in Chapter 10.) 
In closing, 1 want to draw attention to two points. Firstly, we may have established 
that the interests of distributive justice can overrule private rights, but that does not entail 
a decision on the form of the institutions that are to distribute rights, let alone a decision 
in favour of a bureaucratic stale, or for any slate, for that matter. One can still imagine a 
perfectly libertarian stateless society that lives up to the principles just described, by 
mobilizing its members on a voluntary basis every time one of its members is in need. 
Finally, I want to point out once more that this scheme, like many others, presup­
poses that making (mixing one's labour) implies owning. Il is a very strange and unsatis­
factory axiom, one that involves something like the transubslantiation of a self (or ils 
endowments) in an object and, as this does not seem to subtract anything from the self, 
the mysterious multiplication of the self. Another loose end is that the mixing-owning 
theory cannot account for the symbolic or emotional value we attach to our personal goods 
(my genealogical notes, Jack's mother's teapot, your marriage portrait), which is often far 
greater than their market value or the emotional value attached to the products of our 
labour.87 However, I cannot think of a less metaphysical alternative lo mixing-owning, 
and I do not see it as my task to develop one here. For our present purposes, the import­
ance of this or any theory of legitimate ownership does not lie in the precise way in which 
it legitimizes private property but in the observation that even if privale ownership can be 
justified there can be impartial reasons in favour of (re)distribulion, reasons overruling 
those for private ownership. 
For a more detailed - and more destructive - critique of mixing-owning see Onora O'Neill's excellent 
article on Nozlck's theory of entitlement (O'Neill 1981). 
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Section 37: Distribution and the limits of justice 
I have just, incidentally, defined two kinds of distributable or redistributable rights: 
those that should be (re)dislributed to allow full lives to be lived, and those that could be 
redistributed to allow complete lives to be lived if political necessity so requires. I shall 
call them, in correspondence to the qualities that make claims in either area valid, 
respectively the sphere of Rights to Basic Needs and the sphere of Rights to Further 
Wants. So far, I have merely supposed that the difference between the two was clear; in 
this section I shall try to underpin this assumption and elucidate the difference. 
The simplest approach would be that of describing basic needs, as further wants are 
simply everything else. Yet this seems to be impossible: basic needs are the things we 
need to pursue a full life, that is, rights that give us at least an opportunity for unhindered 
reasonable self-development. The fact that our conceptions of a full life differ seems to 
imply that our basic needs, as means to individual ends, differ as much as those concep­
tions do - unlike Rawls's basic needs as described by the objective list of primary social 
goods with its supposed interpersonal validity (Rawls 1982: 172). However, the full life is 
one in which we can realize our HIS-reasons, in which we have the opportunity to live up 
to the standards we set on our behaviour. And the conditions under which, or rights 
through which, we are free to take responsibility for our own behaviour and actions can, 
to a large degree, be generalized: we are equals in many relevant respects. 
In the first place, we all have certain physical and mental needs: we need life itself, 
air to breathe, water to drink, food to eat, a place to sleep, nearly always shelter and 
clothing, a lime and a place to reflect on our actions, and whatever cures are available to 
secure our physical and mental capacity to act. 
Secondly, in order to develop a sense of self in the first place, not to mention plans 
of life themselves, we have certain social needs irrespective of the kind of society in 
which we live. For starters, we need means and opportunities to communicate, to inform 
and to be informed. A full life can, but need not, be lived in splendid isolation. Without a 
mutual understanding of what is going on, only a recluse could live her life as she wanted, 
and even she needed a social environment earlier In life to Imagine and develop her plan 
of life. Depending on the circumstances of society then, we need at least a language, and 
often enough the possibility to read and write. Next to communication, we need some 
general education, again to enable us to conceive, find or choose a path in life. Thirdly, 
we need a social environment and a status in this environment as a psychological point of 
departure for our individual development, and - obviously with the exception of the future 
recluse - as a place in which to realize our plans later on. 
Finally, we have political needs. We plainly must have the formal freedom to live 
according to our conception of a full life.88 Furthermore, we need to have a voice both in 
the collection and in the (re)dislribution of rights so as to represent our interests in basic 
needs and further wants. Finally, and in order to secure the previous two political needs, 
we must have a voice in decisions about the structure of exploitable relations, including an 
exit-option. 
The formal freedom to live the full life of one's choosing should not (o be confused with a complex 
right to the same. Λ formal freedom Is limited by the rights and freedom of others; a complex right satisfies 
condition Ш and therefore precisely and completely dennes what is and what Is not allowed. 
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Admittedly, there are visions of the full life that are exceptional in that they do not 
require most of the needs listed above some of the time, and some of them all of the time. 
Apart from some minor rights during childhood, a Buddhist may need nothing more than a 
place to meditate, and he may well be able to meditate in the middle of a battle. Here, the 
beauty of the idea of distributing conditional rights to basic needs, rather than distributing 
basic needs themselves, becomes apparent. On the one hand, a society that does not 
provide for the basic needs of its members is straightforwardly partial to the plans of those 
who (can) help themselves and those - like Buddhists - who need no help. In other words, 
such a society violates impartiality. On the other hand, a society that directly distributes 
food and beds and housing violates impartiality in the opposite direction. It seems to force 
those same members who can help themselves or and need no help into accepting 
wasteful, unwelcome and even harmful goods - and into paying taxes, thus punishing their 
independence. If we distribute rights instead of goods, the problem can solve itself. The 
distinguishing feature of rights is that they leave us a choice; a conditional right can be the 
freedom to do or use a thing, within the circumscribed limits and within the limits of 
physical possibility - it need not be a duty, let alone anyone's fate. One is not forced to 
use the right to vote, or the right to write, rule, talk, or even the right to breathe; once 
conferred, one is free to use it - or not. 
The sphere of basic necessities consists of all that is due to us, all we deserve by 
virtue of our status as class-Α recipients with the capacity to develop plans of a full life. It 
differs from the sphere of further wants in two respects. For one, further wants bear no 
intrinsic relation to the full life nor, consequently, to the distributor's duty to safeguard 
opportunities for fulfilling plans of a full life. Secondly, the grounds for deserving further 
wants differ. As to the first point: further wants at best facilitate certain ways of living a 
full life more than others; their presence or absence does not however make a full life 
possible or impossible. If, say, generosity is part of someone's plan for a full life, wealth 
can but need not make it easier to be generous - it may also give rise to avarice - but 
there are other means and other courses in life to the same end. If intellectual excellence 
is part of it, a career in the academic community is not essential to that aim. Depending 
on the actual form and condition of society and one's own talents, a career in the world of 
big enterprise or as a craftsman can at times be more expedient. 
Moreover, further wants can be totally unrelated to the full life. A desire for 
wealth, for a video or for a particular career may be the product of peer pressure, envy, 
greed, seduction by commercials, lack of self-respect, or any combination of these or other 
factors. (Think of "the Joneses syndrome": when the Joneses buy a new car, their 
neighbours suddenly also need a, preferably a more impressive, car.) 
As to the first difference between basic needs and further wants, the absence of an 
inherent relation with the full life implies that no-one deserves further wants, at least not 
in the same sense as one deserves basic needs. This is, nevertheless, no reason not to care 
about the way in which further wants are distributed, nor one for believing that their 
distribution is irrelevant to the issue of minimal justice. We should care about something 
else to which the issue of their (jusl) distribution is indispensable: the preservation of 
social order and social cooperation. It is this last trait that, as I hope to show in the next 
chapter, offers a viable and morally acceptable criterium for the just distribution of further 
wants. 
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Section 38: The subject of justice: the structure of institutionalized exploitable relations 
Minimal justice, as discussed so far, requires: 
(1) that vital aspects of the self are considered to be beyond the realm of owner­
ship rights; 
(2) that an individual's rights to his or her natural assets are recognized as uncondi­
tional, inalienable rights; 
(3) that conditional ownership rights cannot include a right to destroy the object of 
a right unless destruction is unavoidable, in which case the good in question should 
be replaced or restored, or a proper compensation should be provided - in declining 
order of preference; 
(4) that conditional rights to basic needs be distributed if morally required: and 
(5) that conditional rights to further wants be distributed if - to put it bluntly -
politically necessity so demands. 
If we follow the right rules, the principles of minimal justice which we are 
developing here, then the resulting distribution of rights will be just. This does not 
however mean that a just result is the only thing that matters. Principles of justice and the 
adjective "just" can be applied to results as well as to intentions and acts. If what we 
ultimately care about is that every person has his or her share of the social stock, we must 
care less about the means that lead to this just end-slate or about the true intentions the 
distributor had when distributing. Analogously, if we want distribution processes to follow 
a pattern in which each recipient is assigned rights according to a measure of desert, we 
should care less about the means and the actual results. Or if we want the distributor (say, 
the stale) First of all to follow a perfectly impartial procedure, we will care less about the 
results and about the substance of the procedure: "chop off every head" is quite impartial 
in the everyday sense of the word and would, on this view, be quite just. 
A choice for the primacy of just intentions, acts or results implies another choice 
for the primacy of just procedures, just distribution patterns or just end-states. This 
question can easily be narrowed down to a choice between patterns and procedures, 
because even if we should care most of all about end-states, we could not One reason lies 
in the impossibility of maintaining any distribution of rights. Suppose that a society 
reaches, at a certain moment in time, the ideal end-state, the ideal distribution of rights. 
Now having a right - one right - means having the authority to decide between ρ and -y?; 
having more rights means being able to creale several distinct possible worlds. The 
exercise of each and every one of these rights can change the impact of other rights, it can 
create new ones (scientific research for instance sometimes leads to new inventions), or it 
can void them. The result is a new distribution of rights, that is, in one diverging from the 
ideal end-slate.89 
A choice between procedures and patterns is less easy to make. Procedures are 
important for at least two reasons: because we need certainty to "plan" life and hence need 
a stable basis on which to build expectations, and because we want to ensure that no 
matter how recipients gel their fair share, they do not get it by violating impartiality or 
other recipients's rights. Patterns on the other hand are important because we want lo 
«9 For a classic example see Robert Nozick's story of Wilt Chamberlain (Nozick 1974: 161 ff.). 
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ensure that the distribution is not just impartial in the everyday sense of the word as 
indifference as to who exactly gels a share of rights; all that is the function of a just 
procedure. We also, or rather, want impartiality with regard to conceptions of the good, 
i.e., we do not want two people to end up with the same quantity of rights but different 
subjective qualities, or the other way around, unless there is a relevant difference between 
them - relevant as seen from the impartial point of view. Fortunately, we do not need lo 
assign relative weights to patterns and procedures. We can have them both. 
Our point of departure in this is the explanation Rawls's gave for his decision to 
make the basic structure of society rather than the individual the subject of social justice, 
the result of which is a reconciliation of pattern and procedure. If the basic structure of 
society satisfies certain principles of justice, the aim of ensuring social justice is sufficient­
ly met. Rawls's reason for giving this central position to the structure of society (by which 
he in fact means the state) is as simple as it is convincing: being the composite of the 
institutions distributing basic rights and duties, the basic structure is the basis of our 
expectations, permeating almost every aspect of life and influencing our chances at 
success for our plans of life at the most basic level. It shapes and directs lives, it can 
favour "certain starting positions over others" (cf. Rawls 1971: 7) and it therefore precedes 
any attempt at being just or advancing justice on the side of individuals and non-political 
institutions. 
Now, as said before, the concept of society as understood by Rawls and his fellow 
theorists of justice is not a very suitable basis for a realistic theory of justice. The state 
and intra-state institutions - national, local and regional governments - arc just as much 
part of the basic structure on which individuals build their expectations as international 
codes and agreements are, or regional political unions like the European Union, or 
intergovernmental institutions like the UN, EFTA and NATO. For this reason I earlier 
proposed to redefine society as the structure of exploitable social relationships. 
Rawls's interpretation of a basic structure, on the other hand, is quite adequate. He 
specifically referred to institutions as making up the basic structure of society. I see no 
reason not to support this thesis and apply it to our new conception of society. Institutions, 
understood as organized, regulated and formalized forms of cooperation with a basis in 
positive law or in tradition and custom, are extremely basic. Without them, the benefits 
and burdens of cooperation in other (mostly voluntary) organizations are accidental and 
uncertain. Every instance of social interaction inside or outside of such organizations 
would be little more than that - an instance, a unique incident without any relation to other 
incidents except coincidence. Without the chains of institutions, of some kind of "basic 
structure" of social relations, the freedom to lead a secure life let alone a full life cannot 
be ensured or enforced. 
As Nozick correctly observed when attacking patterned principles of justice, taking 
the basic structure of society (in our case: the structure of institutionalized exploitable 
relations) as subject of justice means subjecting procedural justice to the demands of a 
patterned principle. Still, we should notice that it also means subjecting the pattern to the 
demands procedural justice imposes on it: those of being fair and predictable, of offering 
an impartial and secure basis of expectation. "Only against the background of a just basic 
structure ... can one say that the requisite just procedure exists" (Rawls 1971: 87). 
CHAPTER 9: EQUALISANDA 
Section 39: Types of equalisanda 
In the preceding chapters we learned that minimal justice is concerned with the 
protection of the inalienable rights to a recipient's natural endowments and with the 
distribution of complex rights to basic needs and further wants. We have also uncovered 
several grounds of recipiency. Yet we are not quite ready to give a practical meaning to 
the basic maxim of justice, the demand that equals get an equal treatment and that 
unequals are treated in proportion to their inequality. We cannot treat equals equally: 
(a) as long as the rights recipients get only have a purely subjective meaning, a 
meaning that cannot be communicated given uncertainty about the identity or 
comparability of different persons's feelings; 
(b) as long as the meanings of rights are measured by different and incompatible 
standards; or 
(c) as long as we cannot compare the positions of individuals relative to one 
another. 
In this chapter I shall therefore be concerned with the quest for an intersubjectively 
acceptable measure for (in)equality, an equalisandum. 
The search for this measure of inequality is the common denominator of two 
opposed schools of thought with fundamentally different interpretations of the expression 
"equal treatment". On the first view, usually branded egalitarianism, the presumption is 
that all recipients are basically equal and consequently deserve to get an equal part of the 
social stock. However, egalitarians admit that equality is a controversial notion.90 Rights 
or goods do not mean the same to people, or do not affect them in the same manner and 
to the same degree, as humans are undeniably different - by accident, of course (on this 
view), and not by nature. A blind, deaf and mute man probably gets less (joy, utility, or 
whatever) out of a ticket for the Eiffel Tower than the average healthy person; the jaded 
taste will have a different opinion on the digestibility of fast food than the average 
homeless person. Clearly, an egalitarian cannot measure equality by the number and 
amount of goods a person holds; instead, it requires some abstract quality that allows 
comparisons between all these different goods and the different values they have for 
different people. In social justice research, this quality is often referred to as the equalisan­
dum, "that which is to be equalized". 
Non-egalitarians do not care about the quantity of rights that people get relative to 
one another. For them, equal treatment may very well result in inequality - in fact, on 
their view distributive justice should often lead to inequality. Aristotle is one of the best 
known representatives of this school; the theory behind honours, orders and medals 
illustrates the position best. One could say that non-egalitarians try to lake the difference 
between persons seriously. They acknowledge that individuals differ in their mental and 
physical make-up, in status and position, in what they do and how they do it, and as a 
consequence in what they deserve or need. Some, for instance, need more food than 
others; some deserve а К and others do not. Nevertheless, non-egalitarians insist upon 
I discuss the complexities off (he concept of (in)cquality only In so far as this is directly relevant to the 
Issue of equalisanda. For a more fundamental discussion of equality, see Larry Temkin's seminal Inequality 
(1993). 
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some form of equal treatment: there ought to be an equal standard for the desert or need 
of all, so thai the objectively same achievement is rewarded either with the same reward 
or with intersubjeclively equivalent rewards. Note that the latter option in effect (though 
not in theory) erases the difference with egalitarianism, as moderate egalitarians allow 
deviations from equality if deserved or needed. A difficult point for non-egalitarians is the 
determination of the relevancy of the reasons offered for (un)equal treatment Like 
egalitarians, they need a universally acceptable meter for individual need or desert - a 
measure for "that which is to be proportionally equalized", the equalisandum. 
There is as yet no need to choose between these interpretations of equal treatment 
We shall postpone an answer to this question until the first issue on our agenda, the 
designation of an impartial equalisandum, has been addressed. 
First, let us remove a source of possible confusion. Principles of justice are 
traditionally classified as being either essentially principles of equality, or essentially 
principles of need, or essentially principles of desert." In everyday life, these categories 
suffice to distinguish the kinds of reasons that are thought to be relevant to (un)equal 
distribution. To be given a share on the basis of need, one has to suffer from something, 
preferably (I assume, to avoid confusion) something undeserved - a disease, a defect, a 
disaster. To get or be denied a share on the basis of desert implies that one has done 
something admirable or abominable, even if nothing more than (not) being bom of noble 
blood. Lastly, to receive equal shares of anything implies either that no reasons whatso-
ever can justify inequality, or that no one should or can pass judgement on (private) 
reasons. Consequently, one might expect that these three notions could serve well as 
equalisanda: the more you need, for instance, the more you should get. 
In the realm of theory however, the distinctions between need, desert and equality 
are far less clear. Some principles, like "the working poor should get a compensation 
equalizing their income to that of the average citizen", can be defended in terms of more 
than one category: they do not deserve their poverty, yet work hard for their money, and 
their bad luck should therefore be compensated; they need the money to survive or to 
reach a tolerable level of welfare; or the basic equality of all humans should be reflected 
in everyone's wealth and income. In fact, principles that look like need-principles may be 
desert-principles, and vice versa: "to each according to his contribution" may well refer to 
a basic psychological need for rewards, and "to each according to his professed prefer-
ence" could just as well be based on the conviction that we deserve all we desire. Most 
importantly, the three principles fail to establish clear measures for (un)equal treatment: 
they do not specify the quality in which recipients are equal or by which their differences 
in need or desert should be assessed. 
The debate on social justice of the last twenty-odd years has resulted in a long list 
of possible equalisanda, often criticized and dismissed as either needing inadmissible 
premises or leading to counter-intuitive (inconsistent) results. These equalisanda are 
basically of three kinds: they are result-oriented, opportunity-based, or means-based. 
A popular result-oriented equalisandum was and still is individual utility. It is most 
often used as a basis for the comparison of (changes in) social stales: the sum of individ-
ual utilities, average utility, and other aggregates of individual utility are the fundamental 
ingredients of utilitarian and welfarist schools in moral philosophy and (especially) 
See e.g. Vlaslor (1962: 31 ff.) and Dell and Schokkaert (1992: 245). David Miller (1976: 27) 
distinguishes need, desert and rights. 
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economics. These schools have, from the early beginning, been under heavy fire exactly 
because of the aggregate character of their meters. In its most simple incarnation as a 
counter-argument to the crudest version of utilitarianism, total utility, the critique insisted 
that utilitarianism could not distinguish between two societies with the same total utility, 
in one of which utility was distributed equally, whereas in (he other millions suffered and 
one person enjoyed all the pleasures life can provide. John Rawls criticized utilitarianism 
along these same lines as not taking the difference between persons seriously; in his view, 
the justice of a stale of affairs should have some relation to what individuals get, and not 
to what they get in average or sum. Essentially, as Jan Narveson (Narveson 1983: 73) 
observed, utilitarianism is more interested in making happy people than in making people 
happy. In short, utilitarianism was thought to be unable to assess the distributive aspects of 
social states. 
Now, apart from the fact that modern versions of utilitarianism are less vulnerable 
to this kind of critique,'2 objections to its aggregate character and its supposed inability 
to deal with the distribution aspects of justice cannot be used against utility as an 
equalisandum. If someone uses wine to get drunk, it does not mean that you cannot also 
use it to cook. The fact then that utilitarians use individual utility to compare social states 
does not prove that it cannot be used to compare individual positions within one social 
state, i.e., to assess the distributive rather than aggregate aspects of stales of affairs. 
Two questions now rise: can utility actually be used that way, and if so, should it? 
Presupposing that an ш/rosubjective measurement of utility is possible in itself (cf. Smart 
1986: 32), the first problem is essentially one concerning intersubjective measurement. I 
discuss this point only to show that it is a problem; I do not intend or need to solve iL 
Basically, utility is a subjective measure. One can ask an individual to rank and even 
assign values to her rights or to alternative bundles of rights, but we have no reason to 
suppose beforehand that Harry's marks will be comparable to Cissy's. Harry and Cissy 
may both rank their individual rights to drive a car highest, they may both value it with a 
10 on a scale of 1 to 10, but that still docs not tell us if Harry and Cissy derive the same 
satisfaction from their respective rights, simply because we do not know how (say) happy 
a 10-right mokes them. 
So let us suppose something else as well, namely that there is a certain "similarity" 
of utility scales and utility experience (cf. Smart 1986: 33). How would this intcrsubjec-
tively comparable quality be measurable? One strategy to ensure an inlersubjectively 
correct measurement might be to simply ask Harry and Cissy to value each other's 
bundles of rights, i.e., asking them how they would feel if they were to trade places. This 
would at least tell us how strong their feelings are relative to one another. Or so it seems. 
If Harry values his own life (bundle of rights) with a 6 and Cissy's with an 8, and Cissy's 
values are directly opposite, all we know is that they seem to prefer to trade places. As an 
alternative to refining the techniques for comparison, we could consider a second strategy: 
that of developing an objective rather than intersubjective basis for comparisons, a kind of 
lie-detector measuring the physical signs of excitement and anxiety. Or, thirdly, we could 
try to argue that the differences between the characters and emotions of persons are 
irrelevant from an impartial point of view; what ought to matter is each person's position 
relative to his minimum and maximum possible utility. There is something to be said for 
For some modem and stronger versions of uliliiarlansm cp. several contributions lo Sen and Williams 
(1982). For an overview of the alternative uses of utility In modem economics, see Schnkkaert (1992). 
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the last: perhaps one cannot make a fundamentally depressed person as happy as a maniac 
can be even on his worst day (Ackerman 1980: 47), so why lake the impossible as a basis 
for policies? 
But let us suppose that an adequate interpersonal measurement of utility is both 
theoretically and practically possible. A more important question is whether we should 
base principles for the just distribution of rights on the utility that those rights produce for 
their recipients. The answer is a plain no. 
Utility is a universal meter; one can rank religious comfort, political freedom, 
material possessions, sexual satisfaction and whatnot on this one scale. The implication is 
that all complex rights are comparable qua satisfaction (cf. Sen and Williams 1982: 6). It 
follows that it can also used to measure two distinct categories of rights separately, as in 
John Rawls's theory, where two fundamentally different kinds of primary social goods are 
distributed according to two different principles based on what are in fact two distinct 
equalisanda: liberties are divided equally in an advanced society, material goods can be 
distributed unequally if that is to the advantage of the worst-off. Instead, utility could have 
been applied to both spheres without blurring the normative distinction between the two. 
The distinction I made earlier between basic needs and further wants is of the same type: 
it presumes that the two categories are not interchangeable, that they should not be 
measured on one scale but should instead be valued for their own reasons. Nevertheless, 
utility can theoretically measure both. 
Yet utility should not be the standard for even only one of these categories: being 
result-oriented, it cannot be an impartial standard. It can measure results only in terms of 
one conception of the good, i.e., the good of enjoying utility in some form. It therefore 
discriminates against other conceptions. To summarize Bruce Ackerman's argumentation 
against utility (Ackerman 1980: 46 ff.): if shares in the social stock were to be distributed 
on the basis of utility, one person would be more deserving than another because of the 
satisfaction they would derive from their shares, and not because of the (for instance) 
moral value they attach to their respective courses in life - that is, not on the basis of the 
standards their conceptions of the good or of a full life prescribe. One can argue that these 
latter standards are in fact measures of individual satisfaction (utility). One can argue with 
the same force that they have nothing to do with individual experiences, that for example 
individual happiness is of no interest to the full life, but that creating wisdom and beauty, 
undergoing God's decisions, or learning to live with and assent to one's fate is all that 
matters. Either way, "we search in vain for a neutral yardstick for measuring the 'real' 
value of different conceptions of the good" (Ackerman 1980: 48). 
With this, we have found a strong argument against all result-oriented equalisanda 
(satisfaction of wants, needs, preferences, creation of wisdom, experience of divine mercy, 
etc.) in general: any measure for the effect of rights-packages can be attacked as being 
partial to some conceplion(s) of the good and partial against another or others. Unfortu­
nately, Ackerman's anti-equalisanda argument is so strong that it can also be turned 
against means- and opportunity-based equalisanda, the application of which of course 
implies discrimination against result-oriented equalisanda. 
Before I try to solve this problem, I nevertheless want to spend a few words on 
these other two types of equalisanda. In recent years, several means- and opportunity-
based equalisanda have been proposed. I cannot discuss them all, nor do I need to. The 
choice for an equalisandum depends, first and foremost, on the fit between the equalisan-
dum and the theory in which it is to operate. My principal concern in the following 
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sections will therefore be that of showing why archpointers would accept the two 
equalisanda I propose, option equality for rights to basic needs and envy-containment for 
rights to further wants. In this context, it is worth while to look at a problem that two of 
the more successful equalisanda encountered. 
In his 1980 Tanner Lecture, Amartya Sen argued that one of the main defects of 
John Rawls's equalisandum, primary social goods, consisted in Rawls's preoccupation 
with "good things" rather than with what a good does or means to people (Sen 1980: 218). 
With this. Sen reflected a widely shared feeling that Rawls's theory might be insensitive 
to the special needs and demands of some recipients. It is all very nice to distribute, say, 
freedom of movement equally, but a lame man is more interested in the actual capability 
to move than in the formal freedom to do so only. Even though Rawls's principles of 
justice, in particular the rule demanding genuine equality of opportunity, would probably 
let this man end up with the means or capabilities which he in fact requires, it seems to be 
intuitively wrong not to be concerned in the first place about capabilities - especially since 
the whole idea of primary goods is to enable people to live as they may (reasonably) like. 
Embracing Rawls's egalilarianism but rejecting his orientation on goods, Sen 
proposed that justice should be concerned with equality of basic capabilities, with "being 
able to do certain basic things" (Sen 1980: 218) - a proposal for a means-oriented 
equalisandum which he refined in later years (see e.g. Sen (1993) and Cohen's (1993) 
critique of Sen). At about the same time, Ronald Dworkin advocated his own alternative 
to the equal distribution of primary goods: equality of resources (Dworkin 1981: 283 ff.; 
for comments on Dworkin see Schokkaert 1992: 102). Like Sen, Dworkin felt that what 
mattered to people was being able to pursue one's chosen course in life, rather than having 
the means to live that what a distributor believes to be the right life. Dworkin suggested 
that instead of using a list of primary goods, recipients should pool all their resources and, 
being given equal purchasing power, buy or regain the resources they really want at an 
auction. 
Both equalisanda are designed to give people equal starting positions in life; their 
aim is to alleviate the effects of the undeserved differences in capacities with which we 
are bom. Capability and resources are, however, ambiguous concepts: they refer to means 
or capacities but also to opportunities, at least if they are to be less formal than Rawls's 
primary goods - which was clearly Sen's intention (cf. Sen 1993: 33, 44). To have the 
resources to move requires legs or an alternative to legs, but one also needs something to 
walk on and one needs the absence of obstacles to walking (like ropes around you or 
people pointing their guns at you); to be capable to vote one needs to be registered as a 
voter as much as one needs elections. Yet in these two means-oriented equalisanda the 
notion of opportunity is virtually absent. 
Clearly, opportunity without means is not enough - but neither are means without 
opportunities. An impartial equalisandum should be a measure of the effect rights have on 
their recipients's life, more precisely on their capability (means plus opportunity) of 
leading the life of their choosing. Regardless of the role that we would want to assign to 
equality in starting positions or to inequality in later life, the standard by which we 
measure the inequality of recipients should take account of what their rights can mean to 
them, not merely of what they might mean. 
214 JUSTICE FROM A DISTANCE 
Section 40: Equality of options: an equalisandum for basic needs 
Ackerman's anti-equalisanda argument actually averts any attempt to arrive at an 
account for all kinds of equalisandum except one. It excludes equalisanda based on 
interpersonal comparisons and those based on a one-sided measure for the meaning of 
rights (compare the first paragraph of the previous section). The way is still open for a last 
type, one that is intersubjectively acceptable and allows for comparisons of the individu-
als's positions without falling in the trap that Ackerman set. The equalisandum that I 
propose for basic needs, equality of options, satisfies these conditions. 
The basis on which we can compare rights to basic needs, (he trait these rights 
have in common, is not that they enable us to make others work for us, or to make things 
happen for us, nor, conversely, that they give us the potential to do what others want us to 
do. Rather (han as means to dominate or be dominated, rights to basic needs must be 
understood in terms of the capability to remain independent: undominaled and undomina-
ting (cf. Spinoza's Tractatus Politicus. 1951: 295 and Terpstra 1990: 332). Their function -
in Sen's words, what they do to people, or in G.A. Cohen's, what people can do with 
them - is to allow people to live a full life. Rights to basic needs offer both the means 
(capabilities, resources) to that aim and the opportunity. Whether and to which degree we 
use them is our own choice. It is in this sense of a two-dimensional concept, as both the 
means and the opportunities to live a full life, that I shall use the word option. 
Now basic needs have been defined as the necessary means lo a full life, and being 
the subjects of complex rights, they are also by definition, or by definition offer, genuine 
opportunities to a full life. It should then come as no surprise that rights to basic needs 
can be expressed in terms of options, the synthesis of means and opportunities. What may 
be more surprising and what certainly requires a justification is the decision to choose 
options as an equalisandum, rather than means or opportunities. Why should option 
equality be the impartial standard for judgements on the value of individuals^ bundles of 
basic rights? 
One reason, a necessary but not sufficient condition, has already been discussed 
above: if a certain right were to give you all the opportunity in the world to do something, 
say eat, but not the means, say a mouth, it would be as empty as when it gave you all the 
means but no opportunities to eat. Either way, the right cannot have more than a formal 
meaning. To be capable of representing the meaning rights and goods have or can have for 
people, an equalisandum should take account of both aspects. 
What makes options an impartial equalisandum becomes clear when we consider 
the effect of its application to basic needs. The principal common feature of rights to basic 
needs is the freedom they give to live the full life we want to live, the freedom to 
determine our way of (rather than path in) life. Without basic necessities, it would be 
impossible to be free to realize any set of HIS-reasons; even the notorious Ch'an Buddhist 
would no longer have a choice. With rights to basic needs on the other hand we are free 
to use all, part, or none of them in any way we feel to be consistent with our conception 
of the full life. 
Not all basic needs are equally basic for all of us. Clothing, for instance, is 
obviously more important the colder it gels. Yet basic needs do not have to mean the 
same to each to be equally important for all. Impartiality demands the postponement of 
judgement on HIS-reasons and on sets of HIS-reasons, i.e., on conceptions of the full life. 
They all deserve the same respect, but that respect cannot remain purely formal. To 
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express equal respect for, while at the same time avoiding prejudice against, any possible 
plan of a full life, impartiality should extend beyond HIS-reasons to both the means and 
the opportunities that are - together - indispensable for a full life. Hence, the set of means 
and opportunities one person necessarily needs for a full life is just as valuable and just as 
important as any other's. 
So much then for the intersubjcclive acceptability of our equalisandum: anyone 
accepting the conditions of the archpoint will have to accept subjective neutrality and, as a 
further consequence, an understanding of a just treatment as an equal treatment with 
respect to HIS-reasons. It is now also easy to see why equality of options escapes 
Ackerman's anti-equalisanda argument: it does not require interpersonal comparisons, and 
it leaves everyone's private convictions as to what matters about basic needs - means, 
opportunity, results - a matter of, precisely, private convictions. 
Equality of options defines the basic criterium for judging claims to basic needs: 
any partial or total lack of options on the part of a recipient counts as a good reason. It 
also defines, at least in principle, the standard for a just distribution of basic necessities: 
equality. Impartiality with regard to plans, means and opportunities for a full life implies 
that, first of all, unequal starling positions in life should be regarded as totally undeserved. 
No plan of a full life being better than any other, each recipient should get an equal 
chance - means and opportunities - of realizing it. Secondly, inequalities that arise later in 
life should be seen as prima facie unjust, that is, unjust until proven just. As impartiality 
forbids judgements on HIS-reasons, any condoning of option inequality, inequality that is 
due to different ideas about the full life or to developments in one's conception of a full 
life, comes down to condoning violations of subjective neutrality. This accounts for the 
prima facie injustice of inequality of options. There is, however, one factor that might 
seem to be able to lip the balance in favour of inequality: irresponsibility. The woman 
who capitalizes her rights - first her further wants, then her basic needs - and wastes what 
she has capitalized on classic vices; not in the pursuit of a full life but out of a plain and 
pure lust for pleasure (assuming the two to be mutually exclusive in her case), will seem 
to have forfeited her rights." Yet when I return to this mailer of prodigal daughters in 
the next chapter, I shall argue that even the most Irresponsible recipient deserves the 
benefit of the doubt, as far as her bare survival as an autonomous agent is concerned. 
Option equality is an egalitarian equalisandum: rights to basic needs give means 
and opportunities to live a full life, and if those means and opportunities are distributed 
equally, then all's well and just. So much for theory. A conversion of this principle into 
practice will confront us with a nasty problem: that of measuring options. Measuring the 
means-aspect of one basic need (e.g. amount of food) will be difficult but as a rule not 
more so than determining if a person is still alive, in that it is not technically impossible: 
most basic needs can be represented as what methodologists call dummies, eilher-or 
variables. Either one has enough food to survive, reproduce and live a full life, or one is 
starving; either one has a voice in politics and a place in society or one does not. 
Measuring opportunities may be equally difficult for similar reasons, and adding all means 
and opportunities together while still making sense of it is - well, an expert's job. I admit 
the difficulties and I admit, that quantifiabilily could help us understand the further 
implications of option equality - but I do not admit the existence of a fundamental 
I presume for a momenl thai the woman in quesiion acts irresponsibly and that there are objective 
criteria Tor irresponsibility. 
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problem. Measures of justice do not have to be quantifiable to make sense, even political 
sense. Like beauty, virtue, melancholy and other "hard-to-quantifiables", the notion of 
having options lo live a meaningful life can be understood without computations and 
applied without figures. 
Section 41: Containment of envy: the equalisandum for further wants 
Option equality is not a good equalisandum in the sphere of rights to further wants. 
Whatever these rights may have in common, it is not that they are essential to the full life, 
or even contribute to it. Lacking a relation of necessity to the full life, further wants do 
not offer opportunities or means to that aim, and therefore cannot be evaluated in terms of 
options. As already remarked in section 37, the archpoint in fact does not enable us to 
define any equalisandum for rights to further wants as such at all. They may be scarce 
goods but remain "merely" luxury as compared to basic needs: at the end, or in the end, 
the criteria for a life worth living can hardly be the merits of our cars and wallpaper, the 
number of loves loved and ruined, or that of soccer games seen on TV. Yet from the 
archpoint of view or from any human point of view, it cannot be irrelevant that further 
wants mean enough to people to continuously fight about them in each and every social 
context Being the object of so much social conflict, they satisfy any condition of social 
justice they can satisfy (see section 25 above). 
Then again, what rights to further wants exactly mean to the individuals who have 
them or desire having them depends not on their HIS-reasons but on two other factors. 
One is a very broad and very contingent psychological and social context: culture and 
subculture, profession, persuasion and convictions, status, family, education, friends, peer 
pressure, one's inclination towards or away from conformism, personal and general 
economic prospects, and so on. All of these influences shape an individual's preferences, 
some of them rationally, other in an irrational direction. Outsiders as they arc, archpoinlers 
will be able to perform some Brandlian cognitive psychotherapy and sift out the irrational 
desires, leaving them with a small set of tastes, preferences and basic moral motives. 
At this point the second factor that gives meaning to rights comes in: the indivi-
dual's theory of the good, her plan of a complete life. And here also the usefulness of 
archpointers to the debate on distributive justice in a society ends. We allowed archpoint-
ers to have encyclopedic knowledge of the society or societies on which they judge. We 
assumed that this knowledge can include every fact there is to know about any person's 
social ideal, anyone's concrete ideal for his or her personal life, any conception of the 
good life expounded by ideological, religious, or other segments of society, and, if 
available, the whole community's (i.e., the communitarian) consensus on the good life. But 
all this knowledge is in vain, as the archpoinlers lack one piece of information that would 
allow them to judge on individual and societal views on the good from a higher point of 
view, namely which moral view is the right one. The whole point of defining impartiality 
was, after all, to avoid that archpointers were able to choose sides on the kind of moral 
issues that we ourselves are unable to decide and (should) believe to be undecidable. 
To cut a long story short: an equalisandum measures the strength of reasons for 
claims on parts of the social product, but the archpoint does not allow judgements on the 
kinds of reasons that are relevant to further wants - and therefore it cannot compare these 
goods and rights themselves. There is no impartial equalisandum for further wants as such. 
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Nevertheless, the issue of the distribution of rights to further wants does have one 
aspect that not only requires but also allows an impartial appraisal. As sources of conflict 
and notwithstanding the emancipatory influence social conflicts may have, further wants 
are a potential threat to the fabric of society and thereby to the individuals's prospects on 
a full life; the more intense the conflict, the greater the danger. An almost self-evident 
example is a civil war of the kind Somalia experienced in recent years. Crops and 
farmlands were destroyed and harvests stolen, causing on the one hand famine among 
farmers and other ordinary citizens, but benefitting on the other hand the warlords and 
their gangs, who ended up having far more food than they basically needed (not to 
mention other "luxury" goods). There was, in principle, enough food for everyone to 
survive, and without war there would have been plenty, so the problem was not a supply-
side issue of real scarcity but a matter of extreme unfairness in the distribution. In their 
fight over - initially - further wants like status, family affairs and relative political 
autonomy, the warlords literally tore their society to pieces. To use an understatement: 
they violated the precepts of minimal justice by furthering some full lives at the expense 
of others. 
If we want to protect individuals and their life-prospects against discrimination of 
at least this most fundamental sort, the distribution of goods and rights in the sphere of 
further wants must be judged by ils impact on social peace and individual security, on the 
options to lead a full life. The equalisandum I propose in this context is containment of 
envy - envy, as a pars pro toto label, referring to all the possible reasons for discontent 
and for claims to further wants. It is a purely formal measure of individual discontent over 
the distribution of rights to further wants, not a substantial criterium interpreting (discon-
tent as (lack of) opportunity, means, utility or individual desire-satisfaction. Our second 
equalisandum cannot judge reasons as reasons. It can only measure the strength of 
feelings, and it should measure individual feelings rather than a more abstract quality like 
total or average (dis)content, as social peace depends more on the distribution than on an 
aggregate of (discontent. 
How can envy or discontent be measured? One possibility is the well-known envy 
test, Introduced in mainstream social Justice theory by Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin 1981: 
285), and, in the different shape of the exploitation test (see section 31), in analytical 
Marxism by amongst others John Roemer. Dworkin applied the envy test to the distribu-
tion of scarce goods (resources) that shipwrecks on a desert island would agree to after a 
fair auction. If none of them wanted to trade her packet of goods for that of anyone else, 
the distribution satisfied the envy-test; if it did not, it appeared that the resulting distribu-
tion of resources was still not totally fair. The envy test has many advantages - for one, it 
neatly circumvents the problem of interpersonal comparisons - but it also has two 
disadvantages: it only measures whether desires and preferences are equally satisfied, and 
it measures opinions on existing bundles of rights only. 
As to the latter problem: social cooperation is not guaranteed, and envy will not 
disappear, when no one wants her neighbour's rights and goods. I may not want to trade 
places and jobs with my closest colleagues or with anyone, but that does not stop me from 
envying others for parts of their bundles of rights. In one of the belter worlds I can 
imagine, no one would desire to have my income, yet I would be a millionaire. Envy or 
discontent is, in other words, not limited to actually existing distributions. It applies to all 
feasible and even all imaginable distributions. For that reason a useful envy lest will have 
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to take account of at least all feasible (re)dislributions of the existing stock, rather than of 
discontent over the existing allocation only. 
With regard to the equality aspect of the Dworkinian envy test, there are two 
reasons for rejecting this bias. In the first place, we do not want to ensure equality per se; 
unlike options, envy-containment is not an egalitarian equalisandum. We want a certain 
degree of social peace and hence a meter for envy that measures more than a simple yes 
or no. It is, for an analysis of envy in itself, totally irrelevant that the best warrant for 
cooperation in a particular society at a particular point in lime is an equal distribution of 
discontent. Secondly, equality of (dis)contcnt is not the only imaginable way of avoiding 
the problem of inlersubjective measurement. There is still the simple and more accurate 
alternative of asking people how envious they feel - though, admittedly, the idea is simpler 
than the implementation. 
For the sake of argument, I assume that we only want to know how envious people 
are, and not which rights they are envious of. In the real world we have political institu-
tions and bargaining mechanisms to fill in these not unimportant details. We can then 
imagine an envy-containment test as a four-stage procedure. At the first stage, recipients 
are asked to look at the bundles of rights to further wants they and others actually have 
and at the feasible permutations of these bundles. Subsequently, they are asked to scale 
their sense of (dis)contcnt on a scale from, say, 0 to 10. They should, thirdly, indicate at 
which level of discontent they would consider separating from society (in the rational 
choice idiom: indicate the base line for cooperation) and at which level of discontent they 
would start or join an uproar. Finally, the data for a whole society are assessed in the light 
of the potential for social unrest they may reveal. 
Quite obviously, this method is sensitive to strategic behaviour, i.e., to lying, 
cheating and misleading. Recipients can easily exaggerate their discontent or raise their 
standards, if they suspect greed to produce sweet grapes. However, the same is true of the 
original envy test. 
Section 42: Ontions meet envv 
There is one possible objection to this whole scheme of equalisanda and rights that 
is too obvious not to discuss: do we really need two equalisanda, or is it possible or 
necessary to reduce one to another? An argument for such a reduction would have to 
claim either, indirectly, that the distribution of rights to basic needs will influence the 
distribution in the sphere of further wants, or vice versa, and that they should "therefore" 
be measured by one standard, or, directly, that option equality is in fact a kind of envy-
containment, or vice versa. 
The first part of the indirect version of this argument is undeniably true, among 
other reasons because distribution is in one respect a zero-sum game. One can have one's 
pudding only once. If a good like food is detracted from the social slock to cover basic 
needs, it can no longer be used to temper a further want. Moreover, analogous lo ihe 
positive effect an incentive-based distribution of further wants can have on the social stock 
(i.e., growth and, via a trickle-down effect, a larger part of the cake for the worst-off), il is 
possible that a particular distribution of further wants gives rise to social unrest and to a 
reduction of the social slock, for instance if shares are reduced to cover the basic needs of 
the worst-off. Finally, induced by simple learning effects or by less admirable stimuli like 
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greed, the experiences derived from the use of rights to basic needs may bring on changes 
in life-plans. One may, for example, go to school and discover a talent for trade, change 
one's plan of (a complete) life, and require starting capital; or one can watch loo much 
commercials and develop an intense desire to own a car. New plans of life mean new 
desires, new wants. 
The distribution of rights to basic needs influences that of rights to further wants 
and vice versa. Yet this does not imply the truth of the second part of the indirect 
argument, namely that the distribution of all conditional rights should be measured by one 
standard only, either option equality or envy-containment. For that part to be true, a 
change in the distribution of options should itself necessitate a change in that of envy-
containment, or vice versa - which is not the case. There is no direct connection between 
having had or having missed lunch and being more or less envious of other people's 
interactive high-definition stereo megascreen colour television with teletext, nor does 
feeling more or less envious about the television sets of others in any way imply having or 
needing more options to live a full life. 
Which brings us to the direct argument: is it possible that envy-conlainment and 
option equality are the same thing, or that one of them is merely an aspect of the other?94 
To reduce option equality to envy-containment it would have to be true that 
chances of living a full life are, in fact, instances of envy-containment over further wants. 
Now this would, first of all, mean that supporting full life plans is merely instrumental to 
the ultimate aim of protecting the social structure, which was meant to facilitate full lives 
in the first place. This cannot be our intention. Secondly, and worse, it would imply that 
giving options to live a full life can never be at odds with containing envy. Fortunately, a 
counter-example is easy to find: imagine ten million radical buddhists realizing their full 
plans of life in what used to be a consumer society of fifteen million people - it is hard to 
believe that the remaining five million will ungrudgingly accommodate themselves to a 
crashing economy. 
To be able to reduce envy-containment to option equality, on the other hand, it 
must be true that containing envy is one means, possibly among others, of giving people 
options to live a full life. Thus, as envy-containment is by definition aimed at the 
protection of the social structure, protecting the social structure would by definition further 
the realization of full lives. On this view even the most basically unjust society, one 
wilfully distributing little or no panem but a lot of circenses, would not be totally unjust 
However, there are ways of furthering social peace without impartially furthering full lives 
- all it takes is the kind of state terrorism that typically attracts the warm attention of 
Amnesty International. 
Apparently then, there is no reason to suppose that options and envy-conlainment 
can be brought under the same heading. They define two different equalisanda for two 
different realms, each of which determines a distinct aspect of the (injustice of the basic 
structure of society. In the next chapter we shall examine the way in which these standards 
can be applied. I want to close this chapter with a summary, in the form of a table, of the 
specification of complex rights which I gave in the last two chapters. The first column 
Call Ρ the sel of rights lo basic needs, instruments of power, and EC ine sel of rights to further wants, 
the instrumenis of envy-containment. Then either (1) Ρ = EC (idcniily). (2) Ρ с EC & Ρ » EC, Ο) Ρ ¡χ EC & Ρ 
ζ> EC (total inclusion), (4) Ρ a EC, Ρ » EC & Ρ η EC * 0 (partial inclusion), or (5) Ρ a EC. Ρ » EC &.P r\ 
EC = 0 (mutual exclusion). I argue that either (4) or (S) must be the case. 
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delineates the possible objects of complex rights, the second divides them in categories of 
ownership rights (or impossibility of ownership rights), the third indicates when rights can 
be the object of (re)distribution, the fourth couples these to equalisanda, and the fifth 
column, alluding to the principles of social justice ruling the distribution and protection of 
rights, gives a preview of the following chapter. 
| Rights are: 
complex rights 
| made up of r-
H molecules 
ownabillty 
unownable: 
vital aspects of 
the self 
unconditional: 
(essential) 
natural assets 
untouchable: 
the right to 
destroy 
conditional 
rights in the 
strict sense 
alienability 
no 
if morally 
required 
if politically 
necessary 
distribute as 
no 
basic needs: 
option equality 
further wants: 
envy-contain-
ment 
principles 1 
equal respect j 
equal prolec- I 
tion I 
save, replace, | 
restore, or 
compensate 
equality 
minimize envy | 
CHAPTER 10: PRINCIPLES OF MINIMAL JUSTICE 
Section 43: Principles for options and envy 
Up to this point, we have discussed separate issues in the theory of social justice 
and not principles of justice as such. We have asked to whom justice should be done: who 
is to be a recipient, and why? We have examined what it is that a distributor should 
distribute, in which connection we distinguished several categories of rights and described 
a proper subject for the principles of minimal social justice. Lastly, we discussed equali-
sanda, the bases of comparison for the distribution of rights. 
Between the lines, we touched on two other problems: that of the identity of the 
distributor, and that of the grounds of desert (the reasons for getting more or less of the 
equalisandum). With regard to the first issue we found little more than that (1) the 
existence of a diversity of distributors in the real world may complicate the allocation of 
responsibility for distributive justice, and that (2) we were as yet unable to decide whether 
state and state-like institutions or the free market would be best fit to warrant distributive 
social justice. However, we shall see in this chapter that this is enough information to 
allow more precise answers. 
Our conclusions regarding the second issue were more specific but equally 
unordered. We determined that to count as a recipient of social justice and hence to be 
deserving, one should necessarily exist, live, and be the subject of a distributor's responsi-
bility. Three other qualities make a difference for the degree of recipiency and, 
consequently, for the degree of deservingness: consciousness, the possibility of autonomy 
and agency, and membership of society. The recipient's responsibility and irresponsibility, 
we saw, should also be taken into account, as should, finally, the availability of the 
options and envy-containment equalisanda. What we did not discuss was the effect that 
these nine elements will have on recipienLs's shares. 
In this chapter we shall link these separate propositions together and construct a 
complete metric of minimal justice, step by step, working more or less backwards through 
the preceding chapters. I shall start with principles for the distribution of options (rights to 
basic needs) and envy-containment (rights to further wants) sec, i.e., without reference to 
other elements of a metric such as types of recipients, grounds of desert, and the shape of 
the distributor. I do not want to claim that the list of principles with which we shall end 
up exhausts the list of possibilities, but I do believe that it gives an adequate description 
of where an understanding of justice as impartiality takes us. 
Defining a principle for the distribution of options for a full life requires that we 
take account of the scarcity of rights to basic needs in a specific way. There can obviously 
be too few options: circumstances like famine, thirst, sickness, political oppression and 
coercive isolation all obstruct the full life. Scarcity of this sort need not be a primarily 
distributive problem. If impartiality demands that we show equal respect to all (fellow) 
recipients because of their capacity for having a plan of a full life when distributing rights, 
it seems that we have a similar and perhaps even greater duty to prove this respect when 
producing rights. Political rights can be created, food and medicines produced, all to and 
above the level of sufficiency. Distributive justice analysis is, however, not concerned with 
supply-side solutions; it must start out literally from what is given, i.e., the stock of rights 
at a particular point in time. Nor is distributive justice, in so far as it deals with the 
distribution of options, concerned with abundance. Once the necessary conditions for the 
realization of an individual's plan for a full life have been satisfied, additional rights 
become the object of further wants rather than basic needs. 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, rights to the available basic needs ought to be 
distributed so as to guarantee equality of options. Option equality answers the demand to 
respect each and every individual's HIS-reasons and plan of a full life without taking sides 
and without directly or indirectly favouring some reasons and persons over others. Any 
argument for an unequal distribution of the equalisandum implies that we choose sides, 
which is by definition unjustified and unjustifiable - in principle. There is one legitimate 
exception to this rule, and that is not, as some readers might expect, a Rawlsian difference 
principle. 
Before I introduce the exception that I intend to allow, let me first explain my 
reasons for rejecting an unequal distribution of rights to basic needs if that is "to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged", to copy Rawls's criterium for justifiable 
inequality (Rawls 1971: 83). Rawls believes that an unequal distribution of certain primary 
goods can serve as an incentive for those who are directly benefitted by the difference 
principle, which will lead to a growing production of the goods in question, which will in 
turn via a trickle-down effect leave the worst off belter off than equality would have let 
them be. 
Now let us suppose that the same mechanism could work in the case of rights to 
basic needs. Basically, there are two kinds of incentives to be reckoned with: investments, 
extra resources that are physically or economically necessary to allow growth, and pure 
incentives, extra resources needed to motivate those now better off to produce more. (The 
distinction between these two will be dealt with more extensively below.) The latter type 
of incentive is clearly incompatible with impartiality: the inequality in question is 
unnecessary, as those profiting from pure incentives could also have produced more 
without an incentive and with another (impartial) altitude. Giving in to demands of this 
kind comes down to giving in to blackmail. In the case of pure investment incentives there 
is no blackmail, but we do have another problem. The theory of distributive justice is not 
concerned with the justification of growth or other supply-side solutions to questions of 
basic needs. To justify a growth policy (note that inequality may not even be necessary for 
growth to occur) other political ideals like human dignity, emancipation or positive 
freedom have to be Invoked, and those Ideals would have to take precedence over the 
ideal of social justice. I can very well imagine that this is possible and even morally 
required, at least in the poorest societies, but it would still mean a deviation from justice 
in the name of a higher ideal, which is a choice that cannot be justified from within a 
theory of distributive justice. If and when a society decides to deviate from justice, all that 
a principle of justice for rights to basic needs can add is that burdens should not be 
distributed unequally unless that is really physically unavoidable, because there is no 
reason why anyone should suffer more than anyone else - other than voluntarily. 
Which brings me to the real exception to options equality: unavoidable inequality. 
Some sources of options are simply indivisible. The one remaining unii of a serum, for 
example, cannot save the lives of two or more dying patients. Under such circumstances, 
and if no one freely withdraws his claim, all that can be done is lo choose between a 
violation of equality by denying one person his chance to survive - and Ihe fiat justitia 
pereat mundi option of withholding it from everyone. Unfortunately, the last and easiest 
solution is also the worst: it apportions no options and allows no full lives to be lived at 
all. Which leaves us with a necessarily tragic choice for one rather than another life. In 
situations like these, the best approximation of impartiality is chance: though in the end it 
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indirectly favours one plan of life over another (a violation of subjective neutrality), at 
least chance avoids the graver sin of directly judging persons and reasons." 
Bringing all these considerations together, the following principle for the distribu-
tion of basic necessities emerges: 
(1) Rights to basic necessities are to be distributed so as to give recipients equal 
options for a full life. Unavoidable inequalities should be as small as possible and 
should be randomly distributed, with an equal chance for all to win or lose. 
To illustrate some of the effects of this principle, let me discuss two examples. In 
the first case, Harry Stoltle has been caught stealing the works of Plato from a bookshop 
and setting fire to them in front of the shop. As he did such things before, he has been 
sentenced to three months in prison and he has lost his active and passive voting rights for 
that period. Whether Harry deserved this is a question of retributive justice; whether laws 
allowing citizens in general to be locked away and to be deprived of political rights are 
just is, on the other hand, a question of distributive justice. Judged by our first principle, 
one would have to say that it depends. It depends, in general, on whether convicts still get 
the basic needs required for a full life - food, medical aid, shelter, etcetera. It depends in 
particular, firstly, on whether Harry and his likes still have a voice in politics,9* that is, 
whether their political opinions can still be heard outside the prison walls. This is an 
empirical question, or in other words, it is uncertain. It depends, secondly, on the 
influence a prison sentence has on one's status and role in society. One could argue that 
prison sentences, especially when combined with the loss of political rights, are a form of 
symbolic banishment from society, but again one would have to ask whether the actual, 
empirical result is the same as that of genuine banishment. Finally, and if it turns out that 
under circumstances (in certain countries) symbolic exile obstructs the full life, it depends 
on whether we can reasonably maintain that criminals are not first-class recipients. 
As a second example, consider the prodigal daughter introduced in section 40. 
She - say, Cissy Roo again - sold or threw away all her rights, including her house, her 
clothes, and the contents of her refrigerator; she spent It all on gorging, gambling and 
gigolos and now lies in a dark alley recuperating from the effects of very bad wine. Like 
Firy Harry's condition in the first example, Cissy's fate in terms of basic needs is both 
presumably the result of plain stupidity or irresponsibility, and (see section 40) prima facie 
unjust. Like Harry, Cissy seems to satisfy all the requirements for full, first-class, 
recipiency. Whether she should be given a second chance in life and whether Harry should 
temporarily be barred from his options thus depends on the strength of second-thought 
arguments against their full recipiency. We cannot (or, for the sake of argument, shall not) 
Provided (hat they do noi email judgements on IHS-reasons, random distribution of unavoidable 
inequality is compatible with reasoned choices for one rather than another life, for Instance because of the 
existence of ties and obligations towards family or friends (reasons that are probably irrelevant for social justice, 
as we may expect slate institutions not to have families or friends). In fact, any rule satisfying the conditions of 
the third principle that will be discussed shortly can be compatible with the Idea of a random choice. 
Having a voice is not necessarily the same as having the vote. Compare in this connection Ronald 
Dworkin's helpful distinction between political influence and political impact (Dworkin 1988: 4); the latter equals 
voting influence, the first consists of impact and influence on other people's impact. Having a voice In politics is 
having influence rather than impact only. 
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deny their existence, the facts that they live and that they are conscious, their capacity for 
agency and autonomy, and the fact that there are distributors with a moral responsibility 
for their fates. The remaining options for exclusion, if we want to exclude them, are that 
we try to argue that Harry and Cissy cut their lies with society or that their irresponsibility 
makes them less deserving. 
Now assume that Налу I acted quite responsibly: he knew what he was doing and 
he knew what the consequences would be. He burnt Plato's books as a protest against 
impartiality, against a society allowing bad tastes, and he had the welfare of society in 
mind. He acted, among other things, on HIS-reasons. In some respects this puts his action 
in the same class as civil disobedience and conscientious objection. Harry II, on the other 
hand, acted in an uncontrollable fit. Cissy I let her passions get the better of her; some­
where on the road to ruin she lost sight of what she was doing. Cissy II knew what she 
was doing - having a good time. We cannot deny the status of full recipient to Harry II on 
grounds of irresponsibility without denying it to Cissy I as well, but we cannot deny it to 
Harry II - what happened to him was pure and undeserved bad luck. Nor can we deny full 
recipiency on grounds of responsibility to Cissy II without also denying it to Harry I, but 
we cannot deny it to Harry I without judging on HIS-reasons, i.e., without violating 
impartiality. Hence arguments based on responsibility or irresponsibility alone are simple 
not strong enough to justify the partial or total exclusion of both Harries and Cissies from 
rights to basic needs. 
We are left then with the argument that Harry and Cissy themselves cut the ties 
with society. The fact of the matter is that Harry and Cissy are still both deeply embedded 
in social relations of all sorts; if anyone has cut these ties, it must have been society itself. 
Which brings us to the question of the criteria for membership or citizenship: when can a 
society justifiably admit or expel members? Now, I cannot discuss all possible criteria,'7 
but we should note one - politically suspicious - criterium that is of particular relevance to 
our cases: the structural danger that massive immigration would pose to other recipient's 
options (cf. Goodin 1992: 11, Woodward 1992: 68). The argument behind this criterium 
for non-admission is that even though inequalities between those bom in the Third World 
and, say, inhabitants of Monaco are or ore thought to be undeserved, Monaco has a right 
to refuse to admit immigrants from the Third World should there one morning stand five 
million of them at the border, as admitting them would totally ruin Monaco's opportunity 
to guarantee an acceptable minimum level of welfare even (especially) to its current 
citizens. It is far-fetched to compare Harry I to five million immigrants, but one might 
argue that he, unlike Harry II, Cissy I or Cissy II, poses an in principle similar threat to 
his society's opportunities to guarantee the options of its members, and that he can 
consequentially be said to be less deserving of membership and less deserving the status 
of first-class recipient. Harry I's action was, after all, intended to destroy or contribute to 
the destruction of a just and impartial basic structure. Once more, the argument is 
politically suspect and far-fetched, and it is not one that I myself believe to be sustainable, 
but it is the only reason I can think of for excluding recipients from rights to basic needs. 
I shall let these cases rest at this point; this is a chapter about the construction of 
principles and not about their application. All I wanted to do was to show that our first 
principle is a practical principle, in that it allows a meaningful debate on and analysis of 
97 
For ihosc inlcrcstcd in Die debate on criteria for admission to citizenship, see Barry and Goodin 1992. 
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the distribution of options and basic needs, and that it is a critical principle in permitting 
us to question the morality of existing practices and intuitions. 
The case of principles for rights to whatever fulfils a further want is quite different. 
Here we do not have a good reason for equality - nothing in this sphere is essential to a 
full life, so whichever distribution rule is chosen, they need not make judgements on or 
show disrespect for HIS-reasons. The sources of further wants, the reasons behind claims 
in this sphere, are to some extent coincidental with regard to the person: they derive from 
an extended plan of life which in its turn, as a specific adaption of a conception of the full 
life, is given shape by purely external conditions like the structure of society, its culture, 
one's genetical, physical, cultural and family background, and so on. And just like no one 
really deserves innate capabilities, no one deserves the society and the place in it in which 
one finds oneself. In short: to the extent that they are externally caused, no one deserves 
the reasons one may have for one's further wants. Under these conditions every distribu-
tion rule based in the content and meaning of further wants themselves, including equality 
or chance, is arbitrary. 
In so far as these reasons are not externally caused, one is responsible for their 
existence and deserves them. Yet even this fact cannot support a - any - distribution rule. 
It indicates that people partly create their own wants and reasons for wants, not that they 
do so with the help of an unquestionable objective criterium for the value of wants, a 
criterium that is acceptable from an archpoint of view. There is no such criterium. It is 
still possible that specific conditions in a specific society dictate an equal distribution of 
rights to further wants in the cause of envy-containment, but precisely because this 
depends on contingent circumstances we cannot pinpoint "the" best distribution rule for all 
societies and times. 
Nevertheless, we can put some formal limitations on the political freedom of 
choice regarding distribution rules. For starters, the impartial protection of plans for a full 
life demands that (1) the distribution of rights to further wants should not lead to a social 
breakdown. For very much the same reason, (2) it should not induce any individual to 
prefer sabotage or secession from society back to a limited or total state of nature, over 
staying in.98 Leaving society altogether (which is not the same as emigrating to another 
society) certainly diminishes the departing individual's chances of accomplishing her plans 
of life. By taking her possible contribution to society with her, she probably also reduces 
the chances of others. Thirdly, hindering plans for a complete life implies hindering at 
least some full lives, that is, violating the requirement of subjective neutrality. 
Consequently, a distribution scheme for this sphere must do more than merely prevent 
self-destructive behaviour; it need not actively further the individuals's pursuit of a 
complete life, but (3) it ought at least not to hinder them in this. 
It takes no more than a glance to see that these three limitations will in some cases 
be incompatible. The non-hindrance condition (3) and the prevention of individual exit (2) 
are compatible only if the first gives way to the second: the minimum a distributor or a 
distribution system can do to avoid hindrance is to meet as few further wants as possible 
without making the exit-option more attractive than a life in society. It does not work the 
other way around: forcing one person to leave a society to whatever benefit of others 
means denying her rights to further wants and basic needs. These two conditions will, in 
98 Assuming the ralionalily of such a move - which may be questionable. 
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turn, have to give way to the prevention of a social breakdown. As in the case of 
indivisible basic needs, a choice must be made between lifeboat-ethics (protecting as many 
persons and interests as well as possible) and sacrificing the meaning of justice to the pure 
idea of justice. In summary, we find the following principle for the distribution of rights to 
further wants: 
(2) Rights to further wants are to be distributed according to rules that minimize 
envy, first down to a level preventing the distributing institution from breaking 
down, аПег that down to a level at which no one prefers leaving this institution above 
staying, and beyond that down to a level at which the pursuit of plans of a complete 
life is minimally hindered. 
In an ideal world, where envy never occurs, this principle is probably superfluous; 
it is clearly designed for the non-ideal world in which the conditions of justice obtain. The 
last part of the principle, nearly demanding the promotion of complete lives, still allows a 
very large degree of inequality in treatment and in circumstances. It is left up to concrete 
societies and individuals to determine the degree of inequality they find acceptable. In 
principle even an egalitarian can live with inequality - as long as there are good reasons 
for it. Unfortunately, the second principle does not contain a test of reasons. It allows all 
imaginable sources of envy: racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination that are, to 
say the least, quite suspect from an impartial point of view, changes in tastes, in needs and 
in plans of life regardless of personal responsibility, incentive-based arguments, and 
ultimately also pure extortion. Anything goes, it seems, as long as everyone accedes to 
whatever reasons for (in)equalily are advanced. Now perhaps envy and envy-containment 
should be measured impartially - but should impartiality go so far as to sacrifice the well-
being of minorities (qua strength of conviction) to the whims of majorities? 
In the first place, impartiality does not imply that all reasons are equal and equally 
good. It allows tests for the consistency and rationality of convictions. What it lacks is 
something that a real society may have: either a communitarian view of the good life, or a 
liberal political system reconciling different views of the good, both allowing the creation 
of standards for the ultimate moral quality of claims and arguments. (Which, incidentally, 
should not be taken to mean that communities and liberal societies have such standards by 
definition, nor that those standards are reliable.) 
An archpointer will not find every degree of (in)equalily acceptable, nor every 
reason for maintaining social peace or for preventing secession. Although minimal justice 
is not concerned with contingent factors like the particular sense of justice of particular 
individuals and societies or with actual economic growth figures, it does pose some limits 
on the kinds of arguments citizens would be demanded to embrace for the benefit of social 
peace. A first limit is clearly reached where claims are only supported by, by definition 
inadmissible, judgements on HIS-reasons: "You shall not have access to a university, for 
society is not interested in supporting weaklings that basically want nothing but to be 
loved by others, which you say is your ultimate aim in life". This maxim is a special case 
of a more general precept: respect for recipients should be translated into respect for their 
claims. 
In the eyes and vocabulary of an archpointer, the basic reason for the existence of 
social institutions is the protection of full life plans, and the reason for valuing full life 
plans lies in the respect that we owe to each possible recipient of justice by virtue of his 
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or her capacities for recipiency. To those who are our equals in this respect, who can 
account for their actions, ultimately in terms of HIS-reasons, we owe equal respect. And 
we do not show this by neglecting one person's reasons or accepting another's without 
any investigation (let alone by doing both). They - reasons and persons - all deserve to be 
heard and investigated seriously. In this context, the conditions of the archpoinl can again 
be helpful: a distribution rule must be compatible with these conditions or it cannot be 
called (minimally) just. Again, the conception of minimal justice does not furnish us with 
methods to corroborate moral arguments about further wants as such. It can only, on 
formal grounds, refute those arguments that violate its basic demand for equal respect. 
One of the conditions of the archpoint, the condition of weak rationality, plays a 
central role in assessing the acceptability of arguments. It demands that we reject fallacies 
and accept logically sound arguments, which would be impossible without even consider-
ing arguments for or against a distribution rule. It also demands three other things: (1) that 
arguments should be logically sound; (2) that arguments, in so far as they are based on 
facts, are confirmed by the facts; and (3) that arguments, in so far as they are based on a 
moral evaluation of facts, are not inconsistent with or unsupported by the moral theory or 
theories in terms of which they are defended. Finally, weak rationality suggests a more 
substantial limit: that one is held responsible for the things, the character traits, abilities, 
actions, and ideas, for which one is responsible - no more, and no less. If we are to 
respect recipients for the capacities that make them recipients, we cannot at the same time 
call those capacities morally irrelevant. 
Further criteria for the evaluation of claims to further wants can be found in the 
principles of natural justice. Distribution rules and arguments for them must be consistent 
with these principles, i.e., every difference in treatment must be based on a relevant 
difference between recipients. 
We can now formulate a third principle, which, as it in fact excludes certain 
reasons for discontent and certain sources of envy, logically precedes the second principle 
formulated above: 
(3) Rules for the distribution of rights to further wants must be compatible with the 
respect arch pointers owe to recipients of justice. 
This principle excludes: distribution rules chosen without consideration of argu-
ments pro or con; rules based on logically fallacious arguments, on arguments 
inconsistent with the facts they refer to, and on arguments that are inconsistent 
with or not supported by the moral theories in terms of which they are defended; 
rules presupposing responsibility for more or less than for what one is actually 
responsible; rules based on judgements on HIS-reasons; and rules (hat are incom-
patible with the principles of natural justice. 
To get some impression of the strength of this principle, let us consider some cases 
of discrimination and threats. Why, to begin with discrimination, would one refuse to give 
a woman (as a representative of the whole set of possible victims of discrimination) the 
job of, say, school director? One well-worn argument points to the risks of hiring women: 
they are presumed to become pregnant, or to marry, or both, and quit the job. Now there 
is good reason to assume that if no one or nothing (like husbands, families, laws and 
cultures) forces them to, mothers and married women will not quit any more than married 
men or fathers would. The facts, then, do not support discrimination. Still, the defender of 
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conservative family values would contend, pregnant women will give birth one day and 
take leave, whereas men do not. But are women responsible for what men do? Under 
different circumstances, in some modern societies and in recent years, both parents take 
leave and, incidentally, take further care of their children - ideally in equal amounts. Yet 
let us suppose that even under these more favourable conditions, women still give up their 
jobs sooner and more often than men, for no identifiable reason. If one were to use this as 
an argument against women, one would ultimately be thrown back at one of two argu­
ments: either that women are intrinsically unworthy of any (or this particular) public 
responsibility, or that the consequences of being a woman will keep women from 
adequately fulfilling their responsibilities. Perhaps such reasons are sound on some view, 
but not on any (hat is acceptable to an archpointer: the things a person is born into, like 
class, caste, society, body, skin colour or the "intrinsic worth" attached to any of these 
things are not of his making, and cannot therefore be held against him. Or her. 
Threats, to move on to another example, are made in terms of what is known in 
bargaining theory as the non-agreement point, the point at which the benefits of cooper­
ation equal the costs. They appear in different shapes, the most obnoxious being black­
mail, extortion, or, as Robert Nozick called il, unproductive exchange. "I want you to give 
me some of your goods or rights, thus creating a state Xt in which I feel better off than 
now, at my basic level in X„ - or else I shall create Х
г
, which you will generally find to be 
far less attractive than either X0 or Xt". I could be the classic robber demanding your 
money or your life. I could be a tyrant dealing with religious dissenters or minorities by 
threatening to exclude them from, say, anything but their barest needs." I could be your 
best friend making a joke. Or I could be a slave or a victim of crime fighting for my civil 
rights against you, the establishment or the criminal. 
For the moment neglecting the "or else X2" part, which is always the heart of a 
threat, we find a simple basic level negotiation argument. Arguments of this kind seem to 
violate only the first demand posed by our third principle, that of considering arguments. 
Without the X2-part, the legitimacy of threats and of distribution rules brought about by 
threats depends solely on the quality of the argumentative context: is the threat part of a 
debate on claims in which further arguments are submitted, and If so, do these other 
arguments pass the lest of admissibility?100 
It is the X2-part of a threat which is most disturbing, the part that announces that I 
shall not give in an inch to any argument however strong - perhaps not even if Х
г
 is also 
worse for me than X0. An altitude like this cannol be justified unless, again, the argumen­
tative context allows it: (1) it must leave no room for the evaluation of arguments and 
counter-arguments (think of a totalitarian state), or (2) the other parly must boycott the 
discussion or (3) rejects the result. Next to this, (4) at least one of my (suppressed) 
admissible arguments must unconditionally sustain my claim against any admissible 
counter-argument. 
Related to threats are demands for zero-sum redistributions, for incentives, and for 
investments. I can be brief about the first and last taclics. A zero-sum redistribution trans-
Oiher examples could be segregation, clothing prescriptions (yellow stars, school uniforms), limitations 
on civil rights, etc. 
100 
The implication is that bargaining, both for equality and for relative advantages, in itself violates a 
principle of justice, unless further good reasons for the distribution rule are brought forward In the bargaining 
process. 
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forms a state X„ into X,, by which one party gains whatever the other loses. If the demand 
is guised as a threat, it should be judged by (he same standards as a threat; if it is not, it is 
a basic level argument and should be judged as such. Investment arguments are, perhaps 
surprisingly, hardly different. Their general structure is as follows: "I want you to give me 
some of your rights, so that I can transform X0 via X, into X2, in which we will both gain 
relative to X0." (Note that the step from X0 to X, is a zero-sum redistribution.) If the results 
of an investment harm some other recipients, it is a threat to them and a simple basic level 
argument for those benefitted. If, on the other hand, an investment benefits at least the 
investors and harms no other recipients, that is, if it is Pareto-oplimal, there is no threat 
involved. Unfortunately, there probably is no such thing as a free lunch - or an unpolluting 
non-competitive enterprise. 
Genuine incentive arguments are more complicated. On the surface they look like 
investment arguments: "I shall create X2, in which you as well as others gain relative to 
X<,, and no one loses, provided that you give me an incentive creating X,." The difference 
with the investment argument lies in X2: a state approximating X,, with the difference that 
I will not lose relative to X,. If it is impossible to reach X2 without going through X„ an 
incentive argument can be seen - and judged - as a legitimate investment argument, or 
rather, investment arguments can be seen as special cases of the incentive argument. 
If, on the other hand, it were possible to get to X2 without passing through X,, a 
more interesting difference with investment emerges: the profit I make in X, could have 
been avoided. One might then be tempted to call such an argument for genuine incentives 
a negative threat: I still get more in X, and X2 than in X0, but instead of loosing, you will 
gain. In fact, this is what G.A. Cohen thinks about genuine incentives. In his eyes, any 
call for incentives comes down to extortion, as my gain in X, is totally unnecessary and 
even distracts from the gains of others in X2 (Cohen 1991; the point is also implicitly 
made in Boudon 1976: 105). In other words, when incentives are not investments, they 
may be efficient (as Rawls argues) but they will have little to do with justice and 
everything with greed. Cohen is right, though only in a pseudo-Rawlsian context where 
everyone is supposed to desire the maximum advancement of the worst-off and where 
desert plays no role. From a non-Rawlsian point of view, genuine incentives cannot be 
condemned offhand. They can, at the very least, not be condemned on the basis of 
Cohen's critique of Rawls: it is not evident that justice would oblige anyone to actively 
support (economic) growth. Moreover, on a non-Rawlsian view of justice there may be 
good reasons to reward special efforts, even in advance. The third principle allows us to 
discuss these reasons. 
One last remark regarding the arguments of the discontent: the principles I 
proposed will not, or will hardly, work if the recipients of justice are irredeemably 
envious, greedy, or jealous. Ultimately, their actions and desires will not merely obstruct 
the workings of a just social structure, but simply ruin it. I do not consider this to be a 
disadvantage of my theory specifically; as a rule, every theory of justice presupposes just 
citizens. 
Section 44: Principles for the public realm 
The basic structure of society does more than withhold or distribute conditional 
rights in answer to basic needs and further wants; it is concerned with the distribution and 
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protection of all rights. If it is to be just, it should protect the legitimate and reasonable 
expectations of recipients in all respects, that is, with the inclusion of their unconditional, 
inalienable rights and, beyond rights, their self-ownership. Formulating principles for these 
categories is simple, as we have already discussed their content in an earlier chapter: 
(4) Each person's HIS-reasons are inviolable; no social institution is allowed to 
distribute or redistribute (rights to) this vital aspect of the self. 
(5) Each person has an unconditional right to his or her natural endowments, in so 
far as these are essential to that person's full life, and an inalienable right to his or 
her other natural endowments; no social institution is allowed to redistribute or limit 
rights to either. 
Secondly, the protection of both identified and as yet unidentified legitimate 
expectations requires that we put a general limit to the exercise of conditional rights. 
There are several ways to envision such a limit. On an everyday conception of rights, a 
conditional right is a freedom to do or use something under particular restrictions: "You 
have the right to lake bus 50 at 12.05 from Whooping Bus Station to Whooping Shopping 
Centre, provided you pay the usual fare." On this view, some things should just not be 
done with or to the object of the right. On the conception of rights formulated above, a 
conditional right is a (set of) complex rights, for instance: "You have the following set of 
freedoms: to take or not take bus 50, to take it at Whooping Bus Station and to get off at 
Whooping Shopping Centre; you do not have the freedom not to pay the usual fare." On 
this view, some rights just should not be owned or distributed. Summarizing the con-
clusions we drew in section 35, we end up with the following principle for "untouchable" 
rights: 
(6) Conditional rights are to be distributed as rights, limited by a recycling principle: 
the object of a conditional right should not be destroyed unless that is unavoidable; if 
it cannot be used without destroying it, it should be replaced by an identical object; if 
that is impossible, an equivalent object should be made available; if that is also 
impossible, a proper compensation should be provided. 
In most cases, this principle is easy to apply. Consider once more the right to take 
the bus. After having arrived at the Whooping Shopping Centre, I might fancy blowing up 
the bus. Yet it is reasonable to suppose that others will want to use a bus, even that bus, 
for similar trips, and that their reasons for wanting to travel may well be at least as good 
as mine are for blowing it up. In private terms then, I should not destroy the bus after use; 
in distributive terms, I should not be given the right to destroy it after use. Of course, our 
using the bus destroys it bit-wise; there is a limited number of passengers it can carry and 
a limited number of miles it can cover before falling apart. As the next passenger's claim 
can be at least as good as the last one's, the bus has to be replaced by another or, if 
progress makes buses obsolete, by its modern equivalent. Part of the bus fare is - or 
should be - put aside for that purpose. The recycling principle slops being applicable, 
obviously, when (a) a right cannot be used without destroying il and replacement is 
impossible, or when (b) there will be no more claims to a certain right. There is no reason 
for the last living being in the universe to replace the last bite of bread it will ever take. 
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In the real world, the distribution of conditional and unconditional rights is 
hampered by the fact that circumstances and times are a'changin', which can give rise to 
the re-examination of a present distribution and ultimately to redistribution. A just social 
structure is, however, expected to safeguard legitimate and reasonable expectations, a 
purpose that seems to be at odds with the kind of principles described so far, principles 
that allow constant and immense redistributions. On the other hand: imagine a society 
satisfying these principles. One day the earth shakes. Numerous houses and possessions 
are destroyed, hundreds of people are hurt or ruined. We can safely assume that they 
badly need medicine, food, housing, and other basic needs. Given an otherwise unchanged 
social stock (that is, excluding supply-side solutions), how can we not answer these 
legitimate new needs and wants without repossessing rights from those who suffered less, 
thereby possibly endangering the stability of the social structure? 
In more general terms, the problem we face is that of redistribution as compensa-
tion for the (un)deserved (dis)advantages for or changes in plans of life. The aim of 
compensation can never be to restore a prior situation: bygones are by definition bygones. 
We can pay unemployment benefits or create new jobs, but we cannot undo the initial 
bitter experience of being sacked. And still less can we restore situations that never 
obtained, like being reborn with instead of without sight. Justice cannot undo injustice or 
misfortune. Compensation is, at best, an attempt to create a ceteris paribus approximation 
of the world in which some accident had not occurred. 
Now whether claims to compensation are in themselves legitimate - that is, 
disregarding for a moment the effects of compensation on stability - depends lo a large 
degree on the role responsibility plays in these claims. Our third principle holds recipients 
accountable for using or abusing opportunities, and, by not attributing responsibility for 
fate or fortune, it qualifies them for compensation in other cases. Thus, if people willingly 
and consciously choose to run a risk, the consequences might well be theirs and theirs 
alone, but if brute bad (or good) luck hits them compensation can be legitimate: we should 
see it as (mis)forlune that they do not deserve and that we did not deserve to miss. 
However, the distinction between choice and fate does not appear to be the whole 
truth about responsibility and compensation. Consider Cissy Roo, who jumps after a 
drowning child, saves it, but in doing so breaks a leg. Should she pay for her own 
crutches? Imagine the driver of bus 50 being drunk and running straight into Whooping 
Shopping Centre. The driver is injured through a fault of his own; the passengers are also 
injured, but their fate is not of their own making. Are we to treat the passengers and let 
the driver bleed to death? Or let us reverse the case: what if we are not dealing with bad 
but with good luck? Applying the same distinction in the same way, risk-lakers can keep 
whatever they win, but people who gain "though no good deed of their own" should lose 
their winnings. Imagine yourself buying two lottery tickets for £ 1 each (that is, making a 
risky investment). You keep one of the tickets for yourself, and give the other to your best 
friend. Both tickets turn out to be good for a prize of £ 50,000 - but only you can 
legitimately claim the £ 50,000; your friend loses everything or never even gets to see the 
money. Choice and fate, then, do not really seem to be - at least - the only intuitively 
relevant criteria for compensation. 
To accommodate our intuitions, we can of course introduce more and more subtle 
criteria. For instance: there is bad luck in a good cause, as when Cissy broke her leg, and 
bad luck in a bad cause, as when a burglar gets shot. Another possible distinction is that 
between taking risks while knowing that compensation awaiLs you, and doing the same 
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knowing there will or may be no compensation. Or we could try to measure responsibility 
by the degree of reversible or irreversible indoctrination by parents, teachers, social 
environment and peers. However, the finer the distinctions, the clearer it becomes that 
what we are doing is not simply determining the right to compensation by the kind of 
responsibility involved. We are also and primarily trying to justify or correct our intu­
itions, by comparing worlds with what we feel to be (mis)fortune to the ceteris paribus 
worlds with compensation. We compare these worlds by their moral quality, by their 
desirability in terms of our individual conceptions of the good. The reason why some of us 
will believe that Cissy should get free crutches is that she deserves them as part of a 
reward for her moral excellence; others will argue that Cissy's choice to save the child 
was unavoidable in view of her upbringing, so that her accident was undeserved and called 
for compensation; still others will maintain that Cissy is not entitled to free crutches 
(though everyone is free to pay them for her), because compensation schemes should not 
in any way invite or discourage the private initiative. To summarize: the way we distin­
guish and judge (ir)responsibility and (mis)fortune depends on our convictions regarding 
the good. 
The point of minimal justice, justice as impartiality, is to avoid such judgements as 
much as possible. It offers a minimal conception of the good precisely to escape the 
never-ending discussion on the good life. Responsibility does play a role in such a 
conception, but only in a formal sense and only in so far as further wants arc concerned. 
Compensation is implied by the principle for basic needs, which demands equal 
options for all, but not because of any form of responsibility or fate. If. through no fault 
of my own, I am born without a limb or lose one, and if this makes a difference for my 
options on a full life, the principle demands that I should be given the options that I 
would have had with a limb, even if this implies that I will get a larger piece of the basic 
needs cake. If the same happens to me because of a risk I took, or because of a conscious 
act of self-mutilation, I should still be "compensated". Regardless of the way in which I 
practice or betray my HIS-reasons, no government, no church committee, no judge and no 
meddlesome neighbour has any business with my conception of a full life as such. If we 
were to apply standards of responsibility to the distribution or redistribution of basic 
needs, a fundamental rule of impartiality would be violated: that of postponing judgement 
on HIS-reasons. 
In the sphere of further wants, the role of responsibility can only be formal. 
However we conceive of fate and fortune, they are not in themselves grounds of desert: 
neither good nor bad luck are deserved. The only reason for (re)distribulion that our 
principles allow is envy-containment. As for responsibility, we, as archpointers, have no 
means of determining when a risk is acceptable, when foolishness is absolvable, or when 
effects are excusable. We do not even have the certainly of an indubitable moral theory 
distinguishing good from bad luck. In short, as archpointers we cannot determine to which 
degree responsibility should make a difference for someone's share of the distributed 
rights - but we do know that responsibility can make a difference. The third principle 
formulated above takes account of responsibility in precisely this formal way: it demands 
that responsibility is taken seriously, that recipients are asked to account for every self-
inflicted change of plans, needs and wants, and for every consequent claim. Whether or 
not responsible behaviour should be rewarded and irresponsibility punished remains 
undetermined; being archpointers cannot help us there. 
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One more thing needs to be said about restrictions on the compensatory distribution 
of further wants: compensation has effects in two directions. Suppose that, because of a 
misfortune or because of a recognized right to compensation for the consequences of 
responsible behaviour, Cissy Roo deserves some kind of compensation. Other totally 
innocent recipients will then lose part of their, up to that moment established, rights to 
further wants. As this reduction of the means to lead the life they choose is not their own 
fault, they would in turn have - paradoxically - a similar right to compensation. 
Consequently, Cissy loses some of her gains, through no fault of her own, and deserves 
compensation. Etcetera. Even without repetitive compensation, compensation may clearly 
be counter-productive: it can lead to uncertainly about expectations, to disappointments, 
and it will ultimately create rather than contain envy. Envy-containment, as directed by 
our second principle, cannot be successful where the expectations it gives rise to are either 
deceptively certain or openly uncertain; it only works when it ensures the satisfaction of 
the expectations it legitimizes, and thus only generates reasonable expectations. The same 
is true for basic necessities: a government that could know that it promises more than it 
can give provokes unreasonable expectations. In both cases, a basic structure can only be 
just if its distribution rules are either certain and valid for a long term, or if they are 
explicitly incidental: 
(7) Distribution rules should not give rise to unreasonable expectations. 
As with other principles, this one will only work (i.e., be compatible with other 
principles) if recipients themselves are tolerant enough not to pose unreasonable (unsatisfi-
ablc) demands. 
Safeguarding legitimate expectations is not just a matter of the right distribution 
pattern or procedures, but also and foremost one of the right institutions. We want a really 
basic structure, one able to create and subsequently maintain distributive justice, one 
serving as a sound basis of expectations on which to build plans of life. Even if it cannot 
always or in all respects ensure that each person's basic needs are covered or that social 
peace is secure for all, a just social structure must at least ensure that its principles can be 
implemented as far as scarcity allows. This puts certain limits to the possible shape of 
social and political structures. We thus return to the issue of private and collective 
ownership. 
The bias in favour of private ownership, which we gave the benefit of the doubt in 
section 36, does not necessarily lead to a preference for commutative means (read: a free 
market structure) to the distributive ends of a social structure. The theory of justice as 
impartiality is underdetermincd in this respect. Its principles limit but do not fully 
determine the precise shape of a society - free market, collectivism, or anything in 
between. Unlike Rawls's theory, it does not bind us lo a market society with a corrective 
(patterning) stale or to a priority of liberty over equality. A collectivist society can be as 
minimally just as the U.S. The precise shape of society is more a mailer of political 
efficiency than of justice: it depends on given empirical conditions and on the values that 
a society should incorporate next to justice. (Compare in this context Charles Bcitz's 
(1979: 183) important distinction between moral and political structures.) We can very 
well imagine a libertarian society satisfying all human needs and wants simply on the 
basis of exchange and if necessary benevolence, provided the members of society arc the 
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right kind of people. However, in real life humans are not expected to always be honest, 
benevolent, sensitive, or even rational. They would be morally obliged to share some of 
their rights with others if the basic needs of others are urgent enough or if political 
necessity so requires, but moral obligations are not the same as moral actions. In itself, a 
libertarian society or any social system based primarily on exchanges between individual 
and groups is neither distributively just nor unjust - yet it is plainly not safe or basic 
enough to be just. In fact, it is not a basic structure at all, not even a safety-net that can be 
expected to catch the worst problems humans may experience on markets and in voluntary 
associations. 
Conversely, private property and property rights, freedom of trade and exchange, 
freedom of initiative and creativity, and commutative justice can exist but cannot be 
safeguarded without a distributive basic structure of society delineating and protecting a 
private sphere. Again, it is a matter of convention, of politics, and of political virtues other 
than justice how broad the domain and range of this private sphere will be. From the point 
of view of minimal justice, all we can say is that the actual composition of society is 
never for ever, and that, in so far as anything can be certain, individuals should be able to 
rely on the safest possible basis of expectations - laws, not humans: 
(8) The basic needs and further wants of recipients should be covered by a just social 
structure of distributive institutions, at least to the extent necessary for the protection 
of their options and the containment of envy. 
Section 45: Principles for recipients 
As remarked earlier, recipiency is a fuzzy concept. The principles of minimal 
justice described so far are all predicated on the existence of virtually identical recipients, 
human beings who share the same city, province, government and citizenship, and the 
same membership of the United Nations, the European Union, or other inter-state and 
international Institutions. But not all recipients of social justice are equal. To count as a 
recipient of social justice, certain criteria of moral relevancy had to be satisfied (see 
above. Chapter 7). In the first place, it must be possible to be subjected to (un)jusl 
treatment. A recipient must live, he or she must have something of a personal identity, and 
he or she must at least potentially have enough self-consciousness to experience pleasure 
and pain, harm and benefit. Sedation, coma or schizophrenia do not disqualify for 
recipiency; being literally a plant or being the one and only fictitious Natasha Rostov 
however, do - as far as we know. Autonomy and agency, or the capacity for making plans 
of life, are required for full recipiency, though not for recipiency as such: some animals 
are still in a way recipients of justice. Finally, to be a recipient of social justice one must 
be a member of a society - a structure of exploitable social relations - and one's fate must 
be partly in the hands of others, that is, some distributor(s) must be causally responsible 
for at least part of a recipient's circumstances. 
Most of these six criteria - life, existence, self-consciousness, agency and auton-
omy, membership, and responsibility on the side of a distributor - are easy to apply. If all 
of them obtain, one is a first-class recipient of social justice; if they do not, not. Compli-
cations arise, firstly, when two potential recipient are not members of the same society, 
that is, if different distributors carry responsibility for their welfare - in particular. 
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different local, regional, national or international governments. Secondly, animals are a 
problem: they lack self-consciousness, or at least the same degree of self-consciousness as 
humans, yet they are subjects of the distributors's responsibility. 
As to the degree of self-consciousness, let us assume that there are only two 
possibilities: a recipient either does or does not have the potential to make plans of life -
he, she or it is either a human or an animal. This overlooks the differences among animals 
in terms of sensitivity to pleasure and pain, but it serves well to bring out the basic issue: 
do we owe less justice to lesser recipients or should we give them full justice but a lower 
priority? 
Answering that the needs and wants of humans and animals are not the same will 
get us nowhere. Animals do have basic needs, of sorts. They share some of our needs, or 
they would not be like enough to be morally relevant. They even share with us a sense of 
further wants: cats and dogs can be quite choosy in their food preferences. In sofar as they 
have basic needs and further wants, their interests are relevant with regard to justice - they 
merely have less wants and therefore less need of justice. The real difference is in their 
interests themselves. Animals lack responsibility and reasons, and they lack full or 
extended plans of life. Their basic "reasons" hardly go beyond instinctive urges to eat, 
drink, avoid pain, save their skins, and procreate - as far as we know. This makes them 
also less sensitive to justice: denying basic needs to a human harms his interests now and 
in the future, whereas denying the needs of self-conscious animals harms them only for 
the limited time that it experiences (an equivalent of) harm. In a situation in which one of 
the two has to die, killing the animal is clearly less unjust - though still not ideal. A 
similar argument can be made with regard to the further wants of humans and animals: 
animals, one may suppose, suffer less when deprived of "luxury" than humans. We cannot 
say the same for a comparison between human wants and animal needs. Our conception of 
minimal justice cannot assign a priority here, as needs and wants are judged by different 
measures; the question must remain unresolved. Hence: 
(9) Needs and wants of recipients are to be given priority in proportion to their 
potential for making plans of life: the basic needs of humans have priority over the 
needs of self-conscious animals; the further wants of humans have priority over those 
of self-conscious animals. 
Responsibility for the quality of exploitable social relations poses a comparable 
problem: does distance diminish duly? A recipient is likely to be embedded in a whole 
series of social relations, local, regional, national and international. If one basic institution 
dodges its responsibility by neglecting the just distribution of what it is supposed to 
distribute, or if it cannot fulfil its tasks, the question rises whether another, unlike the first 
not directly responsible for that particular right, should interfere. It is an issue that 
emerges in the most diverse circumstances: in cases of civil war or massive famine, when 
a national government is no longer able to keep its citizens alive and international 
organizations are asked to rise to the occasion, as well as in cases of inequality on a local 
scale, when, due to differences in local taxes, the national rules for unemployment benefits 
make the jobless in some communities worse off than in others, and local governments are 
asked to compensate those affected. 
Fortunately, the problem is more of a political and administrative than of an ethical 
nature, and in so far as it is an ethical problem, it is one of just dispositions rather than 
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just procedures. What matters to the victim of injustice is that someone takes responsibil-
ity. If one distributor neglects the duties to which it is bound, say, if it refuses to pay the 
welfare benefits it promised, other basic institutions would in turn duck their responsibil-
ities if they had the means to intervene but did not. Still, there is a procedural aspect to 
the issue: a basic structure must be trustworthy, a sound basis of expectations. An anarchy 
of mutually unrelated institutions covering separate needs and wants - say, a collection of 
distribution agencies without a coordinating government - does not offer the kind of 
certainty demanded. Distributive justice would then depend on the incidental good will of 
agencies to lake up duties neglected by others, instead of on a reliable procedure agreed to 
and announced in advance. 
(10) In a just basic structure, institutions should together guarantee that each takes 
its responsibility for the just distribution of rights to their recipients. 
Section 46: Principles of minimal social justice 
The principles of minimal justice, in their proper priority order: 
I. (Was: 10) In a just basic structure, institutions should together guarantee that each takes 
its responsibility for the just distribution of rights to their recipients. 
II. (9) Needs and wants of recipients are to be given priority in proportion to their 
potential for making plans of life: the basic needs of humans have priority over the needs 
of self-conscious animals; the further wants of humans have priority over those of self-
conscious animals. 
III. (4) Each person's HIS-reasons are inviolable; no social institution is allowed to 
distribute or redistribute (rights to) this vital aspect of the self. 
IV. (5) Each person has an unconditional right to his or her natural endowments, in so far 
as these are essential to that person's full life, and an inalienable right to his or her other 
natural endowments; no social Institution is allowed to redistribute or limit rights to either. 
V. (8) The basic needs and further wants of recipients should be covered by a just social 
structure of distributive institutions, at least to the extent necessary for the protection of 
their options and the containment of envy. 
VI. (6) Conditional rights are to be distributed as rights, limited by a recycling principle: 
the object of a conditional right should not be destroyed unless that is unavoidable; if it 
cannot be used without destroying it, it should be replaced by an identical object; if that is 
impossible, an equivalent object should be made available; if that is also impossible, a 
proper compensation should be provided. 
VII. (7) Distribution rules should not give rise to unreasonable expectations. 
VIII. (1) Rights to basic necessities are to be distributed so as to give recipients equal 
options for a full life. Unavoidable inequalities should be as small as possible and should 
be randomly distributed, with an equal chance for all to win or lose. 
IX. (3) Rules for the distribution of rights to further wants must be compatible with the 
respect archpointers owe to recipients of justice. 
This principle excludes: distribution rules chosen without consideration of argu-
ments pro or con; rules based on logically fallacious arguments, on arguments 
inconsistent with the facts they refer to, and on arguments that are inconsistent 
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with or not supported by the moral theories in terms of which they are defended; 
rules presupposing responsibility for more or less than for what one is actually 
responsible; rules based on judgements on HIS-reasons; and rules that are incom-
patible with the principles of natural justice. 
X. (2) Rights to further wants are to be distributed according lo rules that minimize envy, 
first down to a level preventing the distributing institution from breaking down, after that 
down to a level at which no one prefers leaving this institution above slaying, and beyond 
that down lo a level at which the pursuit of plans of a complete life is minimally hindered. 
Throughout this part of the book, I have been engaged in designing principles that 
correspond to the conception of impartiality at the archpoint. However, section 25 also 
contained another lest for principles of justice: criteria for the output of the archpoint 
(Rl 1-16). I shall now consider whether our ten principles satisfy these criteria. 
Generality and universality pose no problems and hardly need further discussion. 
Publicity is satisfied in one respect (the principles do not require secret application, and 
with Rawls we may assume that ihey are public knowledge), but underdeveloped in 
another: Rawls claims that publicity should have "desirable effects", that is to say, it 
should incite individuals to behave in accordance with the principles for the basic 
institutions of society. I shall return to ihe question of justice as an individual virtue in the 
epilogue. Finality was already ensured at the beginning of part 2, where we distinguished 
minima] justice from communitarian justice as (by definition) the set of minimal require-
ments for the latter. The demand for an ordering of alternatives is nearly completely 
satisfied: we have given equal and inalienable rights to natural endowments, adequale 
decision rules for the distribution of basic needs and further wants, and priority rules for 
most of the claims of Ihe various kinds of recipients. One obvious difficulty remained 
unresolved: that of deciding between the needs of animals and the further wants of 
humans. Perhaps we should let convention decide on this. 
Simplicity may be another matter. I should of course leave this to the judgement of 
the reader, but being a reader myself, I think I may point to, and if possible explain, some 
of the major obstacles to simplicity, The set of principles outlined above contains at least 
four elements thai allow neither simple application nor simple comprehension. First of all, 
they assume the relevance of several differences between recipients. Things would be a lot 
easier if either only "normal" human beings with the same nationality were recipients and 
certain allowances had been made for animals and for international justice, or if the 
interests of every creature able lo experience were equally relevant. However, that is not 
the way the world looks from the archpoint. 
Secondly, things would have been simpler if there had not been so many kinds of 
rights and valid claims, and if those rights were not so ambiguously defined. Unfortunate-
ly, the logic of impartiality does not allow us to treat every right as being equally 
important, equally necessary, or interchangeable. 
Thirdly, the reader's life would have been simpler if we had not defined, as in fact 
we did, society and the basic social structure from the point of view of an individual in a 
modern world with its plentitude of governments and other distributive institutions. One 
state with one government and one level of government would indeed have allowed us to 
describe more clearly how a just basic structure should function and what virtues its 
preservation would demand of the average (that is, or would have been, every) citizen. But 
again, that is not how the world works. 
238 JUSTICE FROM A DISTANCE 
Fourthly and finally, all this makes it quite difficult to imagine what a just society 
should look like and how a distributor should implement the principles of minimal justice. 
This last complication asks for a more detailed answer. The principles together obviously 
form a patterned metric. Following Nozick, we would therefore expect it to be of a 
morally substantive type, allowing statements on the just society or the "just state of 
affairs" (cf. Miller 1976: 17-20), statements like "a just society is one in which every 
person has a guaranteed bundle of fundamental rights and (subjectively) enough wealth 
and every other means to live as he or she likes." Such statements are indeed possible, but 
they can never be so precise as to really represent a substantive ideal; beyond posing some 
limits to substantive ideals of society, the metric remains formal or, in Nozickean terms, 
procedural. It imposes side-constraints on the political freedom of society, allowing a 
broad range of private substantive ideals and ideal worlds, among which perhaps the one 
on which we all could or should, but as yet do not, agree. However, we do not need 
meticulously detailed models of just individuals in a just stale of affairs. Comparisons of 
things with their ideal shape (the perfectly oval world, the young Wittgenstein, Mozart on 
his death-bed) are of little use for the evaluation of the ways and methods chosen to reach 
a realistic goal - nor are they the kinds of comparisons we would want to make if we 
desired to remain impartial. From an impartial of view it is more sincere to compare, 
instead, procedural principles with actual conditions and developments, while at the same 
time respecting the individuals's freedom to form and practice their own view of the good. 
If it is difficult to evaluate justice, it will also be difficult to implement it. The 
greater the number of individuals, claims, and distributing institutions, the less we can be 
certain of the justice of a policy. All this is probably contrary to the desires of many 
policy makers, who would welcome universally applicable principles covering all aspects 
of life and generating distributions that are exactly just down to the fifth decimal. But 
precision is not necessarily a virtue in justice, nor in politics; justice is rather a craft or an 
art. Precision has its disadvantages. For one, it requires access to all sons of information, 
and information implies severe restrictions on privacy. The principles advanced here are 
based on the information recipients are willing to give. Precision, furthermore, denies the 
discursive and uncertain character of justice. If justice is α mean between too much and 
too little, the art of doing justice seems to be one of keeping the mean between arbitrarily 
throwing things at people and meticulously calculating their rations, an art of sailing 
between chance and fate. 
EPILOGUE 
Section 47: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly 
At the end of this book, I want to take some distance from its themes and discuss 
the theoretical and practical implications of justice as impartiality. I shall focus on three 
issues. Firstly, I want to address the Good: the contribution of this theory lo the liberal 
debate on social justice and to politics and the analysis of politics. Secondly, I shall turn 
its Bad aspects, the premises and suppositions that ought to be, but were not, defended or 
sustained. Thirdly, I shall discuss an Ugly aspect of the theory: the almost total absence of 
accounts of retributive justice, of communitarian justice, of justice as an individual virtue, 
and of the relation between social justice and other virtues of societies. 
The Good 
There are two types of liberalism in political philosophy. One is modest in its 
political ambitions and firm in its modesty. It - let us call it moral liberalism - claims no 
knowledge of an ultimate truth, it recognizes and affirms moral pluralism, and it pays 
allegiance to one principle only: that we should each, as well as possible, find salvation in 
our own way and after our own taste. The other type, political liberalism, is slightly 
schizoid: it professes the same formal political principle as moral liberalism, yet it is at the 
same time deeply committed to substantive ideals like liberty, equality and occasionally 
fraternity. Unlike moral liberalism, it has a view of the good life, albeit one that accepts 
and mostly affirms moral pluralism. Moral liberalism is liberalism in its original form; 
political liberalism is its modem offspring, the dominant way of thinking in the debate on 
liberal social justice. 
Moral liberalism is perfectly compatible with the idea of justice. If justice demands 
that we give each person his or her due, a moral liberal will point out that the (physically) 
same reward or penalty may mean different things to different people, as their views of 
use, value, worth and, in general, the good life diverge. A true stoic will not be impressed 
by medals and honours, a true utilitarian will be less affected by them in a capitalist than 
in a feudal society, and the same person who feels deeply honoured by her first medal 
may care less about every next decoration. Thus, and still according to moral liberalism, if 
a society is to be just and practice justice, it should take account of these differences and 
be impartial - or as impartial as possible - with regard to all theories of the good. It should 
be guided first of all by a minimal rather than a communitarian theory of justice. 
Political liberalism, on the other hand, has problems with impartiality. In its 
incarnations as theories of justice it often - and often unconsciously - contains substantive 
ethical ideals and ideas in the form of "thin" theories of the good, of assumptions about 
rational behaviour, or of postulates regarding the overall importance of equality and 
political liberty. As I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, one cannot serve two masters: either 
impartiality has to give way to substantive notions of the good, or impartiality has to take 
precedence at the expense of "higher" - but in moral liberal eyes ultimately unsustainable -
values. 
In the preceding chapters, I have offered a view of social justice that slays closer 
to moral liberalism than modern theories of liberal social justice lend to. The attempt to 
lake impartiality seriously led us to two important results: a new conception of impartiality 
and, as a result, a relatively unpretentious theory of distributive justice. 
With the conceptions of impartiality and of an impartial point of view developed in 
Part II, I intended to avoid (at least most of) the foundational problems of political 
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liberalism sketched above. The notion of HIS-reasons is central to this conception of 
impartiality. It allowed us to fruitfully combine uncompromising impartiality regarding the 
fundamental aims and ends of an individual's life (the plan of a full life) with flexibility 
towards ways and means (the plan of a complete life). Hence, our conception of impartial-
ity does not sacrifice respect for other people and their views to scepticism and - ultimate-
ly - indifference. At the same time it does not make theories of the good sacrosanct. It 
does not prohibit critique, nor a public examination of the legitimacy of rights, claims to 
rights and the use of rights. All it does is scrap one imaginable topic from the agenda of 
the public debate, HIS-reasons, a topic for which no standards of truth or worth are 
available. 
As to the resulting theory of distributive justice, one cannot say that it is generally 
characterized by stringent criteria for just and unjust distribution, by sweeping statements 
condemning existing unjust practices, or by ambitious schemes for society-wide and 
world-wide (re)distribulions of wealth, opportunity and happiness. It was not my intention 
to describe the ultimately just society or the liberal utopia (pace Rawls 1971: 288). Indeed, 
we found that adherence to impartiality made it impossible to formulate criteria for the 
good, better or best society. I argued instead that apart from certain basic rights required 
for the full life, everything flows. Nearly all rights are conditional, nearly all actual 
allocations of rights are temporary, nearly all distribution procedures are provisional, and 
nearly all the institutions of a just society are conlingent. I did, nevertheless, try to provide 
some clue for correctly affixing the adjective "just" to chance and development: the ten 
principles listed in the last chapter. In communitarian societies - in sofar as our societies 
are communitarian societies - convention may rule. Every change, every distribution of 
conditional rights in a community is just as long as it is allowed by those ten principles. 
In pluralistic societies - in sofar as our societies are pluralistic - compromise rules, again 
within the borders set by the principles of minimal justice. In the latter case our theory 
obliges us to use phrases like justice and injustice more sparingly. Claims regarding 
further wants in pluralistic societies are not by definition inspired by a shared, even if 
partial, ideal of the just society. Where they arc not, where they are inspired by private 
convictions, morally and politically controversial convictions, they cannot be defended as 
"just" or as answers to "injustice", except rhetorically. A decision on their legitimacy 
cannot be based on a recognition of the intrinsic value of the claim; it is merely the result 
of pure politics. 
The Bad 
The theory of justice sketched in this book leaves numerous fundamental questions 
unresolved or unasked. Some of these are simply loo complex and too remotely related to 
the theme of justice to be dealt with here. All I can do is admit this, and that only for a 
selection of the shortcomings I myself find in the text. In the last chapter, for instance, I 
assumed that the basic needs of humans can be compared to the needs of animals. This 
was one of several occasions on which the issue of intersubjcclive (inter-human, inter-
cultural, inter-species) understanding surfaced, an issue that, to be properly addressed, 
would require a long journey into epistemology. 
Another issue that deserves more attention than I can give it here is the conception 
of the self that would be required to sustain our theses on the moral relevance of HIS-
reasons, on the designation of recipients, and on the existence of inviolable rights to 
natural endowments. Perhaps alternative theories of the self could fit our framework 
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equally well, but I chose to rely on the Parfitian conception of the self (implicitly in 
Chapter 4 and explicitly in Chapters 7 and 8). According to Parfit, the (morally relevant 
aspect of the) self is "relation-R", conscious connectedness to prior remembrances, 
whatever the cause of the connection may be. If the chain of remembrances is cut (e.g., if 
I become senile and start to appreciate soccer), a new self, a new personality has come 
into existence and an old one has ceased to exist. Parfit's conception is plausible partly 
because competing conceptions are not: physical continuity, psychological continuity, and 
the supposition of a "deep further fact", an essence of self below the surface of attributes 
can all be refuted. To be completely plausible, relalion-R should be defensible in its own 
right, which I believe it is - mostly. Yet I still believe, because of the way that I may be 
remembered by others, that I would rather really die than start to like soccer. 
Thirdly, we could have spent more time considering in which way rather than how 
and for which reasons (un)equals should be treated (un)equally: which political institutions 
are required and where do market forces come in? After all, how convincing a theory of 
social justice is does not depend on its consistency and rationality only but also on its 
practicability. The question may be politically relevant, and as such philosophically 
relevant, but I nevertheless had to decide that it was not directly relevant to a purely 
theoretical discussion of justice.101 The principles developed here, and the environment 
from which they originated, should be what justice is: "free of change, forever and entirely 
pure" (see section 27). Their strength lies first of all in their critical potential, in their 
capacity to judge existing practices and compare them - not with an ideal, which would 
require a True View of the good life, but with the opinions of disinterested, impartial 
beings with human faculties and a human consciousness. Justice as impartiality offers 
ways to interpret and change the world, and its application may in turn prompt us to 
calibrate the theory, but it cannot point the way to anywhere. 
The Ugly 
A genuinely complete theory of justice would give principles for retributive as well 
as distributive justice, it would account for communitarian justice as well as for minimal 
justice, and It would discuss justice as a virtue of Individuals as well as social Justice. Our 
treatise of justice as impartiality begot a theory about minimal distributive social justice 
only. The theory is adequate to its purpose - that of laying down principles of justice for 
pluralistic societies - but it remains ugly without the rest. Again, I can only admit the 
shortcomings and indicate the direction in which answers might be found. 
Basic structures have no life or mind of their own. They cannot be just unless they 
practice justice, and they cannot practice justice unless the individuals running the 
institutions or claiming shares from them act justly. Hence, a conception of a just structure 
of society needs to be accompanied by one of individual justice, of citizenship and, as the 
feminist critique of social justice has shown (e.g. Kearns 1983: 36), one of justice in the 
family. We perhaps do not have to demand more of our claiming and distributing citizens 
than accommodation to the principles of minimal justice - with Rawls, we may trust or 
even assume that a just basic structure will mobilize its own support, and that a good 
education and socialization will temper whatever contrary inclinations people may have. It 
is an optimistic view of human perfectibility, but even if it turns out to be untrue the 
I have addressed one such practical issue, Ihe place lhat foreigners have in a metric of social Justice 
relative to citizens, elsewhere; see Wissenburg 1994. 
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blame should not necessarily be put on the theory. There are limits to the kinds of 
behaviour any moral theory can tolerate. 
Secondly, justice cannot be practised solely on the basis of the principles of 
minimal justice. They only offer the outlines of a just society; society itself has to fill in 
the empty spaces. Sometimes a society does so unanimously or apparently unanimously. 
Here communitarian justice, a sincere consensus on the good, and minimal justice, 
demanding envy-containment, coincide. Sometimes however, a society deviates from 
minimal justice, apparently with full consent of all its members. The age-old and world­
wide discrimination of women or the apartheid system in South-Africa were (often) 
defended that way: it was argued that women and blacks themselves assented to the 
"natural" distribution of rights, and of course that dissenters were blind to these facts. In 
the Soviet Union, similar "weakness of the brain" where the truths of Marxism-Leninism 
were concerned made dissenters end up in similar places: in "internal exile" or in 
psychiatric hospitals, prisons and graves. Obviously - it is not worth more words - full 
consent was lacking in these cases. Yet even if there had been consent, a deviation from 
minimal justice in the name of community values cannot be fundamentally just. If you 
cannot justify your society's acts to an archpoinler, they cannot be justified in all possible 
societies; if they are, from an impartial point of view, unjust in some societies, they 
cannot be totally just. Whatever precise shape we give to justice in concrete societies, 
even in communities, must be compatible with minimal justice. Still, not all deviations are 
necessarily unjust. A "society" of happy anarchists without any basic structure or a 
communitarian caste society without a just basic structure are not unjust - provided that 
they are prepared to become minimally just societies covering the basic needs of its 
members, should the communitarian consensus break down one day. 
Thirdly, a complete set of principles of justice is expected to include principles for 
fair prices and fair punishments. In this case, the subject is so far removed from that of 
social justice that we need say little more than the obvious, namely that principles of 
retributive and minimal justice ought to be compatible. Whether a society is basically just 
is not a matter of retributive justice. It does not depend on whether, how and how good it 
punishes Individual criminals, nor on what happens between consenting and responsible 
adults, but on how well it protects the innocent and powerless. 
Finally, as justice is not the only virtue that we may desire in a society, minimal 
justice should also be related to other virtues like stability, compassion, perfection, liberty, 
equality, privacy, solidarity and tolerance. Justice is an advancement over a state of 
perpetual prédation, but for a society to prosper we need more than justice and at least 
more than minimal justice. A society that limits itself to the tasks of providing basic needs 
and keeping the peace offers little more than a relatively permanent cease-fire - it is 
morally frigid. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Rechtvaardigheid van een Afstand: 
een schets van een liberale theorie van sociale rechtvaardigheid 
Sinds het begin van de jaren '70 woedt vooraJ in de Angelsaksisch georiënteerde 
politieke filosofie een breed debat over sociale rechtvaardigheid, waarbij de agenda in 
hoge mate bepaald wordt door de thema's die John Rawls in zijn A Theory of Justice 
(1971) aansneed. In deze dissertatie. Justice from a Distance, die een reactie vormt op dit 
debat, poog ik nieuwe principes van sociale rechtvaardigheid te formuleren en te verant-
woorden. Sociale rechtvaardigheid wordt hierbij begrepen als verdelende ofwel distributie-
ve rechtvaardigheid ten aanzien van alle zaken (rechten en plichten, voor- en nadelen, 
goederen en lasten) die in een maatschappij verdeeld kunnen worden. 
In Deel I, Hoofdstuk 1 introduceer ik een aantal kernbegrippen uit de theorie van 
de rechtvaardigheid: de betekenis van rechtvaardigheid in relatie tot het moraliteit, het 
juiste, het goede, en rationaliteit; het onderscheid tussen verdelende en vereffenende 
rechtvaardigheid (commutative justice); en andere, aan Aristoteles en Thomas Aquinas 
ontleende, vormen van rechtvaardigheid. Ik betoog vervolgens dat de in het huidige 
politiek-theoretische debat gangbare conceptie van sociale rechtvaardigheid een liberale 
conceptie is die sociale rechtvaardigheid als verdelende rechtvaardigheid begrijpt. Ik 
vergelijk deze benadering met een orthodox-Thomistische begrip van sociale rechtvaardig-
heid waarin de onderlinge verhouding tussen de leden van een samenleving (algemene 
rechtvaardigheid) centraal staat, en met een utopische benadering, waarin sociale recht-
vaardigheid zowel distributieve als algemene rechtvaardigheid betekent. Hel hoofdstuk 
wordt besloten met een korte beschouwing over de sociale, wetenschappelijke en filosofi-
sche invloeden op het onderhavige debat, en een verdediging van de keuze voor hel 
liberale paradigma. 
Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt zeven elementen (normen of idealen) die enerzijds kenmer-
kend zijn voor de rechlvaardigheidsconceptie van de voornaamste deelnemers aan het 
debat (waardoor het mogelijk is van één debat en één conceptie te spreken), terwijl ze 
anderzijds het debat tol een specifiek liberaal debat maken. Van deze idealen is de 
voornaamste onpartijdigheid of neutraliteit; de andere zijn vrijheid, gelijkheid en broeder-
schap (alle in een zeer ruime betekenis), rationaliteit, rechtvaardigheid begrepen als 
"gelijken gelijk behandelen" en eerlijkheid (fairness) begrepen als "elk het zijne geven". 
Het begrip onpartijdigheid wordt op twee wijzen toegepast: zowel ten aanzien van de 
verschillende visies op hel goede die burgers in een pluriforme maatschappij aanhangen, 
als met betrekking tot de vooronderstellingen over het goede die in (de verantwoording 
van) principes van sociale rechtvaardigheid gemaakt mogen worden. De meest fundamen-
tele vraagstukken in het liberale debat over sociale rechtvaardigheid zijn dan ook: hoe 
kunnen principes van rechtvaardigheid op onpartijdige wijze gerechtvaardigd worden? en 
vervolgens: hoe zien onpartijdige principes van rechtvaardigheid eruit? Deze vragen 
vormen de uitgangspunten van respectievelijk Deel II en Deel III van mijn dissertatie. 
In Deel II, Hoofdstuk 3 betoog ik dat, uitgaande van de onmogelijkheid van een 
gefundeerde consensus over het goede, een liberale conceptie van rechtvaardigheid in de 
eerste plaats minimaal zal moeten zijn, wat wil zeggen dat het ontbreken van die consen-
sus tot uitgangspunt moet nemen. Verder moet ze consistent zijn met de principes die uit 
een puur formeel begrip van rechtvaardigheid voortvloeien: gelijken gelijk behandelen en 
ongelijken in proportie tot hun ongelijkheid, en elk het zijne geven. Ten slotte dienen 
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"communitaire" opvattingen van rechtvaardigheid (communitarian justice), gekenmerkt 
door een feitelijke consensus over het goede, ondergeschikt te zijn aan (en dus verenigbaar 
met) de principes van minimale rechtvaardigheid. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 wend ik mij tot de vraag hoe een zogeheten Archimedisch punt 
(archpoint) geformuleerd kan worden, een universeel geldige onpartijdige procedure voor 
het ontwerpen en verantwoorden van even universele en onpartijdige principes van 
rechtvaardigheid. Zo een onpartijdige uitgangspositie mag geen verwijzing naar de - niet 
onpartijdig te bepalen - waarde van concrete goederen en doelen bevallen; ze moet zuiver 
formeel zijn. Wanneer we nu alle inhoudelijke (en daarmee cultuur- of persoonsgebonden) 
middelen en doelen wegdenken, resteert enkel de structuur van de redenen voor het 
menselijk handelen. We moeten wel veronderstellen dat er een zekere structuur in deze 
motieven zit, dat redenen voor handelen te herleiden zijn tot diepere fundamentele 
redenen, willen we niet tot de vreemde conclusie komen dat het menselijk handelen 
uiteindelijk door willekeur of door externe invloeden bepaald wordt - een conclusie die het 
zinloos maakt te spreken over zaken als verantwoordelijkheid, ethiek, of respect voor het 
individu. 
Er is geen reden onpartijdig te zijn jegens de meeste handelingsmotieven: sommige 
kunnen worden bekritiseerd op empirische gronden, andere vanwege incompalibiliteit met 
hogere principes. Handelingsmotieven die echter niet tot andere te herleiden zijn, die niet 
verder te verantwoorden zijn, en die de kwaliteit van handelen omschrijven in plaats van 
het doel (men kan denken aan deugden en categorische imperatieven), zijn evenwel niet 
legitiem kriliseerbaar - precies omdat er geen "hogere" morele standaard is waarmee we ze 
kunnen beoordelen. Ik noem dergelijke redenen HlS-reasons: Неге I Stand, hier sta ik, ik 
kan niet anders. Iemands set van HlS-reasons noem ik, bij gebrek aan een betere term, een 
"plan voor een vol leven"; deze set vormt de kern van het "uitgebreide" of "complete" 
levensplan. 
Hoofdstuk 4 besluit ik met een overzicht van de mogelijke vormen waarin 
onpartijdigheid jegens HlS-reasons gepresenteerd kan worden. Ik kies daar voor het 
Rawlsiaanse model van de contracttheorie, een model dat in Hoofdstuk 5 nader wordt 
Ingevuld. Hier beargumenteer Ik dat de contractanten of "archpointers" mogen beschikken 
over alle denkbare informatie op alle denkbare terreinen, van geschiedenis en psychologie 
tot techniek, inclusief kennis over hun eigen capaciteiten en positie in een toekomstige 
maatschappij, mits zij ten minste op de hoogte zijn van de zogeheten condities van 
rechtvaardigheid. Een van deze condities (die overigens veelal varianten zijn op Rawls' 
"circumstances of justice") is de vereiste dat archpointers correct gemotiveerd zijn. Om 
hun onpartijdigheid te garanderen, zelfs wanneer zij op de hoogte zijn van alle voor- en 
nadelen van hun werkelijke talenten en maatschappelijke positie, dient hun motivatie er 
een van pure intellectuele belangstelling voor het probleem van de sociale rechtvaardigheid 
te zijn. In Hoofdstuk 6, dat opent met een samenvatting van de criteria voor een onpartij­
dig oordeel, beschrijf ik twee fictieve invullingen van het idee van een onpartijdige 
contract. In de ene, de "final position" (laatste positie), worden een aantal vrijwel even 
rationele en goed geïnformeerde individuen aan het einde der tijden gesitueerd, waar zij 
het vraagstuk van de rechtvaardigheid bespreken; in de andere illustratie, Philadelphia, 
buigt een tijdelijk geïsoleerde groep vrienden zich over dezelfde vraag. 
Nadat in Deel II de voorwaarden voor een onpartijdige verantwoording van 
beginselen van rechtvaardigheid zijn geformuleerd, worden deze principes zelf in Deel III 
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stap voor stap ontworpen. Als eerste element van deze "metriek" van rechtvaardigheid 
bespreek ik in Hoofdstuk 7 de vraag wie "ontvangers" (recipients) van sociale rechtvaar­
digheid kunnen zijn. Ik wijk daarmee af van de onder liberale theoretici van rechtvaardig­
heid veelvoorkomende gewoonte om een gesloten, zelfverzorgende samenleving van 
onderling niet te zeer verschillende mensen te vooronderstellen. In plaats daarvan 
formuleer ik een aantal criteria op basis waarvan de status van ontvanger toegekend moet 
worden: bestaan, leven, bewustzijn, het vermogen tot autonoom handelen, verantwoorde­
lijkheid van een verdelende instantie voor het lot van een mogelijke recipient, en lidmaat­
schap van еел "maatschappij" - waarbij het begrip maatschappij een rekkelijke betekenis 
krijgt. Op basis van deze criteria kan en mag de werking van principes van sociale 
rechtvaardigheid niet beperkt worden tot de burgers van één staat Onder omstandigheden 
kunnen ook vreemdelingen en burgers van en in andere stalen deel uitmaken van dezelfde 
"maatschappij" en als zodanig legitieme aanspraken hebben op het maatschappelijk 
produkt. Tot op zekere hoogte (zij ontberen, naar we aannemen, het vermogen tot 
autonoom handelen) strekt de werking van rechtvaardigheidsbeginselen zich ook uit tot 
dieren. Toekomstige generaties daarentegen kunnen, hoe moreel relevant hun belangen ook 
mogen zijn, geen ontvangers van sociale rechtvaardigheid zijn; zij voldoen niet aan de 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde "bestaan": Dit neemt overigens niet weg dat de te formuleren 
principes van rechtvaardigheid hun belangen indirect wel degelijk beschermen. 
Vervolgens, in Hoofdstuk 8, wend ik mij tot de vraag wat nu precies de zaken zijn 
die onderwerp zijn van rechtvaardige verdeling: welke goederen en vrijheden mogen door 
en in een maatschappij verdeeld worden, en welke niet? Gemakshalve val ik alle mogelijk 
verdeelbare zaken onder één begrip: (morele) rechten, een begrip waarvoor ik de definitie 
deels ontleen aan de deontische logica. Ik onderscheid vervolgens vier sferen van rechten. 
Een eerste sfeer is die van de rechten die principieel niet verdeeld mogen worden: het 
menselijk "zelf is, althans HIS-reasons zijn, niet kunstmatig te onteigenen of toe te 
delen - niet zonder de criteria van onpartijdigheid te schenden. In de tweede plaats zijn er 
zaken waarop men een onvoorwaardelijk recht heeft: de aangeboren talenten (of gebreken), 
zeker voor zover deze noodzakelijk zijn voor de verwerkelijking van HIS-reasons. Hierbij 
kan gedacht worden aan het leven zelf, aan de mogelijkheid zich te verplaatsen, of aan de 
zintuigen. Een neutrale theorie van rechtvaardigheid kan onder geen enkele omstandigheid 
toestaan dat een overheid impliciet oordeelt over de waarde van levensovertuigingen, wat 
wel het geval zou zijn als, bij voorbeeld, gezonde burgers werden verplicht op het moment 
- elk moment - dat de staat dat nodig vindt hun hart af te staan voor transplantatie. 
Een derde sfeer is die van de voorwaardelijke rechten, en precies deze rechten zijn 
het onderwerp van verdelende rechtvaardigheid. De erkenning van aanspraken op 
dergelijke rechten resulteert in een bezitsrecht-onder-voorwaarden, dat wil zeggen: er 
moeten redenen worden gegeven voor de aanspraak op, de toedeling van, en het gebruik 
van - bij voorbeeld - de belastingplicht of rechten op een aanvullende uitkering of 
bijzondere medicijnen. (Een maatschappij kan overigens ook afzien van het erkennen en 
verdelen van voorwaardelijke rechten, en daarmee een interventie-vrije sfeer, de vrije 
markt, creeïen.) Aangezien de objecten van voorwaardelijke rechten schaarse goederen 
zijn, en aangezien het recht slechts geldt indien en zolang er betere redenen zijn voor de 
actuele verdeling en legen herverdeling, kan één type rechten (de vierde sfeer) niet worden 
verdeeld: rechten om objecten van rechten te vernietigen wanneer dat te vermijden is. De 
beoordeling van goede redenen is immers voorlopig. Wanneer nieuwe informatie leert dat 
anderen ook, en zelfs betere, redenen hebben om, pakweg, de laatste zitplaats in een bus te 
SAMENVATTING 253 
bezetten, dan moet het eerdere oordeel herzien worden. Via deze omweg kunnen ook de 
belangen van toekomstige generaties gegarandeerd worden. 
Binnen de sfeer van voorwaardelijke rechten kan een verder onderscheid gemaakt 
worden tussen rechten op fundamentele behoeften (basic needs) en rechten op verdere 
wensen (further wants). Rechten op fundamentele behoeften worden gedefinieerd als 
rechten op de mogelijkheden en externe middelen die noodzakelijk zijn om een plan voor 
een vol leven te realiseren; rechten op verdere wensen zijn alle verdere rechten. In 
Hoofdstuk 9 bespreek ik de maatstaven (equalisanda) die bij de verdeling van beide 
categorieën rechten van toepassing zijn. Gegeven het uitgangspunt dal onpartijdigheid 
neerkomt op gelijk respect voor HlS-reasons, dienen rechten op fundamentele behoeften 
gelijk verdeeld te worden. Het criterium voor gelijkheid in deze is gelijkheid van opties: 
om te voorkomen dat zulke rechten louter formele rechten blijven, moeien niet alleen de 
middelen maar ook de mogelijkheden (gezamenlijk: opties) voor de realisatie van HIS-
reasons gelijkelijk beschikbaar zijn. 
Rechten op verdere wensen laten zich per definitie niet vergelijken in termen van 
opties. Ze zijn evenmin meetbaar met maten die een bepaalde waarde aan deze rechten op 
zich toekennen - zo'n waardering is niet verenigbaar met de criteria van onpartijdigheid. 
De maatstaf die ik voor deze categorie rechten voorstel houdt verband met het effect dat 
hun verdeling indirect, namelijk als bron van sociale conflicten en onrust, kan hebben op 
de verzorging van fundamentele behoeften: beheersing van afgunst (envy-containment). 
Afgunst is slechts een pars pro toto label voor alle mogelijke redenen en oorzaken voor 
sociale conflicten; de oorzaak kan evengoed een op zich prijzenswaardig motief zijn. Als 
maatstaf laat beheersing van afgunst volop ruimte voor culturele en interpersoonlijke 
verschillen van inzicht over het goede leven en criteria voor de erkenning van aanspraken. 
In Hoofdstuk 10 zet ik de thesen uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken om in 10 
principes van "minimale" (zie Hoofdstuk 3) sociale rechtvaardigheid. Deze principes 
brengen onder meer een gedeeltelijke rangorde aan in de aanspraken van mensen en dieren 
(de behoeften van mensen gaan voor die van dieren; de wensen van de eersten voor die 
van de tweeden), en een rangorde in de bescherming en/of verdeling van rechten (de 
bescherming van "onverdeelbare" en onschendbare rechten gaat voor de bescherming van 
voorwaardelijke rechten; de verdeling van voorwaardelijke rechten is onderworpen aan het 
recycling-principe; fundamentele behoeften gaan voor verdere wensen). Verder beschrijven 
ze de criteria voor een rechtvaardige verdeling van rechten op fundamentele behoeften 
(gelijkheid van opties) en verdere wensen (minimalisering van afgunst) - waarbij ook 
enige criteria voor de legitimiteit van aanspraken op verdere wensen beschreven worden 
(onder meer logische en empirische consistentie, het niet onredelijk aanrekenen van 
verantwoordelijkheid, het niet oordelen over HlS-reasons, en - uiteraard - gelijke behande-
ling van gelijke gevallen). Verdere principes omschrijven enige taken van maatschappelij-
ke instituties: zij mogen geen aanleiding geven tot onredelijke verwachtingen, en ze dragen 
gezamenlijk de verantwoordelijkheid voor een rechtvaardige verdeling van rechten. Een 
laatste principe onderscheidt ten slotte de sfeer van verdelende rechtvaardigheid van die 
der commutatieve rechtvaardigheid (lees: de vrije markt): een maatschappij kan pas sociaal 
rechtvaardig heten wanneer zij een stelsel van instituties (een "basic structure") omvat die 
ten minste de beheersing van afgunst en de rechtvaardige verdeling van rechten op 
fundamentele behoeften kan garanderen. 
In de epiloog bespreek ik kort de sterkten en gebreken van de hier gepresenteerde 
theorie van sociale rechtvaardigheid. Ik constateer daar dat voor veel verwante thema's 
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(zoals commutatieve en communitaire rechtvaardigheid, en rechtvaardigheid als deugd van 
individuen, burgers en families) verder onderzoek nodig is. Tot de sterke punten reken ik 
onder meer de strikte interpretatie van het begrip onpartijdigheid ten aanzien van HIS-
reasons, een interpretatie die recht doet aan de oorspronkelijke bedoeling van het liberalis-
me een kader te scheppen voor een tolerante samenleving waarin "jeder auf sein Façon 
selig werden kann". 
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Stellingen behorend bij het proefschrift Justice from a Distance van M.LJ. Wissenburg 
I. In John Rawls' tbeone van rechtvaardigheid wordt verondersteld dat rationele wezens steeds meer 
primaire sociale goederen willen hebben, ongeacht de wijze waarop zij aan deze goederen komen 
De theorie is m dit opzicht puur consequentialistisch en daarom met onpartijdig jegens alle redelijke 
levensplannen 
John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Oxford ¡971, ρ 92 
2 Het feit dat m John Rawls' theone van rechtvaardigheid bij de overgang van de algemene naar de 
speciale conceptie van rechtvaardigheid politieke vrijheid ineens ophoudt uitwisselbaar te zijn tegen 
economische voordelen suggereert dat er een hoger goed bestaat dan bet bezit van primaire sociale 
goederen in dienst van een rationeel levensplan. 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Oxford 1971, p. 62 
3 Volgens Rawls' Political Liberalism wordt een overlappende consensus tussen "reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines" over de rechtvaardige samenleving mede mogelijk door het accepteren van 
de "burdens of reason" Daarmee vooronderstelt Rawls de conclusie, namelijk een liberale attitude 
ten aanzien van morele kwesties De "burdens of reason" zijn daarom ook onverenigbaar met elk 
geloof m een ethische waarheid die kenbaar is ondanks alle menselijke beperkingen en alle "burdens 
of reason" 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism. New York 1993, p. 54 ff., 169 ff. 
4. Het feit dat "prikkels" (incentives) op zich met sociaal rechtvaardig zijn wil niet zeggen dat ze niet 
lot een rechtvaardiger verdeling van welvaart kunnen leiden. In een door moreel onvolmaakte 
wezens bevolkte wereld kan hun toepassing daarom met voorshands afgewezen worden. 
S Robert Nozicks aangepaste versie van het Lockeaanse proviso laat het ontstaan van natuurlijke 
rechten op pnvé-bezit alleen toe óf m een wereld van overvloed, óf m een tot duurzame overvloed 
"recyclebare" wereld. 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia. New York 1974, p. 176 ff 
6. Voor een libertair bestaat het gevaar van eigenrichting daann, dat mensen het onrecht m eigen hand 
nemen. 
7. Het grootste bezwaar legen Michael Walzers conceptie van complexe gelijkheid is niet het 
mogelijke bestaan van mensen die m al zijn sferen winnaars zijn en daardoor domineren, maar dat 
van mensen die in alle sferen hooguit middelmatig scoren en daardoor gedomineerd worden. 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. New York 1983. p. 20 
8. De boetes die de overheid oplegt zouden eigenlijk aflaten moeten heten- van boetedoening is immers 
geen sprake, van voorkoming van verdere vervolging daarentegen wel. 
9. Gezien de voortgaande secularisering en ontzuiling van de Nederlandse samenleving wordt het 
onpartijdig ondersteunen van religieuze en zuilorgamsaties steeds duidelijker een vorm van 
bevoordeling van bepaalde levensovertuigingen. 
10 Een salaris is per definiue rechtvaardig wanneer men mei meer verdient dan men verdient 
II. In het belang van een voor alle gekwalificeerdcn gelijke toegang tot de promotie dient het dure 
Nederlandse promotiesysteem te worden afgeschaft en vervangen door procedures naar bij voorbeeld 
Engels of Amerikaans model 
12. Men wordt assistent of onderzoeker in opleiding om uiteenlopende redenen, men houdt het alleen 
vol uit roeping of plichtsgevoel. 



